JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. 1. Heard Sri Sudhir Kumar counsel for the revisionist and Sri K.N. Joshi counsel for the respondent. 2. Present revision has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 15.3.2002 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Nainital in S.C.C. Suit No. 5 of 1998. 3. Briefly stated a suit has been filed by the plaintiff for the recovery of arrears of rent and taxes to the tune of Rs.23,900/- and for eviction of the defendant from the premises in suit. The mesne profits @ Rs.50/- per day has also been sought. 4. According to the plaintiff, he is owner of the house in suit situated in Kichha and defendant is his relative. The plaintiff allowed the defendant to work with him at his shop but the defendant tried to grab the possession of the shop by filing a civil suit No. 159 of 1996 against the plaintiff, alleging that he was tenant of the plaintiff over the shop in question on the rent of Rs.500/- per month. However, the defendant had never paid any rent since 7.8.1986 till 24.12.1997. The plaintiff claimed Rs. 68,820/- as arrears of rent, Rs.9,770/- as water tax and Rs.6,882/- scavenging tax and compensation for use and occupation @ Rs.50/- per day i.e. Rs. 1850/. As such the defendant was liable to pay Rs.87322.00/- to the plaintiff. The plaintiff served a notice on the defendant to pay the arrears of rent through his counsel which was served on him on 25.11.1997 but the defendant failed to pay the rent and taxes and also did not vacate the premises in suit. 5. Written statement has been filed by the defendant and denied the averment made in the plaint. He has submitted that he is continuing as tenant since 1986 @ Rs. 500/- per month. In the additional pleas it has been stated that he is doing business in the premises in dispute and he has also paid a sum of Rs. 25,000/- towards the security of shop when he took the shop on rent. The defendant has stated that the rent of Rs.500/- includes all taxes. 6. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court has framed the following points for determination: 1. Whether the defendant is entitled to the protection under sub section (4) of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972? 2. The defendant has stated that the rent of Rs.500/- includes all taxes. 6. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court has framed the following points for determination: 1. Whether the defendant is entitled to the protection under sub section (4) of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972? 2. Whether the defendant is liable to pay the arrears of rent, taxes and mesne profits claimed by the plaintiff? 7. So far as the point no. 1 is concerned the findings were recorded that since the deposit of Rs.18,500/- does not fulfill the requirements of sub section (4) of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hence, the defendant is not protected from the decree of eviction. 8. So far as the point no.2 is concerned, the trial court has held that the defendant was in possession of the shop in question as tenant since 1986. Defendant made a complaint against the plaintiff regarding alleged commission of theft in the shop of defendant by the plaintiff. He sent a notice by registered post for arrears of recovery of rent and terminated his tenancy, hence the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of Rs.23,900/- towards the arrears of rent and taxes and also to a decree of eviction. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the defendant has preferred the present revision. 10. So far as the applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the premises in dispute is concerned, amendment in Sub section (2) of Section 2 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was inserted vide U.P. Act No. 17 of 1985 to the following effect: Provided further that where construction of a building is completed on or after April 26, 1985 then the reference in this sub section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of forty years from the date on which its construction is completed. 11. As will appear from the record of the case that the building was constructed in the year 1986, and in view of the aforesaid amendment the building shall be deemed to be exempted from the operation of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 for forty years. 11. As will appear from the record of the case that the building was constructed in the year 1986, and in view of the aforesaid amendment the building shall be deemed to be exempted from the operation of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 for forty years. Proviso of sub Section (3) of Section 2 of Act No. 13 of 1972 is quoted below: “Provided further that where construction of a building is completed on or after April 26, 1985 then the reference in this sub section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of forty years from the date on which its construction is completed.” 12. P.W. 1 Makhan Lal has stated that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1986-87. His statement is quoted below: eSa bl le; fyfid ty laLFkku fdPNk ds in ij rSukr gw¡ oknh galjkt dh fdPNk “kgj esa nqdkusa gSa mu nqdkuksa ij tydj yxrk gS o’kZ 86&87 esa fjdkMZ ds vuqlkj #ñ 375@& dqy rhuksa nqdkuksa ij tydj yxk Fkk tks lu 90&91 rd blh jsV ij pykA 13. The plaintiff has also examined himself as P.W.2. He also deposed that the building was constructed in the year 1986. His statement is quoted below: fookfnr nqdku o mlds lkFk dh nks vkSj nqdkusa eSaus fdPNk esa u;k fuekZ.k lu~ 1986 ebZ esa djk;k FkkA izfroknh esjk NksVk cguksbZ gS fookfnr nqdku esa eSaus izfroknh dks cht dk dke djus ds fy, iSlk yxkdj nh FkhA 14. The plaintiff has also proved that the defendant has not paid rent since 1986. In the cross examination it has come that oral tenancy was made in the year 1986 and the rent has not been paid since 1986. 15. Defendant appellant was also examined on oath who has deposed that he has given first rent on 15th September 1986. He has denied that he has not paid rent. In the cross examination it has come that oral tenancy was made in the year 1986 and the rent has not been paid since 1986. 15. Defendant appellant was also examined on oath who has deposed that he has given first rent on 15th September 1986. He has denied that he has not paid rent. His statement is quoted as under: eSa fookfnr nqdku esa #ñ 500@& izfrekg dh nj ls fdjk;snkj gw¡ fookfnr nqdku oknh ls fdjk;s ij yh Fkh rc eSaus oknh dks #ñ 25]000@& vfxze fn;k FkkA eSa fookfnr nqdku esa mér cht HkaMkj ds uke ls dkjksckj djrk gw¡A eSaus oknh dks fnlEcj 96 rd dk fdjk;k vnk dj fn;k FkkA * * * * eSaus tc bl nqdku dks fdjk;s ij fy;k Fkk rks igyk fdjk;k 5-9-86 dks fn;k Fkk mu fnuksa eSa [kkrs ugha j[krk FkkA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eSaus dksbZ fdjk;k u fn;k gksA 16. Apart form that the appellant had to deposit rent to the extent of Rs. 23,900/- including water tax and interest @ 9% but he has deposited only Rs. 18,500/- in compliance of the provisions under section 20 (4) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. 17. In the case Atma Ram Mittal AIR 1988(1) Page 561, it has been held as under: “8. It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim “actus curial neminem gravabit”-Act of Court shall prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the 10 years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within 10 years and even than within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make the 10 years of holidays from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purposes of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation in an imperative irrespective of anything else. 9. That will make the 10 years of holidays from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purposes of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation in an imperative irrespective of anything else. 9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of the Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstonje tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislature is by exploring intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the object matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. (Underlined by the Court). See Commentaries, on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st edition of 1965, University of Chicago Press, 1979. Vol. 1, p. 59), Mukherjea, J. as thelearned Chief Justice then was in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, 1953 SCR 677 said that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Judge Learned Hand, long time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislator had used and the true meaning of what words as was said by Lord Rid in Black-Clawson International Ltd. V. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg AG, 1975 Appeal Cases 591 at 613. We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law. If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and depended upon the ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption of 10 years which is in reality an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and depended upon the ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption of 10 years which is in reality an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our opinion, bearing in mind the well-settled principles that the rights of the parties crystalise to the date of the institution of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta (supra), the meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a period of 10 years and will continue to be available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of 10 years. Once rights crystalise the adjudication must be in accordance with law.” 18. In view of aforesaid decision of the Apex Court no benefit can be accrued to the defendant with regard to the benefit of litigation as there was exemption for a period of 40 years after the year 1985 and admittedly the building was construction in the year 1986. 19. Scope of interference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act has been interpreted by the Apex Court from time to time. It is not an appellate jurisdiction and therefore, the findings of fact cannot be interfered. 20. In Harshvardhan Chokkani Vs. Bhupendra N. Patel 2002 SCFBRC 344, the Apex Court has observed as under: “Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional power which in its very nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers of the Revisional Court cannot be equated with the power of the Appellate Court. In examining the legally and the proprietary of the order under challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved in such that no reasonable person could arrive at or he like, it is only in such situations that interference by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be justified. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power. From the above discussion, it is clear that none of the aforementioned reasons exists in this case to justify interference by the High Court.” 21. Further as pointed out by the Judge, Small Cause Court that there was no compliance of sub section (4) of Section 20 of Act No. 13 of 1972, I find no illegality in decreeing the suit. 22. Thus I find no illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Nainital. The revision has no merit and deserves to be dismissed. 23. However, the revisionist has prayed for time to vacate the premises in dispute. The revisionist is permitted to continue in possession of the premises in dispute till 30th September 2007, on the following conditions: (a) The revisionist shall furnish undertaking by 31st March 2007. (b) He shall deposit the entire amount due upto date. (c) Regularly pay the rent in the first week of every month. 24. If the revisionist fails to comply the above terms and conditions, the decree holder shall be at liberty to execute the decree immediately. 25. No order as to costs.