Judgment ( 1. ) THIS judgment shall also govern the disposal of connected Second Appeal no. 39/2006 as both arise from a common judgment and decree passed by XXth additional District Judge Indore. For the sake of convenience, I have taken up the above appeal as the main case, which has been preferred by the tenants. They have lost in both the Courts below. Dispute relates to eviction of appellants from a non-residential accommodation situated in Kesera Bazar indore more particularly described in the plaint. The other appeal is by the co-owner of the suit accommodation. Both appeals were admitted on 7-3-2006 on the following substantial question of law:- " (1) Whether both the Courts have committed an error of law by holding that one co-sharer of the property can file a suit for eviction, in view of the objection by the another co- sharer of the property in the facts and circumstances of the case ? (2) Whether a decree for eviction can be passed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent in the facts and circumstances of the case ?" ( 2. ) FACTS, relevant for deciding these two appeals are as under :- In this appeal we are concerned with three real brothers, viz. , Ganga Prasad, Uma shankar and S. R. Verma. There is no dispute that appellant No. 2 Gulabchand is the son-in-law of another brother Tapti Prasad and appellant No. 1 Ashok kumar is the son of Gulabchand. ( 3. ) S. R. Verma, instituted an eviction suit against appellants on three counts, non-payment of arrears of rent, denial of title and bonafide need of his major son Krishan Kant for starting business from the suit accommodation. Thus, eviction was sought on the grounds covered by Section 12 (1) (a) (c) and (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity ). It was alleged that S. R. Verma acquired title over entire suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 28-6-1960, executed by Chotelal on behalf of Ganga Prasad for valuable consideration. Chotelal was the father and natural guardian of Ganga Prasad who was blind deaf and dumb since birth. It was also pleaded that after the death of Ganga prasad in the year 1991, plaintiff succeeded to the estate of late Ganga Prasad. Chotelal was the father and natural guardian of Ganga Prasad who was blind deaf and dumb since birth. It was also pleaded that after the death of Ganga prasad in the year 1991, plaintiff succeeded to the estate of late Ganga Prasad. It was the case of plaintiff that appellants were his tenants on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 500/- under an oral tenancy. It was claimed that appellants were in arrears of rent which they did not tender or pay despite service of demand notice. On the contrary, in reply to the demand notice, appellants despite their knowledge and previous admissions in another suit against another tenant, denied the title of the plaintiff, therefore, compelling S. R. Verma to file the suit out of which this appeal arises. ( 4. ) AS usual, appellants in the written statement not only denied each material allegation of plaint but raised a counter-claim that their deposition in an earlier eviction suit against another tenant Ratanlal, are not binding upon them and the rent receipt in favour of S. R. Verma were obtained under coercion. They further claimed that they could not to be ejected without the consent of co-owner Uma Shanker, who was necessary party to the suit. ( 5. ) LATE Uma Shankar, after the institution of the suit filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC for being arrayed as party to the suit on the ground that along with plaintiff he was one of the co-owners and was entitled to share in equal proportion the arrears of rent with the plaintiff. That application was ultimately allowed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 931/98, decided on 1-12-1998 with a rider that no enquiry would be held by the Trial court regarding inter se disputes of title between the two co-owners and suit shall be decided as suit between landlord and tenant. By virtue of said order, uma Shankar was arrayed as proforma defendant. He also filed a written statement and a counter-claim. In the counter-claim, he admitted that plaintiff was co-owner of the suit accommodation but denied the right of the plaintiff to appropriate arrears of rent without sharing them with Uma Shankar. It was also admitted that the appellants were tenant in the suit accommodation. With these pleadings parties went to trial. He also filed a written statement and a counter-claim. In the counter-claim, he admitted that plaintiff was co-owner of the suit accommodation but denied the right of the plaintiff to appropriate arrears of rent without sharing them with Uma Shankar. It was also admitted that the appellants were tenant in the suit accommodation. With these pleadings parties went to trial. Learned Trial Judge, on the pleadings framed issues and allowed the parties to lead evidence, oral as well documentary. ( 6. ) LEARNED Trial Court, in the light of directions given by this Court in c. R. No. 931/98 supra, on appreciation of evidence reached the conclusion that plaintiff had established grounds for eviction covered under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e) but not under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Accordingly, decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. Matter was carried in appeal by the appellants as well as by the legal representatives of Uma Shanker who died during the trial. By the common impugned judgment and decree, both appeals were dismissed and the findings of the Trial Court were affirmed. Hence this appeal, as well as s. A. No. 39/2006 by the L. Rs. of Late Uma Shankar which were admitted on the identical substantial questions of law as stated hereinabove. ( 7. ) AFTER having heard rival submissions of learned Counsel for the appellants in both appeals and the respondents, this Court is of the view that there is no merits and substance in either of the appeals and Shri Chaphekar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents is right in his submissions that these appeals do not give rise to questions of law much less substantial questions of law. ( 8. ) NOW coming to the first substantial question of law, in the opinion of this Court, legal position is quite settled in view of decisions of the Supreme court. In this connection, it may be useful to refer to the decision in Shri Ram pasricha Vs. Jagannath and others, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 184 . That was a case for eviction filed by one of the co-owners of the leased premises without joining other co-owners as party to suit. Tenant lost before the Trial Court and Lower appellate Court. Jagannath and others, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 184 . That was a case for eviction filed by one of the co-owners of the leased premises without joining other co-owners as party to suit. Tenant lost before the Trial Court and Lower appellate Court. In second appeal by the tenant, learned Single Judge of the calcutta High Court accepted the contention of the tenant that the plaintiff being only a part-owner and co-sharer was not the owner within the meaning of section 13 (1) (f) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and as such dismissed the suit. In L. P. A. against said decision, Division Bench took the contrary view and decree the suit for eviction. Tenant preferred an appeal in the Supreme court. While deciding the appeal, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after referring to Salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edition), came to the conclusion that a co-owner owns every part of the composite property along with others and it could not be said that he is only a part owner or a fraction owner of the property as long as partition does not take place within co-owners. Therefore, such a suit for eviction was maintainable and it is inconceivable to throw out a suit on account of not impleading other co-owners. Their Lordships in said decision expressly dissented from the English rule which was laid down in mclntyre Vs. Hardcastle, (1884) 1 All ER 696 that all landlords much joint together, on the ground that the said rule was abhorrent to the Indian conception and structure of social life of our society and approved the contrary view taken by the Calcutta and Gujrat High Court. ( 9. ) THE next decision which is relevant is Kanta Geol Vs. B. P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 , wherein relying upon Shri Ram Pasrichas case (supra), it was held by Their Lordships that one of the co-owners could maintain the suit for eviction in absence of other co-owners, when other co-owners did not object to eviction of the tenant. Same view has been taken in Pal Singh Vs. Surender Singh, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 444 and Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16 . Same view has been taken in Pal Singh Vs. Surender Singh, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 444 and Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16 . No decision striking a discordant note was brought to notice, on the contrary heavy reliance was placed on Dhannalal (supra), by the learned Counsel for appellants in both appeals to contend that as there was an objection by Uma shankar, therefore, suit could not have been decreed. Shri Jain, Advocate appearing for tenants has also relied upon Division Bench decision in the case of smt. Hamceda Begum Vs. Smt. Champa Bai, reported in 2004 (5) M. P. H. T. 427, to contend that no suit would lie at the behest of a co-owner without impleading other co-owners. This Court is of the view that it is not fair reading of the division Bench decision in Smt. Hameeda Begum (supra ). A careful reading of the said decision shows that said decision does not advance the case of appellants because of the facts of that case and the facts of case in hand are altogether different. ( 10. ) IN view of the foregoing discussion and the emerging legal principles, this Court is of the opinion that the answer to the first question of law formulated at the time of admission must go against the appellant, i. e. , that one of co-owners can institute and maintain a suit for eviction without joining other co-owners as a party to the suit because they are not necessary party to such eviction suit. If any co-owner has objection to ejectment of a tenant from the property jointly owned, then said objection must be taken prior to institution of suit in explicit terms and not after filing of the suit because, on the institution of suit, rights and obligations of parties to the suit crystallise for adjudication in accordance with substantive and procedural laws. See India Umbrella manufacturing Co. and another Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by L. Rs. , (2004) 3 SCC 178 (183 ). That was a case where during the pendency of eviction proceedings initiated jointly, one of the co-owners of the accommodation had sold her share in favour of tenant and then applied for the dismissal of the suit. See India Umbrella manufacturing Co. and another Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by L. Rs. , (2004) 3 SCC 178 (183 ). That was a case where during the pendency of eviction proceedings initiated jointly, one of the co-owners of the accommodation had sold her share in favour of tenant and then applied for the dismissal of the suit. Supreme Court in India Umbrella (supra), held that such a course, is not open to prejudice the co-owners and mutual rights of the co-owners could be settled in a partition suit. ( 11. ) NOW coming to the second question, both Courts have upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record have recorded findings of facts. Such findings are binding upon this Court unless it is shown that findings are perverse; some material evidence has been overlooked or inadmissible evidence has been considered. Even after the recent amendment in the CPC, the First appellate Court continues to be the final Court of facts. Now the First appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the First appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one. "a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. " Santosh Plazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 . ( 12. ) A faint attempt was also made by the learned Counsel for the appellant to get an order of remand by contending that the lower appellate did not consider subsequent events which the appellant wanted to introduce by amendment. After going through the impugned judgment it is clear that the lower appellate was alive to subsequent event and the Court below did address itself to that aspect of the matter. No fault can be found with the impugned judgment and decree on that score therefore, there is no need to burden this judgment with various authorities cited by the learned Counsel for appellants including Hashmat Rais case ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ). There is no doubt ratio of said case cannot be ignored but has to be applied in its proper perspective to the facts of a particular case. In the opinion of this Court, principles of law laid down in Hashmat Rais (supra) cannot be invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Thus, in view of the discussion, not only this appeal but also the connected appeal preferred by the L. Rs. of co-owner Uma Shankar fail and they are dismissed without any orders as to costs. Order accordingly. Let a copy of this judgment be retained in the record of Second Appeal No. 39/2006.