Judgment S. R. DONGAONKAR, J.:- Appellant State of Maharashtra is challenging the judgment dated 17-7-1993 of acquittal of the respondents for the offences punishable under sections 304B, 498-A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and of respondent no. 1 for the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Buldhana in Sessions Case No.73/1990. 2. Respondents were prosecuted for the aforesaid offences on the allegations that deceased Leelabai was the wife of respondent no. 1 Ramkisan. Respondent nos.2 and 3 are her in-laws i.e. parents of Ramkisan. Respondent no.4 Gangubai is sister-in-law of deceased Leelabai. They were living at the relevant time at village Shivani Armal [P. S. Andhera]. It is alleged that respondents used to ill-treat the deceased Leelabai by making demands of dowry, radio, wrist watch and bicycle etc. It is alleged that respondent no.1 Ramkisan used to say that he would not allow her to reside with him if the demands are not met. She had informed about this to her father; P.W.7 Sakharam Jadhao. It is alleged that all the respondents used to ill-treat and harass her on this count. She had also informed that her husband was telling that he did not like her, it is alleged that her father P.W.7 Sakharam could not provide all these articles and money, so the ill-treatment and harassment of the deceased Leelabai continued. It is alleged that on 29-11-1989, when he was at home at Malkapur one person came and told that his daughter Leelabai had received burn injuries and she was admitted in Government Hospital, Buldhana. Accordingly, he, his wife Sakhu, his sister Paru started for Buldhana. They went to S.T. Stand Malkapur. One Bansi Masa Jadhao P.W.3 (his cousin) met them at S.T. Stand, so on hearing about the incident, he also joined the parents of deceased for going to Buldhana. They came to Government Hospital, Buldhana. It is alleged that this P.W.7 Sakharam asked (deceased) Leelabai as to how she had suffered burn injuries. She told that accused no.l [respondent no. 1] had asked her to take groundnuts in the house and when she was taking the same, her husband poured kerosene on her person; set her on fire and ran away. It is alleged that this P.W.7 Sakharam asked (deceased) Leelabai as to how she had suffered burn injuries. She told that accused no.l [respondent no. 1] had asked her to take groundnuts in the house and when she was taking the same, her husband poured kerosene on her person; set her on fire and ran away. It is alleged that she also told that after receiving burn injuries, respondents asked her not to tell the truth and asked her to say that she had caught fire due to fall of kerosene lamp. Thereafter, P.W.3 Bansi lodged report to Police Station Andhera. It may be stated that just before deceased Leelabai was taken to the hospital, from the house, her fire was extinguished by one Arun Ghevande (P.W.6) who was residing in the vicinity of the house of the respondents. It is alleged that when she was admitted in the hospital, one Dying Declaration (Ex.27) was recorded by Naib Tahsildar Bhalerao (P.W.4). It was to the effect that she had caught fire by way of an accident because of chimney, when she was in the house. This Dying Declaration was recorded at about 10.50 p.m. on 28-11-1989. The disclosure of the incident by way of accident was of the time of about evening on 28-11-1989. She has also told specifically that she was not subjected to any harassment in her house and she had caught fire by chimney. Besides this she had also told that when she caught fire, she tried to get out of the house, somebody put guilt on her person and extinguished fire. Later on after the report of P.W.3 Bansi (Ex.33) to make enquiry into the matter, the matter was enquired. No offence seems to have been registered at that time as only enquiry into the incident was requested. During the enquiry and investigation, P.W.4 Executive Magistrate Bhalerao again recorded her Dying Declaration on 1-12-1989, which is at Ex.35, which implicates respondents in terms of the prosecution case. Thereafter, this Dying Declaration was treated as F.I.R. and offence under sections 307, 498-A, 201, 504, 506 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was registered bearing Crime no.150/1989. The offence was registered by P.W.9, Head Constable Jagdeo Salve. He prepared spot Panchanama Ex.23, seized said quilt as per Ex.30. Said Dying Declaration was incorporated in the said report lodged by this P.H.C. 3. The offence was registered by P.W.9, Head Constable Jagdeo Salve. He prepared spot Panchanama Ex.23, seized said quilt as per Ex.30. Said Dying Declaration was incorporated in the said report lodged by this P.H.C. 3. Thereafter, during the investigation again statement of the deceased Leela was recorded by H. C. Salve which is at Ex.53. Deceased Leelabai expired on 6-121989, as such the registered offence was changed to one under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It may be mentioned that P.W.5 Dr. Khasbage had issued injury certificate of deceased Leelabai when she was admitted in General Hospital, Buldhana as per Ex.37, and at the time of Dying Declaration the certificate of fitness was issued by P.W.2 Dr. Vyawahare. In the investigation the seized articles were sent to C.A. and C.A.’s Reports were received; Exs.41 and 42. Autopsy on the dead body of the deceased was performed. The said autopsy report is at EX.25. It may be stated that the witnesses to the spot and seizure of chimney are P.W.1 Tukaram Bhutekar and P.W.8 Laxman Bhimaji Armal. After due investigation, the charge-sheet was submitted for the aforesaid offences. On committal of the case, learned Additional Sessions Judge. Buldhana framed charge for the aforesaid offences, respectively against respondent no. 1 and respondent nos.2 to 4. They pleaded not guilty to the same. Their defence is that of total denial. They have however, pleaded that deceased Leelabai had suffered an accidental fire and therefore, she died. 4. The prosecution has led the evidence of 10 witnesses inclusive of the witnesses as stated above. The main evidence against respondents which is relied by the prosecution is in the shape of Dying Declarations i.e. Oral Dying Declaration to P.W.3 Bansi and P.W.7 Sakharam Jadhao, which was made by the deceased in the Government Hospital while she was taking treatment on 29-11-1989. The Dying Declaration recorded by P.W.4 Executive Magistrate Bhalerao on 1-12-1989 at about 8.05 hours and the Dying Declaration in the form of statement EX.53 recorded by P.W.9 Head Constable Salve on 3-12-1989. Defence did not adduce any evidence. 5. Learned trial Judge, after considering the evidence on record found that the Dying Declarations mentioned above, incriminating the respondents are not reliable and sufficient for basing conviction of the respondents. Defence did not adduce any evidence. 5. Learned trial Judge, after considering the evidence on record found that the Dying Declarations mentioned above, incriminating the respondents are not reliable and sufficient for basing conviction of the respondents. First Dying Declaration recorded by P.WA Bhalerao EX.27 immediately on the admission of the deceased in the Hospital was supported by the evidence on record i.e. seizure of the chimney. Other Dying Declarations, are tainted with the possibility of deceased being tutored by her parents. Death of the deceased, by burns is held to be established. Learned trial Judge has mainly considered the evidence of first Dying Declaration to discredit the prosecution version of homicidal death of the deceased. Considering the other evidence on record, including the evidence that of P.W.3 Bansi, he rendered judgment of acquittal of the respondents. 6. Learned A.P.P. Mr. A.D. Sonak, for the appellant State has contended that the prosecution has established the case against the respondents for the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against respondent no.1 2nd fur the offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against respondents no. 1 to 4. According to him, latter Dying Declaration (Exh.35) recorded by the Executive Magistrate Bhalerao P.W.4, is reliable and first Dying Declaration (Exh.27) recorded by him was not reliable inasmuch as at that time, deceased Leelabai was under the pressure of the respondents, i.e. when she stated that she had suffered accidental fire due to chimney. According to him, Dying Declaration which is found reliable and trustworthy can be relied upon for basing conviction and in the present case, therefore, Dying Declaration made to P.W.3 Rami and P.W,7 Sakharam and P.W.4 Bhalerao Exh.35 are reliable, so also statement made to Head Constable Salve Exh.53 and therefore, judgment of the learned trial Judge is not correct and it is perverse to the record .as the learned trial Judge has taken wrong view of the ma1:teir. He has relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1958 SC 22 (V 45 C 4) [Khushalrao Vs. State of Bombay) wherein it has been held that Dying Declaration .can form the sole basis of conviction even if it is uncorroborated and if the Dying Declaration is found truthful and trustworthy in the light of surrounding circumstances, the same can form basis of conviction. 7. State of Bombay) wherein it has been held that Dying Declaration .can form the sole basis of conviction even if it is uncorroborated and if the Dying Declaration is found truthful and trustworthy in the light of surrounding circumstances, the same can form basis of conviction. 7. As against this, learned counsel for the :respondents Mr. Deshpande contended that the learned trial Judge has taken Correct view of the matter and the latter Dying Declarations implicating the respondents are not trustworthy and they are tainted with the possibility 'Of tutoring by the parents 'Of the deceased. According to him, learned trial Judge has rightly considered the first Dying Declaration Exh.27 which is recorded by the Executive Magistrate P.WA Bhalerao immediately after the admission of the deceased in the hospital and therefore, the latter Dying Declarations are not reliable and trustworthy and sufficient for basing the conviction of the respondents. 8. He has relied on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 2004 SC 1708 : 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 111.5 (S.C.) [Nallam Veera Satyanandam and others Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.) to contend that rnuh.ip1e Dying Declarations have to be considered independently on its own merits as regards the evidentiary value. One cannot be rejected because of the contents of the another. Therefore according to him, in view of the first Dying Declaration Exh.27, the other latter Dying Dedar2rions are doubtful and no conviction can be based on the same and therefore impugned judgment is not perverse and it is correct and therefore it is not liable to be set aside in the appeal against acquittal. 9. It would re beneficial to refer the judgment reported in 2007(2) Crimes 103 (S.C.) : 2007 ALL SCR 961 [Chandrappa & others Vs. State of Karnataka]. wherein in paragraph 35 it has been held as under: "35. 9. It would re beneficial to refer the judgment reported in 2007(2) Crimes 103 (S.C.) : 2007 ALL SCR 961 [Chandrappa & others Vs. State of Karnataka]. wherein in paragraph 35 it has been held as under: "35. From the above decisions in our considered view the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge (1) An appel1ate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2)The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may Teach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3)Various expressions such as substantial and compelling reasons good and sufficient grounds very strong circumstances distorted conclusions, 'glaring mistakes'. etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of due accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the aroused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is fut1beir reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. Therefore, when acquittal of the accused is considered, in an appeal, unless there is perverseness in the judgment of the trial Court and there are compelling reasons to set it aside to convict the aroused., the judgment of acquittal can not be overturned, even if other view of guilt of the accused is possible. 10. Here is the case where admittedly first Dying Declaration Exh.27 exonerates the respondents as the deceased makes out a case of accidental fire. 10. Here is the case where admittedly first Dying Declaration Exh.27 exonerates the respondents as the deceased makes out a case of accidental fire. This Dying Declaration is also recorded by the Executive Magistrate P.W.4 Bhalerao, when she was admitted in the hospital. The fitness certificate of the patient was obtained and thereafter, this Dying Declaration was recorded According to P.W.4 Bhalerao this Dying Declaration was recorded after the persons who were attending the said Leelabai in the hospita1 were asked to go out. P. W.4 Bhalerao has also deposed that he had read over the contents of Ex.27 to Leelabai and when she admitted the same, he obtained ha thumb impression. He has deposed about the same procedure followed by him while recording Dying Declaration Exh.35 incriminating the accused on 1-12-1989. It is apparent that both these Dying Declarations are not in "question and answers form they are recorded after asking the Medical Officer as to whether the patient was fit to make it statement and after asking the relatives to go out. It is true that when first Dying Declaration i.e. Exn.27 was recorded, the possibility of accused persons i.e. respondents being there is not overruled. But then, possibility of Exh.35 Dying Declaration which incriminates respondents being made at the instance of the father of the deceased can also not be overruled and therefore, merely because there is possibility of Exh.27 being recorded when respondents were present just before its recording that fact by itself will not discredit the said Dying Declaration. More so because at me relevant time, P.W.4 Executive Magistrate Bhalerao had nothing to exonerate the respondents by recording false Dying Declaration. 11. Considering the manner in which D.Ds. are recorded by Executive Magistrate in this case, it cans for immediate need to en1ighten the Executive Magistrate about the law .and instructions on the ,subject of recording of D.Ds. by the Director of Prosecution. 12. It is necessary to bear in mind that P.W.6 Arun Ghevande who had come to the house of the deceased immediately after the incident and extinguished her fire., did not state that she had mad any utterance incriminating the respondents/accused at the relevant rime. He has stated that on 28-11-1989., he was standing in front of his house he saw Leelabai wife of respondent no. 1 coming out of the house while burning. There was burning only to her backside. He has stated that on 28-11-1989., he was standing in front of his house he saw Leelabai wife of respondent no. 1 coming out of the house while burning. There was burning only to her backside. He went running there. He put one Sari on her person but as it caught fire he extinguished her fire by putting guilt. He has also stated that one Vyankatrao had come there with Handa i.e.. Pot containing water and he prohibited that Vyankatrao to pour water on her person as it might have complicated the state of injuries. This Vyankatrao is not examined by the prosecution. P.W.6 Arun did not state anything about the utterances, if any, by Leelabai. While replying to the court questions, he stated that after he put Godhadi on the person of Leelabai fire was extinguished and when fire was extinguished Leelabai was fully conscious, she was in a position to talk. She did not tell him how she caught fire. She did not complain against anybody at that time. Therefore, even when this first independent witness was available, she has not incriminated the respondents for the fire to her person. 13. What is more important and makes latter Dying Declarations unsuitable for basing conviction, is the evidence of P.W.3 Bansi. 14. It is apparent from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that it is the case of the prosecution that P.W.3 Bansi and P.W.7 Sakharam the father of the deceased had gone to General Hospital, Buldhana and heard Leelabai saying as to what happened and how it had happened, when P.W.7 Sakharam asked her about it. P.W.7 Sakharam has supported prosecution case, however P.W.3 Bansi; to our surprise; has not said anything about the same. It is worthwhile to note that what he stated "We all saw Leela who was lying on cot and she had received burns. Sakhubai asked Leela that how she received burns and what had happened. Leela informed that she was beaten by her husband. She also informed that she did not know what had happened further. I then went to Andhera Police Station and to see what is the truth. The Police reduced into writing my report and obtained my thumb impression. I am now read over the contents of the report and they are correct. She also informed that she did not know what had happened further. I then went to Andhera Police Station and to see what is the truth. The Police reduced into writing my report and obtained my thumb impression. I am now read over the contents of the report and they are correct. It is at Ex.33." Exh.33 report also no where shows that she had disclosed to her parents or to P.W.3 Bansi that respondent no. 1 had set her on fire, respondent nos. 1 to 4 were harassing and ill-treating her on account of demand of articles and dowry, she only stated that her husband had beaten her. Therefore, this evidence of close relation of the deceased inconsistent with that of P.W.7 Sakharam clearly makes the latter Dying Declarations doubtful and insufficient for basing the conviction. It is necessary to further mention that to the court questions, this witness has stated, that Leelabai was talking in low tone, with Sakhubai. He was at distance of about 4 to 5 feet from Leela at that time. He heard what Leela told to Sakhubai from that distance. He did not know as to whether Parbata or Sakharam had heard what Leela told to Sakhubai. Sakharam was near him. Sakharam is blind but not deaf. He did not know that Parbata is deaf. P.W.7 Sakharam is blind and therefore it was only P.W.3 Bansi who could have consciously heard the Dying Declaration made to the parents of the deceased by her and also seen her making that statement. The report (Exh.33) is lodged by him immediately after hearing what deceased Leelabai had told. Apart from this, prosecution has failed to explain as to why; though this oral D.D. to P.W.7 Sakharam was made on 29-11-1989, incriminating D.D. by Executive Magistrate was recorded on 1-12-1989 (Exh.35) i.e. so late. 15. In the present case, chimney has been seized while making the spot Panchanama, therefore, first Dying Declaration EX.27 of deceased making statement of catching accidental fire, is also supported by the said seizure. 16. Learned trial Judge has considered the fact of putting Godhadi to extinguish fire by P.W.6 Arun Ghevande as corroborative piece to the Dying Declaration Ex.27. This aspect does not seem to be incorrect. There is nothing on record to suggest that Exh.27 was a Dying Declaration made under the pressure of the respondents. 16. Learned trial Judge has considered the fact of putting Godhadi to extinguish fire by P.W.6 Arun Ghevande as corroborative piece to the Dying Declaration Ex.27. This aspect does not seem to be incorrect. There is nothing on record to suggest that Exh.27 was a Dying Declaration made under the pressure of the respondents. Only possibility to that effect will not make the same doubtful. Therefore, the first Dying Declaration Ex.27 which exonerates the respondents & is first in time after admission of deceased in Hospital is not proved to be false. Nothing incriminating is stated to P.W.6 Arun Ghevande when he extinguished the fire of the deceased, by her. P.W.3 Bansi did not hear saying the deceased Leelabai that respondent no. 1 had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire and also that other respondents were harassing and ill-treating her for the demand of dowry and therefore, the latter Dying Declarations which implicate the respondents are not found to be so convincingly reliable for basing the conviction. Needless to state that the statement recorded by P.W.10 P.S.I. Ovhal Ex.33, which is a detailed statement recorded on 3-12-1989, will also no lead to the conviction of the respondents. The charge under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is rightly held by the learned trial Judge not proved as the same was based only on the evidence of P.W.7 Sakharam Jadhao the father of the deceased which is based on the information given by deceased Leelabai at the time of Dipawali. He has rightly pointed out that though it was tried to suggest that there were four panch as who were present; when respondent no.2 had come to take back deceased Leelabai after Diwali on the assurance that there would not be any harassment to deceased Lila thereafter, but who were those four panchas; is not made known, nor any of them was examined. Therefore, the view of the learned trial Judge that evidence of P.W.7 Sakharam Jadhao in this behalf cannot be relied upon, does not seem to be incorrect. In sequel, we find that the view taken by the learned trial Judge that prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder, dowry death and cruelty on account of demand of dowry against respondents, can not be said to be incorrect or perverse. 17. In sequel, we find that the view taken by the learned trial Judge that prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder, dowry death and cruelty on account of demand of dowry against respondents, can not be said to be incorrect or perverse. 17. In view of the authorities referred above, as the view of the learned trial Judge does not seem to be incorrect, much less perverse, the impugned judgment of acquittal cannot be overturned and therefore, the appeal has to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.