BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, ACJ. ( 1 ) THIS mandamus appeal is at the instance of unsuccessful writ petitioners and is directed against an order dated september 27, 2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court by which his Lordship dismissed a writ application filed by the appellants in which they challenged the authority of the Commissioner of Central Excise to issue a notice for audit in terms of Rule 173g (6) (c) of the Central Excise rules, 1944 although a similar notice had already been given by the comptroller and Auditor General of India in terms of the self-same provision and the consequent audit had also been made. ( 2 ) BY a letter dated October 13, 2000, issued by the office of the Principal director of Audit, Central, Calcutta. Central Excise, the appellants were informed that the audit of the account relating to excisable goods manufactured in the unit of the appellants would be taken up by CERA audit Party for the last one/two years thereby asking the appellants to make available various documents mentioned in the said notice for inspection. The said notice gave rise to filing of the writ application out of which the present mandamus appeal arises. ( 3 ) THE grievance of the appellants was that if the audit had already been made by the Central Excise Audit Party and/or the audit party appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India in the current financial year namely 2000-2001, there was no scope of passing a direction for further audit at the instance of the Commissioner, Central Excise in terms of Rule 173g (6) (c) of the Central Excise Rules. 1944. According to the appellants, once an audit has been made by either the Commissioner of Central Excise or the party sent by the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, there is no scope of further audit by or at the instance of any of the previously mentioned persons over again. In other words, according to the writ petitioners the word "or" appearing in the aforesaid Rule should not be read as "and". ( 4 ) THE vires of the said Rule was also challenged in the writ application but ultimately the same was not pressed. In other words, according to the writ petitioners the word "or" appearing in the aforesaid Rule should not be read as "and". ( 4 ) THE vires of the said Rule was also challenged in the writ application but ultimately the same was not pressed. ( 5 ) THE writ application was contested by the respondents by filing affidavit-in-opposition thereby disputing the allegations made in the application and the defence of the respondents was that there was no bar of the second audit at the instance of either of the two authorities mentioned in the previously mentioned Rule even if an audit has akeady been done by either of them. ( 6 ) THE learned Single Judge by the order impugned herein has turned down the objection raised by the writ petitioners and has held that the word "or" appearing in the aforesaid Rule should be treated as "and" and therefore, there was no illegality on the part of the respondent in issuing a second notice for audit in terms of Rule 173g (6) (c) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Apart from the aforesaid fact, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the notice of second audit has not caused any prejudice to the writ petitioners and on that ground also, the writ application was not maintainable. ( 7 ) BEING dissatisfied, the writ-petitioners have come up with the present mandamus appeal before us. ( 8 ) MR. Khaitan, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has assiduously contended before us that the learned Single Judge totally misread the aforesaid provision of the rules of 1944 in arriving at the conclusion that both the authorities mentioned therein can audit the accounts of the appellants notwithstanding the fact that an audit had already been done by one of those two authorities. Mr. Khaitan contended that the said rule authorises any one of the two authorities to take the responsibility of the audit of the writ petitioners but if it is already done by one of them, the other cannot undertake the self-same job. He, therefore, prayed for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 9 ) MR. Roy Chowdhary, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has, on the other hand, opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. He, therefore, prayed for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 9 ) MR. Roy Chowdhary, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has, on the other hand, opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. Khaitan and has supported the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge and has contended that this Court should not interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the question that falls for determination in this mandamus appeal is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ application filed by the appellants. ( 11 ) TO appreciate the aforesaid question it will be profitable to refer to the provision contained in Rule 173g (6) (c) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 that are quoted below: "where the Commissioner or the Comptroller and Auditor General of india decide to undertake the audit of the records of any assessee, the said assessee shall be given notice thereof at least fifteen days before the commencement of the audit. The audit party deputed for the purpose shall also call for in writing the records, which are required to be produced by the assessee, either before or during the course of audit. " ( 12 ) BEFORE we enter into the said question involved in this appeal, we must bear in mind that a person is entitled to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if any of his legal or fundamental rights is infringed by the action or inaction of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. As it appears from the aforesaid Rule, both the Commissioner of Central Excise and the Comptroller and Auditor General are authorised to audit the accounts of the appellants. Therefore, the notice of audit given by the Commissioner, Central Excise, which is the subject-matter of the appeal, was not issued by an authority who was not vested with such power under the law. The grievance of the appellant is that there cannot be second audit when already an audit has been done at the instance of the Comptroller and Auditor General. ( 13 ) IN our opinion, the appellant has no legal or fundamental right in their favour to oppose a second audit at the instance of an authority who is vested with the power of audit. ( 13 ) IN our opinion, the appellant has no legal or fundamental right in their favour to oppose a second audit at the instance of an authority who is vested with the power of audit. There is no law in our country prohibiting a further audit in case of any mistake or discovery of any new information regarding fraud or collusion, which will unearth suppression of material facts leading to loss of revenue within the tune fixed by law for reopening an assessment. In this connection, reference may be made the proviso to section 11a (1) of the Central Excise Act which authorises the appropriate authority to recover any duty of excise where the same has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of fact or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty within five years from the relevant date. In this connection, it will be profitable to refer to the following observation of the Apex Court in the case of Sarabhai M. Chemical vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, reported in AIR 2005 SC 1031 : "now coming to the question of limitation, at the outset, we wish to clarify that there are two concepts which are required to be kept in mind for the purposes of deciding this case. Reopening of approvals/assessments is different from raising of demand in relation to the extended period of limitation. Under section 11a (1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, a proper officer can reopen the approvals/assessments in cases of escapement of duty on account of non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, short-payment or erroneous refund, subject to it being done within one year from the relevant date. On the other hand, the demand for duty in relation to extended period is mentioned in the proviso to section 11a (1 ). Under that proviso, in cases where excise duty has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded on account of fraud, collusion or wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, or in contravention of any provision of the Act or rules with intent to evade payment of duty, demand can be made within five years from the relevant date. In the present case, we are concerned with the proviso to section 11-A (1 ). " (Emphasis Supplied.) ( 14 ) FOR enforcing the aforesaid provision and in order to have a preliminary investigation, the authority concerned is definitely required to recheck the records of a person liable to excise duty and thus, the issue of a fresh notice for re-audit is permissible under the relevant law within five years from the relevant date if the authority has any doubt in their mind about fraud or collusion. In this case, the notice was given on October 13, 2000 for inspection of records for a period well within the period of five years. If the first audit could not detect the fraud or collusion on the part of the person liable to pay excise duty, for that reason no right accrued in favour of the appellant not to have any further audit provided such audit is for a period within five years from the relevant date as mentioned in the proviso to section 11a (1)of the Central Excise Act. ( 15 ) THEREFORE, at this stage, for the issue of a mere notice of audit by the commissioner, Central Excise notwithstanding the fact that there had been a previous audit for the relevant year, none of the legal or fundamental rights of the appellants has been infringed and consequently, the writ application filed by the appellants was bereft of any substance. ( 16 ) WE, therefore, affirm the order passed by the learned Single Judge on the aforesaid ground alone. The interim order, granted earlier, stands vacated. ( 17 ) THIS appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs which we assess at rs. 20. 000/ -. Appeal dismissed with costs.