Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. In this revision petition filed by the tenant against the order of his eviction on one ground out of several grounds, the question arises for consideration is, whether the landlord without filing separate revision petition against the rejection of his ejectment application on other grounds, can support the order of ejectment on the ground that the other grounds of ejectment were wrongly decided against him by the Courts below. 2. In this case, the respondent-landlord filed an ejectment application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act) against the petitioner-tenant from the demised premises on the grounds of (a) non-payment of rent; (b) change of user; (c) materially impairing the value and utility of the demised premises by raising illegal constructions; and (d) that the premises became the unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties, vide its judgment dated 9.8.1979, passed the order of ejectment against the petitioner-tenant while holding that the tenant did not tender the complete arrears of rent on the first date of hearing, that the construction raised by the tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and that the premises became unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 3. On appeal, the Appellate Authority under the Act, though confirmed the order of ejectment of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, but reversed the findings recorded by the Rent Controller on the issues of materially impairing the value and utility of the demised premises and that the premises became unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Against the said order of ejectment, the tenant filed the instant revision petition. 4. Against the said order of ejectment, the tenant filed the instant revision petition. 4. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of short tender made by him on the first date of hearing is liable to be set aside in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rakesh Wadhawan and others v. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and others, 2002(1) RCR(Rent) 514 : (2002-2)131 PLR 370, wherein it has been held that the Rent Controller is under obligation to make an assessment of the arrears of rent, the interest on such arrears and the cost of the application by way of provisional order which the tenant is to comply with on the first date of hearing. If he complies with the said order and disputes to the arrears of rent in light of the plea raised by him, the Rent Controller will finally adjudicate that dispute. If the amount deposited by the tenant, under the provisional order is found to be in excess, the Rent Controller may direct its refund and if the amount deposited is found to be short or deficient, the Rent Controller may pass a conditional order directing the tenant to place the landlord in possession of the premises by giving a reasonable time to him for paying or tendering the deficit amount, failing which he shall liable to be evicted. He further submitted that the judgment in Rakesh Wadhawans case (supra) has been re-affirmed by the Supreme court in Vinod Kumar v. Prem Lata, 2003(2) RCR(Rent) 329 : (2003)11 SCC 397 : JT 2003(7) SC 574, which pertained to the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 having the pari materia provisions with regard to the ejectment on non-payment of rent. 5. Shri Anish Setia, learned counsel for the respondents does not dispute the aforesaid legal position. However, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, 2002(3) RCR(Civil) 618 : 2002(2) RCR(Rent) 114 : AIR 2002 SC 2562 : (2002)6 SCC 1, learned counsel submitted that the respondent-landlord is entitled to support the order of ejectment passed against the tenant on other grounds of ejectment which were decided against the landlord while raising the plea that rejection of those grounds was illegal, improper and contrary to the evidence available on the record. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent landlord sought the ejectment of the petitioner tenant from the demised premises on various grounds. His ejectment was ordered by the Rent Controller on the ground of non-payment of rent; that the construction raised by the tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and that the premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. However, the Appellate Authority affirmed the order of ejectment of the petitioner tenant on non- payment of rent, but reversed the findings on the grounds that the construction raised by the tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and that the premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Since the order of ejectment was passed against the tenant on one ground, the respondent-landlord could not have filed the revision against the findings recorded on those issues, as he was not the `aggrieved person, because order of ejectment was passed in his favour. Learned counsel submits that in view of the law laid down in Nalakath Sainuddins case (supra), the respondent-landlord without filing separate revision, has a right to assail the finding of the Appellate Authority on those issues and to argue that the order of ejectment is liable to be sustained on the grounds that the construction raised by the tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and that the premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not dispute the aforesaid legal position nor cited any contrary judgment. 7. Sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act provides that the High Court may, at any time on the application of `any aggrieved parry or on its own motion, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked by an aggrieved party by filing the revision petition. In this revisional jurisdiction, this Court can test the legality, propriety and regularity of an order passed under the Act. When an order of ejectment is passed only the tenant is aggrieved person. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked by an aggrieved party by filing the revision petition. In this revisional jurisdiction, this Court can test the legality, propriety and regularity of an order passed under the Act. When an order of ejectment is passed only the tenant is aggrieved person. The landlord could not have filed the revision against the finding recorded adverse to him on the other grounds of ejectment. But once the revision filed by the tenant is entertained, this Court acquires jurisdiction to call for and examine the record of the authorities subordinate to it. The respondent landlord, who could not have filed the revision petition against the adverse finding recorded against him on other grounds of ejectment, not being an aggrieved person, is legally entitled to support the order of ejectment in the revision petition filed by the tenant and pray for that the decision of ejectment passed against the petitioner tenant is to be sustained as the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority on other issues (i.e. the construction raised by the tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises, and that the premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation) is not liable to be sustained being illegal, improper and contrary to the evidence on the record. Thus, counsel for the respondent landlord was permitted to raise the arguments on the issues that the construction raised by the tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and that the premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 8. I have heard the arguments of the counsel for both the parties on those two issues, perused the record of the case and my findings on those issues are as under :- (i) Issue regarding materially impairing the value and utility of the demised premises : 9. It is the case of the respondent-landlord that the petitioner tenant had constructed one latrine on the roof, which was contrary to the building bye- laws; a staircase in the court-yard in addition to one already existing; one latrine on the back side. It is alleged that these constructions were raised by the tenant without consent of the respondent-landlord and the same have materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises. It is alleged that these constructions were raised by the tenant without consent of the respondent-landlord and the same have materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises. In reply, the petitioner tenant denied the allegations and pleaded that all these constructions were raised prior to the premises was let out to him. To prove that these constructions were raised by the tenant after letting out the premises and have materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises, the respondent landlord examined AW4 Shri A.K. Kapoor, Local Commissioner, who inspected the premises on 13.2.1976. The landlord has also proved two site plans of the demised premises, i.e., Ex.A1 prepared by one Haqiqat Rai (Overseer) at the time of inspection on 17.2.1976 and site plan (Ex.A2) prepared by one Karta Ram on 16.5.1953. Comparison of these site plans Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 reveals that one latrine on the first floor, one staircase and one latrine on the court-yard were constructed later on. In his statement, the tenant (RW1) admitted that he had constructed the staircase and the latrine after taking the premises on rent. After taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the tenant had constructed a staircase in the courtyard in addition to one already existing in the front portion. He had also constructed one latrine on the roof of the main building. He had further constructed a new latrine on the back side of the demised premises after serving the notice for termination of the tenancy. He raised all these constructions without taking permission from the landlord. It is also held that these constructions have materially altered the value and utility of the demised premises. In this regard, the Rent Controller observed as under :- "In the present case before this Court, the building in dispute is a second class construction. It is along the western wall that the respondent has constructed a pucca staircase in the back court-yard adding additional load on his wall. He has reduced the area of the back court-yard by building this staircase as also by building a bath room. It is along the western wall that the respondent has constructed a pucca staircase in the back court-yard adding additional load on his wall. He has reduced the area of the back court-yard by building this staircase as also by building a bath room. Not only this over the mud roof of an ancient building, almost 70 years old, the respondent has constructed a super structure which he calls an enclosure for storing cow-dung and which was found by the Local Commissioner to have steps which can be used as a dry latrine and which enclosure, Hari Ram Sarwal R.W.4 calls a Mumti. Again the latrine on the roof the back passage cannot escape transmitting its burden on the roof and consequently on the Kachha western wall. Whether the enclosure on the front portion is used as a latrine which results in flow of sullage water on the kachha roof or whether it is issued for storing cow dung with half open roof over it, with the result that the rain water again would mix with cow dung to create the same situation, the result would be the same. In my judgment these acts of the respondent have clearly materially impaired the value, if not the utility of the building although the utility has also been impaired as far as the petitioners are concerned and it is from the view of the petitioners that this ground of ejectment has to be considered. The respondent is liable to ejectment on this ground also." 10. The Appellate Authority has reversed the aforesaid finding of the Rent Controller only on the ground that before filing the ejectment application, the respondent landlord served a notice on the petitioner tenant in which he did not revel the allegations about raising of these constructions which have materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises. It is further observed that in his report, the Local Commissioner did not observe that the alleged constructions were recently raised, therefore, it is presumed that the respondent-landlord had allowed the petitioner tenant to raise those constructions. It is further observed that the constructions were probably raised with the consent of the landlord. On these grounds, the Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Rent Controller. 11. In my opinion, the Appellate Authority has committed grave illegality and perversity while reversing the finding on that issue on the aforesaid ground. It is further observed that the constructions were probably raised with the consent of the landlord. On these grounds, the Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Rent Controller. 11. In my opinion, the Appellate Authority has committed grave illegality and perversity while reversing the finding on that issue on the aforesaid ground. Firstly, as argued by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, under the provisions of the Act, the serving of advance notice before filing the ejectment application against the tenant on the ground mentioned in the Act, is not a condition precedent. Therefore, by not taking a particular ground of ejectment in the advance notice, if served at all will not debar the landlord from seeking ejectment on that ground. In this regard, reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, 1979(2) RCR(Rent) 352 : AIR 1979 SC 1745, wherein it was held that in order to get an order of eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act, it is not necessary to give a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is held that determination of a lease in accordance with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get the tenant evicted even after such determination. The tenant continues to be a tenant even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient. Under the Rent Act, it is not obligatory on the landlord to file the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by serving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, in my opinion, merely because in the notice of termination issued by the landlord, non-alleging the point of material impairment of the demised premises, will not have any effect. It will not debar the respondent landlord from getting ejectment of the tenant on establishing and proving the said ground before the Rent Controller. Secondly, the observation made by the Appellate Authority that the alleged constructions were raised by the petitioner tenant probably with the consent of the landlord is based on conjectures. Neither the petitioner tenant did take this plea in his reply nor there is any evidence to that effect. Secondly, the observation made by the Appellate Authority that the alleged constructions were raised by the petitioner tenant probably with the consent of the landlord is based on conjectures. Neither the petitioner tenant did take this plea in his reply nor there is any evidence to that effect. He had taken the stand that he had not raised any such construction and all the constructions were prior to taking of the premises on rent. This plea as a fact is found to be incorrect as in his statement, he himself had admitted that he raised the constructions after one or two years of taking the premises on rent. The finding recorded by the Rent Controller in this regard, as quoted above, is based on the cogent evidence available on the record. 12. Counsel for the petitioners argued that by not raising the objection when the constructions were being raised, and subsequently by not making reference about the constructions in the notice, the landlord is presumed to have waived his right of eviction on the ground of material impairment of the demised premises. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Brijendra Nath Bhargava and another v. Shri Harsh Wardhan and others, 1988 HRR 156. I do not find any substance in this argument. As already discussed, the petitioner tenant has neither taken the plea of waiver in his pleadings nor established the same by leading evidence. Had taken the stand that he did not raise any construction, which proved to be incorrect. Therefore, merely on these grounds, it cannot be presumed that the constructions were raised by the tenant with the permission of the landlord or the landlord waived his right to get ejectment of the tenant on the said ground. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Thus, I confirm the finding recorded by the Rent Controller that while raising the constructions, the petitioner tenant had materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Thus, I confirm the finding recorded by the Rent Controller that while raising the constructions, the petitioner tenant had materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises. The impairing of value and utility of the demised premises due to raising of the construction by the tenant is to be seen from the point of landlord and not of the tenant as has been so held by the Supreme Court in Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lal Anand and others, 1993(1) RCR(Rent) 675 : (1993-2) 104 PLR 349 (SC). (ii) Issue regarding demised premises became unfit and unsafe for human habitation : 13. To prove that the demised premises has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, the landlord examined AW-2 Shiv Singh, retired Town Planner, AW6 Joginder Singh, who was working as S.D.O, in P.W.D. department of the Central Government. On the other hand, the tenant examined RW-4-Hari Ram Sarwal, retired S.D.O. 14. AW-12-Shiv Singh has proved the site plan Ex.AW2/1 as well as his report Ex.AW2/2. According to him, the demised premises has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and it would fall at any time. In addition to that, the respondent landlord has also examined AW3-Ishar Singh, Overseer and AW5-Sajjan Singh, Secretary of Municipal Committee, Doraha. Ishar Singh-AW-3 has proved his report Ex.AW3/1, which he made to the Committee that the demised premises is in dilapidated condition and it can fall at any time, and it may cause danger to the inhabitants of the area. AW5-Sajjan Singh has proved the notice given by the Municipal Committee to the landlord under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act for demolishing the building declaring the same to be unfit and unsafe for human habitation. On the other hand, in his report (Ex.RW411), RW4-Hari Ram Sarwal stated that the property in dispute was quite sound and strong. The Rent Controller after taking into consideration the evidence of both the parties has come to the following conclusion :- ".....The preponderance of evidence, as discussed above, is that the building in dispute is an old one with kachha walls and mud roofs and that the kachha wall has outlived its life. The Rent Controller after taking into consideration the evidence of both the parties has come to the following conclusion :- ".....The preponderance of evidence, as discussed above, is that the building in dispute is an old one with kachha walls and mud roofs and that the kachha wall has outlived its life. It is not necessary for the landlord to show that whole of the building is in dilapidated condition because ejectment can be ordered if a portion of the building is unsafe and unfit. Even if it is possible to make the building fit for habitation by carrying out extensive repairs, then also the ejectment can be ordered if the landlord succeeds in making out a case that a part of the building has become is unsafe and unfit for human habitation. (1970) 72 PLR 411, Dr. Piare Lal Kapur v. Kaushalya Devi may be referred. Sham Dass v. Sunder Singh, 1978(1) RCR(Rent) 276 : (1978-1) RLR 597 : 1970 PLR 411, is a case of our own High Court, where it was held that even when only a part of the building is found unsafe for human habitation, ejectment can be ordered for whole of the building and that it was not necessary for the landlord to prove that he had taken steps to reconstruct the building (para 11 of the Judgment may be referred to). The respondent is, in my judgment, liable to ejectment on this ground also." 15. The Appellate Authority has reversed the aforesaid finding recorded by the Rent Controller while observing as under :- "In relation to the ground stated with regard to the property becoming unfit and unsafe for human habitation it seems to be the admitted case of the respondents that in case the property had not been kept in a proper state of repairs it would deem to have outlived its age. A complaint seems to have been filed by one of the neighbours on the basis of which the Municipal Committee is said to have issued notice to the respondents for demolition of the building. A complaint seems to have been filed by one of the neighbours on the basis of which the Municipal Committee is said to have issued notice to the respondents for demolition of the building. As asserted by the counsel for the appellant, the manner in which this notice was got to be issued leaves much to be desired and evidently in spite of the fact that there is order restraining the Municipal Committee from taking action against the respondents and going ahead by seeking implementation of a notice since 1976 the status quo is being maintained. To my mind, the only conclusion which can be arrived at from these circumstances, is that in all probabilities the notice was maneuvered by the respondents and late after creating has seen to it that the notice is not acted upon. In case the Municipal Committee was really of the opinion that the building in dispute had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation then they would have gone to the extent of seeing to it that the lives of neighbours were not put in danger. Even otherwise the expert opinion is only to this effect that apart from the fact that the premises are in good repairs a kacha building does not last out for more than 10 years. This is not the same thing as saying that the building is in imminent danger in falling down that it is not proper to allow it to be inhabited. Consequently, even in relation to this ground, the finding will have to be interfered with and reversed." 16. In my opinion, the Appellate Authority has reversed the well considered and reasoned finding of the Rent Controller merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The Appellate Authority has not discussed at all the report given by the expert showing the condition of the building. While discussing the evidence available on the record, it has been observed by the Appellate Authority that in all probabilities the notice issued by the Municipal Committee was maneuvered by the landlord. There is no evidence to that effect on the record. The report of the expert produced by the landlord was accepted by the Rent Controller. A perusal of the said report clearly indicates that the demised premises has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. There is no evidence to that effect on the record. The report of the expert produced by the landlord was accepted by the Rent Controller. A perusal of the said report clearly indicates that the demised premises has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. There is no material on the record on the basis of which the said report can be ignored. Thus, in my opinion, the Appellate Authority has acted illegally, arbitrarily and perversely while reversing the finding of the Rent Controller on the issue that the demised premises has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Therefore, the finding of the Appellate Authority in this regard is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is affirmed. 17. In view of the above, though the petitioner tenant is not liable to be ejected on the ground of non-payment of rent, however, in view of the above finding, he is liable to be ejected from the demised premises on the grounds of materially impairing the value and utility of the demised premises by raising illegal constructions and that the demised premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 18. In view of the above, the revision filed by the petitioners is dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.