Judgment :- (Revision filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment dated 07.01.1996 passed in C.A.No.143 of 1995 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Kamarajar District at Srivilliputhur, convicting the revision petitioner.) This matter has been directed to be heard afresh and disposed in accordance with law by the Hon`ble Supreme Court in C.A.No.904 of 1998 as per judgment dated 11.3.2005. 2. The Revision petitioner is the accused in C.C.No.505 of 1992 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Srivilliputhur, who was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of 3 years for the offences under Section 467 & 471 I.P.C. and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year, for the offence under Section 467 I.P.C. and to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. as per judgment dated 29.11.1995, which was confirmed by the first Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.143 of 1995 as per judgment dated 07.01.1996 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Srivilliputhur, and the sentences were directed to run concurrently. This revision is filed challenging the above said conviction and sentence imposed on the revision petitioner as per judgment dated 29.11.1995 in C.C.No.505 of 1992 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Srivilliputhur, as confirmed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Kamarajar District at Srivilliputhur, in C.A.No.143 of 1995 as per judgment dated 07.01.1996. 3. This revision is filed challenging the above said conviction and sentence imposed on the revision petitioner as per judgment dated 29.11.1995 in C.C.No.505 of 1992 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Srivilliputhur, as confirmed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Kamarajar District at Srivilliputhur, in C.A.No.143 of 1995 as per judgment dated 07.01.1996. 3. As per the case of prosecution, P.W.1 is the younger brother of P.W.2; an extent of 49 acres and 12 cents in Ayan Kollakondan Village belonged to them; on 09.02.1991 the accused entered into an agreement of sale with P.W.2 for purchasing the said land and as per agreement Ex.P.3 dated 09.2.1991, he paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- as advance and the sale had to be completed on or before 24.6.1991; since the accused did not complete the sale within the stipulated time, P.W.2 gave lawyer's notice dated 17.7.1991 to him cancelling the agreement and thereafter, the land was conveyed as per the registered sale deed dated 16.2.1992 in favour of P.W.3; after purchase, on 17.2.1992, P.W.3 went to the land purchased by him during which time, P.W.3 noticed the accused standing in that land and stated that since P.W.3 purchased the land, which the accused wanted to buy, he must be done away with if he enters into the land; P.W.3 informed the same to P.W.1 and on 17.02.1992, P.W.3 received summons in a suit in O.S.No.104 of 1992 filed by the accused on the file of the District Munsif, Srivilliputhur, along with documents enclosing the agreement Ex.P.1 dated 06.01.1991 as if it was entered into between P.W.1 and the accused in respect of the above said land by forging the signature of P.W.1 in which he also obtained temporary injunction by filing petition in I.A.No.414 of 1992 restraining P.W.1 and his men from entering into the land pursuant to which, charge sheet was filed under Sections 467, 471, 341 and 506 (ii) I.P.C. 4. In order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 11 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.8. As against such evidence, the accused marked Exs.D.1 to D.6. 5. In order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 11 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.8. As against such evidence, the accused marked Exs.D.1 to D.6. 5. The trial Court, considering such evidence let in on the side of the prosecution and the Exhibits marked, found the accused guilty for the offences under Sections 467, 471 and 506(ii) I.P.C. and convicted and sentenced him as set out above, which was confirmed in appeal in C.A.No.143 of 1995 as per judgment dated 07.01.1996 by the Principal Sessions Judge, Srivilliputhur, by dismissing the said appeal. It was challenged in revision in Criminal R.C.No.50 of 1997. 6. This Court, R.Balasubramanian, J., as per judgment dated 06.02.1998, by accepting the arguments advanced and the stand taken by the then learned Counsel for the revision petitioner that the Criminal Court, viz., the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. III, Srivilliputhur, ought not to have taken cognizance of the case in respect of the offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. in view of the express bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., recording finding that the entire proceedings in respect of the said two offences are ab initio void, allowed the revision, setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court. This Court also held that in respect of offence under Section 506 (ii) I.P.C., there have been delay in lodging complaint by P.W.1 and as such, it is fatal to the case of prosecution in view of the fact that the occurrence took place on 16.2.1992 whereas the complaint was lodged only on 20.2.1992 at about 8.45 p.m. and in between, summons were served on the person, who is said to have intimidated, in the suit filed by the accused in O.S.No.104 of 1992 on the file of District Munsif, Srivilliputhur. Previously, this Court, while allowing the revision, had dealt with, at length, the various judgments of this Court and the Honourable Supreme Court in recording finding that even though the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the 1973 Code, could have been committed in relation to a document prior to the institution of the proceeding itself, if such document is used in those proceeding, immediately, the legal bar enunciated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the 1973 Code gets attracted and, therefore, held that the trial Court committed error in law in taking cognizance of the case for the offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. 7. The said order was challenged in appeal in C.A.No.904 of 1998 before the Honourable Supreme Court and the Constitutional Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal by directing this Court to hear the matter afresh and dispose of in accordance with law, observed as under: "23. That apart, Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., which we are required to interpret, is not a penal provision but is part of a procedural law, namely, Code of Criminal Procedure which elaborately gives the procedure for trial of Criminal cases. The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by Court. A penal statute is one upon which an action for penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved and a penal act in its wider sense includes every statute creating an offence against the State, whatever is the character of the penalty for the offence. The principle that a penal statute should be strictly construed, as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants can, therefore, have no application here. 24. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 476 of old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras ( AIR 1954 SC 397 ) give a complete answer to the problem posed: "(15) As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rules can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. (16) Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S.476. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S.476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished." 8. Heard Mr.V.Selvaraj, learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, Mr.K.Ashokan, learned senior counsel appearing for the second respondent and Mr.A.N.Thambidurai, learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent, after remand of the matter by the Honourable Supreme Court. 9. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the sale agreement Ex.P.1 dated 06.01.1991 has not been forged by the accused as if it was entered into between him and P.W.1 and it is not a document created by the accused by forging the signature of P.W.1. He also submitted that relying on such document, the accused filed suit in O.S.No.104 of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Srivilliputhur, seeking for permanent injunction in which temporary injunction was also obtained by filing petition in I.A.No.414 of 1992. 10. As regards the Scientific Expert's Report Ex.P.5, it is argued by the learned counsel that much reliance cannot be placed on the report. It is further argued that there have been delay in lodging the complaint Ex.P.2 by P.W.1 in respect of the occurrence that had taken place on 16.02.1992 in the disputed land during which time, it is alleged that the accused criminally intimidated and threatened to do away with P.W.3 since he purchased the land from P.W.1, which was agreed to be sold to the accused. It is further urged by the learned counsel that the complaint was actually made by P.W.1 on 20.02.1992 at 8.45 P.M. only after receipt of summons by P.W.3 on 17.02.1992 in O.S.No.104 of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Srivilliputhur filed by the accused, and such delay is very much fatal to the case of the prosecution. It is further urged by the learned counsel that the complaint was actually made by P.W.1 on 20.02.1992 at 8.45 P.M. only after receipt of summons by P.W.3 on 17.02.1992 in O.S.No.104 of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Srivilliputhur filed by the accused, and such delay is very much fatal to the case of the prosecution. Learned counsel also contended that inasmuch as Ex.P.1 agreement was entered into between P.W.1 and the accused, the agreement Ex.P.1 is a genuine document, which falsifies the case of prosecution that Ex.P.1 was created by the accused forging the signature of P.W.1. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the offences under Sections 467, 471 and 506(ii) I.P.C. are not made out against the accused and the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused in respect of the above said offences. 11. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner, in support of his contentions, relied on the following decisions: (i) In Kishore Chandra V. Ganesh Prasad (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 316), Their Lordships have held as under: "Conclusions based on mere comparison of handwriting must, at best, be indecisive, and yield to the positive evidence in the case." (ii) In Bhagwan Kaur V. M.K.Sharma (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1346), Their Lordships have held thus: "The evidence of a handwriting expert, unlike that of a fingerprint expert, is generally of a frail character and its fallibilities have been quite often noticed. The Court should, therefore, be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting expert. Conclusions based upon mere comparison of handwriting must at best be indecisive and yield to the positive evidence in the case." (iii) In Antony, M.A., In re: (1981 L.W. (CRI) 134), this Court has held that the evidence of a handwriting expert, which is opinion evidence, cannot take the place of a substantive evidence and it would not be safe to convict the revision petitioner solely on his evidence. 12. 12. Mr.K.Asokan, learned senior counsel appearing for the second respondent / defacto complainant, submitted that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond doubt that the accused, by forging the signature of P.W.1, created Ex.P.1 dated 06.01.1991 as if it was entered into between him and P.W.1 and used the same as a genuine document by filing it in the list of documents in O.S.No.104 of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Srivilliputhur, for permanent injunction. In this regard, learned senior counsel further submitted that there was no necessity for Ex.P.1 agreement dated 06.01.1991 since there was already sale agreement Ex.P.3 dated 09.02.1991 and both of which have been filed in the list of documents in O.S.No.104 of 1992 and when admittedly, Ex.P.3 was entered into between the accused and P.Ws.1 and 2 and such a case has been spoken to by P.Ws.1 to 3. In Ex.P.2 it is stated that P.W.1, after causing lawyer's notice on 17.7.1991, cancelled the agreement Ex.P.3 dated 09.02.1991, which was admittedly entered into between P.W.1 and the accused, and after such cancellation, P.W.1 sold the said lands to P.W.3. 13. Learned senior counsel, in support of his contention, relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State Of H.P. V. Mast Ram [ (2004)8 SCC 660 ] wherein Their Lordships held thus: "There is no dispute that the report was submitted under the hand of a Government scientific expert. Section 293(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins that any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a government scientific expert under the section, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under the Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. The High Court has completely overlooked the provision of subsection (1) of Section 293 and arrived at a fallacious conclusion that a Junior Scientific officer is not an officer enumerated under sub-section (4) of Section 293. What sub-section (4) of Section 293 envisages is that the Court is to accept the documents issued by any of the six officers enumerated therein as valid evidence without examining the author of the documents". 14. What sub-section (4) of Section 293 envisages is that the Court is to accept the documents issued by any of the six officers enumerated therein as valid evidence without examining the author of the documents". 14. As regards delay in lodging the complaint Ex.P.2 by P.W.1, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel that the delay is not very much fatal to the case of prosecution and, therefore, he submitted that the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused by the trial Court, as confirmed by the first appellate Court, need not be disturbed. 15. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent, while advancing argument in similar line as argued by the learned counsel for the second respondent / defacto complainant, submitted that the prosecution by examining the witnesses and marking documents clearly proved the guilt of the accused and as such, the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused have to be confirmed. 16. It is not in dispute that an extent of 49 acres and 12 cents in Ayan Kollakondan Village belonged to P.W.2 and his younger brother P.W.1. It is also not in dispute that P.W.2 entered into an agreement of sale with the accused as per Ex.P.3 dated 09.02.1991 agreeing to sell the said lands at the rate of Rs.2700/- per acre and that a sum of Rs.20,000/- was also paid as advance. As per the agreement, it was agreed that the sale is to be completed on or before 24.6.1991 by paying the balance sale price amount and by registering the sale deed. It is the case of prosecution that since the accused did not pay the balance sale price amount for completion of the sale transaction, P.W.2 caused lawyer's notice dated 17.7.1991 cancelling the agreement Ex.P.3 and thereafter, sold the said lands to P.W.3 as per sale deed dated 14.02.1992, which was registered in Kerala and sale deed was executed including the properties in Kerala. Though admittedly such an agreement Ex.P.3 was entered into between the accused and P.W.1, P.W.2 and three others, according to the accused, even before the agreement entered into in Ex.P.3, the agreement of sale was entered into between him and P.W.1 as per Ex.P.1 dated 06.01.1991, which was disputed by P.W.1 that it was not executed by him and the document has been created by the accused forging the signature of P.W.1. 17. 17. It is seen that to counter the case of P.W.1, P.W.2 and others that the agreement Ex.P.3 was cancelled after causing lawyer's notice dated 17.7.1991 and to enforce his right to purchase the said lands in Ex.P.1, the accused filed suit in O.S.No.104 of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Srivilliputhur, against the purchaser P.W.3 for permanent injunction and also obtained temporary injunction in I.A.No.414 of 1992 claiming that he is in possession of the property. In the suit, he has claimed right in respect of the suit property, which was agreed to be sold under Ex.P.3 admittedly not under the said agreement but as per agreement Ex.P.1 alleged to have been entered into between him and P.W.1, which is disputed by the latter that the said document has been created by the accused for the purpose of filing the said suit by forging his signature. Further, the accused also obtained temporary injunction by filing agreement Ex.P.1 in the said suit. As such, it is clear that the accused used the said document as a genuine one. 18. It remains to be seen as to whether the agreement Ex.P.1 was created for the purpose of filing the said suit by forging the signature of P.W.1 as stated by the prosecution. If really there was an agreement Ex.P.1 entered into between P.W.1 and the accused, the same could have been referred to and stated in the latter agreement Ex.P.3. But no reference is made about the agreement Ex.P.1 dated 06.01.1991 in the latter agreement Ex.P.3 dated 09.02.1991. Further, there is no necessity for entering into another agreement as per Ex.P.3 if really there was already a genuine agreement entered into as per Ex.P.1 between P.W.1 and the accused. In the agreement Ex.P.3, the date for completion of sale transaction is fixed as on or before 24.6.1991 whereas in the sale agreement Ex.P.1, it is specified that the sale transaction is to be completed on 07.5.1992 by paying the entire sale price amount to P.W.1. Such recital has been made in Ex.P.1 to meet out the case of P.W.1 that after cancelling the agreement Ex.P.3 dated 09.02.1991 and after causing lawyer's notice dated 17.7.1991, the properties were sold to P.W.3 as per sale deed dated 14.02.1992, which was registered in Kerala, along with other properties in Kerala. Such recital has been made in Ex.P.1 to meet out the case of P.W.1 that after cancelling the agreement Ex.P.3 dated 09.02.1991 and after causing lawyer's notice dated 17.7.1991, the properties were sold to P.W.3 as per sale deed dated 14.02.1992, which was registered in Kerala, along with other properties in Kerala. Otherwise, there is no necessity to make out such recital in Ex.P.1 that last date for completion of sale transaction as 07.5.1992. Therefore, on going through the facts, it is crystal clear that Ex.P.1 was created by the accused forging the signature of P.W.1. 19. The next point to be considered is as to whether the signature found in Ex.P.1 sale agreement is the signature of P.W.1. Further, as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, though the name of P.W.1 is Balasubramania Raja, in Ex.P.1 sale agreement, the signature is made as M.P.Balakrishna Raja clearly proving that it was not signed by P.W.1. The trial Court also, by comparing the signature of P.W.1 available in the records, rightly found that the signature found in Ex.P.1 is not that of P.W.1 M.P.Balasubramania Raja. 20. P.W.7 Raghava Raja, Stamp vendor, has also stated in his evidence that stamp papers for Ex.P.1 sale agreement were sold by his Assistant when he had gone to Treasury and entries have not been made in the Stamp Register about the sale of the said stamp papers to one M.P.Balakrishna Raja, who is not P.W.1. The sale agreement Ex.P.1 was also examined by Forensic Science Department and the Scientific Expert's Report Ex.P.5 has been filed in which it is stated that the signature in Ex.P.1 as M.P.Balakrishna Raja is not the signature of P.W.1 clearly suggesting and clinching the issue that the signature in Ex.P.1 as M.P.Balakrishna Raja is not by P.W.1 and the document Ex.P.1 has been created forging the signature of P.W.1, which could have been only by the accused in view of the fact that admittedly, the accused filed suit in O.S.No.104 of 1992 in the Court of Principal District Munsif, Srivilliputhur, for permanent injunction against the purchase of the said lands by P.W.3 and by filing the said document, he also obtained temporary injunction against P.W.3 claiming that he is in possession. 21. Thirdly, both Exs.P.1 and P.3 have been typed in Tamil. 21. Thirdly, both Exs.P.1 and P.3 have been typed in Tamil. It is also to be noted that there have been omissions in both the documents while typing the extent of survey No.2255, which has not been stated correctly though all the survey numbers and the extent of the lands have been typed correctly. Some of the survey numbers and extent of lands have also been omitted to be typed in Ex.P.1. 22. As per the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, taking cognizance of the case for the offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. by the trial Court cannot be said to be improper. 23. The trial Court, considering all these aspects in its proper perspective, rightly recorded finding that the accused created Ex.P.1 sale agreement by forging the signature of P.W.1 and used the same as genuine document in the suit O.S.No.104 of 1992 filed by him for permanent injunction in which he also obtained temporary injunction by filing I.A.No.414 of 1992, against the purchase of the lands by P.W.3 and as such, the guilt of the accused in respect of the offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. have been proved beyond doubt by the prosecution and it has been rightly confirmed by the first Appellate Court. Therefore, such a finding of the trial Court that the accused is found guilty under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. as confirmed by the first Appellate Court, does not call for any interference and as such, the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused for the offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. are to be confirmed. 24. As regards the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C., it cannot be said that the said offence has been made out in view of the fact that there have been delay in lodging the complaint and registration of the First Information Report on 20.02.1992 at 8.45 P.M. in respect of the offence that had taken place on 16.02.1992 during which time, it is alleged that the accused threatened and criminally intimidated P.W.3. That apart, the complaint was not made by P.W.3 and it is only P.W.1, who made the complaint. Therefore, it cannot be said that the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. is made out. That apart, the complaint was not made by P.W.3 and it is only P.W.1, who made the complaint. Therefore, it cannot be said that the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. is made out. In that view, the finding of the trial Court that the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. is made out, which was confirmed by the first Appellate Court, is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed on the revision petitioner for the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. are alone set aside. 25. In the result, in view of the discussions made above, the appeal is allowed partly. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, as confirmed by the first appellate Court, for the offence under Section 506(ii) I.P.C. alone are set aside. In other respects, the revision is dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the revision petitioner for the offences under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. by the trial Court, as confirmed by the first Appellate Court, are affirmed. The Judicial Magistrate No.III, Srivilliputhur, is required to secure the presence of the accused to undergo the unexpired period of sentence.