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2006 DIGILAW 964 (BOM)

Sadanand Vishnu Shirgaokar v. State of Goa

2006-06-27

N.A.BRITTO, RANJANA DESAI

body2006
ORAL ORDER Smt. Ranjana Desai, J.––1. The petitioner claims to be the tenant and deemed purchaser of agricultural land surveyed under Chalta No. 12, P.T. Sheet No. 266 of City Survey of Margao, Gao, belonging to landlord Mr. Rosendo Xavier Barreto (since deceased). According to the petitioner, he is also in cultivatory possession of the said property along with another property bearing Chalta No. 22 of P.T. Sheet No. 266. On 25.4.2002, the State of Goa initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the said Act") for acquisition of part of the aforesaid land by a notification under Section 4 of the said Act published on 17.4.2002. On 3.9.2002, the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was also published. According to the petitioner, he was totally in dark about the acquisition of the property. It is his case that his son and constituted attorney of one Shekhar Sadanand Shirgaonkar came to know about it when they were attending to some other land acquisition proceedings. Further inquiries made by the petitioner revealed that an award was passed on 30.10.2002 and compensation of Rs. 1,35,728/- was awarded and paid to respondent 4 pursuant to the claim made by her in inventory proceeding instituted upon death, of her father. The petitioner has stated that the petitioner wrote a letter to the Land Acquisition Officer bringing to his notice that he was the tenant in possession of the acquired property and he was the person in law entitled to receive the said compensation. He did not receive any reply to the said letter and, hence, this petition. 2. In this petition, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed that a direction be issued to respondent 1 to order and direct respondent 4 to bring back the amount of Rs. 1,35,728/- received by her as and by way of compensation of the acquired land, pending adjudication of the entitlement of the reference under Section 30 of the said Act. 3. We have heard Mr. Lotlikar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Mr. Reis, the learned counsel appearing for respondent 4. 4. 3. We have heard Mr. Lotlikar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Mr. Reis, the learned counsel appearing for respondent 4. 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, since it is the case of the petitioner that he is in cultivatory possession of the land in question, that he is a tenant of the said land and as such entitled to compensation and that he had no notice of the acquisition proceedings and of the award, this case would be covered by Section 30 of the said Act and that the Collector be directed to make a reference to the Court. 5. The learned counsel for respondent 4, however, has strenuously opposed any such reference being made. He contended that the contentions raised by the petitioner in the petition are false and the petitioner's case is fraudulent for the reasons set out by respondent 4 in her affidavit filed in this Court. The learned counsel then relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 942 and contended that since the award has assumed finality and the petitioner's claim is post-award, he is not entitled for an order directing the Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the said Act. The learned counsel then relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Laxman Bhaskar Pathara and others v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 748 and contended that whether to make a reference under Section 30 of the said Act or not is for the Collector to decide and the Collector has to take a decision after due application of mind and after hearing the parties and, therefore, this Court cannot direct the Collector to make a reference. The learned counsel also submitted that the petition suffers from laches and hence the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the petitioner may be relegated to a civil suit to redress his grievance. 6. In our opinion, the judgment in Supreme Court in Sharda Devi's (supra) case makes it clear that a person who was not represented in the acquisition proceedings or who had no notice of the acquisition proceedings is also covered by Section 30 of the said Act. 6. In our opinion, the judgment in Supreme Court in Sharda Devi's (supra) case makes it clear that a person who was not represented in the acquisition proceedings or who had no notice of the acquisition proceedings is also covered by Section 30 of the said Act. In this connection, the following observation of the Supreme Court may be quoted : "Section 30 is not confined in its operation only to persons interested. It would, therefore, be available for being invoked by the persons interested if they were neither present nor represented in proceedings before the Collector, nor were served with notice under Section 12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the basis of a title coming into existence post award." Since no notice was served on the petitioner and he was not present nor was he represented in the proceedings, his case would be covered by Section 30 of the said Act. The first submission of learned counsel for respondent 4 must fail. 7. It is not necessary for us to deal with the submission made by the learned counsel for respondent 4 relying on Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India and others, AIR 2004 SC 3491 , in view of the fact that the parties are before us and Mr. Kantak, the learned Advocate General has made a statement that the Collector shall make a reference under Section 30 of the said Act in terms of letter dated 4.2.2004, which is annexed as Ex-D to the petition. 8. Submissions were also advanced before us on the question of limitation. So far as the aspect of limitation is concerned, in Meher Rusi Dalal's case (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled that a reference under Section 30 of the said Act has to be made within a reasonable time. The following observations of the Supreme Court may be quoted : "Even in Sharda Devi's case (supra) this Court has held that even though no limitation is provided for making a reference under Section 30, the power had to be exercised within a reasonable period. This Court has held that what is the reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each given case. This Court has held that what is the reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each given case. It appears to us that in cases where the parties have notice of the acquisition proceedings, even presuming, they can apply for a reference under Section 30, the reasonable time would be the period prescribed under Section 18. We immediately clarify that where parties do not have notice of the acquisition proceedings and/or their rights come into existence subsequent to the acquisition proceedings the starting point of limitation may be postponed but the reasonable time would be the time set out in Section 18 from the date of the knowledge or from the date they acquire rights, whichever is later." 9. In view of the statement made by the learned Advocate General, which we have recorded, in our opinion, nothing survives in this petition. Needless to say that the question of limitation is kept open and the reference Court will deal with it in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Meher Rusi Dalal's case (supra). 10. In view of the above, the petition stands disposed of. All contentions of parties are kept open. Petition disposed.