PER AJAY RASTOGI, J. ( 1 ) ALL these appeals preferred by claimants involve common question of law, hence are disposed off by present order. ( 2 ) C. M. A. NOS. 1815/2006 to 1819/2006 are 182 days' time barred and for condonation of the delay, application under Section 5 of limitation Act has also been filed. Since appeals, have been heard on merits for a limited controversy raised, the delay in the interest of justice is condoned. ( 3 ) CLAIMANTS in their respective claim petitions filed under Section 166 of Motor vehicles Act, 1988 ("act, 1988") claimed compensation either on account of death of their wards or they themselves were bodily injured; and learned Tribunal awarded compensation in their favour. Either of parties has not questioned amount of compensation awarded by learned Tribunal under impugned awards. ( 4 ) AT the threshold, it is made clear that since these appeals are preferred by claimants and the question with regard to owner's liability to be indemnified by insurer or was there any breach of conditions of policy recorded under impugned awards, has not been examined by this Court. ( 5 ) ONLY question raised for determination is as to whether compensation to which claimants are made entitled for under impugned awards can be made subject to condition of furnishing security by owner of offending insured vehicle before release of compensation by insurer. ( 6 ) COUNSEL for appellants submits that liability of insurer towards third party is a statutory liability under Chapter XI of the act, 1988 which provides compulsory insurance against third party; as such even if there is any breach of condition of policy of insurance committed by owner of offending vehicle, the insurer has a right of recovery, as has been considered by Apex Court in national Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kar but condition incorporated by learned Tribunal vide impugned awards with regard to release of compensation only after owner of offending vehicle furnishes security of entire amount before the insurer pays the compensation in terms of the award, is in clear violation of Section 149 (4) of the Act, 1988 and so also against principles of law laid downby Apex court in National Insurance co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur, (supra) holding that the insurer has to satisfy the award amount of compensation in favour of claimants and recover it from owner of offending vehicle provided owner of offending vehicle furnishes security of entire amount of compensation payable to claimants by the insurer. ( 7 ) COUNSEL for appellants further submits that so far as judgment of Apex Court on which reliance has been placed by learned tribunal in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan, Pramod Kumar v. Mushtari Begum and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa bharathamma, were the cases where appeals were preferred by owner or insurer of offending vehicle; as such what has been finally observed by Apex Court will not be made applicable to cases where appeals are preferred by claimants against whom the award amount of compensation payable by either of parties has not been disputed; and in such circumstances, condition (supra)incorporated under impugned awards is not legally sustainable and in support of their contentions, Counsel placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in Banwarilal v. Gopiram and Shantidevi v. National Insurance co. Ltd. , wherein such like condition precedent impugned herein has been set aside by this Court and insurer has been directed to make payment to claimants in terms of the award reserving their recovery rights. ( 8 ) COUNSEL for respondents (insurer) on the other hand submits that condition incorporated vide impugned awards is valid and justified for a simple reason that in absence of security being furnished by owner of offending vehicle and if compensation is paid by insurer despite the fact that a finding has been recorded which has not been assailed about breach of condition of insurance policy, it would be difficult for insurer to get amount recovered from owner of offending vehicle at a later stage and being public money, safeguard has been provided in public interest with an object and purpose to achieve as is the legislative intent to enact the Act, 1988. ( 9 ) I have considered rival contentions of counsel for parties and with their assistance examined material on record. ( 9 ) I have considered rival contentions of counsel for parties and with their assistance examined material on record. Section 147 (1) (b) of the Act, 1988 duly amended by amendment Act, 1994 speaks of any liability to be incurred by owner of offending vehicle either in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a pubic place. Section 147 (1) (b) (i) reads as follows; "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability: (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in subsection (2)- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; ( 10 ) IN terms of Section 147, ibid, liability of the insurer towards third party is a statutory liability as provided under Chapter xi of the Act and provides for compulsory insurance against third party. ( 11 ) SECTION 149 of the Act, 1988 casts a duty upon insurer to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks and exclusion has been provided under sub-section (4) only to the extent as provided under sub-clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, 1988, which provides as under: " (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the nondisclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. " sub-section (4) of Section 149 of the Act, 1988 reads: " (4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 147 of the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any condition other than those in Clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147, be of no effect: provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. " Only by virtue of proviso to subsection (4)of Section 149 of the Act, 1988, the insurer has been given right of recovery of any sum paid by it in or towards discharge of any liability of any person covered by insurance policy from that person. ( 12 ) A conjoint reading of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act, 1988 clearly demonstrates that the Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation and its ultimate object is that even if there is any breach of policy of insurance by owner of offending vehicle, the insurer is liable for third party risk, which ordinarily casts duty upon insurer to fulfil, however, subject to its right of recovery enjoined upon as provided under Section 149 (4) of the Act, 1988. ( 13 ) IN this context, condition (supra)incorporated by learned Tribunal under impugned awards to release amount of compensation in favour of claimants only after owner of offending vehicle furnishes security of the award amount virtually would be denial of the compensation to the claimants, to which they are entitled for under law. ( 14 ) IN National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit kaur (supra), the Apex Court was considering situation alike herein and after taking note of section 147 of the Act, 1988, observed as under: ". . . . We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. . . . We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing Court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. " "we have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding. " (Emphasis added) ( 15 ) WHILE placing reliance on judgment in national Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur (supra), the Apex Court in Oriental Insurance co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan (supra) which was a case where appeals were preferred by the insurer of offending vehicle but the insured did not appear before High Court and so also the Apex Court despite service of notices; in such circumstances, just to ensure payment of awarded compensation to be indemnified by insurer, a condition was stipulated for furnishing security. ( 16 ) AS regards decision in Pramod Kumar v. Mustari Begum (supra), it was a case where appeals were preferred by owner of offending vehicle and condition was stipulated by Apex court with a view to ensure amount of compensation paid at once by insurer to claimants under impugned award. But, in instant case, claimants have come forward for release of compensation which either of parties has not disputed and in such circumstances, even Apex Court in National insurance Co. But, in instant case, claimants have come forward for release of compensation which either of parties has not disputed and in such circumstances, even Apex Court in National insurance Co. Ltd. Baljit Kaur (supra) has directed the insurer to satisfy the award amount in favour of claimants and a liberty was granted to the insurer to initiate proceedings for recovery thereof in accordance with law by treating it to be a decree as there was dispute between owner and insurer of offending vehicle. In such circumstances, in my considered opinion, condition incorporated by Tribunal under impugned awards to make payment of compensation to claimants subject to furnishing security by owner of offending vehicle is contrary to provisions of section 149 (4) of the Act, 1988. A coordinate bench of this Court in Banwarilal v. Gopiram (supra) has also examined an identical situation and finally held that imposition of condition to furnish security is virtually a denial of compensation amount to the claimants. ( 17 ) IT has been brought to the notice of this court that in C. M. A. Nos. 356/2005, 357/ 2005 and 366/2005, under directions of this court, the insurer deposited compensation amount through A/c payee cheques before the registry of this Court but by efflux of time, cheques have become invalidated, for which the insurer will be free to furnish fresh cheques in favour of claimants or get these cheques re-validated and payments be made to claimants as directed by Tribunal under impugned awards. However, it is made clear that if there is any amount of compensation deposited before the registry, the same be sent back forthwith to concerned Tribunal for its payment to respective claimants under impugned awards. ( 18 ) CONSEQUENTLY, these appeals are partly allowed and condition incorporated in impugned awards with regard to release of the awarded compensation by the insurer to claimants, only on furnishing security by owner of offending vehicle for entire awarded amount of compensation, is hereby quashed and set aside and to this extent, awards under challenge in these appeals accordingly stand modified and the Tribunal is directed to disburse amount of compensation to the concerned claimants immediately. No order as to costs. - .