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2007 DIGILAW 1001 (AP)

Vana Appanna v. Gorle Venkata Surya Prakasa Rao

2007-10-10

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2007
JUDGMENT 1. The first defendant in O.S.No.140 of 1982 in the Court of the II Additional District Munsif, Srikakulam is the appellant. 2. Respondents 1 to 5 herein filed the suit for the relief of partition of suit schedule property of an extent of Ac.1.20 cents into three equal shares and to put them in possession thereof. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. 4. The first plaintiff and his brother by name Gorle Bhaskara Rao filed O.S.No.45 of 1950 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam for partition against their father and other brothers. A compromise decree was passed on 11.03.1953, where under, different extents of properties were allotted to the shares of various parties. The schedule land admeasuring Ac.1.20 cents was allotted in favour of one Kodem Ammadu, the paternal aunt of the first plaintiff with certain conditions. She was entitled to have life estate as regards one-third of it and the vested remainder of that was to pass on to the father of the first plaintiff, by name Achaiah. So far as the balance of two- third is concerned, Ammadu was conferred with the right to enjoy and alienate the property, but, in case it remains in tact during her lifetime, half of it was to devolve upon one Gorle Dalappadu Naidu and the balance upon the wife of her another deceased brother by name Gorle Ammajamma. The plaintiffs are the legal descendants of the said three persons, upon whom the property allotted to Kodem Ammadu was to devolve upon in different shares. 5. The appellant alone resisted the suit. He pleaded that Kodem Ammadu executed two Will Deeds on 24.05.1945 and 12.11.1971 in favour of one Gorle Bullibabu, son of Gorle Dalappadu Naidu bequeathing the entire suit schedule property in his favour. It was also stated that apart from two Wills referred to above, she executed a deed of settlement on 26.03.1972 marked as Ex.B2 in favour of the said Bullibabu for the entire extent of Acs.1.20 cents. The defendant, in turn, is said to have purchased the property under a sale deed, dated 25.02.1979, marked as Ex.B1. It was also stated that apart from two Wills referred to above, she executed a deed of settlement on 26.03.1972 marked as Ex.B2 in favour of the said Bullibabu for the entire extent of Acs.1.20 cents. The defendant, in turn, is said to have purchased the property under a sale deed, dated 25.02.1979, marked as Ex.B1. The gist of the contention was that the right of Kodem Ammadu vis--vis two-third of the property i.e. Ac.0.80 cents was absolute from the beginning and as regards the remaining one-third, for which life estate was created in her had enlarged into absolute right by operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (for short 'the Act'). 6. The trial Court dismissed the suit, accepting the plea of the defendant. The plaintiffs filed A.S.No.49 of 1993 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam. The lower appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court and passed a preliminary decree, as prayed for. Hence, this second appeal. 7. Ms. Anula, the learned counsel appearing for Sri D.Ramalingaswamy, the learned counsel for the first defendant submits that the limited estate that was created in favour of Kodem Ammadu had enlarged into an absolute one, by operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act and that there was no basis for the lower appellate Court in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. She further submits that even the property that accrues to a woman, under a decree would be governed by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act and the mere fact that the property came to be allotted to a woman under a decree does not attract sub-section (2) of Section 14. She places reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in VADDEBOYINA TULASAMMA v VADDEBOYINA SESHA REDDY1. 8. Sri A.Ravi Shankar, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that since the only document under which the property had accrued to Kodem Ammadu was Ex.A1, which is a compromise decree, the exception carved out under sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. He further contends that the said lady did not have any pre-existing right, to be maintained vis-- vis her brothers or their sons and in that view of the matter, the judgment of the lower appellate Court does not warrant interference. 9. He further contends that the said lady did not have any pre-existing right, to be maintained vis-- vis her brothers or their sons and in that view of the matter, the judgment of the lower appellate Court does not warrant interference. 9. The first plaintiff deposed as P.W.1 and he filed Exs.A1 to A4. The defendant deposed as D.W.1 and he filed Exs.B1 and B2. 10. The claim in the suit actually related to an extent of Ac.0.40 cents. The plaintiffs did not lay any claim for the extent of Ac.0.80 cents, representing two-thirds. The basis for their claim was a recital in Ex.A1. The trial Court did not agree with their contention and dismissed the suit by applying sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The lower appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court and passed a preliminary decree, as prayed for. 11. The only question that arises for consideration in this second appeal is, as to whether sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 14 of the Act, applies to the facts of the case. 12. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court have undertaken extensive discussion in their endeavour to arrive at a conclusion as to which of the provisions referred to above apply to the facts of the case. The purport of Section 14 of the Act, as a whole, was dealt with in detail by the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case (supra). A reading of Section 14 of the Act discloses that a property possessed by a female Hindu before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as a full owner and not as a limited owner. In other words, if any limited rights were created in favour of a woman as regards the property such as life estate, that would enlarge into an absolute right. Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act gives guidance as to the nature of the property that is governed by that provision. It can be through inheritance or during the course of partition, or in lieu of maintenance, or by way of gift from any person. Sub-section (2), however, carves out an exception to the principle laid down in sub-section (1). It can be through inheritance or during the course of partition, or in lieu of maintenance, or by way of gift from any person. Sub-section (2), however, carves out an exception to the principle laid down in sub-section (1). According to it, where the property accrues to a woman by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court, in a restricted form, no enlargement of the rights would take place. 13. In Tulasamma's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that a limited estate created in favour of a Hindu woman, under a decree would also enlarge into an absolute one, if the same was given to her, in lieu of maintenance. Therefore, the fact that the limited estate as regards one-third of the suit schedule property was created in Kodem Ammadu under Ex.A1, a decree of a Court, does not make any difference in the context of examining the case vis--vis sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The only area of verification and examination would be as to whether it was given in lieu of her maintenance. 14. The concept of maintenance of a woman assumes significance, in the context of the persons against whom such rights are claimed. It is only when a Hindu woman has a right to be maintained, against another person, and the limited estate is created in her favour in lieu of such maintenance, that sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act would get attracted. In contrast, a limited estate created in a Hindu woman by a person who did not owe any obligation to maintain her would be governed by sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. The present case needs to be examined by keeping this subtle distinction in view. 15. The record discloses that Kodem Ammadu was married. A woman is entitled to be maintained by her parents up to the date of her marriage and after her marriage, by her husband, or in-laws in case of the death of the husband. Therefore, the marital status of a woman would assume significance vis--vis her right to be maintained. Since Kodem Ammadu was married, her basic right to be maintained was against her husband, or her parents-in-law. Her brothers, who were parties to O.S.No.45 of 1950, were not under legal obligation to maintain her. Therefore, the marital status of a woman would assume significance vis--vis her right to be maintained. Since Kodem Ammadu was married, her basic right to be maintained was against her husband, or her parents-in-law. Her brothers, who were parties to O.S.No.45 of 1950, were not under legal obligation to maintain her. The fact that they made certain provision for her maintenance, does not clothe her, with the right to claim maintenance as of right. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act does not get attracted to the facts of the case. The lower appellate Court has taken this view and repelled the contention of the defendant. This Court is convinced that the approach of the lower appellate Court accords with the settled principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court do not warrant interference. 16. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.