ORDER The facts of the case are: The petitioner was working as a peon-cum-watchman in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Yadgiri from the year 2003. It transpires that on 10-12-2003 at about 2 a.m., there was theft in the Court premises when the petitioner was not at his post, since he had unauthorisedly gone home. When he returned to his post, he found that the locks had been broken at the Court premises and he had informed his superiors and a criminal case was registered. In this regard, the petitioner was served with a charge memo and an enquiry was conducted. It was found that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct and ultimately was removed from service. It is in this background that the petitioner is before this Court. 2. The Counsel for the petitioner would submit, that it is not denied that the petitioner was absent at the time that the theft had occurred. The petitioner, after having seen off the Civil Judge at the bus stand at midnight on 9-12-2003, had instructed a colleague, who had accompanied him to the bus stand, to stand in for him for a while at the Court premises and that he would visit his home to look up his son, who was ill, and that he would get back at the earliest. However, it transpires that the colleague may not have obliged and therefore the theft had occurred at the Court premises. Notwithstanding this breach on the part of the petitioner, which was not disputed by him, the extreme punishment of removal from service, was not warranted, as the reasons for the petitioner's absence was prompted by circumstances and that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the act of misconduct. And therefore pleads, that on the doctrine of proportionality, the order of punishment needs to be addressed in the light of the facts and circumstances, which are not in serious dispute. 3. And therefore pleads, that on the doctrine of proportionality, the order of punishment needs to be addressed in the light of the facts and circumstances, which are not in serious dispute. 3. The respondent has entered appearance through the Government Advocate and has filed statement of objections to contend that the petitioner was obliged to inform the Presiding Officer, whose residential quarters was very much in the Court premises and this mandatory requirement was overlooked and though the theft had occurred at 3 a.m., the petitioner did not inform his superiors till much later and this act of negligence on the part of the petitioner has been rightly dealt with by imposing the order of punishment of removal. And therefore, there is no warrant for interference by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 4. The contention that the petitioner ought to have informed the Presiding Officer, was not in accordance with the facts and circumstances. As borne out by the record, the Presiding Officer had left the station on the very night and hence, the question of informing the Presiding Officer did not arise. In any event, the fact that the petitioner's absence was unauthorised, is not disputed. 5. The question for consideration is, whether the order of punishment could be interfered within writ jurisdiction. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Ram v State of Himachal Pradesh, that penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was noted and emphasized all powers have legal limits. In Ranjit Thakur v Union of India and Others2:, The appellant was found guilty in Court Martial proceedings and a punishment of dismissal from service and sentence of imprisonment was imposed as permitted by the Army Act. While quashing the said punishment on the ground of it being 'strikingly disproportionate', the Supreme Court observed: "The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review". This was followed by a later judgment in the case of Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v Union of India and Others1, again a case under the Army Act, 1950. In B.C. Chaturvedi v Union of India2: It was held by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court that while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusions on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal it would appropriately mould the relief, either by directing the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare case, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof In Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Another v Ashok Kumar Arora3, a Similar view was taken, that the Court will not intervene unless the' punishment is wholly disproportionate. Om Kumar and Others v Union of India4: It was held that the administrative action in India in getting fundamental promises has always been on the anvil of proportionality in the last fifty years, even though it is not expressly stated that the action should be based on proportionality principle. And that there are hundreds of such cases dealt with by the Courts in India and in all these matters, the proportionality of administrative action affecting the freedoms under Article 19(1) or Article 21 has been tested by the Courts as a Primary Reviewing Authority and not on the basis of Wednesbury principles. It may be that the Courts did not call this proportionality but it really was. 6. It may be that the Courts did not call this proportionality but it really was. 6. In the light of the law as laid down in the aforesaid judgments and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the punishment imposed is wholly disproportionate to the act of misconduct. 7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed in part. The impugned order of punishment of removal from service and treating the period of suspension as a period of leave to his credit and in excess thereof to be treated as leave without allowances, is quashed. The matter is remitted to the respondent-authority to reconsider the punishment and impose a punishment lesser than that of removal from service, apart from directing recovery of money, if any, in equated monthly instalments.