Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 20.12.2006 passed in Special Case No. 13 of 2003 corresponding to RC No. 24(A)/2003 by the Special Judge, CBI, South Bihar, Patna by which the application filed by the petitioner for alteration of charge u/s. 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been rejected. 3. The case against the petitioner and a large number of other co-accused is that they entered into a conspiracy and pilfered the question papers of 2003 PMDT conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education and sold the same to the parents of certain examinees appearing at the said test. The petitioner is alleged to be the kingpin of the gang which had been operating it on national level by committing such criminal acts on such a large scale. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 under which the petitioner is charged and states that no offence can be made out against the petitioner under the said charges and thus the Court below ought to have accepted his application under Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for alteration/ modification of the charges. It is submitted by the learned counsel that continuance of the trial on this charge against the petitioner amounts to vexatious prosecution and the same should not be permitted by this Court. It is further submitted that there is no material against the petitioner even upto this stage in which as many as 13 witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution and thus without the remotest chance of conviction the petitioner should not be made to suffer. In support of the said submission, learned counsel refers to Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition, at Page 112 of which it is stated that express and unambiguous language appears to be absolutely indispensable in statutes passed for conferring or taking away legal rights, whether public or private. In support of the said submission, learned counsel refers to Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition, at Page 112 of which it is stated that express and unambiguous language appears to be absolutely indispensable in statutes passed for conferring or taking away legal rights, whether public or private. It is submitted that the statute having provided for alteration or addition of charges by Sec. 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court below was required to have entered into the matter and passed a reasoned order after considering in detail the issues raised by the petitioner but the same has not been done and merely on the ground that the petitioner has been heard in detail while considering his petition for discharge the application has been rejected. It is thus, submitted that the rights conferred upon the petitioner by express language of Sec. 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been ignored by the Court below. 5. Learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Sind Judicial Commissioners Court reported in AIR 1937 Sind 1. In the said decision on the principal issue the Judicial Commissioner of Sind disagreed with the decision of this Court in the case of Ramkishoon Pershad V/s. Emperor, AIR 1934 Pat 232 with respect to joinder of charges and then observed that the Magistrate must use a careful and wise discretion and where, as in that case, evidence relating to six charges has gone on the record, whereas there should be evidence only as to three, it may be well the Magistrate would exercise a wise and just discretion in directing a new trial under the provisions of Sec. 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also held that there is nothing in the wording of Sec. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 216 of the present Code) which limits the operation of that Section to mere irregularities or its operation to any particular stage of the case prior to the time that judgment is given or the verdict of the jury is returned. Until that time, it is open to the Court to alter or add to the charge so long as the accused shall not be embarrased or prejudiced by the alteration of the charge. Until that time, it is open to the Court to alter or add to the charge so long as the accused shall not be embarrased or prejudiced by the alteration of the charge. Learned counsel also refers to a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Subbaratnam and others, AIR 1949 Mad 663, in para 11 of which it has been held as follows: "A trial Judge at sessions is not bound by the charges framed by the committing Court and he has ample power to revise and alter them not only at the commencement of the trial u/s. 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but u/s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at any stage of the trial before the verdict of the jury is returned or the opinions of the assessors are recorded." 6. Learned counsel for the CBI, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner had ample opportunity at the time of consideration of his petition for discharge u/s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and all the points raised by him at present, have been considered and rejected by the Court below at that very stage and thus, there is no scope for reiteration of the same grounds and reasonings by filing a petition under Section 216 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the Court below has thus, rightly rejected the petition on the said ground. Learned counsel also submits that while Sec. 216 confers power upon the Court to alter or add to the charge at any stage of the proceedings but no such right has been conferred upon the accused to insist upon addition or alteration of the charge, it is for the Court to exercise discretion one way or the other. 7. In support of his aforesaid stand learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kantilal Chandulal Mehta V/s. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1970 SC 359 in para-5 of which it has been held as follows: "The accused raised no ground on this account in the Special Leave Petition, nor do we think on this account we should interfere with the judicial exercise of discretion of the learned Judge in framing the charge and in giving the accused an opportunity to recall any witnesses or adduce fresh evidence on his behalf. If no objection could be taken to the Trial Court in framing the original charge it is difficult to see how an objection can be taken at this stage to the framing of an alternate charge on the same allegation in the complaint." 8. On a consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the impugned order dated 20.12.2006 of the learned Special Judge, this Court does not find that any illegality has been committed in recording the said order by the learned Special Judge. It is evident that power u/s. 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been conferred upon the Trial Court to alter or to add any such charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced subject only to this that any such alteration or addition to any charge is not likely to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecution in the conduct of the case. However, the said power is to be exercised in order to see that the trial proceeds on the basis of correct charge framed as can be made out from the allegations in the case. The said provision does not confer any right upon the accused to get the charge altered or added and it only confers discretion upon the Court to enable it to see that the trial proceeds in a fair and just manner and with respect to the offences actually alleged to have been committed. 9. Hence, the consideration by the Court of any application, if filed on behalf of the accused u/s. 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be in the same manner or extent as an application for discharge filed u/s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where the accused has been conferred a right of being heard and to show to the Court that charges alleged against him are groundless. Once the same has been considered as in the present case also and the application for discharge has been rejected and charges framed thereafter no right can be claimed by the accused to have the charges altered by raising the same arguments that had been raised at the time of consideration of his petition for discharge. Once the same has been considered as in the present case also and the application for discharge has been rejected and charges framed thereafter no right can be claimed by the accused to have the charges altered by raising the same arguments that had been raised at the time of consideration of his petition for discharge. Such a repeated application with an ulterior motive to cover the same ground which has already been gone through in the proceedings in connection with the application for discharge would clearly be an abuse of the process of the Court. In such circumstances, it can hardly be expected of this Court to assist the accused in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which is meant to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and not to act in furtherance of such abuse. 10. So far as the reliance of the petitioner on the Sind decision and Madras High Court decision are concerned, there is nothing in those cases to assist the petitioner. The decision of the Madras High Court was rendered in the situation then prevailing under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 where charges were framed by the committing Court before the matter was committed to the Court of Session and in those circumstances, it was held that the Sessions Court would not be bound by the charges that have been framed by the committing Court and it may add or alter the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to cite any decision under the new Code in which after the application for discharge having been considered in detail and rejected, the accused has been held to have any right to have the same matter gone through in a petition u/s. 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. Thus, on a consideration of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court does not find any merit in the present application and it is accordingly rejected.