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2006 DIGILAW 997 (GAU)

Radheshyam Rajendra Prasad v. State of Assam

2006-11-14

AMITAVA ROY, B.S.REDDY

body2006
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. This batch of writ appeals registers a challenge to the judgments and orders dated April 8, 1997, August 17, 1998 and September 9, 2003 Reported as Dugar Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Assam [2004] 138 STC 159 (Gau) passed in different sets of writ petitions in essence negating the assailments to the denial of benefit of sales tax exemption under the Industrial Policy of 1986 and consequential assessment orders for the periods ending September 30, 1988, March 31, 1989, September 30, 1989, March. 31, 1990, September 30, 1990, March 31, 1991, September 30, 1991, March 31, 1992, September 30, 1992, March 31, 1993 as well as the Notification No. FTX.28/87/Pt. II/38 dated July 30, 1988 issued under Section 3A of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 (since repealed by the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993). As the parties are somewhat common and the issues of law identical, the appeals were analogously heard and stand disposed by this judgment and order. 2. We have heard Mr. OP Bhatti, Advocate, assisted by Mr. A. Biswas, Advocate, for the appellants and Mr. R. Dubey, learned Standing Counsel, Finance Department, Government of Assam, for the respondents. 3. The appeals, with a view to identify the grounds of the impugned challenge, have been categorised into three groups. The pleaded facts in bare essentials have to be set out to better appreciate the rival assertions. In the first group of appeals, nomenclatured as Group I, the petitioner/appellants have impeached the various assessment orders for the aforementioned periods on the ground that as eligibility certificates in terms of the aforementioned policy had been issued envisaging sales tax exemption for sale of goods involved from April 14, 1988 to April 13, 1993 and the same having been sold without charging such tax from the consumers, the denial of the benefit of such exemption and the assessment of the levy is ex facie in contravention of the policy and the Assam Industries (Sales Tax Concessions) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act"). In the corresponding writ petitions, the petitioners are the holders of the eligibility certificates and their agents who claimed to have sold the goods covered thereby without charging sales tax from the customers. No affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by the respondents. 4. In the corresponding writ petitions, the petitioners are the holders of the eligibility certificates and their agents who claimed to have sold the goods covered thereby without charging sales tax from the customers. No affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by the respondents. 4. In the second category of appeals, designated as Group II, the subject-matter of challenge is the judgment and order dated August 17, 1998 dismissing CR No. 4162 of 1991, CR No. 1474 of 1992, CR No. 2172 of 1992 and CR No. 2345 of 1992. The pleaded version of the petitioners in CR No. 4162 of 1991 is that the petitioner M/s. Dugar Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. (appellant No. 1 in W.A. No. 313 of 1998) is a private limited company carrying on business of blending and the packaging of tea. It started the construction of its buildings and go down and completed the same in January, 1988. After installing the plants and machineries in 1987-88, it started its production in April, 1988. Eligibility certificate was granted to it on July 7, 1988 and the certificate of registration to it as a small-scale industrial unit was issued by the concerned respondent-authority on August 23, 1988. Its application for the authorisation certificate under the Act was rejected in the face of Rule 2(f) of the Assam Industries (Sales Tax Concessions) Rules, 1988 (hereafter referred to as "the Rules"). It having paid sales tax for purchase of raw materials till July 31, 1991, it prayed for refund thereof in view of the policy for the period April 1, 1989 to March 31, 1991. Not having been favoured with the refund or sales tax exemption, it sought to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court questioning the vires of Rule 2(f) of the Rules, refusal of the authorisation certificate and denial of refund of the tax paid. 5. The grievance expressed in the remaining three writ petitions is that the above named company having been granted the eligibility certificate and the other petitioners as its agents having sold its products without sales tax from the purchasers, the refusal to grant the benefit of tax exemption was in derogation of the policy and the Act. The resultant assessment orders for the periods ending September 30, 1989, March 31, 1990, September 30, 1990, March 31, 1991, September 30, 1991 and March 31, 1992 have thus been consequently impeached. The resultant assessment orders for the periods ending September 30, 1989, March 31, 1990, September 30, 1990, March 31, 1991, September 30, 1991 and March 31, 1992 have thus been consequently impeached. The respondents omitted to file their affidavit in the above writ petitions as well. 6. In the last category of appeals (Group III), the common case of the petitioner-appellant M/s. Dugar Tea Industries Private Limited, is that pursuant to the policy, it had set up an industrial unit for blending and packaging tea, the initial steps for starting whereof were taken in the year 1986 and the buildings and plants were made ready for production by incurring huge expenditure whereafter the production started with effect from April 14, 1986. The respondent No. 6, Udyog Sahayak, District Industries Centre, Kamrup, on the application of the petitioner granted the eligibility certificate on July 7, 1988 under the policy thus entitling it to claim subsidies on working capital for a period of three years, exemption of sales tax and subsidies on consumption of power for a period of five years with effect from April 14, 1988 to March 13, 1993. The General Manager of District Industries Centre, Government of Assam, also issued a permanent certificate of registration to it as a small-scale industrial unit on August 23, 1988. It maintained that the Government by the policy promised to extend interest subsidy on working capital above eight per cent for small-scale industries and sick industrial units for loans taken from banks and financial institutions for three years, sales tax exemption on purchase of materials and sale of finished products for a period of five years and power subsidy to the extent of 50 per cent for the first five years of commercial production in case of small-scale sector. 7. According to it, whereas Chapter II of the Act dealt with the sales tax concession in respect of raw materials, Chapter III thereof incorporated amendments to the existing sales tax laws for providing sale/purchase tax concession in respect of finished products. The Rules also dealt only with the exemption in respect of the raw materials to be purchased and did not in any manner refer to exemption of sales tax on finished products. The Rules also dealt only with the exemption in respect of the raw materials to be purchased and did not in any manner refer to exemption of sales tax on finished products. The State Government in exercise of powers under Section 3A of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, issued Notification No. FTX.28/87/Pt-II/40 dated July 30, 1988, which, inter alia stipulated conditions subject to which a dealer was exempted from the liability to pay sales tax in respect of sales of goods produced by him in any new industrial unit in Assam. Apart from the covenant that the dealer to avail such benefit should not collect any amount by way of sales tax in any form or manner in respect of such sales, it required him to hold an authorisation certificate granted under Section 4 of the Act to enable him to be eligible to such exemption for sales from August 1, 1988. 8. The grievance expressed is that though under the policy, the petitioner was not liable to pay sales tax for its finished products for five years and hence it did not charge the said impost from persons purchasing its manufactured tea sold during the period of such exemption from April 14, 1988 to April 13, 1993 and it had submitted its return for the period ending March 31, 1990 disclosing the above, by the impugned assessment orders dated February 1, 1999, it was assessed to various amounts to tax and interest thereon for the aforementioned period. The assessment orders and the above notification more particularly the clause pertaining to the prescription of the authorisation certificate for sales on and from August 1, 1988 were impeached. 9. The Revenue in its affidavit filed in W.P. (C) No. 3660 of 2000 and W.P. (C) No. 3662 of 2000 has pleaded that the business of the petitioner was of blending of tea and the sale thereof under different brand names after packing the same in packages of different sizes and shapes. It denied that under the policy, any exemption of tax was granted to the petitioner and that therefore it was liable to pay the levy on its turnover of taxable goods. It maintained that the assessment orders were valid and that the petitioner had been accorded enough time and opportunity to produce the books of account in the related proceedings. It denied that under the policy, any exemption of tax was granted to the petitioner and that therefore it was liable to pay the levy on its turnover of taxable goods. It maintained that the assessment orders were valid and that the petitioner had been accorded enough time and opportunity to produce the books of account in the related proceedings. As the petitioner-company was not entitled to any benefit of exemption of sales tax under the Act, its assertion of not having collected the same on its sales was inconsequential. The answering respondents denied any promise to have been held out to the petitioner by the Government of Assam, to enforce the plea of promissory estoppel. Nothing in particular was averred controverting the facts relating to the constructions and installations of the appellant-petitioner's plants and machineries and claim of commencement of its production from April, 1988. 10. Whereas by the judgment and order dated April 8, 1997 passed in CR No. 943 of 1992 (corresponding to Writ Appeal No. 283 of 1997), the petition was dismissed having raised complicated and disputed questions of facts granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the competent appellate forum under the sales tax legislation, the other petitions met the same fate in view of the decision rendered on August 17, 1998 in CR No. 4162 of 1991, CR No. 1474 of 1992, CR No. 2172 of 1992 and CR No. 2345 of 1992. Therein the learned single Judge held that the Act had been legislated to consolidate and amend the law relating to sales tax and in the light thereof, the contemporaneous sales tax law had been accordingly amended. While observing that the assailment of the vires of Rule 2(f) of the Rules had not been pursued in course of the hearing it on merits upheld the constitutionality thereof. He held the view that the exemption from payment of sales tax was regulated by the Act and the Rules and, therefore, the plea of estoppel could not override or control the provisions thereof. It was concluded that the pleadings as to the steps and actions claimed to have been taken by the petitioners pursuant to the promise were vague and that in any view of the matter, the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be applied in the teeth of the obligations or liability imposed by law. It was concluded that the pleadings as to the steps and actions claimed to have been taken by the petitioners pursuant to the promise were vague and that in any view of the matter, the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be applied in the teeth of the obligations or liability imposed by law. In substance, it was determined that the legislative sovereignty could not be interfered with by the principle of estoppel. 11. Dismissing the impeachment of the notification dated July 30, 1988, the learned single Judge in his verdict dated September 9, 2003 Reported as Dugar Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Assam[2004] 138 STC 159 (Gau), concluded that under Clause 7 of the policy, the Government had the discretion to deny the benefits of sales tax concession in respect of a certificate, article and raw materials and if pursuant thereto, the benefit of exemption was denied on certain raw materials, the plea of promissory estoppel could not be enforced. The rejection of the assertion of promissory estoppel in the decision dated August 17, 1998 was noticed and it was held that the ratio of the decision of the apex court in State of Bihar v. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 303 was not applicable in the prevailing fact situation. The impugned assessment orders were also upheld. 12. Mr. Bhatti has persuasively urged that M/s. Dugar Tea Industries Private Limited Company, a new industrial unit within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, having been issued the eligibility certificate it was entitled to the benefit of sales tax exemption extended by the policy and there being no inhibition in this regard in the provisions of the Act as well as Section 3A of the 1947 Act vis-a-vis sale of finished products, the denial of such benefit was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the policy as well as the Act and, therefore, the impugned judgments and orders merit interference in these appeals. While reiterating that the assailment of the vires of Rule 2(f) had been abandoned, the learned Counsel urged that the promises made in the policy not being mutilative of the provisions of the Act, no notification denying the benefits assured thereunder (policy) could have been validly issued and, therefore, the impugned notification dated July 30, 1988 to the contrary is unsustainable in law. 13. 13. The learned Counsel contended that even assuming that the appellant-company was not entitled to the benefit of sales tax exemption on raw materials for Section 2(f) of the Act, it was eligible thereto qua its finished products, there being no embargo either in the policy or in the Act with regard thereto. According to him, the appellant-company as a new industrial unit and the holder of eligibility certificate could not have been legally denied the benefit of sales tax exemption guaranteed under the policy and that the impugned action is impermissible on the touchstone of promissory estoppel. The invalid assessment orders are thus liable to be quashed with a direction to the respondent-authorities to refund the sales tax deposited by it and/or on its behalf, he asserted. Mr. Bhatti sought to draw sustenance for his submissions from the decisions of the apex court in State of Bihar v. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 303 , State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. [2004] 269 ITR 97 (SC) and Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2006) 3 SCC 620 . 14. Mr. Dubey, per contra, while endorsing the determinations in the writ proceedings questioned the maintainability of the writ petition in Group I maintaining that those in fact had been instituted by the agents of the assessees who admittedly did not hold any eligibility certificate. The writ petitions, according to him, were liable to be rejected in limine for want of locus of the said appellants. He contended that the policy consciously reserved the power of the State Government to regulate the benefit of exemption comprehended thereunder and the provisions of the Act as well as the impugned notification are fully attuned thereto. He, therefore, emphatically urged that the plea of estoppel against the statute was wholly unsound and thus was rightly dismissed by the learned single Judge. He urged that it being manifest from Rule 2(f) that sales tax exemption for raw materials excepted therein was not conceivable statutorily, no such benefit for finished products there from could be legally permissible. No appropriate factual foundation having been laid to substantiate the plea of promissory estoppel, no interference with the determination in the writ proceedings pertaining thereto is warranted. Mr. Dubey pressed into service the decisions of the apex court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. No appropriate factual foundation having been laid to substantiate the plea of promissory estoppel, no interference with the determination in the writ proceedings pertaining thereto is warranted. Mr. Dubey pressed into service the decisions of the apex court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 118 ITR 326 (SC), State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements 2004 (178) ELT 55 (SC) and of this court in Doson Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Assam [2001] 124 STC 305 : [2001] 2 GLT 481. 15. W.A. No. 312 of 1998 had been dismissed for non-prosecution on January 4, 2004. An application for restoration of the appeal had been filed registered as M.C. No. 2640 of 2004. On a consideration of the grounds shown explaining the default, we condoned the same and recalled the order of dismissal. 16. We have extended our anxious consideration to the rival submissions. Before dealing with the principal issue, we propose to refer to two peripheral aspects noticed in course of the arguments. In the writ appeals comprising category I, the corresponding writ petitions had been filed by the holder of the eligibility certificate and its agent selling its goods. 17. M/s. Dugar India Tea Industries Private Limited to which the eligibility certificate had been issued is one of the writ petitioners. As a common issue of entitlement of sales tax exemption is also involved in the said batch of appeals, the Revenue's plea of non-maintainability thereof on the ground of challenge to the assessment orders passed in the proceedings pertaining to the agents of the certificate holder does not commend for acceptance. Even otherwise, no specific assertion had been made in the pleadings on behalf of the respondents in this regard. 18. Noticeably the impugnment of the vires of Rule 2(f) of the Rules has 18 been renounced in the writ proceedings. The learned single Judge by the judgment and order dated August 17, 1998, however, had upheld the validity thereof on merits. Mr. Bhatti has been unambiguous in expressing that the issue is not pursued in the appeals either. No further dilation thereon, therefore, is warranted. 19. The genesis of the controversy being traceable to the policy, apt it would be to lay the preface of the adjudication therewith. Mr. Bhatti has been unambiguous in expressing that the issue is not pursued in the appeals either. No further dilation thereon, therefore, is warranted. 19. The genesis of the controversy being traceable to the policy, apt it would be to lay the preface of the adjudication therewith. The introductory rendering of the policy notified on December 24, 1986 highlights that priorities like speedy industrial development of the State as well as employment generation in the industrial sector had impelled the Government to review and revise the existing industrial policy and incentive schemes which had remained operative since 1982. The new policy was designed to remove the distortions of development in the past so as to meet the genuine aspirations of the people within a timeframe through economic and industrial development of the State thus aiming to encourage growth and promotion of all industries based on local resources, demands, scarcity conditions and environment. The package of incentives referred to therein and designated as 1986 Incentive Scheme (hereafter also referred to as "the Scheme") had been made effective from January 1, 1987. 20. Eligible units have been identified to be those set up on or after January 1, 1987 and those already existing but have undertaken expansion, modernisation or diversification at the same location or at any other place in the State of Assam provided that a unit under small-scale sector is to have 100 per cent employment of local people. Clause 9 of the policy refers to the eligibility certificate to be issued by the Udyog Sahayak of the Directorate of Industries/District Industries Centre for the Small-Scale Industrial Sector and Assam Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. ("AIDC Ltd.") for the medium and large sectors. Such certificates were required to be issued after ensuring that the norms of eligibility prescribed had been fulfilled. The catalogue of incentives, inter alia, sales tax exemption is provided in Part III of the policy. As the debate centers around the said item of relief, the relevant clause is set out herein below for ready reference. 7. Sales tax exemption.--Sales tax will be exempted on purchase of raw materials and sales of finished products for a period of five years as may be decided by the Government from time to time. 21. As the debate centers around the said item of relief, the relevant clause is set out herein below for ready reference. 7. Sales tax exemption.--Sales tax will be exempted on purchase of raw materials and sales of finished products for a period of five years as may be decided by the Government from time to time. 21. Admittedly, the eligibility certificate issued by the Udyog Sahayak in favour of Dugar Tea Industries Private Limited on July 7, 1988 was, amongst others, for claiming exemption of sales tax from April 14, 1988 to April 13, 1993. This private limited company is the centre figure in all the writ petitions as well as the appeals. The eligibility certificate was to remain valid up to April 13, 1993. The certificate of registration of the said company as a small-scale industrial unit was also issued by the Director of Industries, Assam, on August 23, 1988 indicating it to be involved in activities of tea blending and packaging. 22. In the meantime, the State Legislature had enacted the Act, which received the assent of the Governor on January 5, 1987. The preamble thereof illustrated that its main objective was to consolidate and amend the provisions of law relating to sales tax in the matter of concessions to the industries. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the statute disclose its objective to grant sales tax concession on a selective basis to the new industrial units established in the State on or after October 15, 1982 in the shape of exemption from sales tax on raw materials and sales on finished products in addition to amending the existing law on the subject of sales tax incentive to industries. The Act was brought into force with effect from August 1, 1988 vide Notification No. FTX.28/87/PT.II/19 dated June 9, 1988 published in the issue dated June 15, 1988 of the Assam Gazette. 23. Section 2(2) defines "new industrial unit" to mean an industrial unit for the setting up of which all effective steps had been completed on or after October 15, 1982 but before March 31, 1990. "Sales tax laws" have been defined in Section 2(4) to mean: (a) The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. (b) The Assam (Sales of Petroleum and Petroleum Products, including Motor Spirit and Lubricants) Taxation Act, 1955. (c) The Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956 and (d) The Assam Purchase Tax Act, 1967. "Sales tax laws" have been defined in Section 2(4) to mean: (a) The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. (b) The Assam (Sales of Petroleum and Petroleum Products, including Motor Spirit and Lubricants) Taxation Act, 1955. (c) The Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956 and (d) The Assam Purchase Tax Act, 1967. 24. Chapter II deals with sales tax concessions in respect of raw materials. Section 3 requires that notwithstanding anything contained in any sales tax law, from the commencement of the Act, no dealer would be liable to pay any tax under such law in respect of the sale by him of any goods to a person possessing a valid authorisation certificate, if such goods are specified in such certificate as intended by the holder for use by him as raw materials in the manufacture of goods in the State for sale by him. Sub-section (2) thereof prescribed that such exemption would not apply unless the dealer selling the goods furnishes to the authority competent to assess him under the relevant sales tax law, a declaration duly filled and signed by the holder of the authorisation certificate to whom the goods are sold containing the prescribed particulars in a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority. The declaration is to be furnished by the dealer along with the return of turnover due from him under the sales tax law under which the tax would have been payable in the absence thereof (declaration). 25. Section 4 mandates that a person who undertakes to manufacture in the State such goods as prescribed may make an application in the prescribed form for a certificate of authorisation for the purposes of Sub-section (1) of Section 3. On such application, the authority concerned if satisfied that the same is in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules would grant a certificate of authorisation in the prescribed form specifying the class or classes of goods for the purposes of Section 3 and the period for which it would remain valid. Section 4(3) ordains that a certificate of authorisation granted would remain valid for five years from the date of completion of effective steps for setting up the industrial unit in respect of which the certificate is granted. Section 4(3) ordains that a certificate of authorisation granted would remain valid for five years from the date of completion of effective steps for setting up the industrial unit in respect of which the certificate is granted. The said provision reserves a power in the said authority to extend the validity of the certificate till the expiry of five years from the date of commencement of production by the industrial unit. Section 4(4), however, proclaims that no certificate of authorisation would be granted except in respect of such raw materials as might be prescribed. Section 10 confers power on the State Government to make Rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act. 26. Chapter III of the statute is devoted to the amendment of existing sales tax laws for providing sales/purchase tax concessions to raw materials and finished products. Section 12 occasions an amendment to the 1947 Act by inserting Section 3A, the relevant excerpt whereof is extracted hereinbelow. 3A. Exemption for new industrial units.--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette and subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, direct that no dealer shall be liable to pay tax under this Act in respect of sales of such goods produced by him in any such new industrial unit as may be specified in the notification for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production in such new industrial unit: Provided that exemption under this section shall not be granted in respect of any sale where the dealer has collected any amount by way of sales tax in any form or manner in respect of such sale. Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, the clause 'new industrial unit' shall have the same meaning as in the Assam Industries (Sales Tax Concessions) Act, 1986. 27. It is discernible from hereinabove that the State Government by the amended provision has been empowered to direct by a notification that no dealer subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, would be liable to pay tax under the 1947 Act, in respect of sale of such goods produced by him in any such new industrial unit as may be referred to therein for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production in such unit. The proviso, however, clarifies that such exemption would not be granted in respect of any sale when the dealer has collected any amount by way of sales tax in any form or manner in respect of such sale. The new industrial unit is identified with the one as defined in the Act. The Chapter likewise deals with amendments to the other sales tax laws elucidated in Section 2(4), which for obvious reasons are not being referred to for the present purpose. 28. In exercise of the powers conferred by the Act, the Rules were framed. Rule 2(f) defines "raw material" as hereunder: Raw material' means any material or commodity capable of being used for manufacture of any other product specified in any authorisation certificate as intended by the holder for use by him as raw material in the manufacture of goods in the State for sale by him but shall not include the following commodities namely: (a) tea, (b) coal, (c) liquefied petroleum gas, (d) plywood, (e) petrol, diesel oil and lubricants. 29. Tea, therefore, in terms of the above definition is not construed to be a raw material for the purposes of the Act and the Rules. Rue 3 delineates the procedure for filing an application for an authorisation certificate envisaged in Section 4(1) of the Act. The application required to be filed in form I provided by the Rules is to be accompanied by a certificate of eligibility as per Part II of the said form issued by the appropriate authority as referred to therein and a certificate obtained from the Director of Employment, Government of Assam to the effect that the number of local people on the date of the application in the industrial unit including those in the management cadre is not less than 80 per cent of the total number of persons employed in the unit. The application should, amongst others, specify the particulars of the class or classes of goods intended by the applicant for use as raw materials in the manufacture of goods in the unit. The Rules provide that the certificate of authorisation would be as in form II also prescribing its period of validity. Rule 15 is categorical in stipulating that the authorisation certificate could be issued only in respect of such raw materials as is specified in the certificate of eligibility. 30. The Rules provide that the certificate of authorisation would be as in form II also prescribing its period of validity. Rule 15 is categorical in stipulating that the authorisation certificate could be issued only in respect of such raw materials as is specified in the certificate of eligibility. 30. The authorisation certificate as envisaged in the Act and the Rules, on a joint reading of the provisions thereof is thus required to be issued in respect of the raw materials to be consumed by the holder in manufacturing any other product in his industrial unit. A bare perusal of form I and form II provided by the Rules demonstrates that that not only the application therefore is to disclose the description of the goods required for use as raw materials but also of the goods manufactured or to be manufactured in the unit concerned. The certificate of eligibility is also required to contain the description of goods to be manufactured in the industrial unit and the raw materials to be used for the purpose thereof. It is, therefore, more than apparent from the certificate of authorisation in form II that no tax in terms thereof is payable by a dealer amongst others under the 1947 Act in respect of his sales to the holder of the goods specified therein (Table B) to be used by the holder as raw materials for the manufacture of the goods referred to (Table A) in his industrial unit(s). The certificate of authorisation, therefore, assured exemption from payment of sales tax by a dealer in respect of sales by him of goods to the holder thereof (authorisation certificate) to be utilised by the latter as raw materials for the manufacture of other goods in his unit in the State for subsequent sale. To put it differently, the certificate of authorisation is of relevance vis-a-vis sales tax exemption pertaining to sale of raw materials by a dealer to the holder of such certificate and is of no significance qua sale of finished products by such a dealer. It is in this context that Section 3A of the 1947 Act inserted by Section 12 of the Act assumed prominence. 31. It is in this context that Section 3A of the 1947 Act inserted by Section 12 of the Act assumed prominence. 31. As alluded hereinabove, the said provision vests the State Government by a notification in the official gazette and subject to such conditions as may be specified therein to relieve a dealer from the liability to pay sales tax in respect of sale of goods produced by him in any new industrial unit for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production thereof in the said unit. The Legislature therefore consciously enacted the above enabling provision for sales tax exemption pertaining to finished goods in a new industrial unit. Visibly the State Government was authorised to condition such exemption by detailing the same in the relevant notification to be published in the official gazette. 32. By the impugned notification issued in exercise of. the power under Section 3A of the 1947 Act and published in the issue dated August 1, 1988 of the Assam Gazette (Extraordinary), the Government prescribed the conditions subject to which a dealer would be entitled to sales tax exemption in respect of sale of goods produced by him in his industrial unit in the State for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production therein. The notification, inter alia, provides that for such relief, the dealer must not collect any amount by way of sales tax in any form or manner. The application of the notification is excluded in respect of sales made from August 1, 1988, unless the dealer holds an authorisation certificate granted to him under Section 4 of the Act and the validity whereof has not expired on the date of the relevant sale(s). M/s. Dugar Tea Industries Private Limited not having been issued the authorisation certificate, as the application therefore was not entertained in view of the exceptions of raw materials referred to therein, was consequently, in view of the notification, denied the benefit of sales tax exemption. 33. Reverting to the policy, more particularly, the clause relating to sales tax exemption, we entertain no hesitation to record that the same did not hold out any unequivocal representation acknowledging unqualified and absolute right therefore on the purchase of raw materials and sales of finished product for a period of five years. 33. Reverting to the policy, more particularly, the clause relating to sales tax exemption, we entertain no hesitation to record that the same did not hold out any unequivocal representation acknowledging unqualified and absolute right therefore on the purchase of raw materials and sales of finished product for a period of five years. The words "as may be decided by the Government from time to time" proclaims an inbuilt empowerment of the Government to stipulate conditions or criteria to avail the said relief. Though in principle, the Government had decided to extend the benefit of sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw materials and sale of finished products for the period enumerated hereinabove, it reserved to itself the right to ordain the terms to implement the same in practice. 34. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and the various provisions thereof clearly manifest the restrictive feature of the concessions envisaged therein. The Legislature, mindful of the policy, elucidated in explicit terms that the statute was designed to grant sales tax concessions granted on selective basis to the new industrial units established on or after October 15, 1982 by grant of exemption from sales tax on raw materials as well as finished products and to amend the existing law on the subject of sales tax incentives to industries. While Chapter II thereof dwells on sales tax concessions in respect of raw materials locatable in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, Chapter III dilates on the amendment of the existing sales tax law for providing sales/purchase tax concessions to raw materials as well as finished products. A conscious compartmentalisation of the provisions have been made by the law makers. While Chapter II has been dominantly devoted to the exemption vis-a-vis raw materials, Chapter III has brought about appropriate amendments in the contemporary sales tax laws to accord such relief also for the finished products. 35. Reading the Act as a whole, cumulatively with the statement of objects and reasons and the preamble thereof there appears to be no decipherable incompatibility with Clause 7 of the policy appertaining to sales tax concession. Neither in the policy nor in the Act or the Rules framed to effectuate the purposes thereof, any representation ever had been made by the Government recognising an unfettered and unrestricted right of any dealer or an industrial unit to avail sales tax exemption. Neither in the policy nor in the Act or the Rules framed to effectuate the purposes thereof, any representation ever had been made by the Government recognising an unfettered and unrestricted right of any dealer or an industrial unit to avail sales tax exemption. On the contrary, the relevant provisions of the policy, Act and the Rules accentuate a residuary power of the Government to codify the covenants to avail such exemption. Axiomatically the Act and the Rules are not repugnant to or irreconcilable with the policy. Section 3A of the 1947 Act is integral to the legislative scheme envisaged by the Act and, therefore, the impugned notification cannot be denounced and dubbed as lacking in competence. It is evidently in the exercise of power reserved to the Government to prescribe the conditions subject to which sales tax exemption is grantable. The validity or relevance of the pre-conditions for the applicability of the notification in respect of sales after August 1, 1988 has not been questioned. We see no good reason either to condemn the same. The impugned notification therefore does not merit interference. The decision in the corresponding writ petitions upholding the notification is, therefore, sustained. 36. The policy obviously is not a statutory instrument and cannot be construed to be an yield of act of legislation in the literal sense. It, however, unmistakably embodies a decision of the State on the recorded issues bearing on its governance. It is intended to be acted upon to achieve the object thereof and is informed with public element. Logically, to actualise the same, working norms and precepts have been recited to regulate the appurtenant and ancillary activities to ensure the certitude and credibility of the intended exercise. It portrays the decision of the executive on issues bearing on its sovereign functions designed for general compliance. The analogy of the tenets of the statutory interpretation is thus permissibly available for construing the same. 37. Clause 7 of the policy bearing on sales tax exemption, if construed to recognise an uninhibited and impregnable right to claim exemption on the purchase of raw materials and sale of finished products would render the words "as may be decided by the Government from time to time" to an insignificant surplusage. 37. Clause 7 of the policy bearing on sales tax exemption, if construed to recognise an uninhibited and impregnable right to claim exemption on the purchase of raw materials and sale of finished products would render the words "as may be decided by the Government from time to time" to an insignificant surplusage. As the policy with the package of incentives contained therein has been drawn up by the Government being cautiously aware of its commitments and the desirability of its implementation, understandably the above words cannot be discarded as useless appendages. 38. The primary rule of literal construction of statutes has been culled out in Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, in the following terms: The rule of construction is 'to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed'. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, 'but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used,' for 'it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law'. ....Where, by the use of dear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient: Words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others.' ...A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. Thus, where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one quarter sessions to another, it was observed that such a provision, though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight, could not be eliminated. 39. Thus, where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one quarter sessions to another, it was observed that such a provision, though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight, could not be eliminated. 39. The golden rule of interpretation of a statute is that the words thereof must primarily be given their ordinary meaning and a departure is permissible if it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used or the part of the statutes in which they occur requires a different meaning. This fundamental principle finds expression in the following extract from Cross in Statutory Interpretation (3rd Edition., 1995). The governing idea here is that if a statutory provision is intelligible in the context of ordinary language, it ought, without more, to be interpreted in accordance with the meaning an ordinary speaker of the language would ascribe to it as its obvious meaning, unless there is sufficient reason for a different interpretation.... Thus, an 'ordinary meaning' or 'grammatical meaning' does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and un-researched context and purpose in and for which they are used. By enabling citizens (and their advisers) to rely on ordinary meanings, unless notice is given to the contrary, the Legislature contributes to legal certainty and predictability for citizens and to greater transparency in its own decisions, both of which are important values in a democratic society. 40. This well-accepted canon of interpretation of a statutory provision that if plain language of any section thereof is clear or unambiguous, it is not open to a court to interpret by giving a meaning different from the plain grammatical meaning thereof has been reiterated time out of number by the apex court. In Molar Mal (Dead) through LRs. v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 1261 , it held that a court would have to follow the rule of literal construction which enjoins it to take the words as used by the Legislature and to give it the meaning which they naturally imply subject to the exception that such interpretation does not lead to absurdity or inconsistency. 41. 41. On the aspect of superfluity in legislation, the apex court in Ishwar Swaroop Sharma v. Jagmohan Lal [2001] 1 SCC 218 referring to the maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pareat" held against assumption of use of any word by a Legislature without any purpose. 42. The unequivocal judicial opinion noticed hereinabove reinforces our view in favour of retention of the Government's prerogative in stipulating the conditions of eligibility to avail the sales tax exemption contemplated in the policy. 43. The reliance on behalf of the appellants on the State of Bihar v. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 303 in the contextual facts appear to be misplaced. The question raised therein was whether the industrial units that had started production prior to April 1, 1993 and whose investment in the plant and machinery did not exceed Rs. 15 crores on the said date would be entitled to sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw materials in accordance with Clause 10.4(i)(b) of the Industrial Policy, 1993, of the Government of Bihar and whether the notification issued by it on April 2, 1994 in exercise of power under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, limiting the facility to those industrial units which had not availed any such benefit on the earlier incentive policy is invalid being contrary to the policy. In the reported decision, the State of Bihar declared a policy in the year 1993 which, inter alia, granted sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw materials involved therein. The respondent units were old industrial units that had gone into production prior to April 1, 1993 and whose investment in their plant and machinery did not exceed Rs. 15 crores on that date. Subsequent thereto, the Government in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 7(3)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, limited the facility to those eligible units which had not availed any benefit under the earlier incentive policy. 44. The respondents having successfully challenged the said notification, the State was in appeal before the apex court. 15 crores on that date. Subsequent thereto, the Government in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 7(3)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, limited the facility to those eligible units which had not availed any benefit under the earlier incentive policy. 44. The respondents having successfully challenged the said notification, the State was in appeal before the apex court. It was contended on behalf of the State inter alia, that Clause 10.4(i)(b) of the Policy was to be read subject to Clause (i)(a) thereof declaring that the same would be applicable to those industrial units that had come into production from April 1, 1993 to March 31, 1998 and that as the Government was within its power to issue the impugned notification under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act prescribing the conditions and restrictions in the matter of exemption, interference therewith was untenable in law. 45. Repelling the above, the apex court, while noticing that under the aforementioned clause of the policy, even old industrial units whose investment in plant and machinery did not exceed Rs. 15 crores on April 1, 1993 were entitled to sales tax exemption, refused to interfere in the appeal. It held the view that the Government in exercise of its statutory power under the Bihar Finance Act could not deny any benefit, which was otherwise available to any industrial unit under the policy. On the facts in hand, the decision is of no assistance to the appellants. As determined as above, the Policy, Act and the Rules are not mutually irreconcilable and, therefore, the notification impugned in the present appeals does not stand vitiated by the vice of repugnancy with the policy. To reiterate the Act, Rules, the policy and the notification are in cohesion with each other. The learned single Judge rightly held the reported decision to be inapplicable to the prevailing facts. The challenge to the notification therefore is unsustainable. 46. The pleadings do not provide an adequate factual foundation to sustain the plea of promissory estoppel as well. To reiterate the Act, Rules, the policy and the notification are in cohesion with each other. The learned single Judge rightly held the reported decision to be inapplicable to the prevailing facts. The challenge to the notification therefore is unsustainable. 46. The pleadings do not provide an adequate factual foundation to sustain the plea of promissory estoppel as well. Though the same scantily outlines the dates and the extent of investments made for construction of buildings and go downs including factory shed and purchase and installation of plants and machineries and the commencement of production, those do not clearly bear out that the steps so taken were pursuant to any promise or representation guaranteeing unconditionally, sales tax exemption under the policy and that thereby the appellants had altered their position to their prejudice. The authorities cited at the bar on the plea of promissory estoppel do not advance the case of the appellants in the existing conspectus of facts. Though the fundamental tenets of the said judicially evolved doctrine are well-settled, the applicability thereof are essentially fact oriented. 47. The apex court in State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. [2004] 269 ITR 97 (SC) after an exhaustive survey of its decisions rendered in Collector of Bombay v.Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay [1952] 1 SCR 43, Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies AIR 1968 SC 718 Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 118 ITR 326 (SC) and henceforth recalled the well-known preconditions for the operation of the doctrine. (1) A clear and unequivocal promise knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee; (2) Such acting upon the promise by the promisee so that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise. 48. It noticed that being an equitable doctrine, it ought to yield when the equity so required and that it would be only when the court was satisfied on appropriate and adequate materials placed by the Government that any overriding public interest required that it should not be held bound by the promise that the court would refuse to enforce the same. It further elucidated that no representation prohibited by law could be enforced as the Government could not be compelled to act contrary to any statute. It further elucidated that no representation prohibited by law could be enforced as the Government could not be compelled to act contrary to any statute. However, if the law conferred power on the Government to grant the exemption, it could be legitimately held bound by the promise made. 49. The apex court maintained that the Government could not rely on the representation made without complying with the procedure prescribed by the statute but a citizen could compel it to do so if the factors necessary for founding a plea of promissory estoppel are established. In the facts of the case, the apex court observed that the representations had been made by the highest authorities including the Finance Minister in his budget speech and that pursuant thereto, the respondents had passed on the benefits of exemption by providing various facilities and concessions for the upliftment of milk producers. The exemption in that case pertained to purchase tax on milk and milk products in the State of Punjab. The plea of promissory estoppel was upheld holding that the appellant State had failed to establish any supervening public interest which would make it inequitable to enforce the estoppel against it. 50. In Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. the State of Haryana had announced an industrial policy for the period April 1, 1988 to March 31, 1997 extending incentives by way of sales tax exemption to the industries set up in the backward areas of the State. Rule 28A framed in exercise of powers in the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, provided for the class of industries, period and other conditions for such exemption as envisaged under Sections 13B and 25A of the Act. The appellants were the owners of solvent extraction plants. Schedule III of the Rules furnished the negative list of industries. Solvent extraction plant was not included. The Rules were thereafter amended for which the benefit of sales tax exemption was denied to the appellants. The apex court held that as at all relevant times when the appellants had made investment, Rule 28A was operative and the representation acted upon indubitably had been made in terms of the said Rules which was in accord with the industrial policy of the State, the appellants having altered their position acting on the promise, the impugned action was unsustainable. In both the reported decisions, the concerned policies revealed an unequivocal and unreserved promise to the eligible industrial units assuring the incentives and exemptions referred to therein unlike the appeals under adjudication. 51. This court in Doson Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Assam [2001] 124 STC 305 : [2001] 2 GLT 481 rejected the assertion based on promissory estoppel holding that the same was not available against legitimate exercise of statutory powers or to enforce a promise or undertaking contrary thereto. The appellant industrial unit was operative from before October 1, 1962 and therefore its claim for sales tax exemption was rejected for not being a new industrial unit under the Act. This court declined to entertain the contention that the promise made by the Government that industrial units established under the previous policy of 1982 would be entitled to sales tax concession under the Act being in derogation of the statute. The plea of promissory estoppel therefore cannot be upheld. 52. The apex court in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements 2004 (178) ELT 55 (SC), has enjoined a circumspective approach for the High Court's in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in directing grant of exemption hedged otherwise by conditions stipulated by the authorities concerned. It has held that no such direction ought to be issued by overlooking the statutory conditions stipulated for such grants, more so in absence of any challenge to the validity thereof. We subscribe to the said view. 53. In the wake of the above, the contention raised by the appellants are rejected. The appeals are hereby adjudged to be lacking in merit. We have carefully perused the impugned judgments and orders and are in agreement with the conclusion recorded therein, however, for the reasons scripted hereinabove. The appeals are dismissed. No costs. In favour of Department.