Honble ASOPA, J.–By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the impugned order dated 3.1.1989 whereby he was dismissed from service in a departmental enquiry and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 5.4.1989 as well as order dated 4.7.1991 passed in review petition and further challenged inaction on the part of the Director General of Police of not setting aside the dismissal order and reinstate him on account of acquittal order dated 4.9.1995 passed in criminal case lodged against him. (2). Briefly stated that relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner was enrolled as Constable on 13.3.1970 and was posted in Police Line. On 30.3.1987, two Constables Ram Singh and Laxmi Chand posted at out post Kanwara under Police Station Jhalarapatan while going out for service of summons, spotted two Kanjars with guns on the way. Both Antariya Kanjar and Ramchandariya Kanjar were taken into custody at Police Station Jhalarapatan. On the same date, a FIR No. 30/87 for the offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act was registered against Antariya Kanjar. During the investigation, it was revealed that the license of 12 Bore Gun No. 14949 alleged to be recovered from Antariya Kanjar, which was issued in the name of the petitioner. In enquiry on being suspected that the original number of gun has been tempered by the petitioner in his gun and number 194949 has been superimposed whereas the original gun was sold to Antariya Kanjar. Hence, a FIR No. 55/87 was registered against the petitioner for the offence under Section 3/25, 29 and 8/3 of the Arms Act and the gun of the petitioner was seized. The petitioner was arrested also. A separate case was registered against Antariya Kanjar. (3). That after registration of the aforesaid to FIRs, a charge sheet was issued in the departmental enquiry against the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police on 6.11.1987. The investigation in the criminal case as well as enquiry proceeded simultaneously. Although protest was lodged for not to proceed with the departmental enquiry till the criminal case is finalized. Antariya Kanjar was acquitted on 1.4.1991 and the petitioner was acquitted on 4.9.1995. The judgments of acquittal of Antariya Kanjar dated 1.4.1991 (annexure-3) 8.3.1991, Ramchandariya Kanjar dated 8.3.1991 (annexure-2) and petitioner dated 4.9.1995 (annexure-1) are on record. Although protest was lodged for not to proceed with the departmental enquiry till the criminal case is finalized. Antariya Kanjar was acquitted on 1.4.1991 and the petitioner was acquitted on 4.9.1995. The judgments of acquittal of Antariya Kanjar dated 1.4.1991 (annexure-3) 8.3.1991, Ramchandariya Kanjar dated 8.3.1991 (annexure-2) and petitioner dated 4.9.1995 (annexure-1) are on record. After 4.9.195, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Director General of Police that he was acquitted of the charge by the Criminal Court after regular trial, therefore, he may be reinstated. Along with the said representation, copy of the dismissal order as well as judgment of acquittal were also enclosed. When nothing was heard in the matter, the present writ petition was filed. (4). In ground (g) of para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner has raised the ground that once the petitioner has been acquitted after full-fledged criminal trial in respect of the same charge, the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority in departmental enquiry cannot sustain. (5). The State Government filed reply to the writ petition raising two preliminary objections i.e. delay of six years and not approaching this Court with clean hands. On merit, the respondents have submitted that the petitioner was dismissed after regular departmental enquiry as per Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeals) Rules, 1958, which has been examined by the Appellate Authority as well as Reviewing Authority and there is no violation of the Rules and principles of natural justice. The respondents in reply to ground (g) of para 7 of writ petition have submitted that the charges leveled against the petitioner were fully proved in departmental enquiry, therefore, the punishment order has been rightly passed and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, the respondents do not dispute the fact of acquittal of the petitioner and Antariya Kanjar in the criminal trial. (6). Submission of counsel for the petitioner is that once after full-fledge criminal trial, the petitioner has been acquitted of the criminal charge, the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in the departmental enquiry cannot sustain. However, the respondents do not dispute the fact of acquittal of the petitioner and Antariya Kanjar in the criminal trial. (6). Submission of counsel for the petitioner is that once after full-fledge criminal trial, the petitioner has been acquitted of the criminal charge, the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in the departmental enquiry cannot sustain. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that departmental enquiry was completed despite objection while the criminal case was pending and further without giving opportunity of hearing and copy of enquiry report or notice under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner was dismissed in departmental enquiry vide order dated 3.1.1989, therefore, the impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice and Article 311 of the Constitution of India. (7). Submission of counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case by giving benefit of doubt. The said judgment in the criminal trial will not carry same weight as would be carried by the judgment wherein the petitioner is honourably acquitted. Apart from above, there is no provision of review after the judgment by the Criminal Court in case where the departmental enquiry has already been concluded and punishment has been awarded. The respondents have also contended that proof of departmental enquiry and criminal case is different. (8). I have gone through the record of the writ petition and further considered rival submissions of the parties. (9). Before proceeding further, it would be worthwhile to consider the nature of charge leveled in the departmental enquiry and in the criminal case in order to fine out whether they are substantially same and further based on same set of circumstances and evidence. (10). The charge in departmental enquiry and charge in the criminal case against the petitioner and charge in criminal case of Antariya Kanjar are as follows:- Charge in D.E. Charge in criminal case Charge in criminal case against Antariya 1- vki iqfyl foHkkx esa dkfu 375 ds in ij iq.yk. ÖkkykokM rSukr gS vkids ikl ,d flaxy oSjy 12 cksj oh.,y. xu ua. 14949 esd Hkkrj Leky vkelZ ykblsUl uEcj 1028 ds vUrxZr jgh tks [oktw [kka iq=k ;klhu [kka fuoklh vkoj Fkkuk ixkfj;k ds i{k esa tkjh gksuk fjdkMZ ls ik;k x;kA 1- D;k vfHk;qDr [oktw iq=k ;klhu ds dCts ls fn. ÖkkykokM rSukr gS vkids ikl ,d flaxy oSjy 12 cksj oh.,y. xu ua. 14949 esd Hkkrj Leky vkelZ ykblsUl uEcj 1028 ds vUrxZr jgh tks [oktw [kka iq=k ;klhu [kka fuoklh vkoj Fkkuk ixkfj;k ds i{k esa tkjh gksuk fjdkMZ ls ik;k x;kA 1- D;k vfHk;qDr [oktw iq=k ;klhu ds dCts ls fn. 26-5-87 ;k blds igys ,d 12 cksj cUnwd ftldk mlds ikl oS| ykblsUl Fkk vius dCts esa j[khA 2- vkius vius uke tkjh kqnk oh-,y-xu ua 14949 dks vUrfj;k datj fuoklh ukjk;.kiqjk dks csp nh ftldk eqdnek ua 30@87 /kkjk 3@25 vkelZ ,sDV fo:) vUrfj;k datj Fkkuk ikVu ntZ gqvk gSA 2- vfHk;qDr [oktw us 26-5-82 ;k mlds iwoZ tkucwÖkdj viuh ykblsalh cUnwd 12 cksj dks vUrfj;k datj dks csp nh ftls cspus dk mls dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha Fkk vFkkZr D;k vfHk;qDr us /kkjk 24 vk;q/k vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr n.Muh; vijk/k fd;kA vfHk;qDr vUrfj;k ds fo:) U;k;ky; }kjk Hkkjrh; vk;q/k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3 lifBr /kkjk 25 ds v/khu vijk/k ds fy, fopkj.k fd;k x;kA (from the judgment dated 1.4.1991 in criminal case No. 224/87 arising out of FIR No. 30/1987) 3- vkius ,d flaxy osly 12 cksj oh-,y- xu ua 14449 dh ctk; ,d voS/k cUnwd 53401 izkIr dh vkSj ml ij ua- 14949 [kqnok fy, vkSj mldks vius ikl j[kh ftlds dkj.k vkidks fxjrkj fd;k x;k vkSj vkids fo:) eqdnek uEcj 55@87 /kkjk la- 3@25, vkelZ ,DV Fkkuk ÖkkyjkikVu esa ntZ gksdj pktZkhV ua- 67 fnukad 22-9-87 dh drk dh tkdj pkyku ua 19-10-87 dks isk vnkyr fd;kA 3- D;k vfHk;qDr [oktq us 26-7-87 ;k mlls iwoZ vius dCts esa ,d 12 cksj cUnwd ds uEcj feVk dj ml ij Lo;a ds uEcj 14949 Mkydj QthZ cUnwd vius dCts esa j[kh vFkkZr D;k vfHk;qDr us /kkjk 8¼3½ vk;q/k vf/kfu;e ds rgr n.Muh; vijk/k fd;kA (11). The list of witnesses are as under:- In departmental enquiry In criminal case PW1- HC Ramchander As AW 7 PW2 - HC Munna Lal As AW 3 PW3 - C/- Ramsingh 270 As AW1 PW4- C/-Laxmichand-83 As PW2 PW5- Roop Singh As PW 10 PW6 - Dhan Singh As PW 9 PW9 - Umaid Singh SHO As PW 8 PW10 - Naina Lal As PW 4 PW11 - HC Ramchander (W 7) (In re-examination) In departmental enquiry, Prem Behari and Bhanwar Singh, Inspector were not produced and in criminal case Shiv Charan Singh and Devkaran Gujar were not produced. Thus, the list of witnesses is substantially same. (12). The operative portion of the judgments in cases of Antariya Kanjar (Annexure-3) and petitioner (Annexure-1) are as follows:- Operative portion of judgment dated 1.4.1991 in case of Antariya Kanjar ^^bl izdkj vfHk;kstu dh lk{; ls vfHk;qDr ds fo:) yxk;k x;k vkjksi lkfcr ugha gSA vknsk ifj.kkeLo:i vfHk;qDr vUrfj;k dks Hkkjrh; vk;q) vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3 lifBr /kkjk 25 ds v/khu vijk/k ds vkjksi ls nks"keqDr fd;k tkrk gSA ckn xqtjus fe;kn vihy ,oa vihy ugha gksus ij tIr dh x;h cUnwd ftyk/khk ÖkkykokM+ ds ikl fu;ekuqlkj tek djok;h tkosA** Operative portion of judgment dated 4.9.1995 in case of petitioner ^^vr% vfHk;qDr [oktw dks mDr vkjksi esa lansg dk ykHk fn;k tkdj nks"keqDr ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA vknsk fnukad 30-8-95 vfHk;qDr [oktw iq= ;klhu tkfr eqlyeku fuoklh ÖkkokokM dks /kkjk 3 lifBr /kkjk 25 /kkjk 29 o /kkjk 8¼3½ vk;q/k vf/kfu;e ds vkjksi esa lansg dk ykHk fn;k tkdj nks"k eqDr ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS rFkk vfHk;qDr ds cjken kqnk canwd ckn xqtkjus fe;kn vihy ;k vihy ugha gksus dh lwjr esa ftyk eftLVªsV] ÖkkykokM ds ;gka ij tek djkbZ tk,A (13). A bare perusal of the charge leveled against the petitioner in departmental enquiry and in criminal case would reveal that both the substantially same. List of witnesses is also substantially same. Antariya from whose possession gun said to has been recovered alleged to have been sold by the petitioner has been acquitted as the prosecution failed to prove the charge and further the said acquittal dated 1.4.1991 is also relevant for charge No. 2 whereas the petitioner has been acquitted on 4.9.1995 by giving benefit of doubt. (14). The Honble Supreme Court in a case Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 679 has held that when the proceedings are based on same set of facts, which were sought to be proved by same witnesses and the Court had already acquitted the appellant by rejecting the prosecution story then findings recorded against the appellant in exparte departmental enquiry cannot sustain. The Court has further held that in such circumstances, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in exparte departmental enquiry to stand. The Court has further held that in such circumstances, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in exparte departmental enquiry to stand. The Supreme Court has also held that different approach and burden of proof in departmental proceeding and criminal case will not be applicable to such type of cases. The relevant para 34 & 35 of the said judgment are as follows:- ``34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, `the raid conducted at the appellants residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the the `raid and recovery at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex-parte departmental proceedings, to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case. (15). Based on the aforesaid judgment, this Court set aside the dismissal order in a case Mangal Chand Sain vs. State of Rajasthan - 2001 (5) WLC (Raj.) 219. (15). Based on the aforesaid judgment, this Court set aside the dismissal order in a case Mangal Chand Sain vs. State of Rajasthan - 2001 (5) WLC (Raj.) 219. The Uttaranchal High Court set aside the order of removal in a case Raghuvar Dutt Palaria vs. General Technical Manager, H.M.T. Ltd. Nainital & Ors.- 2005 (8) SLR 465. (16). As regards the issue of acquitting the petitioner by giving benefit of doubt and honourable acquittal, the Supreme Court recently again has considered the said aspect of the matter in a case G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.- (2006) 5 SCC 446 and has held that where prosecution failed to prove the charge then it will amounts to honourable acquittal. In para 24 & 25 of the said judgment, the Court has also considered two basic judgments on the issue of honourable acquittal in cases of Corp. of the City of Nagpur & Anr. vs. Ram Chandra & Ors. - (1981) 2 SCC 714 and Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh- (2004) 8 SCC 200 and has observed that term honourable acquittal will be used when the prosecution failed to prove the charges or the prosecution did not produce sufficient material to establish its charge. Further in case of Corp. City of Nagpur, the term acquitted honourably has been taken with complete exoneration of the charges. Thus, the acquittal can be considered on the following three charges. The relevant para 24, 25 & 31 of the judgment of G.M. Tank (supra) are as follows:- ``24. In the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur & Anr. vs. Ramchandra G. Modak & Ors. (supra), the same question arose before this Court. This Court, in paragraph 6, held as under: ``6. The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction (discretion) in any way fettered. 25. The rulings cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent are: In the case of Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh & Anr., (supra), it was argued before this Court on behalf of the respondent Sangh that the Labour Court ought not to have brushed aside the finding of the criminal Court which according to the learned single Judge ``honourably acquitted the accused workmen of the offence before it. The learned Judges were taken through the judgment of the Criminal Court. The Bench was of the opinion that the acquittal by the Criminal Court was `honourable as it was based on the fact that the prosecution did not produce sufficient material to establish its charge which was clear from the following observations found in the judgment of the criminal Court: ``Absolutely in the evidence on record of the prosecution witnesses I have found nothiong against the accused persons. The prosecution totally fails to prove the charges under Sections 147, 353, 329 IPC. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthonys case (supra) will apply. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthonys case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. (17). It is well settled that in the criminal case, conviction can only be made when the charges/charge are/is proved beyond reasonable doubt, if not proved beyond reasonable doubt then the result is acquittal. There is yet another earlier stage where accused is discharged normally at the time of considering the case for framing of the charge. Thus, there are only two terms which have been used in the Criminal Procedure Code i.e. ``Discharge or ``Acquittal. For exonerating the accused from accusation, there is no term of honourable acquittal or fully exonerated as considered by various High Courts, which have been considered by Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in a case Shashi Kumar vs. Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam - 2005(1) SLR 659. The relevant portion of para 7 & 8 of the said judgment are as follows:- ``7. In any event, the terms ``honourable acquittal or ``fully exonerated are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Mad. 325. Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the division Bench observed as under:- ``There is no conception like ``honourable acquittal in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is one the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply. 8.... Where a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are ``discharged or `acquitted. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parmanand Society vs. The State of Gujarat and Anr., 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows: ....in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows: ....in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge leveled against him and he may meet the charge- (a) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version and the prosecution version is not correct. In any one these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Court is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since he is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamanner, C.J. in Jayarams case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325...... (18). The Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Shashi Kumar vs. Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam - 2005 (1) SLR 659 (supra) has not considered two judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of Corp. of the City of Nagpur & anr. vs. Ram Chandra & Ors. - (1981) 2 SCC 714 (supra) and Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh- (2004) 8 SCC 200 (supra) on the issue of honourable acquittal and further in case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. of the City of Nagpur & anr. vs. Ram Chandra & Ors. - (1981) 2 SCC 714 (supra) and Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh- (2004) 8 SCC 200 (supra) on the issue of honourable acquittal and further in case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 446 (supra) before the Supreme Court while considering the aforesaid two judgments of Supreme Court, the judgments of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, High Court of Gujarat and Madras High Court on the issue of term honourable acquittal or fully exonerated were not brought to the notice of the Court. The judgments of the aforesaid other High Courts are having only a persuasive value, whereas the judgments of the Supreme Court are having binding effect in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, therefore, I have to consider the question of honourable acquittal raised by the respondents as per aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court. (19). Since the Supreme Court in the aforesaid three judgments i.e. Corp. of the Nagpur City (supra), Krishnakali Tea Estate (supra) & G.M. Tank (supra) used the term honourable acquittal in the sense: (a) where accused is completely exonerated of the charge; (b) prosecution did not produce sufficient material to establish its charge; and (c) prosecution failed to prove the charge, I have to examine whether the present case is of any of the aforesaid nature. In my view, the charge No. 2 of unauthorise sale of gun to Antariya Kanjar, as a result of which FIR No. 30/87 was registered against Antariya Kanjar at Police Station Jhalara Patan finds mention in the said charge No. 2 which is the main charge in the departmental enquiry, charge in case of the criminal case against the petitioner and charge in criminal case of Antariya Kanjar are same based on the same set of circumstantial evidence and when the same is not proved in criminal case of Antariya Kanjar as prosecution has failed to prove the charge which is honourable acquittal as indicated in category No. (c), then the entire charge No. 2 in departmental enquiry cannot sustain. (20). The dismissal order has been passed considering the cumulative effect of proving of all the three charges in departmental enquiry. (20). The dismissal order has been passed considering the cumulative effect of proving of all the three charges in departmental enquiry. As indicated above, charge No. 2 could not be sustained then the punishment becomes disproportionate to the gravity of other two charges. However, in case of acquittal by giving benefit of doubt and the mention of criminal case has been made in the charge-sheet like in the present case, in charge No. 3 number of criminal case No. 30/87 has been mentioned then also the same is a mitigating circumstance to reconsider/consider the punishment for awarding lesser punishment, as the case may be. (21). In view of above, the writ petition is partly allowed. The finding on the issue of charge No. 2 is set aside and consequently, the impugned dismissal order is also set aside and the petitioner is reinstated in service. The matter is remanded back to the disciplinary authority to pass an appropriate order of punishment less than the dismissal and removal and one of which may be compulsory retirement with proportionate pension along with order on the issue of salary of intervening period from the date of dismissal till today, within six months.