JUDGMENT P.C. : Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. 1. In both the writ petitions, order dated 16.9.2006, issued by the respondent no. 2 has been challenged and the points to be determined in the writ petitions are common, therefore, both the writ petitions are being heard and decided together by this common order. 2. By means of these writ petitions the petitioners have prayed for issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 16.9.2006 issued by the respondent no. 2 whereby the petitioners Mr. Ishaan Tyagi, Mr. Mausam Sharma and Mr. Zubair-Bin-Hafeez student of B.M.L.T. 3rd Year, B.M.L.T. 3rd year and B.Sc. M.M. 3rd year respectively have been rusticated from the Institute for a period of three years with immediate effect. Against the said order Ishaan Tyagi filed former writ petition No. 1490 of 2006 while the other two petitioners have jointly filed the latter writ petition No. 1517 of 2006. 3. Relevant facts of the case giving rise to the present writ petitions are that the petitioners Ishaan Tyagi and Mausam Sarma were students of BMLT 3rd year course while Zubair Bin Hafeez was student of B.Sc. M.M. 3rd year of Sardar Bhagwan Singh Post Graduate Institute of Biomedical Sciences and Research, Balawala, Dehradun. A show cause notice was issued to all the three petitioners alleging therein that they were involved in a scuffle outside the institute premises on 9th September, 2006 with local residents. It was also alleged that the petitioners had earlier been awarded punishment for indiscipline and were kept under suspension. It was further alleged that the petitioners instigated other hostel inmates on 11.9.2006 thereby disturbed the academic activities of the students. It was also alleged that on 12.9.2006 they entered the institute premises and forcibly disrupted the classes and forced the students to assemble in the lawns and canteen and prevented the students from attending their classes. This show cause notice is dated 12.9.2006 and the petitioners were directed to show cause within 72 hours of receipt of this notice as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated against them, failing which it shall be presumed that they have nothing to submit and ex-parte decision shall be taken against them. This show cause notice is dated 12.9.2006 and the petitioners were directed to show cause within 72 hours of receipt of this notice as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated against them, failing which it shall be presumed that they have nothing to submit and ex-parte decision shall be taken against them. However, a letter dated 13.9.2006 was sent to the father of Zubair Bin Hafeez, whereby he was asked to come to the institute along with his son on or before 17.9.2006. Show cause notice is Annexure No. 1 to the writ petitions. These notices were received by the petitioners on 14.9.2006. According to the petitioners, they went to the Institution with their written explanation but the respondent authorities refused to accept their explanation rather in arbitrary manner the impugned order dated 16.9.2006 was passed against the petitioners, though the stipulated period of 72 hours was to expire on 17.9.2006. The petitioners have alleged that the incident of quarrel came to an end by compromise between the parties on 11.9.2006. The incident of scuffle had taken place outside the premises of the college therefore, it had no concern with the students of the institution and the allegation levelled against the petitioners including disturbance to academic activities is baseless. 4. The respondent no. 1 and 2 filed counter affidavit. The respondents have contended that the writ petitions are not maintainable against the respondent no. 1 and 2 and that no relief has been sought against respondent no. 3. It has been stated that the respondents no. 1 and 2 are neither State nor instrumentality of the State nor other authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, hence writ petitions are not maintainable against private individual and bodies. It has also been contended that a Civil Suit No. 372 of 2006 Gaurav Bharti Shiksha Sansthan and another Vs. Ishaan Tyagi and others was filed by the respondent No. 1 for permanent injunction on 25.9.2006 and an interim order was passed against the defendant-petitioners. It has further been stated that the matter relates to the factual position, therefore, such issues cannot the examined in the writ jurisdiction. It was also stated that the matter of discipline is an internal matter of the institution and beyond the scope of interference of the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has further been stated that the matter relates to the factual position, therefore, such issues cannot the examined in the writ jurisdiction. It was also stated that the matter of discipline is an internal matter of the institution and beyond the scope of interference of the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was stated that the action taken by the disciplinary committee and the petitioners were rusticated as per Rules of the Institution on disciplinary grounds, i.e. having been awarded four black dots. It has been stated that the petitioners caused injuries to two local residents in a scuffle on 9.9. 2006 and consequently F.I.R. was lodged with the police. On 11.9.2006 the petitioners were apprehended by the police and subsequently they were released on intervention of the parents of the petitioners. Thereafter the petitioners dragged the inmates of Boys Hostel to join them in raising anti management slogans. The management called the police in order to avoid an ugly situation. Again on 12.9.2006, the petitioners came to the institution and started instigating the students to disturb the academic activities and peace and harmony. They also prevented the students from attending classes. According to the respondents, the disciplinary matter was considered by the Disciplinary Action Committee on 15.9.2006 after the expiry of the period as contained in the Show Cause Notices and by a unanimous decision the petitioners were rusticated from the institute. The respondents have filed documents along with their counter-affidavit. 5. The petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavit and have refuted the contentions raised in the counter affidavit. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petitions are not maintainable against them. The contention of the learned counsel is that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 are not the instrumentality of the State and they do not fall within the meaning “State” as enumerated in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was urged that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution does not lie against the private individuals and bodies. I have given my anxious thought to the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. I am not inclined to accept the contention for the following reasons. 8. It was urged that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution does not lie against the private individuals and bodies. I have given my anxious thought to the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. I am not inclined to accept the contention for the following reasons. 8. At the outset, it may be noted that Part III and Part IV of the Constitution of India make provision regarding Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the State Policy respectively. The rights granted under Part III are guaranteed rights and can be enforced in the Court of Law whereas the Directive Principles are not enforceable as such, but the principles laid down therein are nevertheless fundamental in governance of the country. Certain duties have been enjoined upon the State. The words “the State” have been defined in the Constitution and by virtue of Article 36 the definition of the State as has been defined in Article 12 has been applied in its application to Part IV of the Constitution. 9. The question to be answered is what would be the scope of writ jurisdiction of the High Court except against the State? No doubt, whenever the Stte violates any fundamental rights, remedy under Article 32 or Article 226 may be invoked but what would happen if a person or the institution against which the relief sought is not “the State” as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. 10. The scope of Article 226 is wider than the scope of the Article 32 of the Constitution. With advancement in society and expansion of Government activities the role of the Government was defined and re-defined. What would be the scope of meaning of the State has come across many a times before the courts of law for interpretation. The Apex Court, in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board Vs. Mohan Lal and others [AIR 1967 Supreme Court, 1857] while interpreting the phraseology “other authorities” as used in Article 12, has held that it would include constitutional or statutory authorities on whom the powers are conferred by law. It was further held that “the State”, as defined in Article 12 comprehends to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting educational and economic interest of the people. In the case of Sabhajeet Tiwari Vs. It was further held that “the State”, as defined in Article 12 comprehends to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting educational and economic interest of the people. In the case of Sabhajeet Tiwari Vs. Union of India [1975(1) SCC 485] the Apex Court interpreted the words as enumerated in Article 12 and held that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In that case, principles as laid down in the case of Praga Tools Corporation Vs. C.A. Imanual 1969 (1) SCC 585; Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar 1969 (1) SCC 765 and S.L. Agarwal Vs. General Manager Hindustan Steel Limited 1970 (1) SCC 177 have been relied upon in which it was held that employees of these companies do not enjoy the protection as available to the Government servant under Article 311, therefore, they could not be held to be department of Government. In the case of Sabhajeet (supra) it was also observed that the CSIR is a society incorporated in accordance with Society Registration Act and this fact was also taken note of that the Government takes special care in promotion, guidance and cooperation of scientific and industrial research. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh and others Vs. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and another [1975(1) SCC 421], wherein the same question was raised, has held that the State was an abstract entity. It can only act through instrumentality or agency or natural juridical person therefore there is no strange notion in the notion of State acting through corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State. In this case the function has been also categorized and it was held that if a given function of such public importance and so closely related to government function as to be classified as governmental agency, then even the presence or absence of State financial aid might be irrelevant in making findings of State action. 12. In the case of Ajay Hasia and others Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others [1981(1) SCC 722], the same principle has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 13. In the cases of P.K. Ramchandra Iyer Vs. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC 141]; Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. 12. In the case of Ajay Hasia and others Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others [1981(1) SCC 722], the same principle has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 13. In the cases of P.K. Ramchandra Iyer Vs. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC 141]; Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology [(2002) 5 SCC 111 and Zee Films Pvt. Limited Vs. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 649], the phraseology “other authorities” as mentioned in Article 12 has been discussed by the Apex Court. In the case P.K. Ramchandra Iyer (supra) it was observed that “much water has flown down the Jamuna since the dicta in Sabhajit Tewari case and conceding that it is not specifically overruled in later decision, its ratio is considerably watered down as to be a decision confined to its own facts.” 14. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) too the ratio laid down in the case of Sabhajit Tiwari (supra) was not upheld and it was observed that had the facts been closely scrutinized in the proper perspective, it could have led and can only lead to the conclusion that CSIR is a State within the meaning of Article 12. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas to answer as to whether a body is State within the meaning of Article 12, it was observed that the question in each case would be whether in the light of cumulative facts established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under Statute or otherwise it would not serve to make the body a State. 15. It may be noted that the scope of the word “the State” as used in Article 32 may not squarely be applied in its application to the writs under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writs under Article 226 may be issued against any person, for that matter, even against any individual. The question is what would be those remedies, which are available under Article 226 against an individual or to put in another words what would be the classification of duties in which prerogative jurisdiction of Article 226 may be invoked? 16. The writs under Article 226 may be issued against any person, for that matter, even against any individual. The question is what would be those remedies, which are available under Article 226 against an individual or to put in another words what would be the classification of duties in which prerogative jurisdiction of Article 226 may be invoked? 16. In the case of Sri Anadi Mukta Sadguru S.M.V.A.J.M.S. Trust Vs. R. Rudani [(1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 691 = AIR 1989 SC 1607] the Apex Court interpreted the term ‘Authority’ as used in Article 226. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, it was held as under :- “The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “Any Person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied.” Regarding scope of Mandamus, it was held in paragraphs 22 as under:- “Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available ‘to reach injustice wherever it is found.’ Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.” 17. In the case of Ramdeo Baba Kamala Nehru Engineering College Vs. Sanjay Kumar [2002 (10) SCC 487] a student, who was admitted in an unaided school against payment seat subsequently withdrew himself from school as he had got admission elsewhere. He sought for refund of the tuition fee and caution money paid by him. Refund was not made. He filed writ in the High Court for refund of caution money and tuition fee and relief was granted by the High Court. The contention there was that writ of Mandamus cannot be issued in such cases but this contention was rejected by the High Court. In appeal, the Apex Court has held that “we do not deem it appropriate to uphold the technical plea of the appellants and drive the respondent student of the need of filing a civil suit. The view taken by the High Court is just and equitable and therefore need not be interfered with.” 18. The Apex Court has further discussed the scope of mandamus in the case on Binny Limited and another Vs. V. Sadashivan and others [2005 AIR SCW 3774] and it was held that this remedy is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against the private wrongs. This writ could also be issued against private body or person, especially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the constitution. However, the scope of Mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. It was also observed by the Apex court that “a body” is performing a public function when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. In that case, the test as enumerated in the case of VST Industries Limited Vs. In that case, the test as enumerated in the case of VST Industries Limited Vs. VST Industries Workers’ Union and another reported in [(2001) 1 SCC 298] has been referred. They are as follows:- 1. “The test of a whether a body is performing a public, function, and is hence amenable to judicial review, may not depend upon the source of its power or whether the body is ostensibly a “public” or a “private” body. 2. The principles of judicial review prima facie govern the activities of bodies performing public functions. 3. However, not all decisions, taken by bodies in the course of their public functions are the subject matter of judicial review. In the following two situations judicial review will not normally be appropriate even though the body may be performing a public function. a. Where some other branch of the law more appropriately governs the dispute between the parties. In such a case, that branch of law and its remedies should and normally will be applied; and b. Where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather than the general law. Thus, where a special method of resolving disputes (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic tribunals) has been agreed upon by the parties (expressly or by necessary implication), that regime, and not judicial review, will normally govern the dispute.” 19. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents no.1 and 2 is that the writ petitions of the petitioners itself are not maintainable, inasmuch as the institution was empowered to enforce the private contract between school and students and the students have been rusticate under the laws/bye-laws to school. He has relied upon the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of M.K. Gandhi Vs. Director of Education (Secondary) U.P. Lucknow [2005(5) ALJ, 416]. In that case, the bone of contention between the parties was service conditions of the teachers of Delhi Public School as formulated in the Bye-laws and there was agreement between the parties to that effect and the bye-laws and there was binding upon them as a contract. Director of Education (Secondary) U.P. Lucknow [2005(5) ALJ, 416]. In that case, the bone of contention between the parties was service conditions of the teachers of Delhi Public School as formulated in the Bye-laws and there was agreement between the parties to that effect and the bye-laws and there was binding upon them as a contract. In this premise, it was held that “The service rules and the agreement- whether framed by a school and agreed between the parties by an agreement or deemed to be adopted by them and agreement to be in the same formal as Appendix-III of the affiliation bye-laws as held in this case-are merely private contract between the schools and the teachers. They do not have statutory force. The writ petition is not maintainable against the School to enforce them.” The Allahabad High Court partly allowed the writ petition and certain directions were given to the Board (Director of Education) including that it may issue a show cause notice to the DPS School to show cause as to why it may not be disaffiliated for terminating the services of the petitioners 1 to 3 contrary to the bye-laws and it may disaffiliate the DPS School unless the school undertakes to conduct the inquiry in accordance with the affiliation bye-laws and pass appropriate orders afresh on the basis of the inquiry. The ratio of the case cannot be disputed, but in the case at hand, the matter related between the institution and the students and the institution-respondents are engaged in imparting education to the students. This case law is of no avail to the respondents. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 again submitted that the relief sought by the petitioners in the writ petitions is against a private party, therefore, no public duty is involved in the present case and no mandamus can be issued by the High Court. He has relied upon the case of Shesh Bahadur Singh V. State of U.P. [2005 All. L.J., 3402], wherein it was held in paragraph 22 that “the relief sought by the petitioner in this writ petition is against a private party, i.e., respondent No. 4. No public duty is involved in the present case and it is only for permitting the petitioner to work as Head Master of the institution, in question. L.J., 3402], wherein it was held in paragraph 22 that “the relief sought by the petitioner in this writ petition is against a private party, i.e., respondent No. 4. No public duty is involved in the present case and it is only for permitting the petitioner to work as Head Master of the institution, in question. No mandamus can be issued in case of a private party except for enforcement of public duty as has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Binny Ltd. V.V. Sadasivan [2005 AIR SCW 3774].” It is significant to note that this Ruling instead of giving support to the respondents, helps the petitioners because while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, the Apex Court in paragraph 32 has observed that “that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private body which is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and such body is amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can exercise judicial review of the action challenged by a party. But there must be a public law element and it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties.” In Shesh Bahadur Singh case (supra) the matter for consideration before the Allahabad Court was between a Head Master and a recognized institution (Janta Vidyalaya, Athilapura, Ballia) and not between the students and private institution. It may be added that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have utterly failed to put forth its case before the Court that the action of harsh punishment of rustication had been exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the writ petitions are not maintainable against the institution because the institution has not been set up by statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled nor does it perform a public function. It has been argued that writ under Article 226 is not maintainable against a private body. He has placed reliance upon the case of G. Bassi Reddy Vs. International Crops Research Institute and Another [(2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases, 225]. It would suffice to mention that in this case the matter of disciplinary action against the students had not been involved. He has placed reliance upon the case of G. Bassi Reddy Vs. International Crops Research Institute and Another [(2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases, 225]. It would suffice to mention that in this case the matter of disciplinary action against the students had not been involved. The matter for consideration in the case at hand is regarding issue of mandamus a against a private institution empowered to promote education/public function for which the institution is affiliated to respondent no. 3 – University. As observed earlier, the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board Vs. Mohan Lal and others [AIR 1967 supreme Court, 1857] (supra), it was held in that case that “the State”, as defined in Article 12 comprehends to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting educational interest of the people. Apart from this, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust V. V.R. Rudani and others reported in [(1989) 2 SCC, 691 = AIR 1989, Supreme Court, Page 1607 has already been referred to above in detail. In that case it has been held that the words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed. This case law is of no avail to the respondents. In the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others etc. etc. Vs. State Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc. (AIR 193 Supreme Court, Page 2178) the Apex Court has observed that right to receive education is a fundamental right flowing from right to life. And right to life includes right to education. In paragraph 142, it has been held that “in particular, we agree with the observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. And right to life includes right to education. In paragraph 142, it has been held that “in particular, we agree with the observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. We do not think that the importance of education could have been better emphasized than in the above words.” The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that writ of mandamus is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution is not tenable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 22. The cumulative effect of the Apex Court verdict in the aforementioned cases and the principles laid down in the cited cases make it clear that even if an institution does not come within the ambit of the State or it is a person, mandamus may be issued but the duty, required to be enforced, by way of writ should be, public duty, there must be an element of public duty. Imparting education by an Institution, may it be aided or unaided inheres in it a public duty element. Basically, imparting education being essential task of the Government, the aided or unaided schools etc. supplement the task of government function. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 from all the four corners of the case in the light of the case-laws referred to above, it may be safely concluded that even if the respondent nos. 1 and 2 are unaided institutions, they impart education, hence the writ petitions are maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is no impediment for issue of mandamus against the respondent nos. 1 and 2 if the petitioners succeed in these writ petitions. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned order mainly on the ground that the action taken against the petitioners is a biased act of the respondent no. 2 and the order is hit by principle of natural justice. It has been vehemently submitted that the petitioners were deprived of opportunity of hearing, their explanations were not taken on record and the impugned order was passed hurriedly before expiry of the stipulated time of 72 hours. 2 and the order is hit by principle of natural justice. It has been vehemently submitted that the petitioners were deprived of opportunity of hearing, their explanations were not taken on record and the impugned order was passed hurriedly before expiry of the stipulated time of 72 hours. Learned counsel for the petitioners has made a reference to the averment made under head ‘m’ of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 which speaks in itself that the Disciplinary Action Committee had closed the way of the petitioners on 15.9.2006. It is admitted case of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 that the decision was taken by the Disciplinary Action Committee on 15.9.2006 vide Annexure R-15. In the said document, it has been mentioned that the above named three students (petitioners) were given reasonable opportunity to present themselves along with their respective parents before the Disciplinary Action Committee which they failed to do so. A bare perusal of the concluding part of the copy of Minutes of the Meeting of the Disciplinary Action Committee held on 15th September, 2006 reveals that the decision to rusticate the three petitioners from the institute had been taken by the 12 Member Committee on 15.9.2006 and the same was also got approved by the Board of Governors and the Competent Authority on that very day itself. 24. In paragraph 1 of the counter affidavit, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 has stated inter alia that “The respondent had also issued a Show Cause Notices to the petitioner and two other students on 12.9.2006. Copy of the Show Cause Notice dated 12.9.2006 is being filed and placed as ANNEXURE R-14 to this affidavit. The said Show Cause Notices was duly served on the petitioner. Despite receipt of the show cause notices, the petitioner did not respond to the same. The show cause notices were sent by Registered Post as well as by means of telegram. In an act of defiance the petitioner did not respond to the said Show Cause Notice.” 25. The most material aspect of the instant case is that in the counter affidavit in reply to paragraph no. 5 of the writ petition the following averments were made by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in both the writ petitions :- 5. In an act of defiance the petitioner did not respond to the said Show Cause Notice.” 25. The most material aspect of the instant case is that in the counter affidavit in reply to paragraph no. 5 of the writ petition the following averments were made by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in both the writ petitions :- 5. That in reply to Para 5 of the writ petition, it is stated that the Show Cause Notice dated 12.9.2006 issued by the Respondent No. 1 was also pasted on the Notice Board of the Institution as well as all other conspicuous places so that the petitioners become aware of the same and he was thereafter well aware of the same on 12.9.2006 itself. 26. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioners have come with a definite case that the show cause notice dated 12-9-2006 was received by the petitioners Ishaan Tyagi and Mausam Sharma on 14-9-2006 while show cause notice of Jubair Bin Hafeez dated 13-9-2006 was received by him on 14-9-2006. In the Show cause notice filed by the petitioners as well as the respondent nos. 1 and 2 along with counter affidavit, it was specifically mentioned therein that “You are therefore directed to show cause within 72 hours of receipt of this notice why disciplinary action should not be initiated against you, failing which it shall be presumed that you have no explanation to offer and an ex-parte decision shall be taken against you.” 27. On the top of the copy of the show cause notice filed by the petitioners, there is mention of “REGISTERED/SPEED POST”. According to the petitioners they received the said notice only on 14-9-2006. There is no denial form the side of the respondents that the show cause notice was not sent by registered post, rather it is admitted to them that the notice was sent through registered post and telegrams. In such circumstances, when it has not been shown to the contrary by the respondents, it can be taken that notices were in fact received by the petitioners not earlier than 14th September, 2006. In such circumstances, when it has not been shown to the contrary by the respondents, it can be taken that notices were in fact received by the petitioners not earlier than 14th September, 2006. The decision to rusticate the petitioners, admittedly, had been taken on 15th September, 2006, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners had been deprived of the reasonable opportunity to explain the charges in their defence has to be It may be added that even if or the sake of argument, it is accepted that the show cause notice was received by the petitioners on the date of its insurance, i.e. 12-9-2006, no order could have been passed imposing extreme penalty of rustication from the institute prior to expiry of 72 hours from the date of receipt of show cause notice. In the instant case where penalty of rustication has been imposed upon the petitioners, there is nothing on record form the side of the respondents to indicate as to when the show cause notice was served upon the petitioners. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 has placed reliance upon the case of Anup Pratap Singh Vs. The Principal, Udai Pratap Mahavidyalay (Autonomous), Varanasi [199 (36) ALR, Page 409], wherein show cause notice was served on the petitioner Anup Pratap Singh on 4.11.1996 and the expulsion order was passed against him on 5.4.1997 and the explanation submitted by the petitioner was found not satisfactory, therefore, in that case it was held that requirement of natural justice was fully complied with. In the case at hand, the respondent authorities have, without ascertaining whether the stipulated time given in the show cause notice had expired or not, resolved to pass the impugned order of rustication against the petitioners in a hasty manner on 15.9.2006 for the reasons best known to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 and it is a case where petitioners were deprived of reasonable opportunity of defence, therefore, the requirement of natural justice was not at all complied with, therefore, the order impugned calls for interference by this Court and the same is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 28. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 28. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 has contended that the institution had taken disciplinary action against petitioners-students on account of misconduct, therefore, the expulsion of student for their misconduct is justified. Reliance has been placed upon a Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Trilochan Singh Vs. The Director Small Industries Service Institute, Madras (AIR 1963, Madras, 68] wherein it was held that the power to take disciplinary action against misbehaviour of a student is inherent in the head of an educational institution. In that case, it was found that the student was given full opportunity to explain his conduct. But in the case at hand, as observed above, the petitioners were deprived of sufficient opportunity of hearing, therefore, the case is distinguishable and the said Ruling does not help the respondents. Learned counsel has further submitted that the punishment of rustication from the institution awarded against the petitioners was an adequate punishment and the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot look into the quantum of punishment. He has placed reliance upon the case of G.B.S. Omkar Vs. Shri Ventateswara Univesity and another [AIR 1981 Andhra Pradesh 163]. In that case, a show cause notice was served on a student by the University on the ground that he committed malpractices in the examination and the explanation of the student was obtained and considered and he was then rusticated. But in the case at hand, as has been detailed hereinbefore, it is amply clear that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 did not choose to wait for the expiry of the period of show cause notice before passing the final order. It will not be out of place to mention that in the present case, the opening lines of the show cause notice issued to the petitioner Mausham Sharma reads as under :- “As reported you were involved in a brawl outside the Institute premises on Saturday the 9th September 2006 with the local residents of the surrounding village. You were earlier also involved in case of fighting and as punishment you have till date been awarded Two Black Dots and have been kept under suspension for quite a long duration. 31. You were earlier also involved in case of fighting and as punishment you have till date been awarded Two Black Dots and have been kept under suspension for quite a long duration. 31. You are aware of the fact that the Ordinance (E) of the Institute Handbook clearly stipulates that if a student has accumulated Four Black Dots will be rusticated for a specific period from the Institute.” 32. Besides there is mention of allegations of the alleged incidents dated 11th September, 2006 and 12th September, 2006 in the show cause notice issued to Mausam Sharma and Ishaan Tyagi in Writ Petition No. 1490 of 2006. In the show cause notice of Ishan Tyagi, there is mention of three Black Dots already having been awarded to him. But the respondents had not even given any such notice to Mr. Zubair Bin Hafeez, rather letter dated 13.9.2006 had been written to his father, who was called upon to come to the institute along with his son on or before 17th September, 2006. The letter was sent by Sri S.P. Singh Chairman. In this letter there is no mention of Black Dots having been awarded to Zubair Bin Hafeez. The impugned order was issued on 16.9.2006 for which a resolution as passed in the meeting of the disciplinary action committee and got approved hurriedly on 15.9.2006 by the Chairman as is clear from Annexure R-14 filed by the respondents. 33. In view of the discussion above, the impugned order dated 16.9.2006 whereby all the three petitioners have been rusticated from the institute for a period of three years is liable to be set aside. The writ petitions are liable to the allowed. 34. Both the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned order dated 16.9.2006 (Annexure No. 3) is quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioners to continue their studies in their respective courses in Sardar Bhagwan Singh Post Graduate Institute of Biomedical Sciences and Research Balawala (Dehradun) forthwith. No order as to costs. However, the respondents would be at liberty to take decision afresh in the matter after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.