Judgment :- S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. This writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant, Chairman, Tamil nadu Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as, the Board) against the order dated 6. 1998 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No.8508 of 1989 whereby and wherein while the order of dismissal was set aside and the respondent/writ petitioner was reinstated, the Board was directed to pay him full backwages. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent/writ petitioner was working in the Board as Divisional Engineer, who remained unauthorised absent from duty from 29th January, 1985, and he applied for leave which was rejected and he was asked to join duty, but he failed. The Board, thereafter, initiated departmental proceedings, vide charge sheet dated 29. 1985 and in spite of notice, the respondent/writ petitioner did not appear and ex parte enquiry was conducted. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 24. 1986 holding that the respondent/writ petitioner is guilty of the charges. In view of the enquiry report, the Board dismissed the respondent/writ petitioner from service on 29. 1986. 3. The respondent/writ petitioner initially preferred a review application which was dismissed on 11. 1988 and thereafter, preferred the writ petition on 14. 1989. The main plea taken therein is that copy of the enquiry report was not served on the writ petitioner and thereby, the Board violated the rules of natural justice. The learned Single Judge, though noticed all the facts and that the respondent/writ petitioner instead of joining in service, somewhere else started an industry, yet allowed the writ petition on the ground that copy of the enquiry report was not served. Further, the learned Single Judge while did not dispute the fact that enquiry was conducted on notice to the respondent/writ petitioner and that the respondent/writ petitioner started an industry, allowed the backwages on the ground that the management Board had not proved that the respondent/writ petitioner was gainfully employed elsewhere at any point of time. 4. The issue whether it is necessary to supply a copy of enquiry report to the charged employee was first considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 , wherein it was held that the supply of copy of the enquiry report is consistent with fair procedure and non-supply thereof violates the principles of natural justice. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 , wherein it was held that the supply of copy of the enquiry report is consistent with fair procedure and non-supply thereof violates the principles of natural justice. The same matter subsequently fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 and thereafter, in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 750, wherein it was observed that the said ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramzan Khan (supra) was prospective in operation, the judgment having been rendered on 20.11.1990. 5. In the present case, the respondent/writ petitioner was dismissed from service on 29. 1986 and thereby, he cannot derive the advantage of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramzan Khan (supra). In such situation, even if a copy of the enquiry report was not served, that will not, ipso facto, invalidate the order of dismissal. That apart, the respondent/writ petitioner having failed to show as to how the non-supply of copy of the enquiry report prejudiced him, there is no occasion to grant any relief in his favour. 6. So far as payment of backwages on reinstatement is concerned, similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in numerous cases. In the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma reported in 2005(2) SCC 363 , the Supreme Court held as follows: " .... When the question of determining the entitlement of a person to backwages is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on record materials to rebut the claim. In the instant case, the respondent had neither pleaded nor placed any material in that regard." In the case of U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Udai Narain Pandey reported in 2006 (1) SCC 479 , the Supreme Court also observed as follows: "It is not in dispute that the respondent did not raise any plea in his written statement that he was not gainfully employed during the said period. Ltd. v. Udai Narain Pandey reported in 2006 (1) SCC 479 , the Supreme Court also observed as follows: "It is not in dispute that the respondent did not raise any plea in his written statement that he was not gainfully employed during the said period. It is now well settled by various decisions of this Court that although earlier this Court insisted that it was for the employer to raise the aforementioned plea but having regard to the provisions of section 106 of the Evidence Act or the provisions analogous thereto, such a plea should be raised by the workman." Similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal & Anr. reported in 2007 (1) Supreme 960 , wherein the following observation has been made: "There is also a misconception that whenever reinstatement is directed, continuity of service and consequential benefits should follow, as a matter of course. The disastrous effect of granting several promotions as a consequential benefit to a person who has not worked for 10 to 15 years and who does not have the benefit of necessary experience for discharging the higher duties and functions of promotional posts, is seldom visualized while granting consequential benefits automatically. Whenever courts or Tribunals direct reinstatement, they should apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances to decide whether continuity of service and/or consequential benefits should also be directed." In view of the aforesaid observations and finding, we have no other option but to hold that the impugned order dated 6. 1998 passed by the learned single Judge is illegal. 7. Now, the questions arise as to what benefit to which the respondent/writ petitioner is entitled and whether the Board should be allowed to recover the amount from the respondent/writ petitioner. .(i) It has already been noticed that the respondent/writ petitioner was dismissed from service on 29. 1986 and the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on 6. 1998. It appears that the respondent/writ petitioner was, thereafter, reinstated in service on 211. 1998 and subsequently, superannuated on 33. 2002. .(ii) In view of the fact that the respondent/writ petitioner rejoined in service and superannuated in 2002, we are of the view that the appellant/Board should not be allowed to recover any amount from the respondent/writ petitioner for the period he worked between 211. 1998 and 33. 1998 and subsequently, superannuated on 33. 2002. .(ii) In view of the fact that the respondent/writ petitioner rejoined in service and superannuated in 2002, we are of the view that the appellant/Board should not be allowed to recover any amount from the respondent/writ petitioner for the period he worked between 211. 1998 and 33. 2002 and the Board should consider the case of the respondent/writ petitioner for providing him the terminal benefits to which a dismissed employee is entitled. If the dismissed employee is not entitled to pension or gratuity, but otherwise entitled to any compensatory allowance, apart from G.P.F. and Group Insurance amounts, the competent authority of the appellant Board should consider the matter sympathetically and pay the admitted terminal benefits. 8. The writ appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations. However, there shall be no order as to costs.