( 1 ) HEARD Sri J. P. Goyal, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri rakesh Nigam for the State. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner challenges the restart of the enquiry proceedings from the stage of submission of the enquiry report to the disciplinary authority/appointing authority on the ground that the punishment of censure entry, awarded after full fledged enquiry, has already been set aside by the Tribunal and, therefore, the State has no authority to reinitiate the proceedings from any stage. ( 3 ) IN nut shell the facts are that the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings in respect of certain charges, wherein the enquiry officer exonerated the petitioner but the disciplinary authority, without affording opportunity to the petitioner to express his views on the proposed difference of opinion as against the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, passed the punishment order. The petitioner feeling aggrieved approached the public Services Tribunal. The Tribunal vide its order dated 4. 12. 05 set aside the order of punishment after holding that since the enquiry officer has exonerated the petitioner of all the charges, therefore, the disciplinary authority could not have inflicted the punishment, without affording opportunity, as required under law. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal thus, did set aside the punishment order because of the violation of principles of natural justice in not affording opportunity before passing the order, while differing with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. Since the punishment order was set aside on technical grounds of not being afforded opportunity, the State Government has issued the present order dated 12. 8. 05 reinitiating the enquiry proceedings from the stage, where the fault had been committed in the earlier proceedings, namely, the petitioner has been issued a notice to show cause against the proposed action, which is likely to be taken by the disciplinary authority vide Office Memo dated 7. 2. 06. The two office memorandum, namely, dated 12. 8. 05, by means of which enquiry has been reinstated and the other dated 7. 2. 06, by means of which petitioner has been asked to submit his reply, both are under challenge in the present writ petition. 2. 06. The two office memorandum, namely, dated 12. 8. 05, by means of which enquiry has been reinstated and the other dated 7. 2. 06, by means of which petitioner has been asked to submit his reply, both are under challenge in the present writ petition. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that once the order of punishment having been set aside by the Tribunal and no direction/liberty being given by the Tribunal to the State for reinitiating the enquiry, the present proceedings are totally without jurisdiction and authority. ( 6 ) IN this regard he relies upon the judgement of the Punjab and Haryana high Court in the case of Parkash Nath Saidha, Naib Tehsildar versus The financial Commissioner (Revenue) Punjab, Chandigarh and others, 1972 slr 601 (Punjab and Haryana ). This case was a case where fresh enquiry to the charges, on which the government servant was exonerated, was initiated. The Court found that it was the case of double jeopardy and that once government servant is exonerated finally, no further enquiry can be held on the same very charges, against him. ( 7 ) THE other case which has been relied upon by the petitioner is State of assam and another Vs. J. N. Roy Biswas 1976 SCC (Lands) 10. Placing reliance upon Para 4 of the report, learned counsel has reinforced his argument that in the absence of any liberty being given by the Tribunal, no further enquiry could have been initiated, unless the rules so provide. Submission is that the U. P. Government Servant (Discipline and appeal) Rules, 1999 do not provide for de novo enquiry or fresh enquiry to be conducted after the order of punishment has been set aside. ( 8 ) IN the aforesaid case, the apex court, observed as under: "we may, however, make it clear that no government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. It can be; but once a disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated, presumably on full exoneration, a chagrined Government cannot restart the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by rules in some authority. It can be; but once a disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated, presumably on full exoneration, a chagrined Government cannot restart the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by rules in some authority. The basics of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry. For the present, this is theoretical because no such deadly defect is apparent on the record. " ( 9 ) THE aforesaid observation itself makes it clear that there cannot be a challenge to the second enquiry, in case for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other ground, first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, meaning thereby that when the first punishment or exoneration, as the case may be, is found to be bad because of some technical reason, then second enquiry can be launched for which there cannot be any exception. However, in a case where disciplinary proceedings have been closed and official is reinstated, presumably on full exoneration, then in that case no second enquiry or fresh enquiry can be held. ( 10 ) SIMILAR matter came up for consideration before the apex court in the case of Anand Narain Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1979 S. C. 1923. The apex court in that case considered the plea (i) that after the earlier order of reversion was quashed by the High Court and after the appellant was reinstated, no second enquiry on the very same charge could be held and no second order of reversion could be legally and validly made; and (ii) that the appellant was entitled to the full salary for the period of suspension. ( 11 ) THE first argument which is applicable in the present case also was rejected by the Court and it was held that there was no substance in either of the points urged by the appellant. The earlier order was quashed on a technical ground. On merits a second enquiry could be held. The observations made in the last paragraph of the judgement in the case of J. N. Roy Biswas (supra) were taken into consideration and were not found applicable in such a situation. The earlier order was quashed on a technical ground. On merits a second enquiry could be held. The observations made in the last paragraph of the judgement in the case of J. N. Roy Biswas (supra) were taken into consideration and were not found applicable in such a situation. ( 12 ) THE case of Anand Narain Shukla (supra) was again taken into consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. M. B. Patnaik and others (1981) 2 S. C. C. 159, wherein when a plea was raised on behalf of the railway administration that it may be made open to disciplinary authority to continue the proceeding in accordance with law, the court observed that the prayer was perfectly justified. The Court took note of the case of Anand Narain Shukla and observed that when the earlier order of reversion was quashed on a technical ground, a second enquiry on merits could be held and that the order of reinstatement pursuant to the quashing of the earlier order on a technical ground is not a bar, and this Court negatived the contention that after the earlier order of reversion was quashed by the high Court and the government servant was reinstated, no second enquiry on the same very charge could be held and no second order of reversion could be legally and validly made. A similar view has been taken by this Court in superintendent (Tech. I) Central Excise, I. D. D. , Jabalpur v. Pratap Rai (1978) 3 SCC 113 , in which it has been that where an order passed in appeal vacates the order of the First Tribunal on purely technical grounds and expressly states that it was being passed without prejudice, which means that it was not an order on merits of the case, such an order does not debar fresh adjudicatory proceedings which may be justified under law and that when an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of the principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and all that is done is that the inherent defect is removed but the proceedings are not terminated. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid dictum of the apex court, it can safely be inferred that in the instant case that by setting aside the order of punishment by the Tribunal on technical ground of violation of principles of natural justice, only the punishment order has been set aside but the disciplinary enquiry cannot be said to have been terminated or quashed nor the petitioner can be treated to have been exonerated from the charges leveled against him. That being so, reinitiation of proceedings cannot be faulted with. It is a different matter that the petitioner, if feels aggrieved by the order passed by the disciplinary authority after his representation is considered, may approach the appropriate forum, as may be permissible under law, for challenging the aforesaid order. ( 14 ) THE petition challenging the present enquiry proceedings is not maintainable. We find the prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioner reasonable, that a direction be issued for early conclusion of the proceedings, in view of the fact that the petitioner is to retire on 31. 1. 07 and the departmental Promotion Committee for promotion to the next higher post is likely to take place shortly. We, therefore, provide that in case the petitioner submits his reply to the notice in question within a period of two weeks, the final orders shall be passed by the disciplinary authority within a maximum period of next four weeks. Subject to the aforesaid direction, the writ petition is dismissed. . .