JUDGMENT As both these applications, involve common question, they are disposed of by this common judgment. 2] The vehicle bearing registration No. MP-28-A-0949 [Jeep] was belonging to applicant in Criminal Application No.3354 of 2004 and vehicle bearing registration No. MH-31-W- 7791 [pick-up-van] MP 28 A 0949 [Jeep] was belonging to applicant in Criminal Application No.1941 of 2005. They were allegedly transporting the fish collected from Wile Life Area as such same were seized by the Forest Officials. The applicants moved the applications for releasing the said vehicles on their Supratnama before the learned J.M.F.C. Ramtek. He rejected those applications by his orders dated 29.9.2004 and 3.12.2004. The revision applications were preferred against those orders, bearing Criminal Revision No.590/2004, which was decided on 30.10.2004 and Revision 795/2004 which was decided on 15.6.2005, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur. The said revision applications were also dismissed and therefore, the applicants have preferred these applications under section 482 Cr.P.C. to challenge those orders seeking release of the said vehicles on Supratnama till the disposal of the proceedings. 3] Before considering the submissions of the parties, it is necessary to mention that this court vide order dated 21.3.2005 in Criminal Application no.3354/2004 passed order to release the vehicle on supratnama, which reads thus: .Heard both sides. Admit. Interim relief in terms of prayer clause ( c ). The vehicle shall be returned to the applicant on the condition that he furnishes cash deposit of bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.25000/- by way of security. The applicant shall furnish an undertaking to this Court that he shall not sell, transfer or alienate the vehicle or create any third party interest in the said vehicle in any manner. He shall not change the colour or identity of the vehicle in any manner and he shall produce the vehicle as and when required before the court or police agency or forest officials. On the guarantee or cash deposit and the undertaking being supplied, the vehicle shall be returned to the applicant. The undertaking to be supplied to th is court within a period of two weeks.. In Criminal Application no.1941/2005, this court had passed an interim order on 12.12.2005 which reads thus: Rule. On the guarantee or cash deposit and the undertaking being supplied, the vehicle shall be returned to the applicant. The undertaking to be supplied to th is court within a period of two weeks.. In Criminal Application no.1941/2005, this court had passed an interim order on 12.12.2005 which reads thus: Rule. By way of interim order the vehicle of the applicant is directed to be released on Supratnama, on his furnishing bond in the sum of Rs.1 lakh and further filing an undertaking before the trial court that the vehicle would be kept in the same condition as far as possible and that the vehicle would be produced as and when directed by the trial court.. It therefore, seems that in both these cases, the vehicles of the applicants have been released on supratnama on usual terms. 4] Learned counsel for the applicant Shri Nawab in Criminal application no.1941/2005 and Shri P.D. Meghe, in Criminal Application no.3354/2004 have submitted that the orders passed by the trial court as well as the revisional court are incorrect, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in (2002) 10 SC 283 [Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai ..vs.. State of Gujrat], wherein it has been held thus: 7. In our view, the powers under Section 451 Cr.P.C. should be exercised expeditiously and judiciously. It would serve various purposes, namely: 1- owner of the article would not suffer because of its remaining unused or by its mis-appropriation; 2- court or the police would not be required to keep the article in safe custody; 3- if the proper panchnama before handing over possession of the article is prepared, that can be used in evidence instead of its production before the court during the trial. If necessary, evidence could also be recorded describing the nature of the property in detail; and 4- this jurisdiction of the court to record evidence should be exercised promptly so that there may not be further chance of tampering with the articles.. They have also relied on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 2000(1) M.P.L.J. 289 [Madhukar Rao s/o Malik Rao ..vs.. State of M.P. and others], wherein the Full Bench of the M.P. High Court has held in paragraph 16 , 17, 18 as under: .16- Strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the State on clause(d) of sub-section 91) of section 39 of the Act. State of M.P. and others], wherein the Full Bench of the M.P. High Court has held in paragraph 16 , 17, 18 as under: .16- Strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the State on clause(d) of sub-section 91) of section 39 of the Act. It is submitted that vehicle including properties mentioned therein which have been seized on the ground of having been used for committing the offence become the property of the state and therefore, such property including vehicle cannot be released even by the Magistrate. it is submitted that other interpretation would frustrate the object of the Amendment Act whereby the power to grant interim release of the property allegedly used in commission of offence has been taken away. On the plain language used in sub clause (d) of sub section (1) of section 39, we are unable to accept the interpretation placed and submission made on behalf of the state that every property seized merely on accusation or suspicion of commission of an offence under the Act would become property of the State. The language used in sub clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 39 is .Vehicle - - - - - that has been used for committing an offence and has been seized.. In order that the seized property may be treated as property of the State, there should be a finding by the competent court that vehicle seized has been used for committing an offence. The seized vehicle or other property merely on the charge of commission of an offence cannot be declared to be the property of the State Government under said Clause (d) of Section 39(1). The power to seize a vehicle by an Authority or officer under the Act is contained in Section 50(1)(c). The power of seizure can be exercised in respect of a property including a vehicle if it appears to the authority that as offence under the Act has been committed. The seizure of property or vehicle is, effected on accusation or suspicion of commission of an offence. The power of seizure can be exercised in respect of a property including a vehicle if it appears to the authority that as offence under the Act has been committed. The seizure of property or vehicle is, effected on accusation or suspicion of commission of an offence. Under sub section (3-A) introduced by Amendment Act No.44 of 1991, power has expressly been conferred on the specified Forest Authorities to grant interim release of any captive animal or wild animal seized in commission of an offence on a condition of executing a bond by the person concerned that the said animal shall be produced before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. Such a power in respect of certain properties, including vehicle existed in sub section (2) of section 50 prior to its deletion under Amendment At No.44 of 1991. The omission of sub section (2) of section 50 by amendment has necessary consequences of taking away power of the prescribed Authorities under the Act to grant interim release of seized property including vehicle to the person claiming ownership to the same. The omission of sub section (2) of section 50 cannot , however, be construed to hold that the power to grant interim release already available to an established criminal court, meaning the Magistrate under section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has also been taken away. No such intention can be gathered from any of the provisions of the Act quoted above. We on the contrary, find a clear indication in them that the power of the Magistrate as a criminal court empowered to deal and try the offence under the Act is not in any manner affected. Sub section (4) of section 50 requires that any person detained or things seized under sub section (1) of section 50 shall forthwith be taken before a Magistrate to be dealt with according to law. It is not disputed on behalf of the state that by virtue of the provisions contained in sub section (2) of section 4 of the Criminal Procedure code any offence under the Act can be investigated, enquired into and tried under the Code. The Magistrate therefore, as a criminal court under the code is empowered to try the offences and impose penalties and punishments provided by the Act on proving of commission of the offence under the Act. The Magistrate therefore, as a criminal court under the code is empowered to try the offences and impose penalties and punishments provided by the Act on proving of commission of the offence under the Act. 17- If the interpretation, as has been sought to be put on behalf of the State on clause(d) of sub section 91) of section 39 , is accepted, every property mentioned therein including a vehicle seized merely on accusation or suspicion would become property of the State and that would be the result even though in the trial ultimately the Magistrate finds that no offence has been committed and acquits the accused. In our considered opinion, the property seized under section 50 of the Act from an alleged offender cannot become property of the State under clause (d) of section 39(1) unless there is a trial and a finding reached by the competent Court that the property was used for committing an offence under the Act. If the seizure of a property was enough to declare it as the property of the Government, there was no necessity to provide under sub-section (2) of Section 51 that on proof of commission of the offence, the properties 9 including vehicle, vessel, or weapon used in the commission of the offence would be forfeited to the State Government we do not find any dichotomy or conflict in the provisions under section 39(1)(d) and section 51(2) of the Act. Properties including vessel can be seized on accusation of commission of an offence under the Act and if the offender is available and is arrested, on proof of his guilt, the property seized form him and used in commission of the offence is liable to forfeiture to the State under section 51(2) of the Act. Similarly every property seized and is held to have been used for committing an offence by competent court, whether the offender is available or not for punishment would be declared to be the property of the State by virtue of the provisions contained under section 39(1)(d) of the Act. Similarly every property seized and is held to have been used for committing an offence by competent court, whether the offender is available or not for punishment would be declared to be the property of the State by virtue of the provisions contained under section 39(1)(d) of the Act. We find that section 39 contained in Chapter V is sort of a residuary provision to make all properties seized and found to be used in commission of an offence as properties of the Ste Government irrespective of the fact whether they are liable to forfeiture at the conclusion of th trial under sub section 92) and section 51 of the Act. A situation can be envisaged where the offence is proved to have been committed but the owner of the property or the offender himself is not available for prosecution. In that situation by virtue of clause (d) of section 39 of the Act the property would become the property of the State without any requirement of passing an order of forfeiture in a trial by the Criminal Court in accordance with sub section (2) of section 51 of th Act. 18- Examination of the provisions contained in section 54 providing for power to compound offences under the Act also leads to the same conclusion that every property seized irrespective of proof of commission of the offence and finding in that respect by the criminal court, would not become property of the State. Section 54 empower the Authorities to compound the offences and release the seized properties in favour of the person suspected of the commission of the offence. If the argument on behalf of the State is accepted a property seized on accusation would become the property of the State and can never be released even on the compounding of the offence. The provisions of clause (d) of section 39 have to be reasonably and harmoniously construed with other provisions of the Act and the code which together provide a detailed procedure for the trial of the offences. If, as contended on behalf of the State, seizure of property merely on accusation would make the property to be of the Government, it would have the result of depriving an accused of his property without proof of his guilt. On such interpretation clause(d) of section 39(1) of the Act would suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality. If, as contended on behalf of the State, seizure of property merely on accusation would make the property to be of the Government, it would have the result of depriving an accused of his property without proof of his guilt. On such interpretation clause(d) of section 39(1) of the Act would suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality. The interpretation placed by the State would mean that a a specified officer under the Act merely by seizure of property of an accused would deprive him of his property which he might be using for his trade, profession or occupation. This would be serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on his trade, occupation or business. The power thus would be exercised by an Executive Officer and without any proof of commission of an offence. Such arbitrary and uncanalised powers cannot be allowed to any Executive Authority. That would be against basic structure of the constitution. The constitution envisages trial of offences by an independent judiciary. As interpretation which would render clause(d) of section 39(1) to be unconstitutional has to be eschewed and interpretation which makes it constitutional should be preferred. See the following observations of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath ..vs.. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 : It is well settled that if certain provisions of law, construed in one way, would make them consistent with the constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the court would lean in favour of the former construction.. They have also relied on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in 2004 Cri.L.J. 3691 [Mathew ...vs.. The Range Officer, Chedelath Range Officer] wherein in paragraph 4 it has been held thus: .It is not at the time when the vehicle is seized that it becomes the property of the government, but it is when it is found by a competent court that the offence is committed that it becomes the property of the government. So the provision can be understood as one which says that as and when it is found by a court that a person committed the offence under the Act, the vehicle which he used for the commission of the offence will become the property of the Central Government. So the provision can be understood as one which says that as and when it is found by a court that a person committed the offence under the Act, the vehicle which he used for the commission of the offence will become the property of the Central Government. It is not correct to say that the interim custody of the vehicle cannot be given to the owner of the vehicle by virtue of what is said in Section 39(1)(d) of the Wild Life (Protection ) Act. If the petitioner is the owner of the vehicle, interim custody of the vehicle can be given to the petitioner. it is necessary to give interim custody of the vehicle to the owner since the vehicle is kept in Forest Range Office from 9.6.2002. According to the petitioner, the vehicle is being damaged.. Further they have relied on the judgment of the Orissa High Court reported in 2002 Cri.L.J.4151 Baikuntha Bihari Mohapatra ..vs.. State of Orissa], wherein in paragraph 6, it has been observed thus: 6- The language used in Section 39 also makes it clear that only when it is found that a vehicle has been used for committing an offence and has been seized under the provisions of the Act, the same shall be the property of the State Government. At this stage it can only be said that an allegation has been made that the vehicle was used for commission of the offence. So long as a competent court of law does not find that the vehicle had in fact been used for the purpose of commission of the offence, the vehicle does not become the property of the State Government. There is no finding till date by a competent court of law that the vehicle had been used for commission of the vehicle under the Act and the materials existing on record only indicate that an allegation has been made by the prosecution that the vehicle was used for commission of the offence. There is no finding till date by a competent court of law that the vehicle had been used for commission of the vehicle under the Act and the materials existing on record only indicate that an allegation has been made by the prosecution that the vehicle was used for commission of the offence. Though this court has decided in the case of Satyabrata Madjhi ( 2000(1) OLR 230 ) (supra) that after seizure of a vehicle for commission of the offence under the Act, it becomes the property of the State Government, in view of the reasonings given by the Full Court of Jabalpur Bench of Madhya Pradesh high Court, I am of the view that the Full; Bench had laid down the correct proposition of law. I, therefore, do not find any bar for the court to release the property, since it has not been found by a competent Court of law that the vehicle had been used for commission of an offence under the Act.. 5] It is the contention of the learned counsel that as the vehicles were seized, they have to be released immediately and in particular on the supratnama of their owners, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court referred above and the same cannot become the government property unless the trial is held and prosecution succeeds against the accused in securing conviction i.e. ultimately when the vehicles are found to be used in commission of the offences under the Wile Life (Protection) Act. Therefore, according to them, the interim order passed by this court should be continued during the pendency of the trial and the vehicles may not be ordered to be returned to the Forest Department, treating them as the government property. 6] As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent Shri S.R. Deshpande, has relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this court reported in 2001(4) Mh.L.J. 177 [State of Maharashtra ..vs.. 6] As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent Shri S.R. Deshpande, has relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this court reported in 2001(4) Mh.L.J. 177 [State of Maharashtra ..vs.. Gajanan Dajiba Jambhulkar], wherein it has been held in paragraph 10 and 11 thus: 10- Therefore, according to us, when any vehicle is seized on the allegation that it was used for committing the offence under the Wild Life (Protection ) Act, the same should not normally be returned to the party seeking its release till the culmination of the criminal proceedings in respect of the offence if the material so collected prima facie discloses involvement of the vehicle in respect of commission of the offence under the Wild Life (Protection ) Act. If for any exceptional reason the Court feels that the vehicle is not prima facie involved in respect of the commission of the offence under the Wild Life (Protection ) Act, the court should impose stringent conditions while ordering its release so that at the conclusion of the trial, if forfeiture is to be ordered, the vehicle is available in the same condition in which it was seized. Casual approach in ordering the release of the seized vehicles has to be seriously deprecated as such casual approach has resulted in frustrating the very object for which status was enacted. 11- A fervent plea was made before us that as three years have passed since the release of the vehicle and apparently there were no complaints of either misuse of the vehicle or of having breached the condition of the bond this court need not deprive the respondent of the possession of the vehicle. But the other side of the picture has been clearly etched by Mr. Badar by pleading before us that the courts cannot turn a Nelson's eye to the stark realities of having the objects of enacting the statute being frustrated. Passage of time would neither clothe an otherwise illegal order with a cloak of legality nor would it stamp an illegal order with correctness. Upholding such an order, according to us, is impossible in the present circumstances, as not only the learned Magistrate has failed to apply his mind to the provisions of the Wile Life (Protection) Act, but has allowed himself to be misled by the arguments which were not germane for deciding the case. Upholding such an order, according to us, is impossible in the present circumstances, as not only the learned Magistrate has failed to apply his mind to the provisions of the Wile Life (Protection) Act, but has allowed himself to be misled by the arguments which were not germane for deciding the case. This is a case where the petitioner contend that the jeep was especially designed having a certain cavity built in the Jeep to conceal and carry the weapons, which we have referred to above. The concealment of the weapons and the surreptitious manner in which they were carried in the forest would only be for the purpose of hunting wild animals. The material so far placed before us does prima facie indicate that the jeep was involved in the commission of offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act. Therefore, according to us, passage of time would not deter us from quashing the order and ordering the seizure of the vehicle.. 7] According to him, when there is no prima facie case to show non-involvement of the vehicle, in commission of the offence under Wild Life (Protection) Act and as there are no exceptional reasons, said vehicles cannot be released on Supratnama of the applicants, though they are stated to be registered owner of the said vehicles. According to him, therefore, these applications should be rejected & the interim orders passed by this court should be recalled and the vehicles should be returned to the Forest Department. 8] In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to bear in mind that the trial Judge and the revisional Judge have found prima facie that the accused have committed offences under Wild Life (Protection) Act and therefore, the said vehicles become government property. It is held by the courts below that it is prima facie seen and disclosed that these vehicles were carrying fishes which were from the reserved forest area i.e. National Park and the fishes are the wild life under the provisions of Wild Life (Protection) Act and therefore, in view of the provisions of section 39 of the said Act the said vehicles are liable to be seized as it became government property. 9] On perusal of the orders of the learned trial Judge as well as revisional Judge, it seems that they have relied on the above referred judgment of this court in 2001 (4) Mh.L.J. 177 [State of Maharashtra ..vs.. Gajanan Dajiba Jambhulkar]. 10] As regards the binding nature of this Division Bench Judgment , same can not be disputed. Only question would be, what should be the order in the present applications. 11] Needless to say that this court had passed an interim orders stated above to release the said vehicles on the supratnama to the registered owners. It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicants that at the time of passing interim orders, the contentions of the parties were heard and thereafter, the said orders were passed. This contention is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. However, the fact remains that the said orders have been passed long back. On perusal of the judgment of this court referred above, it would be seen that in that case, the case was where the state has alleged that the Jeep was specially designed having a certain cavity built in the jeep to conceal and carry the weapons. The said concealment of the weapons and the surreptitious manner in which they were carried in the forest would only be for the purpose of hunting wild animals and in that case villagers found arms and ammunitions and they also noticed a carcass of a black buck. Therefore, it was a clear case of wild life hunting with deliberate and intentional attempt; rather successful attempt of hunting which was totally prohibited. 12] Here the allegations against the applicant and the accused are that they were caught carrying fishes which were collected from Totladoh; the wild life area. No doubt it is alleged that the said vehicles were containing the fishes collected from wild life area, ex-facie it does not seem that said vehicles were containing fish from the tank in the protected forest area only. In fact these vehicles were caught far away from the forests. Applicants have contended that their jeeps were hired for carrying away fish collected under relevant licences. In fact these vehicles were caught far away from the forests. Applicants have contended that their jeeps were hired for carrying away fish collected under relevant licences. In fact, in Criminal Application No.3354/2004 the certificate issued by Gat Gram Panchayat Bandra, Panchayat Samiti Ramtek, District : Nagpur that Adarsha Zingapalan Bachat Gat Dongartal, Panchayat Samiti, Ramtek, District : Nagpur is near to Bandra Talav No.1 Gat and it has been awarded contract for fishery and is permitted to carry fishes through Z.P. Bandra. And fishes were allowed to be transported by Bhandara Road wherein jeep was found is produced. Therefore, when applicants prima facie show that the fish that was carried by their vehicles were found outside of Wild Life Protection area. Therefore unless those fishes are proved to be of the quality which is available only in Totladoh i.e. protected forest area, mere seizure of the same can not lead to the conclusion of ex-facie guilt of accused . It is matter of trial to find out as to whether those fishes were wild life .animals. and the said vehicles had brought them from the protected forest and the same were seized; while being carried in the said vehicles. 13] To elaborate further, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Wild Life (Protection) Act. Section 2 deals with definitions. Sub-section 2(1) says Animal as .animal. includes mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish, other chordates and invertebrates and also includes their young and eggs; Section 2(5) deals with .captive animal., .captive animal. means any animal, specified in Schedule I,Schedule II, Schedule III or Schedule IV, which is captured or kept or bred in captivity; Section 2(14) says .Government property. means any property referred in section 39 [or section 17 H] Section 2(15) says .habitat. includes land, water or vegetation which is the natural home of any wild animal; Section 2(33) says .vehicle. means any conveyance used for movement on land, water or air and includes buffalo, bull, bullock, camel, donkey, elephant, horse and mule; Section 2(36) says .wild animal. means any animal specified in Schedules I to IV and found wile in nature; Section 2(37) says .wild life. means any conveyance used for movement on land, water or air and includes buffalo, bull, bullock, camel, donkey, elephant, horse and mule; Section 2(36) says .wild animal. means any animal specified in Schedules I to IV and found wile in nature; Section 2(37) says .wild life. includes ay animal, aquatic or land vegetation which forms part of any habitat; Section 39 reads thus: 39 - Wild animals, etc., to be Government property (1) Every - (a) wild animal, other than vermin, which is hunted under section 11 or sub section 91) of section 29 or sub section (6) of section 35 or kept or [bred in captivity or hunted] in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder or found dead, or killed [***] by mistake; and (b) animal article, trophy or uncured trophy or meat derived from any wild animal referred to in clause(a) in respect of which any offence against this Act or any rule or order made thereunder has been committed; (c) ivory imported into India and an article made from such ivory in respect of which any offence against this Act or any rule or order made thereunder has been committed; (d) vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool that has been used for committing an offence and has been seized under the provisions of this Act, shall be the property of the State Government, and, where such animal is hunted in a sanctuary or National Park declared by the Central Government, such animal or any animal article, trophy, uncured trophy, or meat [derived from such animal, or any vehicle , vessel, weapon, trap or tool used in such hunting shall be the property of the Central government. (2) Any person who obtains, by any means, the possession of Government property, shall within forty eight hours from obtaining such possession, make a report as to the obtaining of such possession to the nearest police station or the authorized officer and shall, if so required, hand over such property to the officer in charge of such police station or such authorized officer as the case may be. (3) No person shall, without the previous permission in writing of the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorized officer- (a) acquire or keep in his possession, custody or control, or (b) transfer to any person, whether by way of gift, sale or otherwise, or (c) destroy or damage, such Government property.. 14] No doubt the vehicle carrying the wild animal or animal articles etc. becomes property of the state government but the vehicle has to be used for committing the offence and has been seized under the provisions of the Act. 15] It is necessary to note the provisions of section 50 which are regarding the entry, search, detention etc. and section 51 which are regarding the offences. There is a provision of compounding of the offence also. Under these circumstances, in view of the authorities referred above, particularly the Full Bench Decision of M.P. High Court in 2000(1) M.P.P.L.J. 289 [Madhukarrao s/o Malik Rao ..vs.. State of M.p. and others] to which I respectfully agree; Seized vehicles would become the property of the state government only when after the trial relevant accused are held guilty for the offences charged and vehicles are proved to have been found being used in commission of offence. 16] In view of the Apex Court judgment in Sundarbai's case as the vehicle is likely to be damaged at Police station and there is no use in keeping seized vehicles in the police station or forest office, for long time, it would be necessary to release the same on Supratnama during the pendency of case when ex-facie they do not seem to be involved for any serious forest or wild life offence; particularly when previous commission of such wild life offences are not alleged against accused or owners of the vehicles. 17] In the present case arguable points are raised by the defence. Seized vehicles ex-facie do not seem to be used in such a way as to attract action of not releasing of the vehicle on supratnama as envisaged in the decision of this court in 2001(4) Mh.L.J. 177 . Intention of the accused therein was obviously very damaging to the wild life. Here there is a doubt as to from which tank the fishes were collected i.e. whether they were from licenced tank. This can be determined only after the evidence is recorded and tested by way of cross examination during trial. Intention of the accused therein was obviously very damaging to the wild life. Here there is a doubt as to from which tank the fishes were collected i.e. whether they were from licenced tank. This can be determined only after the evidence is recorded and tested by way of cross examination during trial. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the interim orders passed by this court, need to be not withdrawn. In fact to prevent the damage to the vehicles, as they would not be available for being used by the State Government or forest and they cannot become Government property at this stage, there is no point in keeping the same in the police station or in the forest office. Therefore, these applications will have to be allowed to that extent and the interim orders would be required to be accordingly modified. 18] Thus applications are partly allowed. The interim orders passed by this court be continued till the trials of the applicants and the concerned accused are finally disposed of , but subject to the condition that they shall not transfer or damage the said vehicles in any way during the pendency of the trial and shall produce the same as and when directed by the trial Judge. They shall also furnish security to the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate for their production at the end of the trial, before the court, if necessary. It is made clear that above observations are in prima facie view of the matter and shall not be binding on trial court while deciding the matter on merits. With these observations, the applications stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.