ORDER This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash the proceedings against the petitioner in STC No.56 of 2006 on the file of the First Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Kadapa. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. Records are perused. 3. The second respondent herein filed a complaint before the learned Magistrate under Section 200 Cr.P.C. accusing the petitioner of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'the Act'). According to the complainant, the accused joined in their company as Plant Manager in 1977 and was promoted as General Manager in 1982 and that the accused obtained complete control and grip over the company, which includes monitoring day to day transactions since 1985 and he started mis-utilizing his authority as General Manager and started playing double game adversely affecting the finances of the company, as a result of which, the company incurred heavy loss of Rs.25,00,000/- in 2003-2004 and Rs.33,00,000/- in 2004-2005 and the complainant's company questioned the accused about his fraudulent practices, misuse of technology, theft of machinery, exploitation of good will of the company to promote accused company and there was a mediation in the presence of Rachapogula Gopal and others and having no other way, the accused admitted the loss caused to the company due to his illegal and fraudulent practices and volunteered to compensate the loss and accordingly, gave a cheque for Rs.1,00,00,000/- on 08.08.2005 drawn on State Bank of India, Yerramukkapalli to make good the loss sustained by the company on account of his mis-deeds and when the said cheque was presented on 6.10.2005 in the same Bank, the same was dishonoured due to insufficient funds and the accused pleaded for 15 days time and accordingly, the complainant waited and again presented the said cheque on 24.10.2005, but again it was dishonoured due to insufficient funds and the complainant gave a notice on 29.10.2005 demanding payment of the amount and the accused received the notice on 2.11.2005 but did not give any reply and thereafter, the complaint was filed. 4. Learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and issued process against the accused in STC No.56 of 2006. Aggrieved by the same, the accused filed the present petition seeking to quash the proceedings against him. 5. 4. Learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and issued process against the accused in STC No.56 of 2006. Aggrieved by the same, the accused filed the present petition seeking to quash the proceedings against him. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no subsisting legal liability by the petitioner to the company and therefore the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are not attracted. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent on the other hand contended that the cheque was given in acknowledgment of the liability for the loss caused to the company on account of the mis-deeds by the accused and hence, there was legally enforceable liability against the accused. 6. The question as to whether or not the company sustained loss on account of the alleged misdeeds of the petitioner-accused does not arise for consideration at this stage. Admittedly, the cheque was issued by the accused. According to him, the statement of the account of the company would show that the company was running on profits during his tenure as General Manager till 2002-2003, but subsequently, there was a glut in the market for the products manufactured by the company and also due to escalation of the cost of the raw materials, there has been loss, for which, he cannot be held responsible. He further alleges that the Chairman and Managing Director of the company with the connivance of other staff have fabricated and forged the cheque by making use of the un-used old cheque left by the accused in almirah. He would further allege that he filed a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Narsapur in that regard alleging the offences under Sections 483, 465, 506 and 420 IPC and the same is pending investigation by the police. 7. The factual aspects raised by the petitioner-accused are the matters to be considered at the time of trial after the evidence is let in. The presumption under Section 139 of the Act prima-facie operates in favour of the complainant to the effect that unless contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the Act prima-facie operates in favour of the complainant to the effect that unless contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. No doubt, the presumption is rebuttable by adducing evidence to prove the contrary and the occasion for proving the same would be available to the petitioner only at the time of trial. 8. In 'K.Bhaskasran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & another the Apex Court held as follows: 'As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins on the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption'. 9. In 'Maruti Udyog Ltd. Vs. Narender & others, the Apex Court held as follows: "In view of the express provision of section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in section 138, for the discharge of any debit or other liability unless the contrary is proved. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in entertaining and accepting the plea of the accused- respondent at the initial stage of the proceedings and quashing the complaints filed by the appellant. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and direct the trial court to proceed with the complaints in accordance with law". 10. In M/s M.M.T.C. Ltd and another Vs. M/s Medchl chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. & another the Apex Court held as follows: "Inherent power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very stringently and with circumspection. Court exercising inherent powers is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. Court exercising inherent powers is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. At this stage the Court could not have gone into merits and/or come to a conclusion that there was no existing debt or liability and quash complaint. It is not necessary to allege specifically in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability an and enforceable debt and to discharge the same, the cheques were issued. There is therefore no requirement that the complaint must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondent. This they have to discharge in the trial. At this state, merely on basis of averments in the Petitions filed by them the High Court could not have concluded that there was no existing debt or liability." 11. In Hiten P. Dalal vs. Bratindranath Banerjee the Apex Court held as follows: "Section 139 provides that "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the complainant towards the discharge of any liability. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court " shall presume" the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. It introduced an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused. Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the Court "may presume" a certain state of affairs." 12. It introduced an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused. Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the Court "may presume" a certain state of affairs." 12. In the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions and in view of the fact that the question as to whether or not the subject cheque was issued by the accused in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability and whether or not the cheque came into existence under the circumstances alleged by the accused are all the matters that can be decided only after the evidence is adduced by both parties at the time of trial in discharge of the onus respectively lying on them, it is considered not a fit case to quash the proceedings in pursuance of the complaint by invoking the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is an established proposition that inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked sparingly and with care, caution and circumspection. In the present case, there are absolutely no valid or justifiable grounds to quash the proceedings. 13. In the result, the criminal petition is dismissed.