Judgment : Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents. 2. In the judgment rendered by me in the batch of Writ petitions in W.P.Nos. 409 of 2004 etc. dated 6.2.2006, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kunalsingh v. Union of India and Another Kunalsingh v. Union of India and Another Kunalsingh v. Union of India and Another AIR 2003 SC 1623 : 2003-II-LLJ-735: 2003 (4) SCC 524 , I have held that as per Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, any person acquired disability during the course of employment either in consequence of the nature of employment or otherwise, the “disability” as defined under Section 2(i) of the Act, is to be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits and even in cases where it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post he should be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post was available or he attains the age of superannuation whichever is earlier. 3. I have also held that the Act has come into force on 7.2.1996 and any employee who was discharged thereafter on account of the disability acquired is vested with such right. 4. I have also held that in Para. 29 of the said judgment while deciding about the term disability under Section 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, is different from the term “person with disability” defined under 2(t) of the act and only in respect of those cases where, person who is not in employment seeking the benefit under the Act in respect of schemes promulgated therein, the certificate of medical authority contemplated under the Act is required. However, in respect of the person who are already in services who have acquired disability during employment there was no necessity for producing a certificate from medical authority contemplated under Section 2(p) of the said Act. 5. However, in respect of the person who are already in services who have acquired disability during employment there was no necessity for producing a certificate from medical authority contemplated under Section 2(p) of the said Act. 5. Apart from many other reasons, I have come to the said conclusion on the basis that the various disabilities mentioned under Section 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1955 have been independently defined under the definition clause itself and therefore construing the said provision as a beneficial legislation. I have held that finding of any authority about said disabilities is sufficient for the purpose of the Act. 6. The relevant passage in the judgment are “Therefore in my considered view, the contentions of the learned counsels that unless and until a certificate issued by the competent authority contemplated under the Act is given, the benefits under Section 47 of the Act cannot be claimed is an untenable argument. Further as laid down by the Supreme Court, the beneficial legislation like Act 1 of 1996 must be construed with the object of the Act and its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstruts the objects and paralyses the purpose. Therefore, the finding of any authority about disability is sufficient for the purpose of the Act.” 7. Even though, it is true that the certificate of the medial authority as prescribed under the Act is not necessary for the purpose of conferring benefit under Section 47(1) of the said Act, there must be some certificate to prove that the person has suffered any one of the disabilities mentioned under Section 2(i) of the Act, by construing the definition of various disabilities explained by way of definition under Section 2 of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Therefore, touch stone to decide about the disability explained in the medical certificate is Section 2(i) itself. 8. Therefore, touch stone to decide about the disability explained in the medical certificate is Section 2(i) itself. 8. In cases where the certificate produced by a medical board or any of the authority for the purpose of stating that a person is unfit due to the medical reason, is unable to be construed as a disability under the above said Act, it is always open to the employer to refer such employee for a fresh certificate to show whether the disabilities comes within the meaning of the said Act namely Section 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, for, under the said Act person having disability but those disabilities which are defined therein alone are entitled to the benefits of Section 47(1) of the Act. 9. In this case, the Medical Board report which states as follows : ‘K. Jayakannan, Driver, Staff No. 9269, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, Madurai, has appeared before Medical Board on 12.11.2002. He is examined and found to be a Color Blind persons (Defective Colour Vision) We the medical Board are of the opinion that he is unfit for Drivers post. 10. For the disabilities of Colour blindness and as I have held earlier, the petitioner is certainly entitled for the benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act, since the disability come under Section 2(i) of the Act. In this case learned counsel for the respondent would also raise another contention that in the event of this Court coming to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled for the benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act such benefits should be restricted to treat the petitioner as a new entrant. I am unable to accept this contention. As I haveal-ready held in the judgment dated 6.2.2006 in W.P.No.409 of 2004 etc., batch, the benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act has come into operation even on the date when the Act came into force ad therefore, it is duty on the part of the employer even on that date and therefore, the question of saying the petitioner to be treated as a new entrant does not arise. 11. In view of the same the writ petition stands allowed. There is no order as to costs. Consequently connected W.P.M.P. is also closed.