( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal has been filed by the defendant of Original No. 226 of 1982 for setting aside the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court by which the appeal was allowed and the suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 9th December, 1981 purported to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the respondent was decreed with costs. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-respondent had filed the suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 9th December, 1981 purported to have been executed in favour of the defendant-appellant in respect of agricultural land on the ground that it was without consideration; that the plaintiff had not executed the deed knowing it to be the sale deed; that it was not a conscious act of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was not in need of money; there was no question of her executing the sale deed of the entire property and that the sale deed was obtained by fraud with the help of attesting witnesses and in collusion with the Clerk in the office of the Sub-Registrar. It was alleged that in December, 1981, the plaintiff had seriously fallen ill and the defendant who was the son of elder brother of her deceased husband took the plaintiff for treatment to a hospital where she was asked to put a thumb mark on certain papers in connection with the treatment and it was only in January, 1982 when the defendant disclosed in the village that he had got executed a sale deed of the property that the plaintiff got the papers inspected and then came to know about the sale deed. ( 3 ) THE case of the defendants was that the sale deed had been executed on 9th December, 1982 for a consideration of Rs. 6500/- out of which Rs. 4500/- was paid in advance and Rs. 2000/- was paid before the Sub-Registrar. It was denied that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud or that it was without consideration. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court found that the said sale deed had not been obtained by fraud and it was also not without consideration. There was, therefore, no justification for cancelling the sale deed and the suit was accordingly dismissed. It was denied that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud or that it was without consideration. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court found that the said sale deed had not been obtained by fraud and it was also not without consideration. There was, therefore, no justification for cancelling the sale deed and the suit was accordingly dismissed. ( 5 ) THE Appellate Court observed that that even if the plaintiff was not a Purdahnashin lady then too she would be entitled to the same protection a Purdahnashin lady was entitled to by reason of helplessness of her state on account of illiteracy and ignorance and, therefore, the burden lay upon the defendant-vendee to prove that the transaction of sale was a bona fide transaction. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was an illiterate lady who was living in a village and had no knowledge of the worldly affairs and was entitled to the same protection as was available to a Purdahnashin lady. In order to discharge this burden, main reliance placed by the defendant was not on the evidence adduced by him in the Court but on the presumption arising out of the endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar on the sale deed. The Court found that such a presumption was rebuttable and the Court had to examine whether the document was voluntarily executed and there was no fraud. The Appellate Court found that it was not a voluntary act of the plaintiff and the sale deed was obtained by fraud and was without consideration. The Appellate Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. While admitting this appeal, the two substantial questions of law that were framed, were as follows :- "1. Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in granting special protection to the plaintiff- respondent? 2. Whether under the facts and circumstances when the trial Court refused special protection to the plaintiff-respondent for valid reasons the lower appellate Court was justified in granting the proteaction?" ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. Whether under the facts and circumstances when the trial Court refused special protection to the plaintiff-respondent for valid reasons the lower appellate Court was justified in granting the proteaction?" ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff-respondent was not a Purdahnashin lady as she was looking after her fields and was managing her affairs for the last many years after the death of her husband. He, therefore, submitted that the protection which a Purdahnashin lady was entitled to, could not have been given to her by the Appellate Court. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that there was no infirmity in the findings recorded by the Appellate Court. ( 8 ) A careful perusal of the judgment of the Appellate Court clearly shows that the Court had not held that the plaintiff-respondent was a Purdahnashin lady. On the other hand, the Appellate Court has observed that even though the plaintiff was not a Purdahnashin lady, she was entitled to the same benefit as a Purdahnashin lady was entitled in view of the fact that she was an illiterate woman who was living in the village and had no knowledge of the worldly affairs. It, accordingly, came to the conclusion that burden of proof that the sale deed had been executed in a bona fide manner fell upon the defendant. ( 9 ) THE aforesaid observation of the Appellate Court finds support from the decision of the Calcutta High Court given in Smt. Sonia Parshini Vs. Sheikh Moula Baksha, AIR 1955 Calcutta 17, and the relevant portion is quoted below:- "it is clear that the real question between the parties was whether the plaintiff appellant was entitled to any kind of protection under the law by reason of the helplessness of her state on account of illiteracy and ignorance and secondly if she was so entitled what corresponding burden was cast on the respondent who dealt with her. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The substantial question here is whether in the facts and circumstances proved the plaintiff appellant could be held to be entitled to this protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The substantial question here is whether in the facts and circumstances proved the plaintiff appellant could be held to be entitled to this protection. This would require examination of the reasons behind the rule protecting transactions in which pardanashin women are concerned. The inhibitions imposed by social conditions upon women of a certain well-defined class bring in their train disabilities which have compelled reversal of the rule that ordinarily a person is to be held to his contract. These disabilities are due to largely to illiteracy and ignorance which superadded to restrictions on free movement and contact with the world outside induce a condition of helplessness requiring the utmost vigilance to prevent unfairness in a deal in which she is concerned. The parties to the transaction not being evenly placed, courts called upon to pronounce on such transactions have always jealously guarded against possible unfairness. It has therefore come to be recognised as a rule of law that a party founding on a deed executed in such circumstances has to establish intelligent understanding of the deed and the burden is not discharged by mere proof of the execution of the document. Questions of fraud or undue influence apart, the plain requirement of the law in such cases is clear proof of comprehension of the contents of the document executed by her. Such protection cannot plainly be the exclusive privilege of the class commonly known as pardanashin. The parda with its inhibitions may be an additional feature or element in the case but the real reason behind the rule is lack of understanding and appreciation of what an illiterate woman without independent advice, is about. Where ignorance and illiteracy are proved exposing the woman concerned to the danger and the risk of an unfair deal it would, we think, be a perversion of the rule to deny in such case the protection, despite the helplessness of her state, merely on the ground that she is not strictly pardanashin. It is quite conceivable that a woman belonging to the pardanashin class properly so-called may in spite of the restraints of the parda have sufficient understanding and appreciation of the contents of a document to which she is a party. It is quite conceivable that a woman belonging to the pardanashin class properly so-called may in spite of the restraints of the parda have sufficient understanding and appreciation of the contents of a document to which she is a party. In such case there can be no question of the protective cloak being thrown around her and she cannot be heard to plead her pardah in avoidance of the transaction. The criterion cannot be the social status implied in the pardah class but the ability to comprehend the contents of the document in question and the means or opportunities of such comprehension. The emphasis must be on the factual understanding of the document with reference to the individual concerned and not upon presumptive disability incidental to mere status. In the case of -- hodges v. Delhi and London Bank Ltd. , 27 Ind App 168 (PC (C), the Judicial Committee had occasion to observe that outside the well-known class of pardanashin women "it must depend in each case on the character and position of the individual woman whether those who deal with her are or are not bound to take special precautions that her action shall be intelligent and voluntary and to prove that it was so in case of dispute. " It would therefore be wrong to suppose that a woman outside the parda class is not entitled to the protection despite the disability of illiteracy and ignorance and absence of independent advice where her pardanashin counterpart is readily admitted to it. "the court below held that the appellant though an illiterate woman was not entitled to the protection in view of her status and habits. Presumably, the learned Judge had in mind the fact that the appellant used to work in a mill and was therefore not subject to the disability imposed by the pardah. The mere fact that the appellant made a living as a mill-hand did not necessarily imply that her deficiencies on account of illiteracy and ignorance were supplied and she was competent to transact business with normal skill and care. In order that the impugned kobala might be upheld it has to be found upon evidence that she understood the contents of the same. In order that the impugned kobala might be upheld it has to be found upon evidence that she understood the contents of the same. An omnibus finding to the effect that the appellant was a woman of the world -- a phrase not easy to understand and one arrived at without real basis in evidence - cannot possibly take the place of proof of the essential fact that she comprehended the terms of the kobala by which she purported to have parted with all that she possessed. The observation of the learned Judge that she appeared to be conversant with the language in which the kobala was written is equally unhelpful. Mere acquaintance with the language of the deed as spoken in common parlance can be of no assistance in view of her proved illiteracy and in the absence of satisfactory evidence to establish that the kobala was read out to her so that she was enabled to understand the contents of the document. " (emphasis supplied) ( 10 ) OBSERVATIONS to the same effect have been made in Parasnath Rai and Ors. Vs. Tileshra Kaur, 1965 ALJ 1080 which are as follows :- "it has been strenuously contended by Mr. Bakshi, learned counsel for the defendant, that the approach of the lower appellate court to the case was vitiated by application to the deed in question of those principles which govern deeds by Pardanashin ladies, in spite of a finding that the plaintiff has not been proved to be a Pardanashin lady. He has urged that circumstances which might invalidate the deed of gift and deprive it of legal effect had to be positively established by the plaintiff, and the lower appellate court erred in thinking that it was for the defendants to prove that the deed had been explained to the plaintiff and she executed it after fully understanding its nature, contents, and consequences. The evidence relating to the physical condition and mental capacity of the appellant and to the circumstances of her life, however, makes it abundantly clear that even though the plaintiff is not a Pardanashin lady and a transaction by her in regard to her property must be viewed in the light of those very principles and be subjected to those very tests which apply to a transaction by a Pardanashin lady affecting her property. " (emphasis supplied) ( 11 ) IN the present case, the finding that has been recorded by the Appellate Court is that it was not disputed that the plaintiff was an illiterate lady who was living in the village and had no idea of the worldly affairs. In view of this specific finding and in view of the aforesaid decisions, the lower Appellate Court was justified in granting the same protection to the plaintiff-respondent as was available to a Purdahnashin lady. ( 12 ) THE Appellate Court further proceeded to find out whether the sale deed had been voluntarily executed and there was no fraud as according to it the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar on the sale deed was only a prima facie evidence to show that the document had been executed but the presumption was a rebuttable one. The Appellate Court considered the testimony of the plaintiff who had stated that she did not put her thumb mark on the deed knowing it to be a sale deed and in fact she had put the thumb mark as she was made to believe that she was required to put it for obtaining medicines and medical aid. The Appellate Court noticed that it was not even suggested to her that the sale deed had been readover and explained to her and she had put her thumb mark knowing it to be a sale deed. It was also not suggested to her that she had received Rs. 4500/- in advance and Rs. 2000/- before the Sub-Registrar and as to what loan was to be paid by her as the sale deed recited that she was to pay some loan for which she required the money. After a careful consideration of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud and that no consideration whatsoever was actually paid. These are findings of fact and learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any infirmity in these findings. ( 13 ) THE Second Appeal has no force and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. .