ORDER Mr. A. Baskar, learned counsel for the respondents, takes notice on behalf of the respondents. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing, for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. This writ petition is filed challenging the impugned order of the first respondent dated 15.2.2006, under which, the registration of petitioner as a contractor under the first respondent was cancelled on the basis of the enquiry conducted in respect of certain charges framed against the petitioner, in respect of the event, which took place on 21.4.2001, relating to the work of picking up of stones, lump coal and other foreign materials, manually, from the running conveyors and transporting the same to the respective yard. As there was some breach committed by the petitioner, his contract was terminated on 3.10.2001. When a claim was made by the petitioner for a sum of Rs.67,600/- as if the petitioner had transported the materials as contractor, a charge was levelled against him, saying that without transporting any materials, the petitioner made a false claim and according to the first respondent, the receipt of the claim was a fraudulent one. 4. Earlier, for the same charge, an order was passed by the second respondent on 30.10.2001, debarring the petitioner from participating in the tender called by the respondent Board, for a period of one year, against which the petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 23594 of 2001 and this Court by an order dated 30.11.2001, set aside the said order and remitted the matter back to the Superintending Engineer, Mechanical-1, Tuticorin Thermal Power Station, Tuticorin for a fresh enquiry, after giving opportunity for both parties. 5. Thereafter, another order came to be passed by the Superintending Engineer, Purchase and Administration (in-charge), Tuticorin Thermal Power Station, Tuticorin on 29.5.2002, black-listing the petitioner again for a period of one year. That order was also challenged before this Court in W.P. No. 20482 of 2002. This Court by an order dated 1.8.2002, set aside the said order and directed the respondents to complete the enquiry without being influenced by any observation made in the earlier impugned order dated 29.5.2002. Thereafter, the respondents passed another order on 20.6.2003, debarring the petitioner from participating in future tenders being called for by the respondent Board for a period of one year. That order was also challenged before this Court in W.P. No. 18380 of 2003. Thereafter, the respondents passed another order on 20.6.2003, debarring the petitioner from participating in future tenders being called for by the respondent Board for a period of one year. That order was also challenged before this Court in W.P. No. 18380 of 2003. By an order dated 24.9.2003, the said order was also set aside and this Court directed the respondents to conduct a full-fledged enquiry with reference to the alleged malpractice and the false claim said to have been made by the petitioner, after giving a fair and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. Pursuant to the said direction given for the third time, the present impugned order has been passed by the first respondent on 15.2.2006. But this time, cancelling the registration of the petitioner with the respondent as a contractor, which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, amounts to permanent black-listing, of the petitioner. 6. The impugned order is challenged on various grounds, including that even the show-cause notice was issued by the first respondent before passing the impugned order and there was absolutely no whisper about the proposed punishment of debarring the petitioner permanently, not enabling the petitioner to give proper explanation to the show cause notice. 7. Another ground is that on earlier three occasions as per the direction of this Court, an enquiry was conducted, not in a fair manner. Even now, before passing the impugned order, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend his case fairly. 8. The impugned order is challenged on another ground that by the subsequent conduct of the respondents in renewing the licence for the year 2003, even assuming otherwise, that the petitioner has committed the mistake in respect of performance of contract in 2001, such mistake is deemed to have been condoned and therefore, on the concept of waiver, the respondents cannot now go back denying the right of the petitioner. 9. On the other hand, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit. The respondents would say that the petitioner was working as a contractor and he has chosen to make a claim for the work, which was not actually carried out by him and therefore, such a person cannot be a contractor under the respondents’ undertaking which is a public department. On the other hand, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit. The respondents would say that the petitioner was working as a contractor and he has chosen to make a claim for the work, which was not actually carried out by him and therefore, such a person cannot be a contractor under the respondents’ undertaking which is a public department. It is further stated that, in spite of due opportunity given to the petitioner, the petitioner did not appear before the Enquiry Officer and submit his explanation. 10. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner now to say that opportunity was not given. Further, to conduct a fair enquiry, the respondents changed the Enquiry Officer and the place of enquiry was shifted to some other place and the petitioner not co-operated for the conduct of the enquiry and therefore it should be taken that due opportunity was given to the petitioner and he has not availed the same and therefore the principles of natural justice cannot go beyond the same. 11. Mr.G.R. Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the contract of the respondents, which has been interfered by this Court atleast on three occasions, is a sufficient proof to show that the respondents had not approached the problem in a fair manner. That apart, even the last Enquiry Officer has not given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner for producing records to cross-examine the witnesses. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that while it is admitted that the conduct of the petitioner, which is complained of, is of the year 2001. Subsequently, in the year 2003, the contract of the petitioner was renewed and therefore it amounts to waiver of any mistake committed by the petitioner, even for the sake of argument. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon a judgment of this Court in the case of A. Rajendran, Managing Partner of Rajendran and Co., Melakuppam Post, Neyveli v. General Manager, Thermal Power Station I, Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., Neyveli 2004 WLR 564 to show that the permanent black-listing of a person is opposed to law wherein it is held thus: “This decision squarely applied to the facts of the present case. Inasmuch as the period of black-listing has not been specified. It is black-listing for indefinite period. Inasmuch as the period of black-listing has not been specified. It is black-listing for indefinite period. Therefore the impugned order is liable to be quashed.” The above said judgment was rendered by relying upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.T. Sumber Mitra Jaya, Chennai v. National Highways Authority of India (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways), New Delhi. 13. It is on the basis of the dictum laid down by this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order which permanently cancelled the registration of the petitioner, amounts to black-listing forever. 14. On the other hand, Mr. A. Baskar, the learned counsel for the respondents, while taking me through the various contentions raised in the enquiry report, would submit that the conduct of the petitioner shows that the petitioner has disobeyed the order of this Court. However when a question was posed to him, about the final paragraph of the impugned order, which reads as, “The registration of the company Ponniah & Co. (Regn. No. TTP S058) is hereby cancelled,” and whether this would amount to black-listing, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that it is open to the petitioner to make a fresh registration to the respondents. Therefore according to him this need not be taken as black-listing. 15. In view of the specific submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner has not co-operated with the Enquiry Officer in a proper manner and the black-listing or cancellation of the contract should be made applicable only for a certain period and that cannot debar the petitioner forever as a registered contractor, making it clear, as suggested by the respondents, it is open to the petitioner to register himself afresh to the respondents. 16. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view, in the interest of justice, the petitioner must be directed to pay the amount mentioned in the impugned order to the respondents. 16. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view, in the interest of justice, the petitioner must be directed to pay the amount mentioned in the impugned order to the respondents. Therefore there will be a direction against the petitioner, to pay the said amount to the respondents, in which event, the impugned order relating to creating the permanent disability of the petitioner as a contractor will stand set aside, making it clear that the petitioner is entitled to register himself as a fresh contractor with the respondent Board. 17. With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected W.P.M.P. is also closed.