Judgment ( 1. ) IN this appeal preferred under section 173 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity the Act)the claimants-appellants have called in question the defensibility of the award dated 24. 7. 1999 passed by the Third Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, sagar Camp Rehli (for short the Tribunal) in M. V. C. No. 22 of 1998. ( 2. ) THE facts which are requisite to be stated for adjudication of this appeal is that the deceased, Sunil Kumar, was travelling in a jeep bearing registration No. MP 15-D 2175 towards Gunjaura on 13. 4. 1998 for obtaining an order for light decoration. The said jeep was driven by the driver, respondent No. 1 herein. Near village udaipura, due to rash and negligent driving of the driver, Sunil Kumar fell down on the road and sustained grievous injuries. He was admitted in the hospital but despite availing treatment he succumbed to the injuries on the next day. Crime in respect of the offence punishable under sections 279, 304-A and 337 of the Indian Penal code was instituted against the driver of the jeep. Because of the death in the vehicular accident the legal representatives of late Sunil Kumar initiated an action under section 166 of the Act for grant of compensation of Rs. 8,75,000 on various heads which included the amount expended on his treatment. It was contended before the tribunal that the deceased was a licensed driver, he was running a furniture shop and was also engaged in decoration work by running a tent house. It was pleaded that his monthly income was Rs. 5,000 and the entire family was dependent on him. ( 3. ) THE respondent No. 1, driver of the vehicle, filed his written statement contending, inter alia, that he was not the driver of the jeep and the same was driven by the deceased himself. On the date of accident the said Sunil Kumar was driving the vehicle in a drunken state and later on he had handed over the vehicle to be driven by someone else and he got stuck to the jeep by holding it in his hand, as a result of which when the jeep was being driven by another he fell down and sustained injuries. The owner of the vehicle took the plea that the deceased had borrowed the vehicle for his own work and he had a valid licence to drive. In essence, the stand of the respondent/owner was that the deceased himself was the driver of the jeep at the time of accident and the vehicle was under his control. He disputed that the respondent no. 1 is the driver and he had permitted the deceased to drive the vehicle. It was set forth that if the deceased was allowed to drive the vehicle that was his negligence and hence, the liability could not be fastened on him. Alternatively it was put forth that the vehicle was insured with United india Insurance Co. Ltd. and, therefore, the insurer was liable to indemnify him. ( 4. ) ON behalf of the insurer it was contended that the vehicle was insured with it but there has been breach of terms of the policy inasmuch as the jeep was carrying 15 to 20 persons on hire and further the driver, respondent No. 1 did not possess any licence. The Tribunal framed as many as five issues and came to hold that the vehicle was not used as a taxi since there was no material on record that anyone travelling in the jeep had paid any fare; that the respondent No. 1 was the driver of the vehicle in question and he did not possess any valid driving licence; that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver and not otherwise; that the claimants were entitled to the compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,04,000 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum which has to be recovered from the owner; and that the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner as there had been breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy. ( 5. ) WE have heard Mr. Akshat Tiwari, the learned counsel for the appellants and mrs. Amrit Ruprah, learned counsel for the insurer, the respondent No. 3. Despite service of notice none has appeared for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. ( 6. ) MR. ( 5. ) WE have heard Mr. Akshat Tiwari, the learned counsel for the appellants and mrs. Amrit Ruprah, learned counsel for the insurer, the respondent No. 3. Despite service of notice none has appeared for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. ( 6. ) MR. Akshat Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the claimants- appellants has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in law by not fastening the liability on the insurer though there is no material on record that the accident had occurred due to negligence of the driver. It is further contended by him that the owner had permitted the deceased, Sunil to drive the vehicle who had a valid driving licence and the accident had occurred while he was driving and, therefore, the insurance company cannot seek absolution from paying the amount of compensation. It is further urged by him that the amount of compensation determined by the Tribunal is quite low and the same deserves to be enhanced. Lastly, submission of Mr. Tiwari is that if the award passed by the Tribunal qua liability of the insurer is upheld the principle of pay and recover should be taken aid of and the insurance company should be directed to pay first and thereafter proceed to recover the amount from the owner that is going to be determined in this appeal. ( 7. ) MRS. Amrit Ruprah, learned counsel appearing for the insurer resisting the aforesaid submission contended that when the Tribunal has recorded a categorical and unequivocal finding that the driver did not have valid driving licence at the time of the accident, the insurance company has been rightly not saddled with the liability. The learned counsel submitted that it is not a case where onus by the insurance company had not been discharged since the driver himself had admitted with regard to non-possession of the licence and the Tribunal has in a clear-cut manner recorded the finding that the accident had occurred due to negligence of the driver and for no other reasons. Submission of Mrs. Ruprah is that the owner has not examined himself to show that he had employed the driver after due verification. The learned counsel urged that the prayer to pay and recover is not to be accepted as there has been violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. ( 8. Submission of Mrs. Ruprah is that the owner has not examined himself to show that he had employed the driver after due verification. The learned counsel urged that the prayer to pay and recover is not to be accepted as there has been violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. ( 8. ) FIRSTLY, we shall advert to the issue whether the Tribunal is justified in exonerating the insurer to indemnify the owner. On a scrutiny of the award and the material brought on record it is evincible that the respondent No. 1 was the driver of the jeep. Admittedly, he did not possess a driving licence. The accident had occurred as he was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Submission of Mr. Tiwari is that that possession of licence cannot be the sole ground to exonerate the insurer. ( 9. ) IN National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, 2004 ACJ 1 (SC), a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in para 102 has culled out the finding after considering various conflicting decisions in the field. The said conclusion read as under: " (102) xxx xxx xxx (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under section 163-A or section 166 of Motor Vehicles act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of section 149 (2) (a) (ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy conditions, e. g. , disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2) (a) (ii) of section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence (s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish breach on the part of the owner of the vehicle, the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches of the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply the rule of main purpose and the concept of fundamental breach to allow defences available to the insurer under section 149 (2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learners licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under section 165 read with section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising from use of motor vehicle. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under section 165 read with section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising from use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims, inter se, between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of section 149 (2)read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this court above, the Tribunal can direct that insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of the claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue, only if, as required by sub-section (3) of section 168 of the Act, the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue, only if, as required by sub-section (3) of section 168 of the Act, the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in subsection (4) with proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims. " ( 10. ) IF the ratio of the aforesaid decision is understood in the proper perspective it would be luminescent that mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. What is required is that to avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. That apart, it has been held by their Lordships that even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. ( 11. ) IN the case at hand, admittedly the driver did not have a valid driving licence at all. The owner had taken the plea that he had allowed the deceased, Sunil Kumar to drive the vehicle, who had a valid driving licence. ( 11. ) IN the case at hand, admittedly the driver did not have a valid driving licence at all. The owner had taken the plea that he had allowed the deceased, Sunil Kumar to drive the vehicle, who had a valid driving licence. The same has been disbelieved by the Tribunal, we are disposed to think, rightly so, inasmuch as the owner has not come in the witness-box supporting his version. Quite apart from the above, the accident had occurred not because of any other reason but due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the jeep as a result of which Sunil Kumar fell down from the jeep. The matter would be different had there been collision or any other aspect from which it could have been fruitfully inferred that non-possession of the licence has fundamentally not contributed to the cause of accident. On the contrary, as the obtaining factual matrix frescoes the scenario it becomes clear as crystal that the driver was solely and exclusively responsible for the accident and his rashness was the only factor and in the absence of a licence it can safely be concluded that it has contributed to the cause of the accident. ( 12. ) IN view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion that finding recorded by the Tribunal that the insurance company was not liable to indemnify the owner cannot be found fault with. ( 13. ) WE have said so as we are inclined to think as the Apex Court has held that it depends on facts of each case and in the case at hand the accident has ensued due to inexperience of the driver which has nexus with the non-possession of the driving licence. ( 14. ) THE next aspect to which we would like to advert is whether the principle of pay and recover would be applicable in the case at hand. Submission of Mrs. Ruprah, learned counsel for the insurer is that when there has been a fundamental breach of the insurance policy the concept of pay and recover would not be applicable. ( 15. ) IN National Insurance Co. Submission of Mrs. Ruprah, learned counsel for the insurer is that when there has been a fundamental breach of the insurance policy the concept of pay and recover would not be applicable. ( 15. ) IN National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur, 2004 ACJ 428 (SC), a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in para 21 expressed the view as under: " (21) The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this court in Satpal Singhs case, 2000 ACJ 1 (SC ). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha ranis case, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC ). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant, if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of section 168 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in terms whereof, it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding. " ( 16. " ( 16. ) IN Pramod Kumar Agrawal v. Mushtari Begum, 2004 ACJ 1903 (SC), in para 12 their Lordships directed as under: " (12) Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit kaurs case, 2004 ACJ 428 (SC), that insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Claims Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondents-claimants within 3 months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the concerned executing court as if the dispute between insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle, i. e. , the appellant No. 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached as a part of the security. If necessity arises the executing court shall take assistance of the concerned Regional Transport authority. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle, i. e. , appellant No. 1 shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default it shall be open to the executing court to direct realisation by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (the appellant No. 1 ). " ( 17. ) SUBMISSION of Mrs. Ruprah is that the law laid down in the case of Baljit kaur (supra) and Pramod Kumar (supra)has been overruled in view of the fact that the Apex Court had directed the insurer to make good the payment from the owner. In view of the decisions rendered in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak singh, 2006 ACJ 1441 (SC); Jayraj v. Kaluram, 2006 ACJ 636 (MP) and Shanti v. Awadh Narayan Jaiswal, 2006 ACJ 1211 (MP); have not issued any direction for the purpose of payment and recovery of the amount by the insurance company. In view of the decisions rendered in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak singh, 2006 ACJ 1441 (SC); Jayraj v. Kaluram, 2006 ACJ 636 (MP) and Shanti v. Awadh Narayan Jaiswal, 2006 ACJ 1211 (MP); have not issued any direction for the purpose of payment and recovery of the amount by the insurance company. It is contended by her that when this court has concurred with the finding of the Tribunal that there has been a breach of policy inasmuch as the driver did not have a licence at all, the conception of pay and recovery would not be applied to a case of this nature. It is vehemently urged by her that whatever directions have been given it related to motor vehicle but the case at hand exposits different factual situation. ( 18. ) AS far as the first limb of submission of Mrs. Ruprah is concerned, doctrine of pay and recovery has been dilated upon we are not in a position to accept the aforesaid submission. It is worth noting that it has to be regarded as a precedent to the effect that what has been laid down therein is a ratio decidendi. Because there has been no direction in some cases by the Supreme Court for the purpose of pay and recover, it does not mean that they are precedent to come to the conclusion that recovery has been dilated upon. In this context, we may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Ambica quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1073 , wherein it has been held as under: "the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. " ( 19. ) IN this regard, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision rendered in the case of State of U. P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals ltd. , (1991) 4 SCC 139 , wherein in para 41 it has been ruled thus: " (41 ). . . " ( 19. ) IN this regard, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision rendered in the case of State of U. P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals ltd. , (1991) 4 SCC 139 , wherein in para 41 it has been ruled thus: " (41 ). . . A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. . . " ( 20. ) IN the case of R. L. Jain v. D. D. A. , (2004) 4 SCC 79 , it has been held as under: ". . . It is well settled that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein not what logically follows from the various observations made therein. . . " ( 21. ) IN this context, we may further usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka state Road Trans. Corpn. v. Mahadeva shetty, 2003 ACJ 1775 (SC), wherein the apex Court expressed thus: " (23 ). . . The decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the court, while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. Therefore, while applying the decision to a later case, the court dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. The only thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty as without an investigation into the facts, it cannot be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as measure of social justice. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual expression carry no weight at all. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty as without an investigation into the facts, it cannot be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as measure of social justice. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual expression carry no weight at all. Nor every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority. " ( 22. ) AT this stage, it would not be out of place to state that a judgment is not to be read as a statute. It must be construed upon reading the same as a whole and the ratio therefrom is required to be culled out from reading the same in its entirety and not only a part of it. This view of ours gets fortified from the decisions rendered in the case of Ramesh Chandra Daga v. Rameshwari Bai, (2005) 4 SCC 772 ; Zee Telefilms ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 and P. S. Sathappan (dead) by L. Rs. v. Andhra Bank Ltd. , (2004) 11 SCC 672 . ( 23. ) THE next plank of submission of mrs. Ruprah, learned counsel for the insurer is that in Pramod Kumars case, 2004 acj 1903 (SC), directions were issued in a different context and hence, it would not apply to the case at hand. Suffice it to say whether a person travelling in a goods vehicle which is not entitled under law to carry passenger, or there has been fundamental breach relating to licence which has entailed in exoneration of the insurer is of no significance to apply the principle of pay and recover. ( 24. ) IN view of the aforesaid analysis, the submission of Mrs. Ruprah despite its immense vehemence that the law laid down in Baljit Kaurs case, 2004 ACJ 428 (SC) and Pramod Kumars case, 2004 acj 1903 (SC) is overruled and diluted leaves us unimpressed. ( 25. ) IN view of the aforesaid we have no hesitation in holding that the principle of pay and recover still holds the field and also is attracted to the case at hand. Hence the amount to be determined by this court has to be made good by the insurer and thereafter it shall proceed to recover the same from the owner as per law. ( 26. Hence the amount to be determined by this court has to be made good by the insurer and thereafter it shall proceed to recover the same from the owner as per law. ( 26. ) PRESENTLY, we shall proceed to deal with quantum of compensation. Submission of Mr. Akshat Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellants is that the deceased was a driver. He was earning Rs. 5,000 but the tribunal has determined the monthly contribution at Rs. 1,000. The accident had occurred in the year 1998. The Tribunal as is manifest, has determined the yearly income at Rs. 12,000. Keeping in view the engagement of the deceased, we are inclined to hold that the yearly income would be Rs. 24,000 and contribution to the family would be Rs. 16,000. The deceased was 34 years of age and thus, multiplier of 17 would be applicable. Hence, the compensation would come to Rs. 16,000 x 17 = rs. 2,72,000. To the aforesaid, we shall add a sum of Rs. 11,000 on three heads, viz. , loss of consortium, loss to estate and funeral expenses. Thus, the amount in toto, would be Rs. 2,83,000 (rupees two lakh eighty-three thousand ). The differential enhanced sum along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum shall be deposited before the Tribunal within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order passed today by the insurer and the insurer would proceed to recover the same as per law. ( 27. ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.