ORDER 1. The unsuccessful judgment-debtors seek to assail the order dated 19-01-2007 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Hindupur, in E.P.No.50 of 1996 in O.S.No.33 of 1985 in the instant revision petition. 2. The respondents herein filed the E.P.No.50 of 1996 under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'the Code') to direct the judgment debtors 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 to execute the sale deed pursuant to the decree dated 11-8-1992 passed by the Court for specific performance in O.S.No.33 of 1985 after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- and to put the decree holders in possession of properties covered therein. That was objected to by the second judgment debtor on the premises that when the decree directed the original defendant in the suit to execute the sale deed by 21-09-1992, the decree holders deposited the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.2,50,000/- after a long lapse of time on 22-04-1995, although E.P. was filed in the year 1994, and that it shows that the decree holders had no money or ready cash to perform their part of the contract and that they must show the readiness for getting the sale deed registered by paying the balance sale consideration and that they have not deposited the balance within a reasonable time and that the value of the property was more than forty lakhs and that the decree holders had no cash and so they had not deposited the amount immediately after the decree and therefore they are not entitled to the relief. 3. No evidence was adduced on either side in the E.P. After having heard either side and under the impugned order, the learned executing Court overruled those objections and ordered the next step. Inter alia in the impugned order, the learned executing Court was of the view that inasmuch as the decree did not fix any date to deposit the balance sale consideration and as after the deposit of balance sale consideration only the E.P. was numbered, the objections on the part of the judgment debtors were not tenable. 4. Inter alia in the impugned order, the learned executing Court was of the view that inasmuch as the decree did not fix any date to deposit the balance sale consideration and as after the deposit of balance sale consideration only the E.P. was numbered, the objections on the part of the judgment debtors were not tenable. 4. Sri M.S.Ramachandra Rao, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, seeks to contend that inasmuch as there was unreasonable delay on the part of the decree holders in having deposited the balance sale consideration, it is a fit case for rescission of the contract and no separate application in that regard need be filed and that in the E.P. such a plea can be taken by the judgment debtors by filing their counters. 5. Sri O.Manoher Reddy, learned counsel, representing the decree holders, per contra, represents that the Court has ample power to extend the time to deposit and it is a fit case where the discretion can be exercised by the Court. 6. A brief resume of facts would elucidate the contentious issue and help adjudicating the same effectively. The suit, O.S.No.33 of 1985, was filed seeking specific performance of the suit agreement of sale dated 19-04-1980 by directing the defendants therein to execute a sale deed pursuant to the terms of the contract of sale after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/-. The defendants were set exparte when their counsel reported no instructions. The suit was therefore decreed in favour of the plaintiffs on 11- 8-1992. The decree directs the first defendant to execute a registered sale deed as per the terms of agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-09- 1992 and in the event of default giving liberty to the plaintiffs to get the sale deed registered through Court on depositing the balance sale consideration and necessary registration charges in the Court. E.P. was filed on 20th June, 1994 with a prayer to direct the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed. The balance sale consideration was not paid either on or before 21-01-1992 or on the date of filing the E.P., instead was deposited on 24-02-1995. After such deposit only, the E.P. was registered and numbered. It is obvious that no date was stipulated inter alia in the decree on or before which the balance sale consideration should be deposited. The balance sale consideration was not paid either on or before 21-01-1992 or on the date of filing the E.P., instead was deposited on 24-02-1995. After such deposit only, the E.P. was registered and numbered. It is obvious that no date was stipulated inter alia in the decree on or before which the balance sale consideration should be deposited. Inasmuch as the judgment debtors were directed to execute the sale deed as per the terms of agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-09-1992, according to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that it shall be deemed that the amount representing the balance sale consideration shall be deposited on or before that date, as otherwise without paying the balance sale consideration, question of execution of sale deed does not arise. In view of the above contention, for brevity and better understanding of the matter, it is expedient to extract the direction of the decree as under: "First Defendant be and hereby directed to execute a registered sale deed as per terms of the agreement of sale dated 19-04-1980 in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-01-1992 (sic 21-9-92); that in case of default by the first defendant to comply the above clause, the plaintiff is at liberty to get the sale deed registered through Court on behalf of the first defendant on depositing the balance sale consideration for amount of Rs.2,50,000/- and necessary registration charges of the Court." A perusal of the above excerpted decree direction shows that the first defendant was directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by 21-09-1992. A default clause was also incorporated inter alia therein to the effect that in the event the first defendant failed to comply with the said direction liberty was given to the plaintiffs to get the sale deed executed and registered through Court on depositing the balance sale consideration. Although no specific direction was given for depositing the balance sale consideration it goes without saying that without paying the balance sale consideration the first defendant cannot be asked to execute the sale deed. Although no specific direction was given for depositing the balance sale consideration it goes without saying that without paying the balance sale consideration the first defendant cannot be asked to execute the sale deed. It is apt here to consider the latter part of the decree direction, which posits that in the event of default by D1, the plaintiffs are at liberty to get the sale deed registered through Court on behalf of D1 on depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- and necessary registration charges in the Court. If the date is fixed for deposit of the balance sale consideration as is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, the question of permitting the decree holders again to deposit the balance sale consideration and necessary registration charges for getting the sale deed registered through Court would not arise. Therefore, the time granted to the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed by 21-9-92 obviously can not be the upper limit for depositing the amount necessitating the decree holders to seek extention of time for depositing the balance sale consideration. The default clause contained in the latter part of the decree clearly shows that the decree holders can deposit the balance sale consideration before the executing Court and can request the Court to direct the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed by the Court itself in the event of non-compliance of the direction of the Court by the judgment debtors. What happens when the judgment debtors refused to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed pursuant to the decree direction is certainly a legitimate question. It cannot therefore be said that invariably the decree holders shall deposit the balance sale consideration on or before 21- 09-1992. At any rate, obviously, the decree does not contain any positive direction to deposit the balance sale consideration on any particular date. 7. It is appropriate here to consider Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. Sub- section (1) thereof is relevant for the present purposes, which reads as under: "28. At any rate, obviously, the decree does not contain any positive direction to deposit the balance sale consideration on any particular date. 7. It is appropriate here to consider Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. Sub- section (1) thereof is relevant for the present purposes, which reads as under: "28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed-- (1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such an application the court may, by order rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the Court- (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or less; and (b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract. (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely: (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be. (5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court." 8. From a perusal of the said provision it is obvious that if the decree holder fails to pay the money within the period allowed by the decree or such further period, as the Court may allow, it is open to the judgment debtor to apply in the same suit in which the decree is made to have the contract rescinded. It may be mentioned here that till the E.P. in this case was filed, the judgment debtors did not choose to approach the Court for rescission of the contract on the ground that the decree holders failed to pay the balance sale consideration, which disabled them to execute the sale deed on or before the stipulated date. The decree holders can pay the balance sale consideration within the period allowed by the decree or within such further period as the Court may extend. Therefore, discretion is given to the Court to extend the time stipulated inter alia in the decree for payment of sale consideration or the balance sale consideration, as the case may be. 9. A brief reconnaissance of the precedential jurisprudence is needed for brevity and better understanding of the matter; a fortiori would elucidate the point in controversy and makes the adjudication of the contentious issue easy and unequivocal. 10. The first in the series is a Judgment of the Apex Court in HUNGERFORD INVESTMENT TRUST LTD. 9. A brief reconnaissance of the precedential jurisprudence is needed for brevity and better understanding of the matter; a fortiori would elucidate the point in controversy and makes the adjudication of the contentious issue easy and unequivocal. 10. The first in the series is a Judgment of the Apex Court in HUNGERFORD INVESTMENT TRUST LTD. v. HARIDAS MUNDHRA1 the Apex Court held in para 22 thus: "The contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree for specific performance and that the contract subsists notwithstanding the passing of the decree." In para 31 it was held thus: "A decree for specific performance is a decree in favour of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the suit." In para 25 it was held thus: "As the contract subsisted despite the decree and as the decree did not abrogate or modify any of the express or implied terms of the contract, it must be presumed that the parties to the decree had the obligation to complete the contract within a reasonable time." In para 26 it was held thus: "The fact that the decree did not fix a time for completing the contract did not prevent either party from demanding performance from other party within a reasonable time and thus make time essential, as the parties had that liberty before the decree was passed and the decree did not abrogate that liberty in any way, and if the party from whom performance was demanded evinced by his conduct that he was unwilling to perform his part, then it was open to the party claiming performance to rescind the contract and obtain an order from the Court adjudging rescission of the contract and the decree thereon." In K. KALPANA SARASWATHI v. P.S.S. SOMASUNDARAM CHETTIAR2. In para 3 held thus: "The proper course in this situation was to pass a decree for specific performance, which would, for all practical purposes, be a preliminary decree. In para 3 held thus: "The proper course in this situation was to pass a decree for specific performance, which would, for all practical purposes, be a preliminary decree. The suit would continue and be under the control of the court until appropriate motion was made by either party for passing a final decree." In para 4 it was held thus: "It is perfectly open to the court in control of a suit for specific performance to extend the time for deposit, and this Court may do so even now to enable the plaintiff to get the advantage of the agreement to sell in her favour. The disentitling circumstances relied upon by the defendant-respondent are offset by the false pleas raised in the course of the suit by him and rightly negatived. Nor are we convinced that the application for consideration and extension of time cannot be read, as in substance it is, a petition for more time to deposit. Even so, specific performance is an equitable relief and he who seeks equity can be put on terms to ensure that equity is done to the opposite party even while granting the relief. The final end of law is justice, and so the means to it too should be informed by equity. That is why he who seeks equity shall do equity." 11. That was a case where the respondent agreed to sell to the appellant for consideration, a lovely mansion, for a sum mount of Rs.4 lakhs way back in April, 1967. The property was subject to an equitable mortgage in favour of South Indian Bank, Coimbatore. The suit was eventually decreed by the Courting directing the plaintiff to deposit the mortgage amount plus Rs.5,000/- with interest at 11% till the date of payment, The decree further provided that the amount should be deposited into Court by the time specified therein and failure to do would result in the suit its being dismissed. The amount, however, was not deposited within the time limit but some months later plaintiff paid the mortgage money to the mortgagee bank and took an assignment of its right and got herself impleaded in the suit filed by the bank against the respondent. The mortgage suit eventually was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. In the appeal, the direction to deposit within three months was affirmed and the default clause was omitted. The mortgage suit eventually was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. In the appeal, the direction to deposit within three months was affirmed and the default clause was omitted. The Apex Court at the end directed that a decree be passed in favour of the appellant to deposit within six months the entire sum together with interest due upto date, together with an undertaking that she would give up all her rights under mortgage decree passed in her favour except to the extent of amount actually paid to the paid for taking the assignment and directed further that on fulfillment of those two conditions, the appeal stands allowed and a final decree for specific performance passed. In BABU LAL v. HAZARI LAL KISHORI LAL3 the Apex Court held in para 21 thus: "Neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance of the contract gives any right or title to the decree-holder and the right and the title passes to him only on the execution of the deed of sale either by the judgment-debtor himself or by the court itself in case he fails to execute the sale deed, it is idle to contend that a valuable right had accrued to the petitioner merely because a decree has been passed for the specific performance of the contract. The limitation would start against the decree- holders only after they had obtained a sale in respect of the disputed property. " In paras 26 and 27 it was held thus: "More over Section 28(3) contemplates that if the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree, the Court may on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including delivery of possession of the property. A Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree had been passed. Therefore, the Court, in the present case, retained control over the matter despite the decree and it was open to the Court when it was alleged that the party moved against had positively refused to complete the contract to entertain the application under Section 28(3). Therefore, the Court, in the present case, retained control over the matter despite the decree and it was open to the Court when it was alleged that the party moved against had positively refused to complete the contract to entertain the application under Section 28(3). " In CHANDI RANI v. KAMAL RANI4 a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held in para 25 thus: "There is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are evident: 1. From the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract. " In RAMANKUTTY GUPTAN v. AVARA5 the Apex Court held in para 9 thus: "After passing the decree for specific performance, the court does not cease to have any jurisdiction. The court retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed. It was open to the court to exercise the power under Section 28(1) of the Act either for extension of time or for rescinding the contract as claimed for." 12. In N.P. THIRUGNANAM v. R.JAGAN MOHAN RAO6 it was held in para 5 thus: "The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract." In K.S.VIDYANADAM v. VAIRAVAN7 the Apex Court held thus: "In the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiffs must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property. while exercising its discretion, the court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limit for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance and that the said time-limit cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract. In the case of urban properties in India, it is well known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades - particularly after 1973. In the case of urban properties in India, it is well known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades - particularly after 1973. Court cannot be oblivious to this reality." In SARDAR MOHAR SINGH v. MANGILAL8 it was held thus: "It is clear from Section 28(1) that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. The very fact that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. The court has power to enlarge the time in favour of the judgment-debtor to pay the amount or to perform the conditions mentioned in the decree for specific performance, in spite of an application for rescission of the decree having been filed by the judgment- debtor and rejected. The court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance. Although the respondent has not given satisfactory explanation of every day's delay but it is not unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, an application for condonation of delay. It is one for extension of time. Under these circumstances, the executing court as well as the High Court had exercised discretion and extended the time to comply with the conditional decree." 13. The Apex Court in V.S.PALANICHAMY CHETTIAR FIRM v. C.ALAGAPPAN9 considered the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. That was a case where the appellant entered into an agreement of sale dated 16-02-1980 with the respondent. The suit for specific performance filed to enforce the agreement was decreed in favour of the respondents with direction to deposit the balance amount of consideration with further direction to the appellant to execute the sale deed on 31-01-1983. The balance consideration was to be deposited on or before 31-03-1983. The appeal filed against the judgment and decree in the suit was dismissed by the High Court on 28-02-1985. The High Court, however, while dismissing the appeal did not grant any extension of time to the respondent for deposit of the balance amount. The balance consideration was to be deposited on or before 31-03-1983. The appeal filed against the judgment and decree in the suit was dismissed by the High Court on 28-02-1985. The High Court, however, while dismissing the appeal did not grant any extension of time to the respondent for deposit of the balance amount. The respondent filed E.P. five years after the decree of the trial Court and three years after the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court. The E.P. was dismissed on the premise that the balance consideration was not paid within the time stipulated under the decree. A revision petition was filed against the dismissal order in the High Court. The decree holder also filed separate application seeking extension of time granted under the decree by the trial Court to deposit the amount. The High Court, however, remitted the matter to the executing Court with the direction to treat the applications as interlocutory applications in the E.P. and to dispose them of in accordance with law, holding simultaneously that the Court has got power to extend the time, having regard to the judgment of the Apex Court in SARDAR MOHAN SINGH v. MANGILAL (referred to aupra). On the above facts, the Apex Court in para 17 after considering its earlier judgments held thus: "The agreement of sale was entered into as far back on February 16, 1980 about 19 years ago. No explanation is forthcoming as to why the balance amount of consideration could not be deposited within time granted by the Court and why no application was made under Section 28 of the Act seeking extension of time of this period. Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 3 years period is prescribed for filing the suit for specific performance of contract of sale from the date of the agreement or when the cause of action arises. Merely because a suit is filed within the prescribed period of limitation does not absolve the vendee-plaintiff from showing as to whether he was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement and if there was non-performance was that on account of any obstacle put by the vendor or otherwise. Provisions to grant specific performance of an agreement are quite stringent. Equitable considerations come into play. Provisions to grant specific performance of an agreement are quite stringent. Equitable considerations come into play. Court has to see all the attendant circumstances including if the vendee has conducted himself in a reasonable manner under the contract of sale. That being the position of law for filing the suit for specific performance, can the Court as a matter of course allow extension of time for making payment of balance amount of consideration in terms of a decree after 5 years of passing of the decree by the trial Court and 3 years of its confirmation by the appellate Court?............ That being the position, if now time is granted, that would be going beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the suit for specific performance of the agreement though this provision may not be strictly applicable. It is nevertheless an important circumstance to be considered by the Court. That apart, no explanation whatsoever is coming from the decree- holder-respondents as to why they did not pay the balance amount of consideration as per the decree except what the High Court itself thought fit to comment which is certainly not borne out from the record. Equity demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the decree holder-respondents and no extension of time be granted to them to comply with the decree." [Emphasis is mine] 14. In KUMAR DHIRENDRA MULLICK v. TIVOLI PARK APARTMENTS (P) LTD.10 the Apex Court held thus: "when the Court passes a decree for specific performance, contract between parties is not extinguished. The Court does not lose its jurisdiction, nor does it become functus officio. Decree of specific performance is in the nature of preliminary decree and suit is deemed to be pending even after grant of such decree. Hence, court retains control over the entire matter even after decree. Section 28 itself indicated the same. Therefore, Court has power to enlarge time in favour of decree-holder to pay the amount or to perform conditions mentioned in decree for specific performance." In CHANDA v. RATTNI the Apex Court held thus: "the present Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act goes further and gives to the vendor or lessor the right to seek rescission in the same suit, when after the suit for specific performance is decreed the plaintiff fails to pay the purchase money within the period fixed. The present section, therefore, seeks to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of a decree for specific performance in the same suit without requiring one of the parties to initiate separate proceedings. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits. Likewise under the present provision where the purchaser or lessee has paid the money, he is entitled in the suit for specific performance to the reliefs as indicated in sub-section (3) like, partition, possession etc. A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the Court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed. The decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree. The power under Section 28 of the Act is discretionary and the Court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it. Although the power to annul the decree exists yet Section 28 of the Act provides for complete relief to both the parties in terms of the decree. The Court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial Court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure suit to stand dismissed. The power exercisable under this Section is discretionary. A conspectus of the above referred judgments shows: 1) A decree for specific performance is a decree in favour of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the suit. 2) The contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree for specific performance and that the contract subsists notwithstanding the passing of the decree. 3) Neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance of the contract gives any right or title to the decree-holder and the right and the title passes to him only on the execution of the deed of sale either by the judgment-debtor himself or by the court in case he fails to execute the sale deed. 4) The decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree. 5) It is clear from Section 28(1) that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. 4) The decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree. 5) It is clear from Section 28(1) that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. The very fact that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. 6) As the contract subsisted despite the decree and as the decree did not abrogate or modify any of the express or implied terms of the contract, it must be presumed that the parties to the decree had the obligation to complete the contract within a reasonable time. 7) The court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance. Although the respondent has not given satisfactory explanation of every day's delay but it is not unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, an application for condonation of delay. It is one for extension of time. 8) The fact that the decree did not fix a time for completing the contract did not prevent either party from demanding performance from other party within a reasonable time and thus make time essential, as the parties had that liberty before the decree was passed and the decree did not abrogate that liberty in any way, and if the party from whom performance was demanded evinced by his conduct that he was unwilling to perform his part, then it was open to the party claiming performance to rescind the contract and obtain an order from the Court adjudging rescission of the contract and the decree thereon. 9) The section, therefore, seeks to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of a decree for specific performance in the same suit without requiring one of the parties to initiate separate proceedings. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits. 10) The facts which warrant the discretion to be exercised differ from case to case. 15. What is patent from the matrix of the case is that the decree holder failed to deposit the balance sale consideration till 24-02-1995 and he did not apply to the Court for any extension of time. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits. 10) The facts which warrant the discretion to be exercised differ from case to case. 15. What is patent from the matrix of the case is that the decree holder failed to deposit the balance sale consideration till 24-02-1995 and he did not apply to the Court for any extension of time. The period interregnum from 11-08-1992, the date on which the suit was decreed, till the deposit was made on 24-02-1995, is no doubt nearly a period of three years. Whether this delay would entail the consequence of rescission of the contract or not shall have to be considered. It is now sought to be contended before me that even at the time of filing of the E.P., the decree holders failed to deposit the sale consideration and although the E.P. was sought to be filed on 20-06-1994, the amount was not deposited even on that day and, therefore, it is fairly a case where there has been undue delay on the part of the decree holders which entails rescission of the contract. Not depositing the amount on the date of filing of the E.P. is of no consequence, inasmuch as the E.P. was returned on that ground and when the amount was deposited, the E.P. was registered; that is in between the executing Court and the decree holders. 16. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners seeks to place reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in C.VENKATA RAO v. B.B.G.SHARMA. That was a case where the respondents executed an agreement of sale on 17-03- 1968 qua the fixed consideration of Rs.10,000/-. A sum of Rs.3,000/- was paid as advance. The suit, O.S.No.105 of 1968, filed for specific performance was dismissed by the trial Court on 31-12-1969. However, the appeal was allowed on 22-03-1973 in the High Court. The decree though directed the plaintiff to pay the balance sum of Rs.7,000/-, did not, however, stipulate the period for such payment. The L.P.A. filed against the said judgment by the subsequent purchasers was dismissed on 23-09-1975. The appellant deposited the balance sale consideration of Rs.7,000/- on 16-04-1981 in the trial Court and filed E.P. on 12-10-1981. The decree though directed the plaintiff to pay the balance sum of Rs.7,000/-, did not, however, stipulate the period for such payment. The L.P.A. filed against the said judgment by the subsequent purchasers was dismissed on 23-09-1975. The appellant deposited the balance sale consideration of Rs.7,000/- on 16-04-1981 in the trial Court and filed E.P. on 12-10-1981. One year thereafter, the respondents filed I.A. No.314 of 1982 under Section 28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act for rescinding the agreement on the ground that for a period of seven years the appellant did not deposit the balance. Under such circumstances, this Court held that even though there is no limit prescribed, the plaintiff must approach the Court within a reasonable time and his hands must be clean. What is reasonable time is again a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of a given case and no hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf. 17. In PEGADALA PEDDA YADAIAH v. K.ANNAPURNAMMA a learned single Judge of this Court was of the view that a decree of a suit for specific performance is not a final decree and the suit must be deemed to be pending even after the decree. As per the matrix of that case the suit for specific performance was filed on 10-10-1995 and it was decreed on 06-03-1998 ex parte. The decree directed the defendants to execute the regular sale deed on receipt of balance sale consideration and deliver possession to the plaintiff within three months. The plaintiff did not deposit the amount. But on 16-12-1999 filed E.P. for execution of the decree, which was numbered on 19-01-2000. In the E.P. the plaintiff was directed to deposit the balance sale consideration on or before 08-03-2000. On 03-04-2000, the plaintiff filed E.A.No.19 of 2000 seeking set off of the costs awarded in the suit qua the balance sale consideration payable by him. That application was ordered without notice to the defendants. Challenging those orders, revision petitions were filed before the High Court. In the meanwhile the defendants filed an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract of sale. That application was ordered without notice to the defendants. Challenging those orders, revision petitions were filed before the High Court. In the meanwhile the defendants filed an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract of sale. Under those circumstances, it was held in para 15 thus: "In the case on hand a true and fair construction of the decretal terms must posit an obligation on the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration within such period as would obligate and enable the judgment-debtor to execute the sale deed within three months from the date of the decree i.e., within three months from 06-03-1998. Since the obligation of the judgment-debtor to execute the sale deed springs into operation on receipt of the balance sale consideration, the plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 herein, must be held obligated, in terms of the decree, to pay the balance sale consideration prior to 05-06-1998." 18. It is no doubt true that there has been long delay in depositing the amount, which was made admittedly on 24-02-1995, although the decree was passed on 12- 08-1992. From this circumstance is it legitimate to conclude that the decree holders are not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. But before raising such question, the judgment debtor shall explain as to why he has not complied with the decree direction. Having not obeyed the direction of the Court, it is not legitimately open to the judgment debtors to contend that there is enormous delay on the part of the decree holders in depositing the amount. The contumacious conduct on the part of the judgment debtors in executing the sale deed in utter disregard to the direction of the Court cannot also be lost sight of. 19. It is not the case of the judgment debtors that the decree holders did not offer to pay the balance sale consideration and, therefore, they could not execute the sale deed on or before 21-01-1992. Such a plea has not been taken inter alia in the counter. The judgment-debtors have not filed any application for rescission of the contract, but inter alia in the counter they have taken the plea of the inexecutability of the decree for the default on the part of the plaintiff. It is not the form that is criterion, but the substances that is to be seen. The judgment-debtors have not filed any application for rescission of the contract, but inter alia in the counter they have taken the plea of the inexecutability of the decree for the default on the part of the plaintiff. It is not the form that is criterion, but the substances that is to be seen. The suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under Section 28 of the Act is barred in terms of sub-Section (4) thereof. Therefore, not filing an application, for which no prescribed form is there under the Act by the judgment debtors, is of no consequence. Therefore, the counter filed by the judgment- debtors in the E.P. can be considered as an application having been filed under Section 28 of the Act. But in the instant case there has been no whisper in the counter about the relief of rescission 20. In the instant case, the revision petitioners inter alia in their counter objected for the execution on the ground that that the decree holders have not deposited the amount within a reasonable time from the date of decree and deposited the amount nearly after 21/2 years after passing of the decree and that the value of the property is more than Rs.40,00,000/-, since it is situate in the midst of Hindupur town and that decree holders had no money or cash to perform their part of the contract. But no evidence has been adduced in support of the said plea. There has been no explanation whatsoever forthcoming in this case from the decree holder as to why he did not deposit the balance sale consideration. The Court has to see reasonableness of the request for extension of time or as to whether it is a fairly a case for recession of the contract. Inasmuch as the contract between the parties is not abrogated and exists not withstanding the decree passed by the court the executing court still has to consider as to whether decree holder is entitled to the equitable relief or the equity lies in rescinding the contract with reference to matrix of the case and respective contentions. There seems to have been no endeavour on the part of the executing court to consider these aspects. A clear and unequivocal finding is needed to be reached by the court. There seems to have been no endeavour on the part of the executing court to consider these aspects. A clear and unequivocal finding is needed to be reached by the court. Therefore the matter requires to be remitted to the executing court for fresh consideration. 21. In the result the Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the court below for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made inter alia in the order. Therefore there shall be no separate order as to costs.