JUDGMENT A.K. Sikri, J.- The respondent herein filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 6,89,364.49 against the appellant herein. It was pleaded that the respondent and the appellant were close friends as they were course mates in the same squadron in the National Defence Academy during the period 1954-57. Another course mate of the respondent, Brig. P.s. Yadav (Retd.) was allowed to form a Coal Transport Company by the Director General of Resettlement under the scheme for retired Army personnel. Brig. Yadav requested the respondent to join him in the said enterprise. When the appellant came to know of this, he expressed his desire to invest his money and join that venture representing that he had sufficient funds at his disposal for this purpose. The respondent communicated this desire of the appellant to Brig. Yadav, who also agreed to the inclusion of the appellant. All the three, namely, the respondent, the appellant and Brig Yadav decided to subscribe 3334, 3333 and 3333 shares respectively of face value of Rs. 100/ - each in the company agreed to be floated by them jointly. Two tipper trucks were also to be purchased for running the coal transport company. 2. It was further averred in the plaint that on or around 20.3.1995 the respondent approached the appellant and requested him to contribute his share by making investment of Rs. 3,33,300/- towards share capital and Rs. 1,70,000/- towards margin money for two tipper-trucks. Contrary to the earlier representation, the appellant now held out that he did not have funds available to him. In any case, on his request, the respondent arranged for a temporary loan on Rs. 5,04,000/- which money was provided to the appellant for subscribing to the share capital and contributing his share of margin money for the purchase of tripper trucks. Vide his letter dated 26.10.1995, he acknowledged his liability and also created a pledge/lien upon his shares. 3. As the loan was not repaid by the appellant, the respondent filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 5,04,000/- along with interest, which was claimed at the rate of 18% per annum on the ground that this rate of interest was agreed upon between the parties. The appellant herein filed the written statement and denied the liability, including acknowledgement dated 26.10.1995. However, when the admission/denial of the documents took place on 4.8.1998, he admitted this letter which was marked as Ex. PI. The appellant herein filed the written statement and denied the liability, including acknowledgement dated 26.10.1995. However, when the admission/denial of the documents took place on 4.8.1998, he admitted this letter which was marked as Ex. PI. Immediately thereafter, the respondent filed application under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that there were sufficient admissions on the part of the appellant, which would entitle him to obtain a decree. The appellant filed reply to this application. In the reply, his plea was that Ex. PI was not willingly accepted and was executed under coercion and pressure. Arguments were heard and vide impugned order dated 14.12.2004 the learned ADJ has allowed the application of the respondent herein. As a sequitur, decree, as prayed for, is passed. However, pendente lite and future interest is restricted to 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realisation of the decretal amount. 4. Feelings aggrieved with the said order, this appeal is preferred by the appellant. He states that there were no admission, much less sufficient admissions warranting passing of the decree in favour of the respondent. 5. Since decree has been passed by the learned ADJ on the basis of purported admissions contained in Ex. PI, in the first instance we look into this document. It is handwritten document dated 26.10.1995 by the appellant herein described as Acknowledgement. It read as under: " ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The undersigned acknowledges having received loan of amounts shown as under advanced by Maj. Gen. P.C. Puri, A VSM, VSM or arranged under the arrangements. (a) Bank of Baroda, Pallia draft No. DD/94/ AJ No. 129913 dt. 24 Mar., 95 85,000/- (b) Bank of India Sector 17, Chandigarh, draft No. BFS/NWZIDD 270482 dt. 25 Mar, 95 85,000/- (c) A sum of Rs. 3,33,000/ - has also been deposited on behalf of the undersigned as share capital on A/c No.13592 of BMC BL New Delhi on 30 Mar, 95 (i) Bank of Baroda Pallia draft No. DD/94/AJ 129912 dt. 24 Mar., 95 3,15,000/- (ii) Bank of India, Sector 17, Chandigarh, Draft No. BFS/NWZ/DD 270430 dt. 25 Mar, 95. 2. The undersigned agrees to pledge the portion of his shares in M/ s. MAA KARNI COAL CARRIERS PVT. LTD. to Maj. Gen. P.C. Puri, AVSM, VSM. The share certificates will remain in the safe custody of MAA KARNI COAL CARRIERS PVT. LTD. 25 Mar, 95. 2. The undersigned agrees to pledge the portion of his shares in M/ s. MAA KARNI COAL CARRIERS PVT. LTD. to Maj. Gen. P.C. Puri, AVSM, VSM. The share certificates will remain in the safe custody of MAA KARNI COAL CARRIERS PVT. LTD. still liquidated (not legible). 3. The loan carries an interest of 18 percent (18%) per annum. sd/ (D.S. SACHAR, COL. (Retd.) DIRECTOR M.K.C.C. Pvt. Ltd. Camp-Bisrampur 26 Oct., 95." 6. The appellant did not dispute that this document is in his handwriting and contains his signatures thereon. Reading of this document would clearly disclose that the appellant has, in no uncertain terms, accepted that he received loan from the respondent. Particulars of various cheques vide which amount was paid to him are also given. The document further reveals that two demand drafts of Rs. 85,000/- each dated 24th and 25th March, 1995 respectively drawn on Bank of Baroda were given by the respondent to the appellant, which were deposited in the appellants current account. In addition, a sum of Rs. 1,000/ -was also deposited in cash which makes a total of Rs. 1,71,000/-. It appears that this is the amount which was given as margin money for purchase of two tipper trucks. Two more demand drafts of Rs. 3,15,000/- and 18,000/- dated 24.3.1995 and 25th March, 1995 respectively were also given for the share capital subscribed by the appellant. He has also agreed to pledge the portion of his shares in the company which the parties floated with Brig. Yadav under the name and style of Maa Karni Coal Carriers Pvt. Ltd. till the liability is liquidated. It is also acknowledged that the loan was to carry an interest of 18% per annum. 7. In view of categorical admission contained in this document by the appellant in his own hand, there is hardly anything which needed to be proved by the respondent in support of his suit for recovery of this amount given by way of loan. Realising this, the plea taken in reply to application under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC was that the said document Ex. PI was not written voluntarily, but executed under coercion and pressure, etc. Realising this, the plea taken in reply to application under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC was that the said document Ex. PI was not written voluntarily, but executed under coercion and pressure, etc. The learned ADJ turned down this plea of the appellant observing that there was no explanation of any sort as to under what compelling circumstances the appellant could have been forced to execute this document. Such a plea was taken just for the sake of defeating the rightful claim of the respondent. 8. We have perused the reply filed by the appellant to the respondents application under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC. We find from the reply that apart from making a bald averment to the effect that the document was executed by him under coercion, pressure, etc., no particulars of such coercion or pressure are given at all. Whenever plea of such coercion, etc. is taken, law mandates that plea should be supported with proper particulars. Reference to the provisions of Order 6 Rule 4, CPC may usefully be made in this behalf. This provisions makes the following reading: //4. Particulars to be given where necessary.-In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue intluence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.// 9. No doubt, this provision relates to pleading and pleading shall mean plaint or written statement as per Rule 1 of Order 6, CPC. However, the spirit of this provision shall apply even to a case like this where there is an unqualified admission in the document, which is even admitted by the appellant but the appellant still wants that this document should not be looked into by taking the plea of coercion. It would be of interest to note here that in the written statement, the appellant had totally denied having executed any such acknowledgement dated 26.10.1995. However, at the time of admission and denial of the document when he was confronted with this particular document, he found no option but to admit the execution thereof. When examined in this light, it would be clear that the only plea of the appellant in the written statement was that this acknowledgment was not even executed by him. However, at the time of admission and denial of the document when he was confronted with this particular document, he found no option but to admit the execution thereof. When examined in this light, it would be clear that the only plea of the appellant in the written statement was that this acknowledgment was not even executed by him. However, when application under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC was filed, he felt alarmed and realised the consequence of this admission and took the plea that it was obtained under• undue influence and coercion. Learned trial Court is, therefore, right in its remark that such a plea, in reply to application under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC, was an attempt to defeat the rightful claim of the respondent. If there was any such coercion, as alleged, the appellant should have come out clean by honestly admitting the execution of the document in his written statement itself and taking this plea therein. The plea of coercion in the reply was, therefore, clearly speculative and make belief, which was rightly not eschewed by the learned trial Court. 10. Faced with this situation, the learned Counsel for the appellant in c this appeal made the following two submissions: (A) For a decree to be passed on the basis of admissions, admissions have to be clear, unambiguous and unqualified and for this purpose, entire written statement is to be read and not the isolated portions. He referred to the following judgments in support of his submission- (i) Balraj Taneja and Anr. v. Sunil Madan and Anr... VIII (1999) SLT 65= AIR 1999 SC 3381 . . (ii) Manisha Commercial Ltd. v. N.R. Dongre & Anr., 85 (2000) DLT 21l=AIR 2000 Delhi 176. (iii) Parivar Seva Sans than v. Dr. (Mrs.) Veena Kalra & Ors., 86 (2000) DLT 817=AIR 2000 Delhi 349. (iv) Madhav Leasing Finance (P) Ltd. v. Erose Educational Infotech Pvt. Ltd., 68 (1997) DLT 846=1997 V AD (Delhi) 627. There is no doubt about the principles of law contained in the aforesaid judgments. However, in the present case, we find that Ex. PI is clear and unqualified acknowledgement and acceptance of the liability. Not only it confirms that the respondent had given the loan in question, it also gives the particulars of the demand drafts vide which the loan was given. It also states the purpose for which the money was utilised. However, in the present case, we find that Ex. PI is clear and unqualified acknowledgement and acceptance of the liability. Not only it confirms that the respondent had given the loan in question, it also gives the particulars of the demand drafts vide which the loan was given. It also states the purpose for which the money was utilised. It also mentions that the appellant was pledging the shares of the company for repayment of the loan. It even mentions the interest which this loan was to carry (See Balraj Taneja and Anr. v. Sunil Madan & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 3381 ). The object of, Order 12 Rule 6, CPC is to enable the parties to obtain speedy judgments and, therefore, Courts are not to unduly narrow down the scope and meaning of this Rule. In Shikharchand & Ors. v. Mst. Bari Bai & Ors., AIR 1974 MP 75 , the Court held that a judgment under Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC can be based on a statement made by the parties de hors the pleadings and such admissions could be either expressed or constructive. This Court in K.N. Construction v. JVG Finance Ltd., 111 (2004) DL T 437, concurred a with the aforesaid view. We may also, quote for our benefit, the following observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik, 104 (2003) DLT 151=2003 III AD (Delhi) 419: "9. The test, therefore, is (i) whether admission of fact arise in the suit, (ii) whether such admissions are plain, unambiguous and b unequivocal, (iii) whether the defence set up is such that it requires evidence for determination of the issues and (iv) whether objections raised against rendering the judgment are such which go to the root of the matter or whether these are inconsequential making it impossible for the party to succeed even if entertained. It is immaterial at what stage the judgment is sought or whether C admissions of fact are found expressly in the pleadings or not because such admissions could be gathered even constructively for the purpose of rendering a speedy judgment." The present case fulfils the aforesaid test. (B) Ex. PI could not have even been considered, as it is an unstamped :I document, though it required stamp of rupee one and, therefore, is inadmissible under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. (B) Ex. PI could not have even been considered, as it is an unstamped :I document, though it required stamp of rupee one and, therefore, is inadmissible under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. He submitted that the document is termed as acknowledgement and is required to be stamped as per Article 1 of Schedule 1 to the Stamp Act. The submission of the learned Counsel was that Section 35 lays down that an unstamped document cannot be looked into as evidence and passing judgment on the basis of such a document was totally untenable. He referred to the judgment in the case of Smt. Gita Devi Shah & Ors. v. Smt. Chandra Moni Karnani & Ors., AIR 1993 Calcutta 280 wherein it was held that even if the objection of stamp duty was not taken by a party, the Court was under obligation to look into this question as it was an independent obligation of the Court to look into admissibility of the evidence. We have the following two answers to this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant: (i) even if the document is unstamped, Court can impugn the document and get the same adjudicated in so far as the payment of stamp duty is concerned. The penalty up to 10 times of the stamp duty payable can be levied. Since the document requires, admittedly, stamp duty of one rupee, the respondent will have to pay stamp worth ten rupees even if maximum penalty is imposed. On payment of this duty the document can be read into evidence. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Narender Kumar and Ors. v. Hans Raj and Anr., AIR 1986 HP 75 has explained the legal position in the following words: 17. The approach of the learned Sub-Judge in the matter in my view was wholly erroneous and has resulted in his failure to exercise his lawful jurisdiction. So as to call for interference by this Court It is an admitted position that the document sought to be produced by the petitioners before the trial Court was an unstamped one. In a situation of this type when a document chargeable with duty is found unstamped or insufficiently stamped and is produced before a Court, the Court is under a legal obligation in terms of Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act to impound such a document. In a situation of this type when a document chargeable with duty is found unstamped or insufficiently stamped and is produced before a Court, the Court is under a legal obligation in terms of Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act to impound such a document. In other words, the Court is duty bound to take such document into legal custody. After the document is so impounded there are two courses open to the Court. The first course is to admit the document into evidence of course subject to all just exceptions, upon payment of the duty chargeable thereon and the penalty as provided under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act if so tendered by the party producing the document. After the stamp duty and the penalty are so paid, the Court is required to send to the Collector an authenticated copy of the document together with a certificate in writing stating the amount of duty and penalty levied in respect thereof and also to send such amount to the Collector as provided by Sub-section (1) of Section 36 of ~he Stamp Act. The second course is when the party producing the document fails to pay the duty and penalty as provided under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, the Court must send the original document to the Collector who shall then take necessary steps for realising the stamp duty and the penalty. There is no third course open to the Court like keeping the unstamped document on the record without first realising the stamp duty and the penalty. 8. Again if we look to the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, it is obvious that the bar against admittance in evidence of an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument of the nature like the one under consideration as placed by Section 35 of the Stamp Act is not an absolute bar and the same would stand removed as soon as the duty chargeable on the instrument or the deficiency in such duty along with the prescribed penalty are paid. The party producing an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument of this nature has, therefore, the right to claim that the instrument be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficient stamp duty and the penalty which right as earlier stated is, of course, subject to all just exceptions. The party producing an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument of this nature has, therefore, the right to claim that the instrument be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficient stamp duty and the penalty which right as earlier stated is, of course, subject to all just exceptions. This view found support in the judgment of the Apex Court in Peteti Subba Rao v. Anumala S. Narendra, II (2001) SLT 370= (2002) 10 SCC 427 . We, therefore, take this document, namely, Ex. PI into legal custody and direct the respondent to pay the requisite stamp duty along with penalty, which would be Rs. 10/-. Since the learned Counsel the respondent, during the course of arguments, had stated that such duty would be paid, he admit the document into evidence, which otherwise stands proved as it is an admitted document and can proceed with the case on the basis of this document. We, however, make it clear that after the stamp duty and the penalty are paid, the Registry shall send to the Collector, an authenticated copy of the document together with a certificate in writing stating that the amount of duty and penalty levied has been paid. The embargo, as sought to be created by the appellant in admitting this document into evidence, thus vanishes and with that goes the basis of submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. (ii) Learned Counsel for the respondent had submitted that apart from Ex.PI, the pleadings, namely, the plaint and the written statement would clearly bear out that there was hardly any dispute raised by the appellant in so far as liability to make the payment is concerned. 11. He referred to paras 14,17,18,21,22,24 and 28 of the plaint and the replies given thereto in the written statement in juxta position with each other to decipher as to what was the stand of the appellant to the case set up by the respondent: Para No. 14 Plaint Written Statement On learning from the plaintiff of the proposed company to be formed by the said Brig. Yadav and the plaintiff, the defendant disclosed to the plaintiff, his desire to invest his money and join the venture. At that time, the defendant represented that he had sufficient funds at his disposal that would be required to be invested in the proposed company. Yadav and the plaintiff, the defendant disclosed to the plaintiff, his desire to invest his money and join the venture. At that time, the defendant represented that he had sufficient funds at his disposal that would be required to be invested in the proposed company. Paragraph No.14 of the plaint is absolutely wrong, not correct and is denied. It is wrong and is denied that the defendant ever disclosed his desire to invest money and join the venture as alleged. It is also denied that the defendant ever represented about having sufficient funds at his disposal. It is submitted that the plaintiff had informed the defendant about the formalities of the company but he never disclosed the quantum of the amount required to be invested. It is further submitted that the defendant at the outset had informed the plaintiff that he would have no objection to join the venture but would not be able to contribute any substantial amount. It is wrong and is denied that the defendant ever represented to the plaintiff that he had sufficient funds at his disposal that would be required to be invested in the proposed company. All other averments in the paragraph under reply are denied. 17 The said three Directors namely Paragraph No.17 of the plaint is a the plaintiff, the defendant and matter of record. Brig. Yadav, agreed to subscribe to 3334, 3333 and 3333 shares, respectively. Each share costing Rs. 100/-. The capital of the company being Rs. 10,00,000/-. The company namely Maa Karni Coal Carriers Pvt. Ltd. was registered with the Registrar of Companies on 10th January, 1995. ]8. By repeated and concerted efforts Paragraph No.18 of the plaint is a of the plaintiff and the intervention matter of record. C of the DCR, a viable work was offered to the said Company on 16th March, 1995 and the DCR was accordingly informed of the same for grant o~ sponsorship to the company. d 21. On or around the 20th March, 1995 Paragraph No. 21 of the plaint is the plaintiff approached the wring not correct and is denied. defendant and requested the later, It is wrong and is denied that on that the time had come for him to 20th March, 1995 the plaintiff make the requisite investment of approached the defendant as alleged Rs. 2,33,300/- towards share capital or otherwise. it is wrong and is e and Rs. defendant and requested the later, It is wrong and is denied that on that the time had come for him to 20th March, 1995 the plaintiff make the requisite investment of approached the defendant as alleged Rs. 2,33,300/- towards share capital or otherwise. it is wrong and is e and Rs. 1,70,000/- towards margin denied that for the first time the money for two tipper trucks. This is defendant took the stand that he the time when defendant dropped was having no funds available the bomb-shell. Contrary to his with him. As submitted herein before earlier representations to the defendant had made it clear to plaintiff, the defendant now took the plaintiff even at the time of their f a stand that fundt, were not first meeting that he would not be available with him. The defendant able to contribute any substantial now represented that his money amount in the venture and as such was invested and any premature the allegations made by the plaintiff encashment would result in loss of are false to his own knowledge and interest, etc. He requested the have been made with ulterior plaintiff to arrange for a temporary motives. Each and every averment in 9 loan the paragraph under reply is wrong and is specifically denied. 22. In view of what was now held by Paragraph No. 22 of the plaint is the defendant, the plaintiff and Brig. denied for want of knowledge. It is F.5. Yadav, were in quandary. They wrong and is denied that the had either to believe the defendant defendant at any point of time made h and arrange for the temporary loan any alleged representation to the or to disbelieve him and go through plaintiff or to Brig. Yadav as alleged the process of finding a third Director and fresh registration of the Company which may have resulted in the losses of the opportunity of carrying out coal transportation and also loss of money which had already been spent in carrying out the feasibility studies and registration of the company. There was nothing before the plaintiff and Brig. Yadav to disbelieve the defendant especially in view of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, did not at that time suspect the ulterior motive and mala fide intentions of the defendant. The plaintiff arranged for the loan i.e. total sum of Rs. There was nothing before the plaintiff and Brig. Yadav to disbelieve the defendant especially in view of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, did not at that time suspect the ulterior motive and mala fide intentions of the defendant. The plaintiff arranged for the loan i.e. total sum of Rs. 5,03,000/- which included the said sum of Rs. 3,33,000/- and Rs. 1,70,000-. The said amounts were agreed to be treated as a temporary loan granted by the plaintiff to the defendant to tide over the crisis created by the defendant. It was further agreed between the parties that the said loan of Rs. 5,03,000/- would be repaid by the defendant to the plaintiff within six months along with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum the plaintiff handed over drafts to totalling a sum of Rs. 5,03,000/ - to the defendant at Delhi on 28th March, 1995. Drafts worth Rs. 3,33,000/were deposited in the Current Account of the company (C/A No. 13592) maintained with Bombay Mercantile Cooperative Bank and two drafts worth Rs. 85,000/- each were deposited in the personal account of the defendant (C/A No.13761) with the said Bank. The defendant stayed at the said site til126th October, 1995. During this period, the plaintiff requested the defendant on several occasions or otherwise. It is wrong and to denied that the defendant has any ulterior motives or mala fide intentions as alleged or otherwise. Paragraph No. 24 of the plaint is not admitted as stated. It is wrong and is denied that the alleged drafts were delivered to the defendant at Delhi on 28th March, 1995. It is submitted that all the drafts were deposited by the plaintiff in the current account of the company with the Bombay Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd. and in the alleged personal account of the defendant in the name of the defendant. In reply to paragraph No. 28 of the plaint, it is admitted to the extent that the defendant stayed at the site till 26th October, 1995. It is submitted that during the stay of the defendant the plaintiff with mala fide intentions and ulterior motives obtained the signatures of the defendant on blank Share Transfer forms. In reply to paragraph No. 28 of the plaint, it is admitted to the extent that the defendant stayed at the site till 26th October, 1995. It is submitted that during the stay of the defendant the plaintiff with mala fide intentions and ulterior motives obtained the signatures of the defendant on blank Share Transfer forms. It is submitted that by that time the shares had not been issued by the company to the defendant and in fact till date no shares have been delivered to the defendant by the company. As such obtaining the signatures of the defendant by the plaintiff on blank share transfer forms was wholly illegal and mala fide. It is submitted that, according to the information of the defendant, which has been received subsequently, the plaintiff did not have so much money with him as he alleged to have advanced to the defendant. The plaintiff is put to strict proof of the allegations in the plaint. Each and every averment in the paragraph under reply which has not been specifically admitted here in before is specifically denied. 12. The aforesaid comparison would reveal that the appellant though denied that he represented that he had sufficient funds at his disposal to invest in the proposed company, he admitted that he would have no objection to join the venture but would not be able to contribute substantial amount. He further admitted about the grant of sponsorship by the DGR for establishing this company. Again, in reply to para-21, he only stated that he had already informed that he would not be able to contribute any substantial amount but did not specifically deny at all the averment made in para-21 to the effect that "he requested the plaintiff to arrange for temporary loan". Like Wise, averment in para-22 of the plaint that in these circumstances the respondent was to arrange for temporary loan for the appellant or find a third director and fresh registration of the company are also not disputed specifically by the appellant. He has only stated in the written statement that he had no ulterior motives or mala fide intentions. Like Wise, averment in para-22 of the plaint that in these circumstances the respondent was to arrange for temporary loan for the appellant or find a third director and fresh registration of the company are also not disputed specifically by the appellant. He has only stated in the written statement that he had no ulterior motives or mala fide intentions. In reply to para 24 of the plaint wherein it is stated that the plaintiff had arranged for the loan in question, though the appellant has denied that the drafts were delivered to him, he had admitted that the drafts were deposited in the current account of the company as well as personal account of the appellant (as already noted, it is stated in the acknowledgment that two drafts were deposited in the current account of the company and other two drafts were deposited in the account of the appellant). In reply to para-25 of the plaint, the appellant admits deposit of Rs. 1,000/- by the plaintiff, to reply the said loan amount. However, the defendant continued to offer excuses and represented to the plaintiff that he would only be able to repay the amount on his return to his horne town. The plaintiff started becoming apprehensive of the intentions of the defendant. After much coaxing, the defendant agreed to acknowledge the loan in writing. As security for the said loan, the defendant also offered to pledge and/or create lien upon his shares of the said company in favour of the plaintiff. This offer of the defendant was accepted to by the plaintiff respondent herein in the account, although he gives his own version. In para-28 of the written statement the appellant admitted that he had signed a share transfer form, though he alleged that signatures were obtained on the blank forms. This offer of the defendant was accepted to by the plaintiff respondent herein in the account, although he gives his own version. In para-28 of the written statement the appellant admitted that he had signed a share transfer form, though he alleged that signatures were obtained on the blank forms. It clearly follows from the aforesaid contents of the written statement that the defendant admitted the case set up by the plaintiff to the effect that he wanted to become one of the directors and share holders of the proposed company; he was required to invest the money as well (the only dispute raised by him is that he had not represented initially that he had sufficient money in this behalf and rather he had told the respondent in the very beginning that he was not having sufficient money); he did not specifically deny the averments that loan was arranged by the respondent for him to buy the shares and also give the margin money for purchase of trucks; he admited the deposit of the bank drafts of Rs. 1,70,000/- plus Rs. 1,000/- in the current account of the company for the purchase of trucks and deposit Rs. 3,30,000/- in his account from which shares were subscribed. 13. Thus, by vague denials coupled with some specific admissions, the whole transaction in question stands admitted even in the written statement. These kinds of pleadings appearing in the written statement, when read in the light of Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order 8, it would be clear that decree could be passed unhesitently. These Rules are to the following effect: "ORDER VIII [WRITTEN STATEMENT, SET-OFF AND COUNTER-CLAIM] 3. Denial to specify-It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the ground alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. 4. Evasive denial-Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. 5. Specific denial-[(l) Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability: Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved other-vise than by such admission. [(2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved. (3) In exercising its discretion under the provision to Sub-rule (1) or under Sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a plea r. (4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.]" 14. In Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. v. Union Bank of India and Ors., VI (2000) SLT 87= (2000) 7 SCC 120 , the Supreme Court held that evasive and unspecific denials would amount to an unequivocal admission of the contents of documents relied upon by the plaintiff. This principle shall apply to pleadings as well. This Court in Rajiv Saluja v. M/s. Bhartia Industries Ltd. & Anr., 98 (2002) DLT on =AIR 2003 Delhi 142, has taken the view that the Court is required to ignore vague, evasive and unspecific denials as well as inconsistent pleas in the written statement and replies (also See Rajiv Sharma and Anr. v. Rajiv Gupta, 109 (2004) DLT 509=AIR 2004 Delhi 248). No doubt, the learned ADJ has passed the decree only on the basis of Ex. Pl. v. Rajiv Gupta, 109 (2004) DLT 509=AIR 2004 Delhi 248). No doubt, the learned ADJ has passed the decree only on the basis of Ex. Pl. However, when we are sitting in appeal and hearing the matter, we can look into these aspects as well having regard to the powers of the Appellate Court under Section 107 of the CPC, more so when the learned Counsel for the appellant himself wanted us to do so. In any case, these are further reasons in addition to the reasons given by the learned ADJ as the decree could be passed on the basis of Ex. PI alone as well. 15. This appeal has, therefore, no merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.