JUDGMENT 1. The appellant was awarded the contract of manufacturing of prestressed sleepers, by the Indian Railways. A unit for manufacture thereof was established in the Gunthakal Railway Yard. On 12.09.1986, the premises where the manufacturing activity, was undertaken were visited by an Inspector, and records from December 1985 to August 1986 were verified. He appears to have recommended to the appellant to get it registered for coverage under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act'). Thereupon, the appellant addressed a letter, dated 23.10.1986, with a request to register its unit and to enable it to pay the contribution. When no action was forthcoming, several reminders were issued. Ultimately, through a letter, dated 21.11.1988, the respondents informed the appellant stating that the unit need not be registered, since it is operating within the premises of Railways. Without stopping there, the appellant made a further representation and the matter was referred to the higher authorities. Even there, the same viewpoint was expressed. 2. The unit of the appellant was once again inspected on 02.11.1990 and the Inspector recommended that the establishment must be brought under coverage, since more than 250 employees were working and the power was being utilized in the manufacturing process. 3. In pursuance thereof, necessary steps were taken for the registration of the unit under the Act and contribution was being paid regularly. In the year 1992, an Inspector, by name Sri S.M.H.Hasmi examined the registers once again and took the view that the appellant is liable to pay the contribution for the period from 15.12.1985 to 31.10.1990 also. Interest was also levied. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed E.I.Case No.26 of 1998 before the Employees Insurance Court-cum-Chairman, Industrial Tribunal- I, Hyderabad (for short 'the Tribunal'). The case was opposed by the respondents. 4. Through its order, dated 05.04.1999, the Tribunal upheld the contention of the respondents and directed that the appellant is liable to pay the contribution with effect from 15.12.1985. Hence, this appeal under Section 82 of the Act. 5. The case was opposed by the respondents. 4. Through its order, dated 05.04.1999, the Tribunal upheld the contention of the respondents and directed that the appellant is liable to pay the contribution with effect from 15.12.1985. Hence, this appeal under Section 82 of the Act. 5. Sri V.Srinivas, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the appellant had undertaken extensive correspondence on the basis of an observation made by the Inspector in the year 1985 to bring the unit under coverage, the respondents themselves in candid and in uncertain terms informed that the unit cannot be registered under the Act on the ground that it is operating in the premises of Railways. He contends that even the superior authorities of the organization have taken the same view and there was absolutely no basis for the demand in question. He further contends that the action of the respondents amounts to reviewing their own decisions which is not permitted under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. 6. Sri B.G.Ravinder Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that basically, it is the obligation of the appellant to comply with the provisions of the Act and instead of undertaking correspondence or waiting for a reply, it ought to have taken necessary steps on the basis of the report submitted by the Inspector on 12.09.1986. 7. It is not in dispute that the appellant had employed nearly hundred persons from the inception and was using power in the manufacturing process. The premises were inspected for the first time on 12.09.1986 and the Inspector concerned recommended that the unit be brought under coverage. Had the appellant remained indifferent even after such intimation, no exception could have been taken for the demand made by the respondents. The record discloses that as early as on 13.08.1986, the appellant addressed a letter (Ex.P-1) with a request to permit it to comply with the provisions of the Act. Unless the respondents accorded permission for registration, there was little, that the appellant could have done on its own accord. When there was no response to Ex.P1, further letters, dated 23.10.1986, 14.08.1987,17.10.1987, 01.11.1987 and 29.10.1988, marked as Exs.P-2 to P-6, were addressed. Unless the respondents accorded permission for registration, there was little, that the appellant could have done on its own accord. When there was no response to Ex.P1, further letters, dated 23.10.1986, 14.08.1987,17.10.1987, 01.11.1987 and 29.10.1988, marked as Exs.P-2 to P-6, were addressed. It was only through Ex.P6, dated 29.10.1988 that the respondents informed the appellant that the factory cannot be brought under the purview of the Act, since it is operating in the Railway premises. That should have put an end to the entire controversy. 8. The appellant addressed another letter, dated 03.12.1988, seeking clarification, obviously, with a view to avoid future complications. The matter was referred to the Deputy Regional Director. The latter, in turn, required the appellant to submit the copies of the contract entered into with the Railways. On a verification of the same, he replied through Ex.P-10, dated 22.09.1989, clearly stating that the appellant was not covered by the provisions of the Act. The matter should have rested there. However, the premises were inspected on 02.11.1990 and on the basis of the observations made during the inspection, the unit was brought under the purview of the Act with effect from 01.11.1990. Without any protest, the appellant complied with the same and the unit was registered. Two years thereafter, another inspector verified the records and took the view that the appellant was liable to pay the contribution from 15.12.1985 to 31.10.1990 also. The same constituted the basis for the present demand. 9. The Tribunal observed that the appellant ought to have made the contribution on its own accord, since there existed a statutory obligation. It lost sight of the fact that it is only on registration of the unit under the Act, that further steps in the form of contribution etcetera have to be taken; and for that purpose, almost a desperate attempt was made by the appellant to get it registered. Through Exs.P-6 and P-10, the respondents have categorically informed the appellant that it is not covered under the Act. These decisions were not revoked by the superior authorities. 10. Almost an employee of the lowest category in the scheme of the things virtually reopened the matter in the year 1992. The effect of the letter addressed by him is to set aside the view taken by the Deputy Regional Director. Such a course is totally impermissible. These decisions were not revoked by the superior authorities. 10. Almost an employee of the lowest category in the scheme of the things virtually reopened the matter in the year 1992. The effect of the letter addressed by him is to set aside the view taken by the Deputy Regional Director. Such a course is totally impermissible. The Tribunal held that the plea of estoppel cannot be invoked in the matters of this nature. On a close analysis, there does not exist any occasion to invoke that principle. What emerges from the record is that a conscious and well-informed decision taken by the respondents as regards the coverage of the unit and the same could not have been unsettled by an employee of inferior category. The whole episode discloses that the decisions rendered by the superior authorities in the organization were virtually set aside, if not reviewed by an Inspector. Even the Deputy Regional Director could not have reviewed his own decision. Viewed from any angle, the demand made against the appellant cannot be sustained in law. 11. It is stated that after the dismissal of the C.M.A. for default, the respondents have recovered the amount in question. 12. Hence, the C.M.A. is allowed and the respondents are directed to refund the amount recovered from the appellant towards the demand in question, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.