1. This revision is directed against the judgment, and decree, dated 30.6.2004, passed, in Title Appeal No. 7 of 2003, by the learned Additional District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, upholding the judgment and decree, dated 28.5.2003, passed, in Title Suit No. 217 of 1988, by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Kamrup, Guwahati, whereby the plaintiff-respondent's suit for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the suit premises, on the ground that the defendant is a defaulter, was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. 2. The material facts and various stages, which have led the present revision, may, in brief, be set out as follows: (i) The respondent herein instituted the suit aforementioned seeking eviction of the defendant from the suit premises, his case being, in brief, thus: The defendant has been a tenant under the plaintiff as a landlord in respect of the suit premises since 1.10.1975, the tenancy being a monthly tenancy and the rent of Rs. 2,400 being payable within the first week of each succeeding month according to English calendar. As the plaintiff resides in the United States, the defendant had been depositing the rent in the plaintiff's account and had so deposited the rent till December 1997. By his letter, dated 10.1.1998, the plaintiff informed the defendant to deposit the rent with Smt. Saroj Tahbildar, constituted attorney of the plaintiff. However, the defendant failed to deposit the rent with the said attorney of the plaintiff since the month of January 1998. Moreover, the plaintiff has decided to return to India and settle at Guwahati, and, hence, the suit premises are bona fide required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation. On the basis of the case so set up by him, the plaintiff sought for, inter alia, a decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises, for recovery of possession thereof, etc. (ii) The defendant contested the suit by filing its written statement, the defendant's case being, briefly stated, thus: In accordance with the request made by the plaintiff, the defendant had sent a cheque, dated 3.2.1998, for Rs. 2,400 to the plaintiff's said attorney as rent for the month of January 1998, the cheque having been sent to the plaintiff's said attorney by the defendant through one of its employees. 2,400 to the plaintiff's said attorney as rent for the month of January 1998, the cheque having been sent to the plaintiff's said attorney by the defendant through one of its employees. As the said attorney refused to accept the cheque; and returned the same, the cheque was, again, sent by registered post to the said attorney of the plaintiff; but the attorney, once again, refused to receive the cheque sent by registered post. The defendant, then, sent the cheque through its employees and on this occasion, while the said attorney of the plaintiff accepted the cheque, she refused to give any receipt. Left with no other alternative, the defendant deposited the rent in the court, for the months of January and February, on 27.3.1998. The suit premises are not bona-fide required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation. The defendant accordingly sought for dismissal of the suit. (iii) Following issues were framed in the suit: 1. Whether there is any cause of action for this suit ? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form ? 3. Whether the defendant has defaulted in payment of rent for the suit premises ? 4. Whether the suit premises is required for bona fide use and occupation by the plaintiff? 5. Whether the defendant is liable to be ejected from the suit premises ? 6. To what relief/reliefs the parties are entitled ? (iv) The learned trial court held that the plaintiff could not prove that he required the suit premises bona fide for his own use and occupation. It, however, held that the defendant was proved to be a defaulter for having not paid the rents since January, 1998. For the conclusions, so reached, the learned trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. As the appeal preferred by the defendant proved futile, the defendant has, now, impugned the judgment and decree aforementioned in this revision. 3. I have heard Mr. A.K. Sarkar, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, and Mr. H.K. Deka, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. 4. As the appeal preferred by the defendant proved futile, the defendant has, now, impugned the judgment and decree aforementioned in this revision. 3. I have heard Mr. A.K. Sarkar, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, and Mr. H.K. Deka, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. 4. While considering the present revision, it may be pointed out, at the very outset, that though it was agitated, in the present revision petition, by the defendant that the suit was not maintainable due to non-joinder of parties, this aspect of the revision has not been pursued at the time of hearing of this revision. The only question, which has been agitated in this revision, and which needs to be answered, is as to whether the concurrent findings of the learned court below that the defendant was a defaulter is sustainable in law. 5. While considering the question as to whether the defendant could be proved to be a defaulter, what needs to be noted is that it has been the case of the plaintiff, as already indicated above, that the rent was payable by the defendant within the first week of every succeeding month according to English calendar. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant contended, in the written statement, that there was not specific date for payment of rent and that the rent was payable at the convenience of the defendant, the fact remains, as correctly noted by the learned appellate court, that the defendant's witness (DW1) admitted, in his cross-examination, that the defendant had been paying rent within the first week of every month. In the face of this categorical admission and in the absence of any other evidence showing that the rent was used to be paid at the convenience of the defendant, there can be no escape from the conclusion, as has been correctly concluded by the learned appellate court, that within the first week of each succeeding month, rent was payable. In the face of this categorical admission and in the absence of any other evidence showing that the rent was used to be paid at the convenience of the defendant, there can be no escape from the conclusion, as has been correctly concluded by the learned appellate court, that within the first week of each succeeding month, rent was payable. I may hasten to point out that though it surfaces from the evidence on record that the rents for the months of June and July 1983, were paid together and so were paid the rents for the months of November and December 1983, what needs to be carefully borne in mind is that payment of rent on two occasions, as indicated hereinabove, during the subsistence of more than 20 years of tenancy, cannot be made a ground to hold that the rent was not payable within the first week of each succeeding month. This impression gets strengthened from the fact that the suit was instituted in the year 1998 and since December 1983, no instance has been cited to show that the monthly rent was not paid within the first week of each succeeding month according to English calendar. 6. Bearing in mind, therefore, the fact that the rent was payable within the first week of each succeeding month according to English calendar, let me determine if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant was not a defaulter. While considering this aspect of the case, it needs to be pointed out that when a landlord alleges that rent has not been received by him, the onus lies on the tenant to prove that the rent has, in fact, been paid or deposited in accordance with law. This apart, a tenant cannot deposit rent in the court in terms of section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 ('the said Act) unless the rent, having become due, has been offered to the landlord and the landlord has refused to accept the same. 7. A careful reading of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the said Act shows that the right of a tenant to deposit rent in the court arises, when a lawfully due rent is offered by him to the landlord and the landlord refuses to accept the offer of payment of such a lawfully due rent. 7. A careful reading of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the said Act shows that the right of a tenant to deposit rent in the court arises, when a lawfully due rent is offered by him to the landlord and the landlord refuses to accept the offer of payment of such a lawfully due rent. Sub­section (4) of section 5 of the said Act also shows that on such refusal, the rent can be deposited within a fortnight of the rent having become due and that such deposit has to be together with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord. The language, used in sub-section (4) of section 5 of the said Act, makes it abundantly clear that it is only on refusal to accept the lawfully due rent offered by the tenant that the tenant acquires the right to deposit the rent in the court. If the rent does not become due and payable to the landlord and/or if such a lawfully due rent is not offered to be paid to the landlord and such offer is not refused by the landlord, the tenant would not be entitled to deposit rent in the court. 8. In the case at hand, even if, for a moment, it is assumed that there was no fixed or agreed mode or date of payment of rent, the fact remains that the defendant, in the present case, deposited rents, for the months of January and February 1998, on 27.3.1998. The logical inference from such deposit would be that the rent had become due and payable, when the defendant claims to have offered to make payment of the rent by sending the cheque to the plaintiff's attorney, for, any contrary interpretation would make the deposit of rent by the defendant, I otherwise also, illegal. 9. The logical inference from such deposit would be that the rent had become due and payable, when the defendant claims to have offered to make payment of the rent by sending the cheque to the plaintiff's attorney, for, any contrary interpretation would make the deposit of rent by the defendant, I otherwise also, illegal. 9. What may, now, be noted is that though the defendant has shown that the rent for the month of January 1998, was sent by cheque, dated 3.2.1998, to the said attorney of the plaintiff through the defendant's employees, namely, Kanak Sharma, B.K. Sharka, K.P. Mahanta and J. Prashad and the plaintiff has denied this assertion, what cannot be ignored is that the cheque aforementioned is shown to have been encashed on 30.3.1998; hence, even if one assumes that the defendant had offered or paid the rent for the month of January 1998, what cannot be ignored is that it is neither the pleaded case of the defendant nor is there any evidence on record to show that the rent for the month of February 1998, was ever offered to the plaintiff or his attorney and/or that it was, on their refusal to accept the rent for the month of February 1998, that the same was deposited in the court. At any rate, when the defendant has deposited the rent for the month of February 1998, the logical inference would be that the rent for the month of February 1998, had become due and payable, for, had the rent not become due, the defendant could not have deposited the rent in the court. A tenant has no right to deposit rent in the court, if I may reiterate, unless the rent has been offered to the landlord and refused to be accepted by the landlord. In the case at hand, in the face of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the rent for the month of February 1998, was never offered to the plaintiff or his attorney. In fact, there is no pleading or evidence on record to show that the defendant ever offered the rent to the plaintiff or his attorney for the month of February 1998. In the face of these facts, one cannot but hold that the deposit of rent by the defendant was not in accordance with law. In fact, there is no pleading or evidence on record to show that the defendant ever offered the rent to the plaintiff or his attorney for the month of February 1998. In the face of these facts, one cannot but hold that the deposit of rent by the defendant was not in accordance with law. In such circumstances, the decree passed against the defendant needs no interference. 10. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, I find absolutely no merit in this revision. This revision, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed with costs. 11. Send back the LCR.