Judgment Syed Md.Mahfooz Alam, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 25.4.90 passed by Sri D.P.S. Chaudhary, 7th Additional District Judge, Arrah, in Title Appeal No. 77 of 1987 reversing the judgment and decree dated 28.4.87 passed by Sri Ranjeet Pd. Sinha, Sub-Judge IInd, Arrah, in Tile Suit No. 53 of 1984. 2. It appears that the plaintiff-appellant has preferred Title Suit No. 53 of 1984 against the defendant-respondent for specific performance of contract and for issuance of direction to the defendant to execute the sale deed with alternative prayer that if the court finds that the specific performance of contract is not possible then the decree for recovery of consideration amount paid to the defendant be passed. 3. It appears that the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit for specific performance of contract but decreed the suit for realisation of consideration amount. Against the said judgment and decree the defendant preferred appeal which was disposed of by the impugned judgment and the learned Additional District Judge has been pleased to allow the appeal and held that the plaintiff is also not entitled to get money decree for recovery of the alleged consideration money. Against the said finding the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 4. The case of the plaintiff-appellant, in brief, is that he had very good relation with the defendant since long and due to this good relation the plaintiff used to lend money to the defendant, who was serving at Asansol. In this way, the defendant borrowed money several times from the plaintiff and in lieu thereof he agreed to sell Schedule-I land to the plaintiff for a consideration of rupees twenty thousand. After the said agreement, the defendant took permission from the Consolidation Officer vide Case No. 158 of 1974-75 for sale of the land to the plaintiff and handed over possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff made several request to the defendant to execute the sale deed for which he had already received entire consideration amount in instalments but the defendant remained evading to execute sale deed on one pretext or the other. The defendant through several letters written to the plaintiff admitted about the receipt of the consideration amount in instalments and gave assurance to the plaintiff for execution of the sale deed in question. The defendant through several letters written to the plaintiff admitted about the receipt of the consideration amount in instalments and gave assurance to the plaintiff for execution of the sale deed in question. A Panchayati was also held in this regard on 1.9.1988 in which the Panches gave an Award of Rs. 7,155.00 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The plaintiff on several occasions asked the defendant to execute the sale deed but he did not do so and finally on 25.5.1984 the defendant refused to execute the sale deed. Hence, the necessity of filing of the suit arose and the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit. 5. As per the written statement filed in the Suit, the defendant completely denied the allegation of the plaintiff and has stated that the entire case of the plaintiff is false, fabricated and without any basis. It has been stated that the defendant had never agreed to sell his land to the plaintiff much less the Schedule-I land of the plaint. There was never any oral or written agreement in between them for the sale of the land as alleged. The entire case of the plaintiff is vague and there is no specific assertion in the plaint as to when there was agreement in between the plaintiff and defendant for the execution of the sale deed. There was neither any occasion nor any necessity on the part of the defendant to sell his land to the plaintiff. The statement that the defendant obtained permission from the Consolidation Officer for selling the land is false and fabricated. The defendant had never applied to the Consolidation Officer for permission to sell his land. It is further stated that the defendant had never taken any amount from the plaintiff either in lump sum or in the instalments. The defendant had never accepted the receipt of consideration amount or to execute the sale deed in any letter alleged to have been written by him to the plaintiff. Further case of the defendant is that after retirement he settled at Asansol and on his behalf the plaintiff used to look after his property at village Manikpur. The defendant had never accepted the receipt of consideration amount or to execute the sale deed in any letter alleged to have been written by him to the plaintiff. Further case of the defendant is that after retirement he settled at Asansol and on his behalf the plaintiff used to look after his property at village Manikpur. The plaintiff had greedy eye over the land of the defendant and he was of the view that since the defendant has already settled at Asansol and has become considerably old, and so, with some pressure put up on him he would sell the land and with this ulterior motive the plaintiff after manufacturing some papers filed this suit. There was no occasion for the defendant to borrow any money from the plaintiff, rather, the plaintiff, who used to look after the property of the defendant, was in the habit of keeping the income from agricultural land of the defendant for the purpose of making payment of Malguzari for which there used to be accounting between the plaintiff and defendant and there was every possibility that some papers or receipt might have been left in the hands of the plaintiff. It has further been stated that a Panchayati was also convened for the purpose of settling the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant with regard to the misappropriation of income from agricultural produce by the plaintiff and it is altogether false to say that in the said Panchayati the Panches had given any Award in favour of the plaintiff asking the defendant to execute the sale deed. The prayer has been made to dismiss the suit. 6. It appears that on the basis of the pleadings of both the parties the trial court framed as many as seven issues for determination in the suit out of which issue nos. V and VI were main issues. It further transpires that Issue No. V with regard to the relief for specific performance of contract the trial court held that the plaintiff is not entitled for decree for specific performance of contract but Issue No. VI with regard to the decree for money the trial court decided the same in favour of the plaintiff. 7. It further transpires that Issue No. V with regard to the relief for specific performance of contract the trial court held that the plaintiff is not entitled for decree for specific performance of contract but Issue No. VI with regard to the decree for money the trial court decided the same in favour of the plaintiff. 7. From perusal of judgment of the appellate court, it appears that the appellate court also confirmed the finding of the trial court with regard to the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit regarding the specific performance of contract but reversed the finding of the trial court with regard to the plaintiffs entitlement for a decree for money and dismissed the entire suit of the plaintiff against which the plaintiff-appellant has preferred this second appeal. 8. From perusal of the order dated 4.3.93, it appears that at the time of admission of this Second Appeal only two substantial questions of law were formulated for adjudication which are as follows: (i) Whether in view of the statement made in the Award (Ext. A), which was filed by the Defendants, the finding as recorded by the court of appeal below that the suit was barred by limitation, is correct and sustainable in law? (ii) Whether the court of appeal below was correct in its interpretation given in regard to the provision of Order XLI, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Substantial Question of Law No. (i) 9 It has been submitted by the learned Advocate of the appellants that Ext. A is the award of the Panches which has been brought on record on behalf of the defendant-respondent and this award was given by the Panches in the year 1983 after considering the claim of both the parties. The learned Advocate submitted that since the last accounting between the parties was done in the year 1983 on which date the Panches gave an award that a sum of Rs. 7155.00 was due with the defendant payable to the plaintiff, as such the limitation period will start from the date on which Panchayati was held and Panches gave their award and, therefore, the finding recorded by the court of appeal below that the suit was barred by Law of limitation is illegal and cannot be sustained in law. 10. 7155.00 was due with the defendant payable to the plaintiff, as such the limitation period will start from the date on which Panchayati was held and Panches gave their award and, therefore, the finding recorded by the court of appeal below that the suit was barred by Law of limitation is illegal and cannot be sustained in law. 10. From perusal of the judgment of the first appellate court it appears that the first appellate court has mentioned this fact in its judgment that Ext. A which is the award of the Panches was filed on behalf of the defendant-respondent to show that there was an agreement that the plaintiff was to look after his property at his village home as the defendant was living at Asansol in connection with his job. The learned court below on the basis of the evidence brought on record and on the basis of Ext. A has come to the conclusion that there was dispute on accounting between the parties and, therefore, the Panches were appointed from both the sides to settle the dispute and the Panches after hearing both the parties and perusing the papers produced on behalf of the parties found that a sum of Rs. 7155.00 was due to the plaintiff payable by the defendant. I have gone through the evidence of both the parties adduced on the point of Panchayati. I have also gone through the contents of Ext. A which shows that after accounting the Panches found that the defendant had also handed over some money to the plaintiff for payment of Malguzari but the plaintiff did not pay Malguzari and the said amount remained due with him. This recital in Ext. A shows that the amount which fell due with the defendant payable to the plaintiff after accounting was not with respect to the payment of money towards part performance of any contract, rather, the same was related with payment of some money by the plaintiff to defendant starting from the period from 1971 to 1977. It may be for the purchase of land but since the last payment was done in the year 1977, as such, no suit either for specific performance of contract or for recovery of money can be instituted after expiry of period of three years from 1977. It may be for the purchase of land but since the last payment was done in the year 1977, as such, no suit either for specific performance of contract or for recovery of money can be instituted after expiry of period of three years from 1977. Admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 1984 i.e. much after expiry of the period of limitation and, therefore, I am of the view that the learned first appellate court has rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation. 11. Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 , provides that for specific performance of contract the limitation period for filing the suit is for three years. Ex-hibit-A, which is said to be an Award prepared by the Panches shows that in the year 1971 the plaintiff Brahamdeo Singh had paid Rs. 4,700/- and till 1977 a total sum of Rs. 7155.00 was found due to be paid by the defendant Askaran Singh to plaintiff Brahamdeo Singh and, therefore, I am of the view that the period of limitation will be counted from the year 1977 i.e. the year when last transaction between the plaintiff and defendant was done. Thus, I find that from this aspect also the suit is time barred. 12. It has further been argued that as per the judgment of the trial court the trial court has held that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for money which has been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant and on this finding the trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 14,658.00 in favour of the plaintiff but the learned first appellat court has wrongly held that this money decree is also barred by law of limitation. I am of the view that the finding of the court below is correct and in accordance with law as according to Exhibit-A the last transaction between the parties was done in the year 1977 and, as such, any suit for recovery of any amount which became due in the year 1977 should have been filed within three years from 1977. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the learned first appellate court has rightly held that any money decree can also not be passed in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. 13. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the learned first appellate court has rightly held that any money decree can also not be passed in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. 13. It should be mentioned here that the suit was brought for specific performance of contract but it appears that both the courts below concurrently held that there was no contract between the parties with regard to sale of any immovable property and, as such, there was no question for specific performance of contract. I am of the view that the finding of both the courts below are correct and legal but at this stage I would like to mention this fact that as per Sections 10 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter to be referred as "Act") grant of decree for specific performance of contracts is the discretion of court. The bare reading of Section 10 of the Act shows that in this section word "may" and "discretion of the court" were used which goes to show that the grant of decree of specific performance of contract is the discretion of the court and the court may refuse to grant decree for specific performance even if the court finds that there is existing contract between the parties. Here in this case both the courts have found that there was no such contract between the parties, so, there is no unreasonableness in refusal of the prayer. Likewise, Section 20 of the Act also says that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. Thus, Section 20 of the Act also empowers the court to refuse the prayer of grant of specific performance of contract. Thus, refusal of grant of decree for specific performance is not against the spirit of law. I am, therefore, of the view that the refusal by both the courts below to grant decree for specific performance of contract is lawful specially when the court found that there was no such contract between the parties to sell the land. 14. In such view of the matter, I am of the view that there is no illegality in the judgment of the first appellate court. 14. In such view of the matter, I am of the view that there is no illegality in the judgment of the first appellate court. I therefore find and hold that the finding recorded by the court of appeal below that the suit was barred by limitation is correct and sustainable in law and even on the basis of the averment made in Exhibit-A no other conclusion can be drawn. Accordingly, Substantial Question of Law No. (i) is decided. Substantial Question of Law No. (ii) 15 It has been argued by the learned Advocate of the appellants that the learned first appellate court has wrongly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to raise the point in appeal which has been decided against him and against which he has not preferred any appeal/cross-appeal. In this regard, he referred Section 22 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 22 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure runs as follows: "22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal.(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree [but may also state that the finding against him in the court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection] to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal: Provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. [Explanation.A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent]" 16. The proviso of abovementioned section establishes beyond doubt that only by filing objection within one month from the date of service on him a party can raise objection in the appeal against any finding but if the party does not raise any objection or does not file any cross-appeal he is not entitled to challenge the finding of the court which has been given against him. 17. Under the circumstances, I am of the view that the learned First Appellate Court has rightly held that since the plaintiff-appellants had not filed any cross-appeal or objection, as such, he has no locus standi to challenge the finding of the trial court which has been given against him. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is also decided against the appellants. 18. In the result, I do not find any merit in this Second Appeal and, as such, the same is hereby dismissed and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court are hereby upheld. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.