Judgment : On 10.8.1998 this Court made the following order: “This appeal is admitted to consider the following question of law: Whether the appellate Court is correct in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court having held that Bapanamma had no pre-existing interest and as such Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act does not apply and consequently dismissed the plaintiff’s suit on the ground that the impugned sale deeds were executed by the plaintiff’s father for legal necessity, which fact is neither pleaded nor proved in the case on the basis of the material on record.” 2) Sri G. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel representing the appellant had pointed out that apart from the said substantial question of law on the strength of which the second appeal was admitted the following substantial questions of law also would arise for consideration: (1) Whether the sale deed executed by Bapanamma relating to item No.1 can be said to be valid and binding as she got only life interest? (2) Whether the transactions made by such a life interest holder to be treated as void transactions? (3) Whether the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 executed by the said Bapanamma and the father of the plaintiff can be said to be valid and binding on the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case? 3) Sri G. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel representing the appellant had also taken the Court through the finding of the Court of first instance and would maintain that the well considered findings of the court of first instance had been reversed by the appellate Court without any valid or acceptable reasons. The learned counsel would also submit that as far as applicability of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is concerned, since Bapanamma had no pre-existing right or interest in the property in question, Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be made applicable. The learned counsel after elaborating his submissions had taken this Court through the relevant events after the sale transactions viz., death of Bapanamma, filing of the suit and also pointed out that the suit, in fact, had been filed within the period of limitation. The learned counsel after elaborating his submissions had taken this Court through the relevant events after the sale transactions viz., death of Bapanamma, filing of the suit and also pointed out that the suit, in fact, had been filed within the period of limitation. The learned counsel would also maintain that the plaintiff was not born by the date of the settlement deed executed by his father (D3) in favour of Bapanamma in respect of the ancestral property and even as per the settlement deed, Bapanmma was given only life estate to enjoy the property and the remainder interest shall vest in the male issues of D.3 and in their absence, on the female children and only in their absence, on the other female members and, therefore, the findings recorded by the appellate Court cannot be sustained. The counsel also pointed out to the reliefs prayed for in the suit and would maintain that the settlement deed as such was not questioned at any point of time. He had also taken this Court through Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and also Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The learned counsel would also maintain that in the case of such property of a minor, obtaining permission of the Court is mandatory and inasmuch as the transactions in question had been entered into in contravention of the statutory mandate, the said transactions cannot be said to be valid and binding on the plaintiff and the same can be avoided and hence the findings recorded by the Court of first instance are in accordance with law; that the said findings are to be restored and the findings recorded by the appellate Court are to be set aside and the second appeal is liable to be allowed. 4) Per contra, Sri G. Jaganadha Rao, representing Sri Chidambaram, learned counsel representing the respondents had taken this Court through the respective findings of the Court and the evidence available on record and would maintain that the property in question continues to be ancestral property of the father and son though the son is an after born son, since the father was unmarried by the date of settlement deed. The learned counsel also would maintain that though the other coparcenor as on the date of settlement deed was not born, the character and nature of the family property i.e., ancestral property would not be lost and hence in view of the general powers of the Kartha of the joint family of himself and the plaintiff, the father executed the sale deeds along with the life estate holder and, therefore, the sale transactions are to be held valid. The learned counsel also pointed out the relevant portions of the findings recorded by the appellate Court in relation to the needs of the family and the aspect of legal necessity. Therefore, in view of the fact that there is no dispute that the property was originally ancestral property of the family, by the mere execution of the settlement deed in favour of Bapanamma by creating life estate in her favour, the character of the property would not be changed as separate property of the minor after the life estate of the settlar. In the light of the same, if Sections 6 & 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and also Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are carefully examined, the findings recorded by the appellate Court cannot be found fault with and hence the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions in this regard. 5) Heard the learned counsel on either side. 6) The substantial question of law on the strength of which the second appeal was admitted and the other substantial questions of law, which had been pointed out by the learned counsel representing the appellant have already had been specified above. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to as plaintiff and defendants as shown in O.S.No.19 of 1992 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Eluru. 7) The plaintiff instituted the suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 1.2.1962 and for possession of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff has also sought for mesne profits and for future profits from the date of suit till delivery of possession and for costs of the suit. During the pendency of the suit, the D2 died and his legal representatives were brought on record as D4 to D11 and written statements were filed. The plaintiff has also sought for mesne profits and for future profits from the date of suit till delivery of possession and for costs of the suit. During the pendency of the suit, the D2 died and his legal representatives were brought on record as D4 to D11 and written statements were filed. On the strength of the pleadings, the issues had been settled. 8) On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A3 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.B1 to B10 were marked. 9) The Court of first instance recorded reasons in detail and came to the conclusion that from a reading of Ex.A2, the intention of executant is to give life estate to Bapanamma and vested remainder to his male issues and in case no male issue is born, to the female issues and in case no issues were born, to the heirs. In the light of the same, the Court of first instance came to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff is to be decreed and accordingly decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried in appeal being A.S.No.33 of 1992 on the file of the learned District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru. The appellate Court recorded certain reasons and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is bound by the two sale deeds viz., Ex.B1 and B3 in favour of D1 and D2 and hence the alienations in favour of D1 and D2 being valid and binding on the plaintiff, they cannot be cancelled and ultimately set aside the decree and judgment of the Court of first instance and allowed the appeal. Hence, the present second appeal. 10) The plaint averments read as under: “The plaint schedule property was the ancestral property of the third defendant. The 3rd defendant ‘s father died in or about 1937 and the third defendant was very young. The third defendant was then brought up by late Totali Bapanamm wife of Tirupayya, his mother’s junior maternal aunt. Hence, the present second appeal. 10) The plaint averments read as under: “The plaint schedule property was the ancestral property of the third defendant. The 3rd defendant ‘s father died in or about 1937 and the third defendant was very young. The third defendant was then brought up by late Totali Bapanamm wife of Tirupayya, his mother’s junior maternal aunt. After he became major, the third defendant who was the sole surviving co-parcener executed a registered settlement deed dated 19.9.1955 giving the property to the said Bapanamma for life and remainder to the male children that may be born to him absolutely and if no male children are born to female children that may be born to him. The suit property was being enjoyed by Bapanamma with a life estate. The plaintiff is the only son to the third defendant and he was born on 23.1.1961. Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was sold to first defendant under a registered sale deed dated 1.2.1962 by Totali Bapanamma third defendant and third defendant as guardian as guardian of plaintiff. The said sale is not binding on the plaintiff. It was not for any necessity binding upon the plaintiff. Bapanamma had no right to execute the sale deed as guardian of the plaintiff and the sale is void. The permission of the District Court was not obtained, the sale is therefore not binding upon the plaintiff. Item No.2 of he plaint schedule property was sold to Datla Venkata Raju of Sayampalem under a registered sale deed dated 10.3.1966 by third defendant Tetali Bapanamma for herself and as guardian of the plaintiff. The said sale is not binding upon the plaintiff. It was not for any legal necessity binding upon the plaintiff. Bapanamma had no right to execute the sale deed as guardian of the minor plaintiff and the sale is void. Datla Venkata Raju and his sons sold item No.2 of the plaint schedule property to Golusula Simhachalam and Golusula Satyam under a registered sale deed dated 26.2.1974 and put the vendee in possession of the property. Subsequently Golusula Satyam and Simhachalam sold the said property to the second defendant under a registered sale deed dated 25.5.1976. Totali Bapanamma died on 2.12.1977. On her death the plaintiff as the only male issue of the third defendant became entitled to the possession of the property. Subsequently Golusula Satyam and Simhachalam sold the said property to the second defendant under a registered sale deed dated 25.5.1976. Totali Bapanamma died on 2.12.1977. On her death the plaintiff as the only male issue of the third defendant became entitled to the possession of the property. The vendees under the two sale deeds dated 1.2.1972 and 10.3.1966 were entitled to be in possession only during the life time of Bapanamma as the two sale deeds are not binding upon the plaintiff and in any case are voidable at the option of the plaintiff. The defendants 1 and 2 are not entitled to continue in possession of the property after the death of Bapanamma. As the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 is not valid so far as the plaintiff is concerned and is void and it is valid only for the life of Bapanamma. So, cancellation of the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 is not necessary. The plaintiff has been demanding defendants 1 and 2 to put him in possession of the property. As they have not done so, he issued a notice, dated 2.2.81 to the defendants 1 and 2 demanding the possession of the property. The first defendant received the notice but did not give any reply. The notice issued to the second defendant returned unserved with an endorsement that he is in Government Hospital, Eluru. The plaint schedule lands are delta wet lands and yield at least 12 bags not or hereafter meeting all expenses nor a year. Hence the suit.” 11) The first defendant filed a written statement disputing all the plaint averments and the averments made in the written statement are as hereunder: “It is stated that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable under law. The plaintiff has no right to claim the suit properties from he defendants 1 and 2. Hence the suit.” 11) The first defendant filed a written statement disputing all the plaint averments and the averments made in the written statement are as hereunder: “It is stated that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable under law. The plaintiff has no right to claim the suit properties from he defendants 1 and 2. The settlement deed dated 19.9.1955 executed by third defendant in favour of Tetali Bapanamm does not create any right in favour of the plaintiff to claim the suit properties from the defendants 1 and 2, as the third defendant is alive and conveyed his rights under the sale deed dated 1.2.1962 in favour of the first defendant in respect of item No.1 and under the sale deed dated 10,3.1966 in favour of Datla Venkataraju, the predecessor in interest of the second defendant regarding item No.2, the plaintiff did not acquire any right in the suit properties after the death of Bapanamma. The settlement deed must be under stood to have given a right only to Purusha Santhathi in the event of the death of the third defendant before the death of Bapanamma and not otherwise. The settlement deed must be understood as giving a right to the third defendant the settler, after the death of life estate holder Bapanamma. The omission of the words “ “ does not in any way deprive the third defendant of the vested remainder under the settlement deed, as there is no question of his Purusha Santhathi during the life time of third defendant and create any rights in the plaintiff to the exclusion of third defendant. Plaintiff is estopped from claiming the suit property from defendants 1 and 2 as third defendant conveyed all his rights to the vendee under the sale deeds dated 1.2.1962 and 10.3.1966. Plaintiff who is only a heir apparent to the third defendant cannot claim any right in the suit properties. The settlement deed contemplates the operation of the subsequent clause “Purusha Santhathi” etc., only in the event of the death of the settle, and the intention of the settler is that the properties are to revert to him and his family after the death of Bapanamma, and the third defendant for himself and as guardian of the plaintiff, executed the registered sale deed dated 1.2.1962 in favour of the first defendant conveying item 1 of the plaint schedule for Rs.1,500/-. Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of the third defendant and so he and Bapanamma are fully entitled to convey item Nol.1 to the first defendant with absolute rights. As the plaintiff is in existence by the time of sale, the third defendant at the request of the first defendant executed the sale deed as guardian of the plaintiff also, though the plaintiff has no rights in item No.1 of the plaint schedule. Out of the consideration for the sale, the first defendant paid Rs.200.- to the third defendant as advance which amount was paid by third defendant in part payment of the mortgage debt due to Therli Dalayya, paid Rs.963.28 ps to Thorli Dalayya in full satisfaction of the mortgage debt on behalf of the third defendant and paid Rs.336.72ps to the Rural Bank, Pulla in discharge of the debt due to it from the third defendant. Thus, the entire consideration of Rs.1500/- under the sale deed dated 1.2.1962 was paid by the first defendant in full satisfaction of the building debts, which were incurred by the third defendant for cultivation expenses of his lands and for family expenses. Thus, the sale of item No.1 to the first defendant is for family benefit and legal necessity of the family and it is binding on the plaintiff, even assuming that item 1 is joint family property or the separate property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is bound by the sale of item No.1 in favour of the first defendant and he is not entitled to seek for cancellation of the ale deed or for recovery of possession, of, and mesne profits on, item No.1 from the first defendant. Thus, the sale of item No.1 by the third defendant is for discharge of antecedent debts incurred by him. The plaintiff is not entitled for any relief and the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs. 12) Defendants 4 to 11 filed a separate written statement, which reads as under: “The suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable under law. The plaintiff has no right to claim the suit properties from defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff is not entitled for any relief and the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs. 12) Defendants 4 to 11 filed a separate written statement, which reads as under: “The suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable under law. The plaintiff has no right to claim the suit properties from defendants 1 and 2. The settlement deed dated 19.9.1955 executed by the 3rd defendant in favour of Tatali Bapanamma does not create any right in the favour of the plaintiff to claim the suit properties from defendants 1 and 2.As the 3rd defendant is alive and conveyed his rights under the sale deed dated 1.2.1962 in favour of the 1st defendant in respect of item 1, and under the sale deed dated 1.2.1962 in favour of the 1st defendant in respect of item 1, and under the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 in favour of Sri Datla Venkatraju (the predecessor in interest of the 2nd defendant) regarding item 2, the plaintiff did not acquire any right in the suit properties after the death of Tatali Bapanamma. The settlement deed must be understood to give a right only to Purusha-santati in the event of the death of the 3rd defendant before the death of Bapanamma and not otherwise. The settlement deed must be understood as giving right to the 3rd defendant, the settler, after the death of life estate holder Bapanamma. The omission of the word “ “ in the settlement deed does not in any way deprive the 3rd defendant of the vested remainder under the settlement deed, as there is no question of his ‘purusha santati’ during the life time of the 3rd defendant and create any rights in the plaintiff to the exclusion of the 3rd defendant. These defendants submit that the plaintiff is estopped from claiming the suit properties from defendants 1 and 2, as the 3rd defendant conveyed all his rights to the vendees under the sale deeds dated 1.2.1962 and 10.3.1966; and the plaintiff, who is only on heir apparent to the 3rd defendant, cannot claim any right in the suit properties. The settlement deed contemplates the operation of the subsequent clause ‘Purusha-santati’ etc. The settlement deed contemplates the operation of the subsequent clause ‘Purusha-santati’ etc. only in the event of the death of the settler before the death of the settles and the intention of the settlar is that the properties are to revert to him and his family after the death of Bapanamma. Tatali Bapanamma and 3rd defendant etc., executed the registered sale deed dated 10.3.1966 in favour of the 2nd defendant’s predecessor in title (Datla Venkatraju s/o Maniraju) conveying item 2 of the plaint schedule for Rs.3,000/-. These defendants submit that item 2 is the self acquired property of the3rd defendant and the plaintiff was represented by Tatali Bapanamma under a mistaken advice. The plaintiff has no right in the said property and he cannot claim any right in the said land under the settlement deed executed by the 3rd defendant in favour of Tatali Bapanamma. Item 2 was sold to Datla Venkatraju for discharge of debts incurred by the 3rd defendant for the family and for family expenses. Out of the sale consideration, Rs.2,210/- was paid by the vendee under the sale deed in discharge of the promissory note debt incurred by the 3rd defendant from Penmetsa Somaraju, son of Subbaraju, on 25.4.62, and the balance of the amount of Rs.790/- was paid before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration of the sale deed. Thus, the sale deed 10.3.1966 is fully supported by consideration and is valid and binding on the plaintiff. Even assuming that item 2 is joint family property and that the plaintiff is not a nominal party to the sale deed, as the sale was for discharge of antecedent debts incurred by the father-manager, the interest, if any, of the plaintiff is also conveyed by the sale deed by the 3rd defendant, who is the manager of the joint family of the 3rd defendant and the plaintiff. Datla Venkatraju, while being in possession and enjoyment of item 2 of the plaint schedule, sold it to Gadusula Simhachalam and Satyam under the registered sale deed dated 26.2.1974. Gadusula Simhachalam and Satyam and their sons, while being in possession and enjoyment of item 2, sold it to the 2nd defendant from Rs.9,000/- under the registered sale deed dated 25.5.1976 and he was in possession of the said item from that time in his own right. The 2nd defendant died in May 1983. Gadusula Simhachalam and Satyam and their sons, while being in possession and enjoyment of item 2, sold it to the 2nd defendant from Rs.9,000/- under the registered sale deed dated 25.5.1976 and he was in possession of the said item from that time in his own right. The 2nd defendant died in May 1983. These defendants have been in possession of the land (item2) after the death of the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant, after his purchase, leveled an extent of Ac.0.40 cents out of this item and raised a cattle shed. The defendant is living in the shed after converting it for his residential purpose and is cultivating the said item along with defendants 5 to 11. The plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to question the sale of item 2 or recover possession of the same or mesne profits on that item from the 2nd defendant. The allegations in para 3 of the plaint that the property mentioned in the schedule was originally the ancestral property of the plaintiff’s father (i.e., the 3rd defendant herein) are not true and correct. These defendants do not admit that the 3rd defendant’s father died in or about 1937 when the 3rd defendant was very young. The contents of the settlement deed are not set forth in a proper way. The plaintiff ailed to understand the effect of the terms of the settlement deed in the circumstances of this case, as the 3rd defendant is alive on the date of death of Bapanamm and still continues to be so. These defendants do not admit that the plaintiff was born on 21.1.1961. The allegations in para 6 of the plait that the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 was also executed by Mallidi Veeramma, mistress of the 3rd defendant, are not correct. Mallidi Veeramma is the mother of the 3rd defendant. The said sale deed is true, valid supported by consideration and is binding on the plaintiff. The allegation in para 7 of the plaint that the sale deed is not for any legal necessity and is not binding upon the plaintiff is not true and correct. Bapnamma and the 3rd defendant, who were together entitled to all rights item 2, executed the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 and hence it is valid. These defendants put the plaintiff to strict proof that Tatali Bapanamma died on 2.12.1977. Bapnamma and the 3rd defendant, who were together entitled to all rights item 2, executed the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 and hence it is valid. These defendants put the plaintiff to strict proof that Tatali Bapanamma died on 2.12.1977. The contention of the plaintiff that, on the death of Bapanamma as the only male issue of the 3rd defendant became entitled to the possession of the property is in correct and unsound. On Bapanamma’s death, the right if any in the plaint schedule properties reverted to the 3rd defendant as there is no question of Purusha Santati of the 3rd defendant when he is living. As whatever rights the 3rd defendant could have on the death of Bapanamma were already conveyed to the vendees under the sale deeds dated 1 2.1962 and 10.3.1966 in respect of items 1 and 2 respectively, the 3rd defendant himself could not have any right in the said lands after the death of Bapanamma. The plaintiff, who has not got any right in the plaint schedule properties at any time, has no right to file this suit. The plaintiff has no right on the file this suit. The plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant and the cause of action alleged in the plaint is not true. Defendants 1 and 2 have absolute rights under their respective sale deeds 1.2.1962 and 10.3.1966, 26.2.1974 and 26.5.1976 and the plaintiff is not entitled to question their rights. The allegations in para 10 of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has been demanding defendants 1 and 2 to put him in possession of the properties are not true and correct. To the registered notice dated 2.3.1981 got issued by the plaintiff with false allegations and contentions, a reply registered notice was sent stating true and correct facts. The clause in the settlement deed dated 19.9.1955 in favour of Tatali Bapanamma regarding settlement of interest in male issue of the 3rd defendant is a contingent interest, which never came into existence, as the 3rd defendant is living at the time of death of Bapanamma and subsequently till now. The said clause became void and unenforceable under law by subsequent events. The allegations in para 11 of the plaint that the plaint schedule properties yield at the rate of 12 bags of paddy per acre after meeting all expenses for a year are not true and correct. The said clause became void and unenforceable under law by subsequent events. The allegations in para 11 of the plaint that the plaint schedule properties yield at the rate of 12 bags of paddy per acre after meeting all expenses for a year are not true and correct. The suit lands are situated near Kollaru and they do not yield more than 5 or 6 bags of paddy per acre. The claim for mesne profits made by the plaintiff is excessive. The valuation of items 1 and 2 by the plaintiff and the court fees paid thereon are not true and correct. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim interest on the amounts of past mesne profits claimed by him. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of cancellation of the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 executed in favour of the 2nd defendant by Bapanamma and the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule properties or mesne profits thereon from the defendant. The plaintiff is not entitled to ignore the sale deed regarding item 2 executed by his father i.e., the 3rd defendant herein. These defendants submit that in any event, the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant are members of a joint Hindu family and as the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 was executed by the 3rd defendant, the manager of the family, the plaintiff is not entitled to question the said sale and recover possession of item 2 from these defendants.” 13) On the strength of these pleadings, the following issues were settled: 1. 1. Whether the settlement deed dated 19.9.1955 by third defendant in favour of Totali Bapanamma confers any right on the plaintiff in respect of suit properties? 2. 2. Whether the suit properties are self acquired properties of third defendant? 3. 3. Whether the sale deed dated 1.2.1962 in favour of first defendant executed by third defendant and Bapanamma and third defendant representing plaintiff as a guardian and the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 executed in favour of Datla Venkataraju, by the third defendant and others and the sale deed dated 26.2.1974 executed in favour of Golusula Simhachalam and others and by Venkatarao and the sale deed dated 25.5.1976 executed in favour of 2nd defendant by Golusula Simhachalam and others are true valid and supported by consideration and are binding on the plaintiff? 4. 4. Whether the suit is in time? 4. 4. Whether the suit is in time? 5. 5. To what relief? 14) The Court of first instance appreciated the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, Exs.A1 to A3 and also DWs.1 to 6 and Exs.B1 to B10 and came to the conclusion that in the light of the recitals of Ex.A1, the intention of the executant being clear, the plaintiff is bound to succeed. It may be appropriate to have a look at the recitals of Ex.A2 dated 19.9.1955, which read as under: 15) Ex.B1 is the registered sale deed dated 1.2.1962. Ex.B2 is the registered mortgage deed dated 8.8.1961. Ex.B3 is the registered sale deed dated 10.3.1966. Ex.B4 is the Discharged pro-note dated 25.4.1965. Ex.B5 is the registered sale deed dated 26.2.1974. Ex.B6 is the registered sale deed dated 25.5.1976. Ex.B7 is the registered notice dated 2.2.81. Ex.B8 is the office copy of the registered notice dated 16.2.1981. Ex.B9 is the payment endorsement on Ex.B2 dated 25.12.1961. Ex.B10 is the endorsement on Ex.B4. Ex.A1 is the extract from the register of births dated 29.1.1961. Ex.A2 is the certified copy of settlement deed dated 19.9.1955 and the recitals already had been referred to supra. Ex.A3 is returned registered notice. 16) The Court of first instance while appreciating Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Hindu Succession Act observed that Section 14 (1) operates only when there is a pre-existing right for a female and in pursuance of pre-existing right, if any property is settled, then the rights of the female will be enlarged into absolute rights and accordingly decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried by way of appeal in A.S.No.33 of 1992 on the file of the learned District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru. The appellate Court framed the following points for consideration. 1. 1. Whether the sale deeds under Ex.B1 and B3are not binding on the plaintiff/R1 and voidable at his instance, and liable to be set aside? 2. 2. Whether the plaintiff/R1 is entitled to recover possession of suit properties from the appellants herein viz., D1 and the legal representatives of D2 viz., D4 to D11? 3. 3. What relief? 17) The appellate Court recorded findings commencing from paras 14 to 22 and ultimately allowed the appeal with costs through out by setting aside the decree and judgment of the Court of first instance. Hence the present second appeal. 3. 3. What relief? 17) The appellate Court recorded findings commencing from paras 14 to 22 and ultimately allowed the appeal with costs through out by setting aside the decree and judgment of the Court of first instance. Hence the present second appeal. 18) The recitals of the crucial document viz., Ex.A2 had already been referred to supra. The relationship of Bapanamma and D3 had already been specified above. In view of the relationship between these parties, it cannot be said that by virtue of Ex.A2 whereunder life interst was given to Bapanamma, she would get absolute rights since by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that Bapanamma had pre existing right of maintenance or otherwise since she was a stranger to the family though otherwise closely related to the father(D3) of the plaintiff in the suit. Hence, the findings recorded that Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 cannot be made applicable and Bapanamma’s life estate cannot be said to have enlarged into absolute estate by operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession act, cannot be found fault with. 19) The question, which had been argued elaborately is that the sale deeds which had been challenged in the present suit cannot be said to be true, valid and binding on the plaintiff inasmuch as these alienations were made by the father of the Plaintiff, Bapanamma and yet another without obtaining prior permission of the Court and inasmuch as obtaining such prior permission while making alienation of minor’s property being mandatory, the findings recorded by the appellate Court cannot be sustained. 20) Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 reads as under: “Natural guardians of a Hindu minor: The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are .(a) in the case of a boy or unmarried girl-the father, and after him, the mother, provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; .(b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl- the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl-the husband: Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section— .(a) if hehas ceased to be a Hindu, or .(b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi). Explanation: In this section, the expressions ‘father’ and ‘mother’ do not include a step-father and a step-mother. Section 8 of the said Act reads as under: Powers of natural guardian.--(1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate, but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2) Thenatural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court,-- a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority. .(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. .(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in subsection (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. .(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in subsection (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. .(5) The guardians and Wards Act, 1890, shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining the permission of the court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the court under Section 29 of that Act, and in particular -- a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A thereof; b) the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2) (3) and (4) of Section 31 of that Act; and c) an appeal shall lie from an order of the court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decision of that court. .(6) In this section, “Court” means the city civil court or a district court or a court empowered under section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such court, means the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate. 21) Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as under. What may be transferred.— Property of any kind may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force. .(a) The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred. .(b) A mere right of re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent cannot be transferred to any one except the owner of the property affected thereby. .(c) An easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage. (d) All interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be transferred by him. .(b) A mere right of re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent cannot be transferred to any one except the owner of the property affected thereby. .(c) An easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage. (d) All interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be transferred by him. (dd) A right to future maintenance, in whatsoever manner arising, secured or determined, cannot be transferred. .(e) A mere right to sue (xxx) cannot be transferred. .(f) A public officer cannot be transferred, nor can the salary of a public officer5, whether before or after it has become payable. .(g) Stipends allowed to military, naval, air-force and civil pensioners of the Government and political pensions cannot be transferred. .(h) Notransfer can be made (1) in so far as it is opposed to the nature of the interest affected thereby, or (2) for an unlawful object or consideration within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), or (3) to a person legally disqualified .(i) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize a tenant having an untransferable right of occupancy, the farmer of an estate in respect of which default has been made in paying revenue, or the lessee of an estate, under the management of a Court of Wards, to assign his interest as such tenant, farmer or lessee. 22) Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 enunciates that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor is the father, and after him, the mother, provided that the custody of minor below the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother- Sanjiv Sangwan v.Sangeeta Sangwan (2004 (1) HLR 263 (Del). In Ramadas Menon v Sreedevi (2004 (1) HLR 375 (ker)(FB) it was observed that alienation of the property of minor by his natural guardian is voidable and there should be a prayer to set aside the alienation effected by the natural guardian without the courts sanction. 23) There is a controversy between the parties as to whether the natural guardian as specified in Section 6 can be appointed only in the case of guardians of the separate property of the minor or in respect of the joint family property as well. 23) There is a controversy between the parties as to whether the natural guardian as specified in Section 6 can be appointed only in the case of guardians of the separate property of the minor or in respect of the joint family property as well. There is also some controversy between the parties relating to the character of the property and the nature of the property - whether the original ancestral character of the property is changed as that of the separate property of the minor by virtue of the settlement deed in question. 24) In M. Pullaiah Chetty and others v. B.Subash Chandra Bose (SA No.937 of 1974) (SA No. 937 of 1974 dated 5.11.1976) while dealing with the provisions of Guardian and Wards Act (8 of 1890) and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 it was held as under: “In view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below in the present case, the first respondent must be held to have received the benefit of sum which the appellant-purchaser has paid as the price of the sale property. The broad rule of equity and good conscience that in such a case, the person seeking avoidance of a voidable transaction should restore the benefit, is a well established rule of English law and is not expressly confined to any particular section or to a particular situation. If the property, who wants to avoid a transaction has, by conduct of his, put it out of his power to restore the benefit or the former state of things, by exercising acts of ownership e.g., dealing with the property in question or altering its state, it is too late for him to rescind, for he must be held to have exercised his option and the remedy if any must be of some other kind. The rule of equity and good conscience that a person seeking to avoid a voidable transaction should restore the benefit, if any which he had received thereunder, is applicable to the present case.” 25) In P. Govinda Reddy v G. Obulamma (1971 (2) AWR 43) while dealing with the joint family property, it was held as under: “As there seems to be some misunderstanding with regard to the meaning of certain legal concepts, we may, for proper appreciation of the points involved, deal at this very stage, as briefly as possible with the concepts of joint Hindu family, Hindu coparcenary and joint Hindu family property before we deal with the powers of the manager of a joint Hindu family. A joint Hindu family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor including their wives and unmarried daughters. But the Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body. Only such persons as acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property are included therein. No female enters in that category. Further, a Hindu coparcenary is a creature of law and save by way of adoption, no stranger can be introduced therein. Coparcenary property is no other than joint family property itself. It may be ancestral property or separate property of coparceners thrown into the common stock or the property jointly acquired with the aid of ancestral property. It is ordinarily managed by the father or by any senior member for the time being of the family. The manager is called kartha. The manager or kartha has vast powers in connection with the management. The powers of a manager of a joint Hindu family are too well known to require elucidation. He represents the family in all business transactions. He can inter alia enter into contracts, give valid discharge for the debts due to the family and pay debts due from the family. He can sue or be sued in his own name in the capacity of a manager and all the members of the family being represented by him must be deemed to have sued or been sued through him. That being the substantive law, learned Counsel is right in his assertion that even in mortgage suits, the kartha of the family should be deemed to have represented its members while suing or being sued for the debts due to or from the family. That being the substantive law, learned Counsel is right in his assertion that even in mortgage suits, the kartha of the family should be deemed to have represented its members while suing or being sued for the debts due to or from the family. This proposition is so well settled that it does not require any elaborate discussion with reference to the authorities on the point. So we, do not wish to refer to the various cases cited by the Counsel in this behalf. It may be sufficient if we refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Devidas and others. V. Shivshailappa and others ( (1961) 3 SCR 896 .) “In a suit by the manager of a joint Hindu family for enforcement of a mortgage an adult member who is interested in the mortgage security is not a necessary party through he can be joined as a proper party an failure to join a person who is a proper but not necessary party does not affect the maintainability of the suit nor does invite the application of Section 22 Limitation Act.” The section is concerned with Mitakashara coparcenary property. The coparcenary property, as already noticed, is no other than the joint family property in which according to Mitakshara law, a coparcener gets right by birth. It is distinct from separate property which devolves by rule of succession. Mainly and essentially it is appratibandhadaya or unobstructed heritage which is not recognized by the Daya Bagha law. The later knows of only obstructed heritage in which the right accrues not by birth but on the death of the last owner without leaving male issue. Every coparcener has a joint interest and joint possession. The ownership of coparcenary property vests in the entire body of coparceners. The peculiar feature of the coparcenary is that no individual member so long as the joint family remains undivided can predicate that he has a precise or definite share in the property for his undivided interest in the joint property is liable to fluctuate with the births and deaths in the family. His interest is enlarged with the death of a male member and diminishes with the birth of such member. The undivided interest of the deceased coparcener devolves on his death by rule of survivorship, which is distinct from rule of succession. His interest is enlarged with the death of a male member and diminishes with the birth of such member. The undivided interest of the deceased coparcener devolves on his death by rule of survivorship, which is distinct from rule of succession. It is only on partition that a coparcener becomes entitled to a definite share. Thus, the characteristic features of coparcenary property are that it vests in each coparcener on his birth and devolves on the surviving coparceners by survivorship on the death of a coparcener and the definite shares of each of the coparceners therein become specified only on partition. It is so according to Mitakshara law.” 26) Reliance was also placed on the judgments in Sheela Devi and others v Lal Chand ((2006) 8 Supreme Court Cases 581) and in D.S. Lakshmaiah v L. Balasubramanyam ( (2003) 10 SCC 310 ). Reliance was placed on ML Subbaraya Setty v M.L.Nagappa Setty ((2002) 4 Supreme Court Cases 743) relating to the concept of the joint family property and also powers of the Kartha of the family or powers of the father in relation to the said joint family properties. 27) Further, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in Amirtham Kudumbah v Sarnam Kudimban ( AIR 1991 SC 1256 ) wherein it was held as under: “The effect of this subsection, is that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian otherwise than for the benefit of the minor or without obtaining the previous permission of the Court is voidable. A person entitled to avoid such a sale is either the minor or any person claiming under him. This means that either the minor, or his legal representative in the event of his death, or his successor-in-interest claiming under him by reason of transfer inter vivos, must bring action within the period prescribed for such a suit, i.e. three years from the date on which the minor died or attained majority, as the case may be. In the present case, the suit was brought, as found by the Courts below, within three years after the minor attained majority. In the instant case, on the facts found, the transfer of the property made by the guardian was a voidable transaction and it was, therefore, open to the minor to challenge it and seek recovery of possession. In the present case, the suit was brought, as found by the Courts below, within three years after the minor attained majority. In the instant case, on the facts found, the transfer of the property made by the guardian was a voidable transaction and it was, therefore, open to the minor to challenge it and seek recovery of possession. Such a right of the minor is a right or interest in property, which he himself or "any person claiming under him" may enforce by instituting a suit (Section 8(3) of the Guardianship Act). "Any person claiming. under him" must necessarily include a purchaser. The transfer made by the father during his son's minority was voidable at the instance of his son who was the real owner, and any person purchasing such property from the natural guardian obtained only a defensible title. The minor retained a right in the property to defeat existing adverse claims, and such right is an assignable right. We are in complete agreement with what has 'been stated on the point in Palaniappa Goundan v. Nallappa Goundan, ( AIR 1951 Mad 817 ) and in P. Kamaraju v. C. Gunnayya, (AIR 1924 Mad 322). We do not agree with the contrary view expressed on the point in Jhaverbhai Hathibhai v. Kabhai Bechar, (AIR 1933 Born 42), Mon Mohan Battacharjee v. Bidhu Bhusan Dutta, (AIR 1939 Cal 460), and Palani Goundan v. Vanjiakkal, ILR (1956) Mad 1062): ( AIR 1956 Mad 476 ).” It is pertinent to note that at Para 16 of its judgment, the views expressed in Palaniappa v Nallappa (AIR (38) 1951 Madras 817 (C.N 283) and in Palani v Vanjiakkal (1956 Madras 476 (AIR V 43 C 156 Sept) had been referred to by the Apex Court. 28) Further, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Pannilal v Rajinder Singh ( (1993) 4 SCC 38 ) wherein it was held as under: Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act sets out the powers of the natural guardian of a Hindu minor. The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of Section 8, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or his estate. The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of Section 8, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or his estate. The natural guardian, however, may not without the previous permission of the Court sell any part of the immovable property of the minor. Any disposal of immovable property which is not necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or is without the previous permission of the Court is voidable at the instance of the minor. The question is whether, in the circumstances of the case, it may be said that the sale was effected by the father and natural guardian of the respondents because he had attested the sale deed executed by the mother of the respondents. In this behalf our attention was invited to this Court’s judgment in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan ( (1970) 2 SCC 717 : AIR 1971 SC 315 ). This was a case in which it was held that the position in Hindu law was that when the father was alive he was the natural guardian and it was only after him that the mother became the natural guardian. Whether the father was alive but had fallen out with the mother of the minor child and was living separately for several years without taking any interest in the affairs of the minor, who was in the keeping and care of the mother, it was held that, in the peculiar circumstances, the father should be treated as if nonexistent and, therefore, the mother could be considered as the natural guardian of the minor’s person as well as the property, having power to bind the minor by dealing with her immovable property. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that the father of the respondents was not taking any interest in their affairs or that they were in keeping and care of the mother to the exclusion of the father. In fact, his attestation of the sale deed shows that he was very much existent and in the picture. If he was, then the sale by the mother, notwithstanding the fact that the father attested it, cannot be held to be a sale by the father and natural guardian satisfying the requirements of Section 8. In fact, his attestation of the sale deed shows that he was very much existent and in the picture. If he was, then the sale by the mother, notwithstanding the fact that the father attested it, cannot be held to be a sale by the father and natural guardian satisfying the requirements of Section 8. The provisions of Section 8 are devised to fully protect the property of a minor, even from the depredations of his parents. Section 8 empowers only the legal guardian to alienate a minor’s immovable property provided it is for the necessity or benefit of the minor or his estate and it further requires that such alienation shall be effected after the permission of the Court has been obtained. It is difficult, therefore, to hold that the sale was voidable, not void, by reason of the fact that the mother of the minor respondents signed the sale deed and the father attested it.” 29) In Meka Peethambaram and others v. Nanduri Lakshminarayana (1978 AWR 512) a learned Single Judge of this Court after referring to the judgments in “Krishnakant, In re, (AIR 1961 Guj.68); Venkataramana Murthy v. Subbayamma, ((1966) 1 An.W.R. 368); Sugga Bai v. Smt Hiralal, ( AIR 1969 M.P. 32 ); Rajalakshmi v. Ramachandran, ( (1966) 2 M.L.J 420 : I.L.R (1967) 3 Mad.778: 79 L.W.516: AIR 1967 Mad. 113 ); Subrahmaniam v. K.Gounder, (85 L. W.211: AIR 1972 Mad. 377 ); Sunamani Dei v. Babaji Das, (AIR 1974 Orissa 184) Ranganatha Gounder V.Kuppuswami Naidu ((1976) 2 M. L.J.128)”, ultimately came to the conclusion as under: “I am equally of the opinion that the observations of Bhagwati, J. In re; Krishnaknt ( AIR 1961 Guj 68 ) and of Gopal Rao Ekbote, J in Venkataramana Murthy v., Subbayyamma ((1966) 1 An.W.R 368) with respect to the scope and ambit of the Act, must be understood in the context of the facts of those particular cases. In fact, Bhagwati, J did not refer to or consider Section 11 at all, obviously for the reason that it did not fall for consideration in that case. Gopal Rao Ekbote, J, no doubt, referred to Section 11, but there was no occasion for him to construe it inasmuch as the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the mother was the natural guardian of the minor therein. Gopal Rao Ekbote, J, no doubt, referred to Section 11, but there was no occasion for him to construe it inasmuch as the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the mother was the natural guardian of the minor therein. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the learned Judge to consider, nor did his Lordship in fact consider the powers of a de facto guardian vis-a-vid the separate property or undivided interest of a minor in a joint family property. I have emphasized herein before the distinction and difference between the language employed in Sections 6 to 9 on the one hand, and section 11 on the other. There are absolutely no reasons to cut down and restrict the scope and natural meaning of the words occurring in Section 11 because of the fact that the preceding provisions govern a limited field. Moreover, the preceding provisions deal with the natural and testamentary guardians and their powers, and not with the de facto guardians or their powers. There is therefore, no reason to, nor is it possible to confine the operation of Section 11 to the field covered by preceding provisions. While on the subject of guardianship of Hindu minors, the Act obviously wanted to curtail the powers of “ de facto guardians” altogether section 11 read with the definition of the expression “guardian” in clause (b) in Section 4 shows that the Parliament did not choose to recognize the “ de facto guardian”, as one of the guardians in respect of the property of a Hindu minor, and made it clear, that no person shall be entitled to dispose of or deal with the property of a minor (whether an undivided share, or otherwise) merely because he purports to or acts as his de facto guardian. I am thus of the opinion that Section 11 disentitles a de facto guardian not only from alienating the separate property of a minor (separate property, in the sense, not including his undivided share in a joint family property), but also his undivided share in a joint family property. I am thus of the opinion that Section 11 disentitles a de facto guardian not only from alienating the separate property of a minor (separate property, in the sense, not including his undivided share in a joint family property), but also his undivided share in a joint family property. If, so, it must be held that the alienations effected by the paternal grand mother of the plaintiffs under Exs.B1 and B2, are void, and the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree in that behalf.” 30) Further, strong reliance was placed on the judgment reported in O.G. Sankar v. S.V.S. Kumar Dev (1994 (4) ALT 520), wherein the learned single Judge of this Court observed as under: “The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the mother of the minor defendants 2 and 3 cannot be considered as a natural guardian when the father of the minors is alive cannot be accepted as an universal proposition of law. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case it is clearly found from the evidence adduced in this case, which is already referred to above, that the father of the minor defendants 2 and 3 was leading a way-ward life and not caring fro his minor sons and the other members of the family and that it is on account of such circumstances the first defendant who is the paternal grand mother of the minors, had chosen to settle the suit house in favour of the minors under Ex.A.1 by giving vested remainder rights ignoring her son, who was alive. Even Exs.A.2, A.3 and A.4, which are already referred to above, clearly reveal that the father of the minors was not conducting himself in the interests of the minors and was leading a way-ward life and that it is on account of such circumstances the mother of the minors chose to file a petition in the District Court at Guntur requesting the Court to appoint her as guardian of the minors for selling the property. Therefore it is clearly established from such evidence that the father of the minors though alive was not caring for his minor sons and not looking after their interests. Under such circumstances, the mother of the minors is to be considered as natural guardian of her minor sons and act as such guardian. Therefore it is clearly established from such evidence that the father of the minors though alive was not caring for his minor sons and not looking after their interests. Under such circumstances, the mother of the minors is to be considered as natural guardian of her minor sons and act as such guardian. As such, the execution of Ex.A.2 agreement cannot be considered as invalid on the ground that the father of the minors is alive, and that the mother, cannot therefore be considered as natural guardian. Such view is clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Gijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathakhan case ( AIR 1971 SC 315 ) wherein it is observed that where father is alive but had fallen out with the mother of the minor girl and was living separately for several years without taking any interest in the affairs of the minor who was in the keeping and care of the mother, the father should be treated as if non-existent and therefore the mother could be considered as natural guardian of the minor’s person as well as the property and had power to bind the minor by granting lease of her property. In the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in B. Ramender Reddy v. Sathyanarayana Reddy (1986 (1) ALT 240) which is sought to be relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, it is observed that the right of the mother of the minor to act as guardian during the life time of the father comes into play when the father was disabled physically or mentally or abandoned or neglected his duty and that under such circumstances only the mother could act as natural guardian of the minors even when the father is alive as the law presumes as if the father was non-existent as far as the minor children are concerned. In the present case, as the father had distanced himself from his minor sons and was not looking after their interests and was leading a way-ward life and not caring for the family, the mother was entitled to act as natural guardian of her minor sons and as such Ex.A.2 agreement executed by her cannot be invalidated on the ground that the father was alive. It is clear from such view expressed by the various High Courts including this Court in the above cited decision in Ramender Reddy Case (4 supra) that when the permission of the District Court as contemplated under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is not obtained, the agreement of sale executed by the natural guardian of the minors cannot be enforced against the minors even if it is to be said that such an agreement is found to be for the benefit of the minors and that the question of considering the beneficial nature of the transaction does not arise when the validity and binding nature of such agreement is to be determined. In the present case, even though Ex.A.2 agreement is found to be for the benefit of the minors such agreement cannot be enforced against the minor defendants 2 and 3 inasmuch as the condition precedent of obtaining the permission from the District Court by the natural guardian of the minors is not fulfilled. Further, the second defendant on attaining majority had chosen to contest the suit by filing separate written statement of his own specifically avoiding the agreement of sale executed by his mother and contending that it is not valid and binding upon him and he does not choose to accept such alienation. It is now a well-established proposition of law that the minor can avoid such transaction by expressing his view and by his conduct without having the necessity of filing a suit for avoiding such alienation. Therefore Ex.A.2 agreement of sale cannot be said to be enforceable against the defendants 2 and 3 as the prior permission of the District Court was not obtained and as such the plaintiff cannot be said to be entitled for the relief of specific performance as granted by the lower Court”. 31) On a careful analysis of the decisions of the Apex Court in Amirtham Kudumbah v. Sarnam Kudimban(6 supra), wherein the judgment in Palaniappa v. Nallappa (9 supra) had been approved and the judgment in Palani v. Vanjiakkal (10th supra) had been disapproved. 32) The facts in the present case also may have to be carefully analyzed especially in the light of the view expressed in Meka Peethambaram and others v. Nanduri Lakshminarayana (11 supra). 32) The facts in the present case also may have to be carefully analyzed especially in the light of the view expressed in Meka Peethambaram and others v. Nanduri Lakshminarayana (11 supra). 33) The learned counsel for respondent, in support of his contentions, placed strong reliance on the judgment in Adapa Chinna Bhumaiah v.Adapa Sailu ( 1996 (3) ALD 313 ) wherein the learned Judge while dealing with Sections 4 and 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1955 observed as under: “Section 6 of the Act applies only to Mitakshara Coparcenary property and it does not apply inter alia to the property held by the deceased as the sole surviving coparcener. The main part of this Section says that where a Hindu dies having at the time of his death an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcener. It cannot be gainsaid that a coparcenary cannot consist of a single individual even if the property in his possession is coparcenary property. It is well settled that the rule of survivorship comes into operation only when the deceased does not leave him surviving a female relative classified in Class I or a male relative in Class I who claims through such female relative in Class I and II where the deceased has not made testamentary disposition of his undivided share in the coparcenary property. There is nothing in Section 6 of the Act or in any other provision of this Act preventing the application of the rule of Hindu Law to the acquisition by birth and when there is a possibility of the heir having a son in future. Though at the time of succession by survivorship it may make the coparcenary property as a separate property, but it gets converted into coparcenary property immediately when a son is born or adopted by the sole surviving coparcener. As noted above, the share, which a coparcener obtains in the ancestral property is ancestral property as regards to the male issue who takes an interest in it by birth. Whether he was in existence at the time of succession or born subsequently, but such share however is the ancestral only as regards his male issue. There is no provision in the Act, which is inconsistent to the aforementioned settled law. Whether he was in existence at the time of succession or born subsequently, but such share however is the ancestral only as regards his male issue. There is no provision in the Act, which is inconsistent to the aforementioned settled law. Similarly, there is no provision in the Act, which provides that the subsequently born son cannot become a coparcener with his father who had inherited interest of his father as the sole surviving coparcener and, therefore, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act are not at all attracted.” 34) Though certain facts are in dispute between the parties, several of the facts are not in dispute. There is no serious controversy between the parties that D3-father of the plaintiff executed the settlement deed Ex.A2 in favour of Bapanamma creating life interest in favour of Bapanamma and subsequent to her, the property to be devolved on the male issues and in their absence on the female issues and in their absence on the heirs of D3. Plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and his mother and father as PWs 2 and 3 respectively. D1 himself was examined as DW1 and D6 was examined as DW2 and other witnesses were examined to prove the sale deeds in favour of D1 and D2 and also to prove that the transactions are supported by consideration. 35) The suit was filed within time i.e., two years after the plaintiff attaining majority. The main ground of attack is that the sale transactions, which are challenged being voidable, are liable to be set aside and consequently the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of these properties. The suit was filed for recovery of items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties from D1 and D2 as already referred to supra. D3 in the suit is the father of the plaintiff. The specific stand taken by the plaintiff is that the property is ancestral property of the family i.e., plaintiff and D3 his father executed a deed in favour of his close relative Bapanamma who brought him up since his parents died at an younger age. The recitals of the settlement deed Ex.A2 had already been specified supra and the said recitals being self-explanatory, need not be explained. The recitals of the settlement deed Ex.A2 had already been specified supra and the said recitals being self-explanatory, need not be explained. Further, it is not in serious controversy that Bapanamma died in the year 1977 and the specific case of the plaintiff is that by virtue of the recitals of the settlement deed, Ex.A2, since the life interest holder left the world, the cause of action accrued to him to challenge the alienations and in accordance with law the plaintiff instituted the suit challenging those alienations and for recovery of possession within time. It is also not in controversy that D3, Bapanamma and mother of D3 Mallidi V eeramma sold item 2 of the plaint schedule property to Datla Venkataraju by sale deed dated 10.3.1966. It appears that the said Venkataraju sold the same again to one Golusula Simhachalam and another in 1974 who in turn sold the same to D2 in 1976 by way of sale deeds. These transactions are evidenced by the respective sale deeds. The specific stand taken by the plaintiff is that the sale deeds are not binding on him since they are voidable on certain grounds. It is true that as far as Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 relating to devolution of the estate by operation of law is concerned, the findings recorded cannot be found fault with since Bapanamma had no pre existing right and hence by virtue of Ex.A2, it cannot be said that her life interest had enlarged itself into an absolute one. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 is available on record. D3 is father of the plaintiff. The origin of the property being ancestral is also not in controversy. But it is pertinent to note that when D3 executed Ex.A2, he was not married by that time. Thereafter, it appears that after his marriage the plaintiff was born to him. Thus he is an after born son. There is serious controversy between the parties as to the character of the property. On one hand it is contended that the property continues to be ancestral in nature despite the execution of Ex.A2 and on the other hand it is contended that when once an unmarried father executes a settlement deed Ex.A2, the property cannot be taken as separate minor’s property by virtue of the recitals of Ex.A2. On one hand it is contended that the property continues to be ancestral in nature despite the execution of Ex.A2 and on the other hand it is contended that when once an unmarried father executes a settlement deed Ex.A2, the property cannot be taken as separate minor’s property by virtue of the recitals of Ex.A2. Consequently certain contentions had been advanced by both the counsel on record relating to the applicability of the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. It is also not in controversy that no permission as such had been obtained from the Court though the permission is mandatory. Whether the permission is required to be obtained even if it is a case of alienation by the father in relation to the ancestral property or whether it is to be applied only in case of the minor’s separate or self acquired property, had been argued in elaboration. No doubt, certain findings were recorded that these alienations were made for the legal necessity of the family by the Kartha of the joint family, and therefore, they can be taken as valid and binding on the plaintiff as well. 36) In the light of the decisions referred to supra, the only point for consideration is whether in a case of this nature where the fathe,r acting as the kartha of the family and in the capacity of the natural guardian can make such alienations along with others. One of such alienations by D3 is along with Bapanamma and yet another along with Bapanamma and his mother, these are questions which have to be gone into. In the event of the Court coming to the conclusion that the property continues to be ancestral in nature, then the questions to be decided are whether the plaintiff will have any rights at all to question these alienations and whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the property is to be treated as a separate property of the minor in the light of the recitals of Ex.A2 especially taking into consideration that the plaintiff is an after born son of the executant of Ex.A2. D3 was unmarried by the date of the transaction. D3 was unmarried by the date of the transaction. In the light of the decisions of two learned Judges of this Court in Meka Peethambaram v., Nanduri Lakshminarayana (11 supra) and O.G. Sankar v S. Veera Sameera Kumar Dev (23 supra) and in the light of the views expressed by the Apex Court in Amirtham Kudumbah v Sarnam Kudimban (8th supra) wherein the views expressed by the learned Judge of Madras in Palaniappa v. Nallappa (9 supra) and also the views expressed by the Division Bench, Madras in Palani v. Vanjiakkal (10 supra) had been considered, this Court is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the appellate Court cannot be totally justified. At any rate, this Court is also of the opinion that the evidence available on record being highly insufficient especially in the light of the rights put forth by the plaintiff, on the settled principles of the Hindu Law, this Court is inclined to set aside the decree and Judgment of the appellant Court and to give opportunity to both the parties to let in further evidence to make an order of remand. 37) Accordingly, Judgment and Decree of the appellate Court are hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate Court to give opportunity to both the parties to let in further evidence on all the aspects in the light of the views expressed by this Court and also decisions referred to supra and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. 38) The second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties shall bear their own costs. It is needless to say that inasmuch as the suit is an old one, the appellate Court shall fix time for disposal of the matter at any early date.