ORDER : S. Rajeswaran, J. This application has been filed by the Plaintiff for an order of interim injunction restraining Respondents its servants agents, assigns or any other persons claiming under them from in any manner continuing the telecast of the impugned advertisement/television commercial in any television channel, the text/story board version of which is filed in English translation as plaint document Nos. 5, 6 and 7 or any other modification, variation or adaptation thereof, pending disposal of the suit. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as they are described in the suit. 3. The Plaintiff filed the above suit for the following reliefs: a. Grant a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants its servants, agents, assigns or any other persons claiming under them from in any manner continuing the telecast of the impugned advertisement/television (commercial in any television) channel the text/story board version of which is filed in English translation as plaint document Nos. 5, 6 and 7 or any other modification variation or adaptation thereof. b. Grant a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants, their men, servants, agents or assigns or any other person claiming under them from in any manner telecasting or otherwise publishing any advertisement that in any manner disparages the brand Parachute. c. Grant a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant, their men, servants, agents, assigns, or any other person claiming under them from in any manner issuing any advertisement that make any claims of superior or general benefits of its product as compared to the brand Parachute unless such claims are clearly established by clinical trials conducted by independent and reputed agency. d. Award special damages of Rs. 25,00,000 for the loss of sale and revenue or such higher amount as may be claimed by the Plaintiff at a later date and as may be determined by this Court upon enquiry. e. Order delivery up for destruction the Production Master Copy and the Artworks/advertisement material of the impugned advertisements. 4. According to the Plaintiff they are one of the oldest distributors of hair care and edible oil products of Marico Limited, a company engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil, edible oils, hair and skin care solutions etc. e. Order delivery up for destruction the Production Master Copy and the Artworks/advertisement material of the impugned advertisements. 4. According to the Plaintiff they are one of the oldest distributors of hair care and edible oil products of Marico Limited, a company engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil, edible oils, hair and skin care solutions etc. Among other products Parachute coconut oil which is manufactured by Marico is one of the largest packaged coconut oil brands and it is one of the 100 most trusted brands in India. 5. The Plaintiff entered into an agreement dated 24.12.2005 with Marico and under this agreement the Plaintiff has been authorised to take necessary legal proceedings in this State against any persons who infringes or misuses the trade mark Parachute or in any manner disparages the brand name Parachute. 6. The grievance of the Plaintiff is that the 1st Defendant company which manufactures VVD gold coconut oil issued 3 advertisement through TV channels of Defendants 2 to 4 and thereby disparaged the Plaintiff's product, namely, Parachute. Hence the above application has been filed for an interim injunction. 7. The offending advertisements, according to the Plaintiff, are that No. 1, in which too tender coconuts, one in green colour and another in blue colour are shown and an actress wearing green dress appears on the scene and asks a question i.e., which is natural and then, she herself picks up a green coconut and says that it is natural. 8. In the advertisement No. 2, an actress wearing green dress picks up one of the green colour plastic bottles of VVD arranged in a shelf and says this is 100% pure and natural and this is what I want. Then the next shot shows an actress wearing green dress in the foreground and the lady wearing blue saree in the background. The lady wearing blue saree has a blue colour bottle in her left hand and a VVD bottle in her right hand. She looks at the blue bottle which is in her left hand and shakes her head disapprovingly and puts the bottle down. Then she looks at the VVD bottle in the right hand and lifts the bottle up and says VVD Gold, this is what I want. 9. She looks at the blue bottle which is in her left hand and shakes her head disapprovingly and puts the bottle down. Then she looks at the VVD bottle in the right hand and lifts the bottle up and says VVD Gold, this is what I want. 9. In advertisement No. 3, which is shown in fast forward mode, people going into a supermarket where two shelves are displayed pick up all the green bottles in no time and empty the shelf which is once again refilled and other shelf with blue bottles is shown as remaining almost untouched. 10. According to the Plaintiff these 3 advertisements are nothing but a dishonest attempt on the part of the 1st Defendant to show that the Plaintiff's product is not a pure and natural product which is totally false. It is not only defamatory, any unethical but a 100% disparaging attempt to discredit the Plaintiffs product. The Plaintiff claims that insofar as the sales of coconut oil in blue colour plastic bottle is concerned. Parachute which is in blue colour plastic bottle holds 64.5% market share and it is the market leader. 11. According to the Plaintiff the blue bottle shown in the advertisements refers only to Parachute blue bottle as the blue bottle shown in the advertisements bears a bar code and only Parachute in blue bottles have a bar code. It is the case of the Plaintiff that all the 3 advertisements deliberately go to show that the blue plastic bottle of Parachute is not 100% pure and natural, which is directly disparaging of Parachute. Hence they filed the above suit and the application for the above said reliefs. 12. This Court on 17.8.2006 granted an order of interim, injunction for a period of 3 weeks against the 1st Defendant, not to make disparaging ads against the Plaintiff's Parachute coconut oil and ordered notice to the Defendants. 13. The 1st Defendant entered appearance and filed counter affidavit. 14. In this counter affidavit they questioned the locus-standi of the Plaintiff to file the suit when Marico Ltd., itself did not care about the advertisements. 15. On merits they contended that WD gold is the leading brand manufacturing 100% pure edible grade coconut oil and all other brands including most of Marico brands manufacture coconut oil mixed with some other oil or substance. 16. 15. On merits they contended that WD gold is the leading brand manufacturing 100% pure edible grade coconut oil and all other brands including most of Marico brands manufacture coconut oil mixed with some other oil or substance. 16. The 1st Defendant stated that their advertisements do not refer to Parachute alone and it refers to all other brands also and most of other brands also sell their oil blue colour plastic bottles. The 1st Defendant cited an example by referring to Plaintiff's another brand Parachute advanced which is composed of refined coconut oil Vitamin E, perfume etc. 17. The 1st Defendant denies that the aim of the advertisement is to disparage the brand Parachute, but to drive home the message that WD is 100% pure coconut oil. The 1st Defendant denies that the Parachute is the only coconut oil brand blue bottles having a bar code and there are at least 6 other brands which are blue coloured bottle having bar code. They contend that the advertisement is clearly decent, honest and truthful and sought for the dismissal of the injunction application. 18. Heard Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff and Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel for 1st Defendant. I have also gone through the documents filed and the Judgments referred to by them in support of their submissions. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff relying on the following decisions submitted that the 3 advertisements are slanderous, defamatory and disparaging and the same should be stopped pending disposal of the above suit: (1) AIR 2005 Del 102 (Dabur India Limited v. Colgate Palamolive India Ltd.) (2) 1975 (2) ALL ER 599 (De Beers Products v. Electric Co. of New York. (3) Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs. Colgate Palmolive (I) Ltd. and Another, (1998) 1 SCC 720 20. Per contra the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Defendant submits that these advertisements are not disparaging as they only focus on their point that VVD coconut oil is the 100% pure and natural oil. 21. He relies on the following decisions, namely. (1) Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Reckitt Benckiser (I) Ltd., (2006) 128 DLT 81 (2) Dabur India Ltd. Vs. Wipro Limited, (2006) 129 DLT 265 22. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations. 23. 21. He relies on the following decisions, namely. (1) Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Reckitt Benckiser (I) Ltd., (2006) 128 DLT 81 (2) Dabur India Ltd. Vs. Wipro Limited, (2006) 129 DLT 265 22. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations. 23. First let me consider the decisions cited by both sides to cull out the legal principles holding this filed of disparaging advertisements. 24. In AIR 2005 Del. 102 (cited supra), the Delhi High Court held as follows: 12. In my view the law relating to generic disparagement of a specified commodity and the entitlement of one of such unidentified manufacture of such decried product is settled by Dabur's (judgment following the Reckitt Coleman) judgment. The Dabur's judgment (supra) indeed in paragraph 9 refers specifically to and prescribes generic disparagement. 13. While Mr. Rohtagi is right in submitting that the generic disparagement was not to be found in the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Reckitt and Coleman's case (supra) which was followed in Dabur's case, yet I am of the view that the position of law about generic disparagement in Dabur's case was not only justified but also warranted. Even if the ratio of the two learned Single Judge's judgments of this Court is considered to be only in respect of an identified product, in principle there is no reason why the manufacturer of a disparaged product, which, though not identified by name, cannot complain of and seek to injunct such disparagement. 19. I am further of the view that generic disparagement of a rival product without specifically identifying or pinpointing the rival product is equally objectionable. Clever advertising can indeed hit a rival product without specifically referring to it. No one can disparage a class or genere of a product without which a complaining Plaintiff falls and raise a defence that the Plaintiff has not been specifically identified. In this context the Plaintiff has rightly rejected the offer of the Defendant to drop the container from its advertisement so as to avoid the averred identification of the Plaintiffs product. I must also deal with a English judgment of Willes J. relied upon the counsel for the Defendant ("or which no citation is indicated), the entire reasoning of which reads as under: Willes, J.- The action cannot be maintained. I must also deal with a English judgment of Willes J. relied upon the counsel for the Defendant ("or which no citation is indicated), the entire reasoning of which reads as under: Willes, J.- The action cannot be maintained. Assuming the article to be libellous, it is not a libel on the Plaintiff: it only reflects on a class of persons dealing in such objects: and it is immaterial in this view whether they are genuine or not. If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless there is something to point to the particular individual, which (350) there is not there. There is nothing to show that the article was inserted with any special reference to the Plaintiff. It does not appear that the Defendant knew of his existence. But further, I am of opinion that this is no libel, for that it is protected by the privilege of fair discussion on a matter of public interest, it is not appearing that it was malicious. With the greatest respect to the reasons said to be contained in the above English judgment, I totally disagree with the view of Willes, J., for the following reasons: (a) It deals with libel and not a commercial advertisement. (b) It contains no worthwhile reasons. (c) English judgements are not binding on me particularly when Dabur India's judgment (supra) of a learned Single Judge covers the issue. 21. The advertisement campaign on the visual media has an immediate impact on the viewers and possible purchaser's mind particularly when a well known cine star is endorsing it. The Plaintiff has thus made out a prima facie case of comparative strength particularly when the Defendant does not deny that its campaign points out the deleterious effect of Lal Dant Manian powder. The balance of convenience is also in the favour of the Plaintiff as the effect of the advertisement aired cannot be repaired readily and easily. The Plaintiff has thus made out a prima facie case of comparative strength particularly when the Defendant does not deny that its campaign points out the deleterious effect of Lal Dant Manian powder. The balance of convenience is also in the favour of the Plaintiff as the effect of the advertisement aired cannot be repaired readily and easily. The averred right of the Defendant to inform the purchasing public of the ill effects of the Lal Dant Manjan powder based on its commissioned study cannot tilt the balance of convenience in the favour of the Defendant particularly when Plaintiff also seeks to rely upon studies commissioned by it to back up the merits of its product Consequently, the non-grant of an interim injunction would cause irreparable injury to the Plaintiff not compensable in damages. 25. In 1975 (2) All ER 599 (cited supra), it was held as follows: Counsel for the Plaintiffs, on the other hand, accepts that a mere puff by any trader of his own products is not actionable, but says that the matter becomes quite different if the trader descends to particulars precisely why his product is better than his rival's or his rival's is worse than his and he says, fairly read, what Tech-Data/1 in the present case is doing is to say in substance not merely that MBS-70 is superior to DEBDUST, but that DEBDUST is not proper for its purpose. What precisely is the law on this point? It is a blinding glimpse of the obvious to say that there must be a dividing line between statements that are actionable and those which are not and the sole question of a dry point of law such as we are discussing here is where does the line lie? On the one hand, it appears to me that the law is that any trader is entitled to puff his own goods, even though such puff must, as a matter of pure logic, involve the denigration of his rival's goods. Thus in the well known case of the three adjoining tailors who put notices in their respective windows reading: The best tailor in the world' 'The best tailor in this town', and 'The best tailor in this street', none of the three committed an actionable offence. This is, I think, a proposition which extends to a much wider field than the slander of goods: for example. This is, I think, a proposition which extends to a much wider field than the slander of goods: for example. I think it extends to other vague commendatory statements about goods or services on offer. Principal among its application has been the case of auctioneers who, within limits, have always been allowed to use language which is strictly perhaps not literally true; thus, for example, to take note of one instance, in Hope v. Walter (1900) I Ch 257 Lindley MR stated (1900) I Ch at 258: 'I do not attach any importance to the word "eligible": it is the ordinary auctioneer's language.' In other words, in the kind of situation where one expects, as a matter of ordinary common experience, a person to use a certain amount of hyperbole in the description of goods, property or services, the Courts will do what any ordinary reasonable man would do, namely take it with a large pinch of salt. Where, however, the situation is not that the trader is puffing his own goods, but turns to denigrate those of his rival, then, in my opinion, the situation is not so clear cut. Obviously the statement: 'My goods are better than x's' is only a more dramatic presentation of what is implicit in the statement: 'My goods are the best in the world'. Accordingly. I do not think such a statement would be actionable. At the other end of the scale, if what is said is: 'My goods are better than X's, because X's are absolute rubbish', then it is established by dicta of Lord Shand in the House of Lords is White v. Mellin 1895 AC 154 at 171, which were accepted by counsel for the Defendants as stating the law, the statement would be actionable." 26. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs. Colgate Palmolive (I) Ltd. and Another, (1998) 1 SCC 720 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 18. On a consideration of the above contentions and on a careful appraisal of the reasons given by the Commission was a purely discretionary order and was also an a interim order pending the passing of a final order or temporary injunction and is not liable to be interfered with in this appeal. On a consideration of the above contentions and on a careful appraisal of the reasons given by the Commission was a purely discretionary order and was also an a interim order pending the passing of a final order or temporary injunction and is not liable to be interfered with in this appeal. As stated earlier, a reading of the Commission's order shows that it noticed that the Appellant was relying upon opinions of experts to substantiate its claim of 102% superiority in anti-bacterial action while the Respondent, 1st complaint was also relying upon the opinion of its experts to contradict the Appellant's claim. The matter being technical in nature, if the Commission felt, as suggested by the Appellant in its reply, that a panel of experts could go into the correctness of rival claims and give its opinion and the Commission further said that after the opinion was given, parties could make their final submissions in the injunction application and if the Commission felt that till then, an order of an interim nature should operate, we do not think that it is a fit case for interference with such a discretionary order. We do not therefore propose to go into the merits of the contentions. Further, any expression of opinion by this Court on merits at this preliminary stage could cause prejudice to the claims and contentions of one or other of the parties. 27. In Dabur India Ltd. Vs. Wipro Limited, (2006) 129 DLT 265 , the Delhi "High Court held as follows: 22. The intent of the commercial is to suggest that the product of the Defendant, that is. Wipro Sanjivani Honey is far superior to that of the Plaintiff, that is, Dabur Honey. While doing so, the commercial does not denigrate or disparage the product of the Plaintiff-it merely compares the two brands of honey and proclaims that the product of the Defendant' is superior. It seems to me that it is one thing to say that the Defendant's product is better than that of the Plaintiff and it is another thing to say that the Plaintiff product is inferior to that of the Defendant. The commercial clearly intends to say (and so it does) that as compared to the product of the Plaintiff, the product of the Defendant is far better. The commercial clearly intends to say (and so it does) that as compared to the product of the Plaintiff, the product of the Defendant is far better. The hidden message in this may be that the product of the Plaintiff is inferior to that of the Defendant but that will always happen in a case of comparison-while comparing two products, the advertised product will but naturally have to be shown as better. The law, as accepted by this Court, is that it is permissible for an advertiser to proclaim that its product in the best. This necessarily implies that all other similar products are inferior. 23. In comparative advertising a consumer may look at a commercial from a particular point of view and come to a conclusion that one product is superior to the other, while another consumer may look at the same commerciar from another point of view and come to a conclusion that one product is inferior to the other. Disparagement of a product should be defamatory or should border on defamation, a view that has consistently been endorsed by this Court. In other words, the degree of disparagement must be such that it would tantamount to, or almost tantamount to defamation. In the present case, the overall audio-visual impact does not leave an impression that the story line of the commercial arid the message that is sought to be conveyed by it is tot Dabur Honey is being denigrated, but rather that Wipro Sanajivani Honey is better. 24. Learned Counsel for the Defendant objected to the use of the bottle of Dabur Honey, which is its registered design and submitted that the use of this bottle in the commercial leaves no manner of doubt that the product sought to be compared by the advertiser is Dabur Honey. While this may be so, the, bottle of Dabur Honey is shown for a fleeting moment and this is immediately followed, by another unnamed and undisclosed brand of honey whose bottle cannot even be located. In other words, the idea behind the commercial is that Wipro Sanjivani Honey is better than any other honey in the market and even if the insinuation is that it is better than Dabur Honey, there is nothing wrong in the Defendant saying so as long as there is no disparagement (in the sense of defamation) of the product of the Plaintiff. This disparagement is lacking in the commercial. 25. A manufacturer of a product ought not to be hypersensitive in such matters. It is necessary to remember that market forces are far stronger than the best advertisements. If a product is good and can stand up to be counted, adverse advertising may temporarily damage its market acceptability, but certainly not in the long run. 28. In Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Reckitt Benckiser (I) Ltd., (2006) 128 DLT 81 , the Delhi High Court held as follows: 9. Development of law on the Comparative advertisement in this country, is a recent phenomenon though abundance of judgments of the Courts in England and United States of America are available. Comparative advertising is advertisement where a party advertises his goods or services by comparing them with goods and services of another party. This is generally done by either projecting that the advertiser's product is of same or superior quality to that of the compared product or by denigrating the quality of the compared product. There is an underlying assumption that the comparative advertising benefits the consumer as the consumer comes to know of the two products and their comparative features/merits. New or unknown brands benefits most from com associated with the compared brand with or to the new brand. Comparative advertising has become more widespread, particularly in fiercely competitive markets. 13. I may state at the outset that the cardinal principle is that the advertiser has right to boast of its technological superiority in comparison with product of the competitor. He can declare that his goods are better than that of his competitor. However, while doing so, he cannot disparage the goods of the competitor. Therefore, if the advertising is an insinuating campaign against the competitor’s product such a negative campaigning is not permissible. The advertiser, therefore, may highlight the positive features of his product and can even claim that his product is better than his competitors. Such a statement may highlight the positive features of his product and can even claim that his product is better than his competitors. Such a statement may be untrue. But while doing so, he is not permitted to project that his competitor’s goods are bad. Accepting this cardinal principle, the Calcutta High Court in the case of Reckitt and Colman of India Ltd. v. M.P. Ramachandr an and Anr. Such a statement may be untrue. But while doing so, he is not permitted to project that his competitor’s goods are bad. Accepting this cardinal principle, the Calcutta High Court in the case of Reckitt and Colman of India Ltd. v. M.P. Ramachandr an and Anr. (supra) after taking note of some English judgments, culled out the following propositions of law: (I) A tradesman is entitled to declare his goods to be best in the world, even though the declaration is untrue. (II) He can also say that his goods are better than his competitors', even though such statement is untrue. (III) For the purpose of saying that his goods are the best in the world or his goods are better than his competitors' he can even compare the advantages of his goods over the goods of others. (IV) He, however, cannot, while saying that his goods are better than his competitors', say that his competitors' goods are bad. If he says so, he really slanders the goods of his competitors. In other words he defames his competitors and their goods, which is not permissible. (v) If there is no defamation to the goods or to the manufacture of such goods no action lies, but if there is such defamation an action lies and if an action lies for recovery of damages for defamation, then the Court is also competent to grant an order of injunction restraining repetition of such defamation. 21. What is that the advertisement of the Defendant wants to project? It shows the presence of both mosquitoes and cockroaches in the house by depicting an attack from both the sides, one by mosquitoes and other by cockroaches. Then it seeks to emphasise that use of two different products at the same time to kill two different insects may be inconvenient. The message which is sought to be projected is that in any household or in a kitchen both the insects are normally found. When the lady of the house is confronted with 'do tarfa hamla'. the message is prevalence of both kinds of insects at same time and same place. At that time holding two cans, one to kill mosquitoes and other to kill cockroaches may be cumbersome. The commercial then comes up with the answer by introducing the product of the Defendant whereby both the cans come together to morph into Mortein aerosols can. the message is prevalence of both kinds of insects at same time and same place. At that time holding two cans, one to kill mosquitoes and other to kill cockroaches may be cumbersome. The commercial then comes up with the answer by introducing the product of the Defendant whereby both the cans come together to morph into Mortein aerosols can. Again, the message is that there is one single product which is insecticide for both types of insects. Telling the consumer that you can use one single product to kill two different species insects, by no stretch of imagination would amount to disparaging the product of the Plaintiff or for that matter, of those manufacture two different products for destroying two different insects. It is a statement of fact which is in the visual. 39. Thus in all the aforesaid cases the sales talks denigrated the product of the competitors and were, therefore, injuncted. If without doing so the advertisement highlights the product of the advertiser as better than that of the competitor, grant of injunction would not be appropriate. 41. It cannot be imagined that the Plaintiff did not come to know of it and the statement in the plaint about acquiring knowledge only in September, 2005 is obviously inaccurate in its pitch confronted with these facts, figures and documents the only oral explanation sought to be given was that in February, 2005 the advertisement was different as when the two cans were shown in earlier commercial. AVO was "Do can kyon" and, therefore, action was not taken but the advertisement is offending as showing 'Do tarfa hamla' and, therefore, action can be taken. There are two responses. First, it is hardly a distinguishing feature in so far as grievance of the Plaintiff is concerned. Even in the advertisement then shown, the lady is looking at the two cans in red and black colour and is in confused and hapless state. This is precisely the grievance today. Then it could be the grievance even at that time as well but the Plaintiff eschewed that advertisement and did not take any action almost for one year. Secondly, this argument admits that the Plaintiff had knowledge about the Defendant's commercial even in February, 2005. Even otherwise, it is highly improbale that the Plaintiff did not come to know of this advertisement and spotted this advertisement only in September, 2005. Secondly, this argument admits that the Plaintiff had knowledge about the Defendant's commercial even in February, 2005. Even otherwise, it is highly improbale that the Plaintiff did not come to know of this advertisement and spotted this advertisement only in September, 2005. The Plaintiff did not even bother to find out since when the advertisement was shown on TV channels and conveniently made the statement in the plaint that it came to know about this advertisement only in September, 2005.I am, therefore, of the view that the Plaintiff is guilty of concealment of material facts as well. 42. As an upshot, not only injunction application of the Plaintiff warrants to be dismissed, even the suit is liable to be dismissed. There is another reason for adopting this course of action. Entire matter is examined treating the averments of the Plaintiff as correct (except the assertion about coming to know of the advertisement only in September, 2005). Therefore, there is no need of evidence to establish the facts. However, even on the basis of averments made in the plaint, the legal right in favour of the Plaintiff is not established as the impugned advertisement of the Defendant is not disparaging. 29. The following are the legal principles that arise for consideration from the above citations: (1) A manufacturer of a disparaged product which though not identified by name can complain of and seek to injunct such disparagement. (2) Generic disparagement of a rival product without specifically identifying or pinpointing the rival product is equally objectionable. (3) Advertisement campaign on visual media has an immediate impact on the viewers and possible purchasers' mind particularly a well known cinema star is endorsing it. (4) There must be a dividing line between statements that are actionable and those which are not. (5) When a claim of superiority over a rival product is made and until the same is proved by a panel of experts, an order of interim nature should operate against those advertisements. (6) Advertiser has a right, to boast of its technological superiority in comparison with a product of a competitor, however while doing so, he cannot disparage the goods of the competitor. (7) If the Defendants highlight its better future while comparing its product with that of the Plaintiff in an advertisement, no possible objection can be raised thereto. (6) Advertiser has a right, to boast of its technological superiority in comparison with a product of a competitor, however while doing so, he cannot disparage the goods of the competitor. (7) If the Defendants highlight its better future while comparing its product with that of the Plaintiff in an advertisement, no possible objection can be raised thereto. (8) Courts will injunct an advertiser from publishing an article if the dominant purpose is to injure the reputation of the Plaintiff. (9) The factors to be kept in mind to decide the question of disparagement are (1) intent of the commercial (2) manner of the commercial (3) story line of the commercial, and (4) the message sought to be conveyed by the commercial. (10) The degree of disparagement must be such that it would tantamount to or almost tantamount to defamation. (11) An advertiser can say that his product is better than that of his rival, but he cannot say that the rival's product is inferior to his product. 30. In the light of the above legal principles let me now consider the facts of the present case to decide the injunction application. 31. The Plaintiff complains of 3 advertisements telecast in the television channel which are marked as plaint documents 5, 6 and 7 and contend that they are aimed at them and are disparaging their product Parachute. 32. Insofar as the 1st advertisement is concerned, there is no reference to any blue bottle referable to the Plaintiffs blue brand, even though a blue coconut is being shown alongwith a green coconut. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that this advertisement refers to the product of the Plaintiff. Therefore I do not find anything offensive and disparaging in this advertisement and the same cannot be injuncted from being telecast through television channels. 33. Insofar as advertisements 2 and 3 are concerned, they definitely refer to a plain unnamed blue bottle and drives home a message that the blue bottle does not contain 100% pure and natural coconut oil whereas the 1st Defendant's product alone contain 100% pure and natural coconut oil. It is one thing to say that the 1st Defendant's product alone is 100% pure which is not actionable and it is another thing to say that the Plaintiffs product is not 100% pure which is actionable. 34. It is one thing to say that the 1st Defendant's product alone is 100% pure which is not actionable and it is another thing to say that the Plaintiffs product is not 100% pure which is actionable. 34. Even though it was denied by the 1st Defendant that they did not mean to run down the product of the Plaintiff, it was admitted by them that it was aimed at all the blue bottles including that of the Plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that only the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are holding the majority market share in the State of Tamil Nadu and in such circumstances it cannot be said that no attempt was made by the 1st Defendant to disparage the product of the Plaintiff namely Parachute. 35. Even in the counter affidavit, the 1st Defendant tries to compare its product with that of the product of the Plaintiff by name Parachute advanced which is not 100% pure edible grade coconut oil. But the 1st Defendant did not come forward with the relative merits of the Plaintiffs product namely. Parachute 100% pure coconut oil and its product which raises a serious doubt about the intention of making such advertisements. It is also not a case of the 1st Defendant that both coconut oils were tested by a panel of independent experts and it was proved that the 1st Defendant's product in 100% pure coconut oil and Parachute is not so. In such circumstances, advertisement Nos. 2 and 3 are certainly causing disparagement of the product of the Plaintiff. 36. If it is an innocuous advertisement without any intent to malign, defame and disparage the product of the Plaintiff, then there was no necessity of showing a blue bottle and comparing its purity by more than one in action. 37. The 3rd advertisement also goes to show that the general public not picking the blue bottles stacked in the shelf whereas the 1st Defendant's product are being grabbed with enthusiasm and swiftness. This definitely would send a wrong message to television viewers and the buyer of the coconut oil that the blue bottle products are inferior to that of green bottle products of the 1st Defendant, which is nothing but openly disparaging the product of the Plaintiff. 38. This definitely would send a wrong message to television viewers and the buyer of the coconut oil that the blue bottle products are inferior to that of green bottle products of the 1st Defendant, which is nothing but openly disparaging the product of the Plaintiff. 38. Therefore I am of the considered opinion that a prima facie case has been made out by the Plaintiff with regard to advertisements 2 and 3 which are filed as plaint documents 6 and 7 and that would definitely cause damages to the products of the Plaintiff and the balance of convenience is also in favour of the Plaintiff to restrain the 1st Defendant from continuing the telecast of those television commercial in any television channel. 39. Even though arguments were advanced by both the parties with regard to locus standi of the Plaintiff to file the above suit, and the maintainability of the suit u/s 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, I have not considered the same in this order as the same are the larger issues which could be gone into at the time of trial. Further a mini trial cannot be conducted at the time of deciding interlocutory application of injunction. 40. In the result the injunction application is allowed to the extent of advertisements 2 and 3 only which are plaint documents 6 and 7. With regard to advertisement No. 1 is concerned namely, plaint document No. 1 the injunction application is dismissed. No costs.