1. This second appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree, dated 21.8.2000, passed by the learned District Judge, Cachar, Silchar, in Money Appeal No. 2/1999, upholding the judgment and decree, dated 19.2.1999, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 1, Cachar, Silchar, in Money Suit No. 1/1997, Whereby the plaintiffs' suit was decreed. 2. The material facts giving rise to this appeal may be set out as follows : The respondent herein instituted Money Suit No. 1/1997 aforementioned seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 30,000, with interest, from the defendants, holding them, jointly and severally, liable to make payment of their debts, the case of the plaintiff being, in brief, thus : On 2.7.1995, on the request made by the defendants, the plaintiff casually lent to the defendants a sum of Rs. 30,000, the said sum being payable on demand. The defendant No. 1 scribed a hand-note and his younger sister (defendant No. 2) executed the said hand-note, whereunder the defendant No. 2 took the responsibility of repaying the said loan by her. On the hand-note, so executed by the defendant No. 2, the defendant No. 1 signed as a witness. At the time, when the loan was so taken, the defendant No. 1, being a head teacher in a school, was under suspension. On the following day, i.e., on 3.7.1995, the defendant No. 1, again, came to the plaintiff requesting him to give him a further sum of Rs. 10,000, as loan, promising to execute a hand-note later on. In good faith, the plaintiff lent a further sum of Rs. 10,000 to the defendant No. 1, but no hand-note was executed by the defendants. However, in terms of the hand-note executed earlier, the defendants paid the monthly interest for two months ; but, later on, the defendants discontinued to pay the interest on the money so borrowed nor did they make payment of the principal sum. The amount, so taken on loan, rose to a sum of Rs. 78,000, which included the principal as well as the interest accrued thereon. As the defendants failed to make payment of the money borrowed by them despite demands raised by the plaintiff, the plaintiff instituted the suit seeking recovery of the said amount, with interest pendente lite and future interest on the entire amount. 3. 78,000, which included the principal as well as the interest accrued thereon. As the defendants failed to make payment of the money borrowed by them despite demands raised by the plaintiff, the plaintiff instituted the suit seeking recovery of the said amount, with interest pendente lite and future interest on the entire amount. 3. The defendants contested the suit, wherein they contended, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, that the document, based on which the suit had been filed, was not a promissory note, they had not executed any hand-note nor did they borrow any money, on loan, from the plaintiff. The suit, according to the defendants, deserved to be dismissed. 4. The learned trial court framed the following issues : 1. Is there any cause of action for the present suit against the answering defendants? 2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and manner ? 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of causes of action ? 4. Whether the defendant No. 2 executed the suit-document alleged to be hand-note/promissory note ? 5. Whether defendant No. 2 borrowed any amount from the plaintiff? 6. To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled ? 5. The learned trial court answered the issues, so framed, in favour of the plaintiff by holding, inter alia, that execution of the said hand-note was proved and the plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to recover the said amount, with interest, as claimed by him. Following the findings so reached, the learned trial court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the decree, so granted, the defendants preferred an appeal. As the appeal too proved futile, the defendants have come to this court with this second appeal. 6. This appeal was admitted on the two substantial questions of law, which read as under : (i) Whether the findings of the courts below are legally sustainable in view of the provisions under sections 101, 102, 103 and 104 of Indian Evidence Act, read with section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in holding that the burden of disproving execution of the alleged promissory note lies on the defendants. (ii) Whether the hand-note marked as Exhibit No. 1 is a promissory note within the meaning under section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 7. (ii) Whether the hand-note marked as Exhibit No. 1 is a promissory note within the meaning under section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 7. During the pendency of the suit, the appellants have also filed an application, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 4018/2006, whereby the appellants have sought for framing of the following substantial questions of law : (a) Whether the findings of both the courts below are legally sustainable in view of provision of sections 101, 102, 103 and 104 of Indian Evidence Act read with section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in holding that burden of disproving execution of the alleged promissory note lies on the defendant ? (b) Whether the finding of the learned court below that the Exhibit No. 1 is a promissory note, is a reasonable finding or not in view of the related provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act or not ? 8.1 have heard Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants. None has appeared on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. 9. While considering the present appeal, what needs to be noted is that it is against the concurrent findings of the learned two courts below that this second appeal has been preferred. While considering this appeal, it is also worth noticing that since the defendants denied execution of the said hand-note by the defendant No. 2, a specific issue, in the form of issue No. 4, as indicated above, was framed and this issue has been answered by the learned trial court in favour of the plaintiff and this finding has also been upheld by the learned appellate court. 10. In the backdrop of what is indicated above, when I turn to the evidence on record, I find that the plaintiff asserted, on oath, that Exhibit No. 1 is the promissory note, which was executed by the defendant No. 2, Exhibit 1(1) being the signature of the defendant No. 2 and Exhibit 1(2) being the signature of the defendant No. 1. Though the defendants, while cross-examining the plaintiff, denied that the Exhibit 1(1) is the signature of defendant No. 2, the fact remains that the plaintiff asserted that Exhibit 1(1) was, indeed, the signature of defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 2, however, did not enter into the witness box in support of her assertion that Exhibit 1(1) is not her signature. 11. The defendant No. 2, however, did not enter into the witness box in support of her assertion that Exhibit 1(1) is not her signature. 11. Thus, while, on the one hand, the plaintiff has given evidence, on oath, saying that Exhibit 1(1) is the signature of defendant No. 2, defendant No. 2, on the other hand, has chosen not to enter into the witness box and assert, on oath, that Exhibit 1(1) is not her signature. This apart, the evidence on record also prove the surrounding circumstances in which the money was borrowed from the plaintiff, for, it is the case of the plaintiff that the money was borrowed by the defendants for solemnizing the marriage of defendant No. 1 and this part of the assertion of the plaintiff stands proved by the evidence on record. In these circumstances, it could not have been held, and has not been rightly held, by the learned courts below that Exhibit 1(1) could not be proved to be the signature of defendant No. 2. To put it differently, the learned courts below were wholly correct in coming to the conclusion that the execution of the hand-note, which is Exhibit 1, by the defendant No. 2 and her signature thereon, as Exhibit 1(1), stood, proved. This document, i.e. Exhibit 1(1) was, in light of the provisions of section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('N.I. Act'), is a 'promissory note' whereby a promise was mad^ by the defendant No. 2 to repay, on demand, the loan taken by her from the plaintiff. 12. Coupled with the above, it is worth noticing that according to section 13 of the N.I. Act, a 'Negotiable Instrument'means, inter alia, a promissory note and section 118 of the N.I. Act, 1881, raises certain legal presumptions as regard negotiable instruments. Section 118 reads : "Presumption as to negotiable instruments. 12. Coupled with the above, it is worth noticing that according to section 13 of the N.I. Act, a 'Negotiable Instrument'means, inter alia, a promissory note and section 118 of the N.I. Act, 1881, raises certain legal presumptions as regard negotiable instruments. Section 118 reads : "Presumption as to negotiable instruments. - Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made - (a) of consideration - that every negotiable instrument was made or * drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration ; (b) as to date - that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance - that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer-that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity ; (e) as to order of indorsements - that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon ; (f) as to stamps - that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course - that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course : provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him." 13. From a careful reading of section 118, it becomes clear that once the execution of a promissory note is proved, the consideration mentioned therein and the date, on which it was shown to have been drawn, ought to be presumed to have been proved. In other words, once the execution of a promissory note is proved, the court has no option, but to presume that the consideration mentioned in the promissory note and the date on which it was drawn also stands proved. 14. It has been contended by Mr. In other words, once the execution of a promissory note is proved, the court has no option, but to presume that the consideration mentioned in the promissory note and the date on which it was drawn also stands proved. 14. It has been contended by Mr. Mazumdar, learned counsel for appellant, that section 118 comes into play only when execution of a promissory note, in terms of the definition of the promissory note, given in section 4, is, otherwise, proved. As to the proposition of law, so advanced, by Mr. Mazumdar, there can be no dispute. In the case at hand, however, the execution of Exhibit 1 by defendant No. 2 stands proved. A bare perusal of Exhibit 1 reveals that it is a promissory note within the meaning of section 4. Once it is proved that Exhibit 1 is a promissory note, the presumption, under section 118, would be available to the plaintiff. Situated thus, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the defendant-appellant No. 2 was liable to repay the loan, with interest, which had been promised by her under the said promissory note. 15. Let me, now, turn to the additional question, which has been framed as substantial question of law. This question, reads as follows : "Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred under section 7-D of the Assam Money Lenders Act, 1934 as also under sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 ? If so, whether the decree passed by the courts below is liable to be set aside ?" 16. While considering the question posed above, what needs to be noted is that in the written statement, the defendants have not taken the plea that the plaintiff is a money lender. True it is, as contended by Mr. Mazumdar, that a person, who lends money, as a money lender, is not entitled to institute a suit for recovery of loan advanced by him unless he has got himself registered in terms of section 7B of the Assam Money Lenders Act, 1934 ('the A.M. Act, 1934'). The question, however, is as to whether the plaintiff is a moneylender at all. The term 'money lender' has been defined by section 2 of the A.M. Act, thus : "2. The question, however, is as to whether the plaintiff is a moneylender at all. The term 'money lender' has been defined by section 2 of the A.M. Act, thus : "2. (1) 'Money-lender' means a person who, in the regular course of business, advances a loan as, defined in this Act and shall include, subject to the provisions of 5.6, the legal representatives and the successors-in-interest whether by inheritance, assignment or otherwise of the person who advanced the loan and money-lending shall be construed accordingly;" 17. A bare reading of the definition of 'money lender' shows that in order to hold that a person is a money lender, such a person must be shown to have been advancing loan in the regular course of business. It is not the pleaded case of the defendants that the plaintiff is in the regular course of business of advancing loan. This apart, if a person casually advances loan, once or even more than once, he cannot be retarded as 'money lender' unless the materials on record reveal that it is the regular business of the person concerned to advance loan. To support his submission that the plaintiff-respondent was a money lender, Mr. Mazumdar has placed reliance on a decision of this court, in Mis. Ramdeo Ranglal v. Jain Hardware Stores & Ors., (2004) II GLT 298. 18. while considering the case of M/s. Ramdeo Ranglal (supra), what needs to be noted is that the clear finding of the court, in Mis. Ramdeo Ranglal (supra), was that the petitioner firm had been regularly advancing loan to the respondent for the purpose of staff payment, labour payment, etc., on condition of payment of interest and it was, therefore, in such circumstances that the petitioner firm was held to be a money lender. In fact, the court, in M/s. Ramdeo Ranglal (supra), observed, ".............Question would have been altogether different had the money been advanced on a very few exceptional occasions to meet the emergent situation." The observations clearly indicate that the advancing of loan by a person in some exceptional cases, to meet emergent situation, cannot make him a money lender. 19. In the case at hand, it is the case of plaintiff that the loan was given to the defendants for the purpose of marriage of the defendant No. 1. 19. In the case at hand, it is the case of plaintiff that the loan was given to the defendants for the purpose of marriage of the defendant No. 1. In such circumstances, the plaintiff-respondent could not have been treated as money lender within the meaning of the A.M. Act, 1934. 20. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find any merit in this appeal. This appeal, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed with cost. 21. Send back the LCR.