JUDGMENT J.M. Malik, J.-These are two second appeals filed against the order whereby the suit of the respondent, Dhanesh Sharma, for declaration and recovery of Rs. 25001- was decreed by the trial Court whereas the counter claim filed by the appellant was dismissed. The first appellate authority confirmed the trial Courts judgment. The facts germane to plaintiffsl respondents case are these. Ram Prashad Jyotishi, father of the respondent herein, was a tenant in respect of shop bearing No. C-158, Hari Nagar, Clock Tower, at the rental of Rs. 1001- per month. He used to run the business of astrology in the abovesaid shop. He died on 23.3.1999 as a , contractual tenant and, thereafter, the respondent inherited the said tenancy. The rent stood paid till May 1990 but, thereafter, appellant refused to accept the rent when tendered by the respondent. Consequently, the instant suit WaS filed with a prayer that respondent be declared tenant with respect to the suit shop. The respondent also claimed a sum of Rs. 25001which he incurred on legal expenses for depositing rent and electricity charges in the Court. 2. The appellant defended the instant suit. She also filed a counterclaim. According to the appellant, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and as a matter of fact, father of the respondent was permitted to stay as a licensee by her father. The appellant claimed that decree of possession be passed against the respondent. She also claimed mesne profits 1 damages. The trial Court decreed the suit of the respondent and dismissed the counter-claim of the appellant. 3. The principal argument urged by learned Counsel for the appellant was that it was for the respondent to carry the ball in proving that he was a tenant in respect of the suit property. He argued with vehemence that the respondent has failed to discharge the said onus of proof. He explained that the respondent has failed to prove, firstly, as to on which day his father was inducted as a tenant in respect of the shop in dispute and, secondly, what were the terms and conditions of the alleged tenancy. It is pointed out that the deposit made by the respondent under Section 31 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934, is merely an eyewash. It was not a valid deposit. It is pointed out that the deposit made by the respondent under Section 31 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934, is merely an eyewash. It was not a valid deposit. He pointed out that had the intention of the respondent been bona fide, the rent would have been deposited under Section 27 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. On the contrary, it stands established that the respondents father was permitted to stay in the shop as mere a licensee. He lastly opined that the case of the appellant stands fully proved. 4. The appellant partakes more of illusions than in reality in assuming that respondent is a licensee simplicitor. Appellants admitted case is that the respondents was permitted to stay as a licensee in the year 1989. The instant suit was filed in the year 2003. The appellant did not initiate any action against the respondent for a period of 14 years. There are no conflictions on the point that no documentary evidence is available. This is an admitted fact that no licence deed or lease deed was ever executed. In his cross-examination, respondent has stated that his father was a tenant in respect of the shop in dispute since 1973-74. The respondent was not cross-examined on this point. I am able to locate few authorities which go to demolish the case of the appellant root and branch. In Panchkuian Road Refugee Vyapar Sangh v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, 130 (2006) DLT 553=2006 (6) A.D. Delhi 573, it was held that if occupation is for extraordinary long period, even if it commenced as a licence, it would transformed into a lease. This Court held that main distinguishing feature between licence and lease as per Section 106, T.P. Act and Section 52, Easements Act are: (a) nature of possession, if it is exclusive then it is lease (or irrevocable licence) (b) if right to enjoy property is purely personal then it would be lease. (c) if immovable structures have been constructed by occupant with consent or acquiescence of owner it would become irrevocable licence (or a lease?) (d) if occupation is for extraordinary long period then even if it commenced as a licence, it would transform into a lease. 5. (c) if immovable structures have been constructed by occupant with consent or acquiescence of owner it would become irrevocable licence (or a lease?) (d) if occupation is for extraordinary long period then even if it commenced as a licence, it would transform into a lease. 5. Similar view was taken by a Full Bench of this Court in a case reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Pradip Oil Corporation, 100 (2002) DLT 442, it was held that wherein exclusive possession has been granted, a tenancy will be presumed. It is for the grantor to show that despite right to possess demised premises exclusive, a right or interest in the property has not been created. Burden ,therefor would be on the grantor to prove contra. This authority goes a long way to dampen the ardour of argument canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 6. There is a long peaceful possession for a period of more than years. This circumstance is .of utmost importance. This circumstance has substance, it can do without frills. 7. It is also surprising to note that the respondent sent notice Ex. PW1/ 1 which was responded to by the appellant vide reply Ex. PW1/2. In this reply, it was mentioned that the appellant reserves her right to serve a detailed notice on the respondent as regards his status in the shop in question. She did not say in so many words that his status was that of a licensee simplicitor. It is difficult to fathom as to why this position was not clarified at the most appropriate time. The reply given by the appellant is cryptic 8. It is also noteworthy that appellant also sent one notice to respondent on 17th May, 2001 find in that notice also, she did not claim that father of the respondent was a licensee. She rather claimed that the respondent was in unauthorised occupation of the suit shop. She also did not disclose that she is one of the co-owners of the shop in dispute. 9. Lastly, the appellant did not appear in witness box. Her power of attorney, that is, her real brother appeared on her behalf. Her presence in the dock would have gone a long way to throw light on her case. 10. Succinctly stated, there are four factors which go to reveal that the respondent is the tenant of the premises in dispute. Her power of attorney, that is, her real brother appeared on her behalf. Her presence in the dock would have gone a long way to throw light on her case. 10. Succinctly stated, there are four factors which go to reveal that the respondent is the tenant of the premises in dispute. Firstly, there is long, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the respondent for a period of more than 30 years. Secondly, the defence set up by the appellant is vague, evasive and leads the Court nowhere. Her version remains opaque despite explanations. The pleas raised by the appellant from time-to-time are contradictory. At one stage, she states that she is not aware of the status of the respondent. At second stage, she states that the respondent is the unauthorised occupant of the shop in dispute and, thirdly, during this case she states that the respondent was a licensee under her father. Lastly, she did not appear in the witness box to explain the things properly. The best evidence was swept under the carpet. 11. It must be mentioned here that like the respondent the appellant also failed to give particulars of the alleged licence agreement. Again, wrong deposit of rent under Section 31 of Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 does not come to the rescue of the appellant. This is not a suit for recovery of payment of rent. Whether the tender was valid or not, is not the question involved hereinwith. In view of the discussion above, I am of view that the appeals have no merit. RSA 112/2007 and RSA 113/2007 are accordingly dismissed at the admission stage. CM Nos. 5319/2007 and 5320/2007 are allowed subject to just exception. RSAs dismissed c, CMs allowed.