RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J: The appellants, defendants in O.S. No.37 of 1982 on the file of the Prl. Subordinate Judge, Chittoor, have preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree in AS No.1995 of 1988 dated 28.4.2000. The parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. 2. The widow of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu and the widow, son and daughter of Sri G. Nan dagopa I Naidu, (son of Sri Govindarajulu Naidu), filed the suit in OS No.37 of 1982 for declaration of title and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It is there case that in the year 1974 there was thatched houses in the suit schedule property in the occupation of tenants, that with a view to get them evicted Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had transferred the property in the name of the defendant who was his close confidante, was assisting him in household work and running errands for him, that the defendant was working as a peon in Co-operative Town Bank Limited, Chittoor, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had executed a sham and nominal sale deed in favour of the defendant on 12.12.1974 without any intention to convey title, that the defendant did not have the capacity to purchase the suit schedule property which as worth Rs. one 1akh, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was then in good health and had no need to sell the suit schedule property to the defendant, that the amount mentioned in the sale deed as consideration was a paltry figure of Rs. one 1akh, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was then in good health and had no need to sell the suit schedule property to the defendant, that the amount mentioned in the sale deed as consideration was a paltry figure of Rs. 1 0,000/-, that the water tank and the urinals in a portion of the suit property was part and parcel of Sri Gurunatha Talkies which belonged to the plaintiffs, that even after executiop of the sale deed Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu continued to be in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property colleting rents from the tenants, that the original sale deed executed in favour of the defendant was also with Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu for sometime, that the sale deed was filed into Court in the eviction proceedings instituted in the name of the defendant against the tenants in occupation of various huts, that the plaintiff paid municipal and other taxes in the name of the defendant, that G. Nandagopal Naidu died in 1975 and thereafter Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu also passed away in the year 1976. 3. According to the plaintiffs the defendant became avaricious and, taking advantage of the sale deed dated 12.12.1974, had issued a legal notice on 27.6.1981 claiming title to the suit scheduled property to which a reply notice was sent on 10.7.2001, that the property belonged to the joint family in which Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was entitled to half a share until the date of his death in 1975, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was entitled only for a half share in the suit property as on 12.12.1974 when the sham and nominal deed of sale was executed in favour of the defendant, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu could not convey anything more than his undivided half share in the suit property and, after the death of Sri G. NandagopaI Naidu, the plaintiffs were entitled for half the share unaffected by execution of the nominal sale deed in favour of the defendant. 4. The defendant, while admitting his relationship with Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, denied that the plaint schedule property was a joint family property. According to him the property was the exclusive property of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu who sold the property along with the thatched houses to him for pressing legal necessities and for valid consideration of Rs.10,000/- under a registered sale deed dated 12.12.1974. According to him the property was the exclusive property of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu who sold the property along with the thatched houses to him for pressing legal necessities and for valid consideration of Rs.10,000/- under a registered sale deed dated 12.12.1974. The defendant would deny that the sale deed is a sham, that the property was worth about a lakh in the year 1974 or that he had no capacity to purchase the property. According to him the proper price for the property, a vacant site in a by-lane besides rocks, was not more than Rs.10,000/-, and that he had the capacity to purchase the property. While admitting to have worked in the Co-operative Town Bank, Chittoor from 1940 to 1965, the defendant would submit that he had applied for leave on loss of pay from 1966 to 1972, that he had retired from service in 1972, that in 1966 he began to take coconut topes on lease from which he was deriving annual income of Rs.5,000/-, that he was running a firewood depot, cultivating 17 acres of land, (3 acres belonging to himself and 14 acres belonging .to late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu), and that he had ample funds to purchase the suit schedule property. He would submit that he had also purchased another vacant site in Doraiswamy Ayyangar Road near Prameela Talkies, Chittoor in 1966 for Rs.7,995/- which he later sold to one Jagannatha Reddy for Rs.30,000/- on 14.7.1975, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was hard pressed for ready cash, that Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was not mentally sound and was in need of an attendant, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had to spend huge amounts for his treatment and to meet the pressing joint family needs, and due to infirmities of his only son, had to sell several properties including the plaint schedule property for pressing legal necessity and for proper consideration. While admitting that there was a water tank and urinal appurtenant to Sri Gurunatha Talkies in a small portion of 36 feet east to west and 12 feet north to south in the extreme north-west of the suit property, the defendant would submit that he was in actual possession and enjoyment of the remaining suit schedule property, that he was col1ecting rents from the tenants, that he had evicted the occupants of the huts and had level1ed the land, that the sale deed was in his possession ever since the date of its execution, that he was paying taxes, that he had mortgaged the suit schedule property with Chittoor Co-operative Town Bank for Rs.4,000/- on 24.12.1976, had cleared the loan on 22.12.1979 and that he had again mortgaged the property with Chittoor Co-operative Bank on 16.2.1981. According to the defendant Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had promised to deliver possession after demolishing the urinal and the water tank, and after the death of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu the plaintiffs got possession of Gurunatha Talkies in 1980. While contending that the property was the exclusive property of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu the defendant would state that, even if it is held to be joint family property the sale deed was executed by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu as the manager to meet the needs of and for maintenance of the joint family. 5. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Chittoor District framed the following Issues : 1. Whether the plaint schedule property was the joint family property of late G. Govindarajulu Naidu and his son Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu as alleged by the plaintiffs ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit property or any portion of the same ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property ? 4. Whether the sale deed in the defendant's favour was executed by late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu for meeting joint family necessities or whether it was only a sham and nominal document ? 6. PWs.l to 3 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and Exs.A.l to A.4 were marked. D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined on behalf of the defendant and Exs.B.1 to B.17 marked. 7. On issue No.1, the Principal Subordinate Judge held that the plaint schedule property was the joint family property of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu who was the original owner. PWs.l to 3 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and Exs.A.l to A.4 were marked. D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined on behalf of the defendant and Exs.B.1 to B.17 marked. 7. On issue No.1, the Principal Subordinate Judge held that the plaint schedule property was the joint family property of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu who was the original owner. On issues 2 to 4 the Subordinate Judge held that none of the plaintiffs had chosen to depose about the nominal or benami nature of the sale transaction of Ex.A1, that instead they had examined P.W.1 who was the attestor of the document and that PW s.2 and 3 had also no knowledge about the sale deed as they were also not present at the time of its execution. The trial Court held that an adverse inference had to be drawn, particularly since the second plaintiff was attending to the management of the theatre and there was no reason why the plaintiffs were not examined through the Court Commissioner even if they were not able to attend the Court. The Trial Court further held that the evidence of PW.l revealed his ignorance on several important aspects including the transaction of the suit site and that his admission indicated that, if the defendant had not given notice asking for delivery of possession of the urinals area and the water tank in the year 1982, the plaintiffs would not have filed the suit questioning his rights or entitlement to the suit schedule property. The trial Court held that the very fact that a notice was given after the plaintiffs had taken over the theatre revealed the conduct of a person who had purchased the property for valuable consideration. The trial Court held that while Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu may have been a rich man having several properties he was not earning much income to meet his considerable expenditure due to his ill-health and the ill-health of his son, that he had to incur debts and had to sell away some properties and, since Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had sold several sites to several persons, there was nothing strange in his selling the suit site to the defendant. The trial Court further held that the evidence disclosed that the defendant was not a pauper and was capable of advancing the sale consideration. The trial Court further held that the evidence disclosed that the defendant was not a pauper and was capable of advancing the sale consideration. On both aspects of late Govindarajulu Naidu not being in need of money for selling the suit site and the defendant being in a position to advance the sale consideration, the trial Court held against the plaintiffs. It also held that the original sale deed was not marked by the plaintiff but was marked by the defendant as EX.B 1 which showed that the sale deed was available only with him, that Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu had predeceased his father and that the father, as the manager, could alienate any property of the joint family for family needs and such alienation was binding on other family members. The trial Court held that the recitals in the suit sale deed clearly showed that, for family necessities and to pay municipal taxes and cists, the suit site was sold and that the Benami Transactions Ordinance, 1988 barred any claim or action, to enforce any right in respect of any property, against persons in whose name the property was held. Issues 2 to 4 were held against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendant and OS No.37 of 1982 was dismissed with costs. 8. In appeal, the learned Single Judge held that the evidence on record disclosed that the defendant was looking after the affairs of the plaintiffs family, that D.W.3 in his evidence had categorically stated that he had not seen Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu and that the entire sale transaction was negotiated on behalf of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu by the defendant who was looking after his affairs, that this clearly established that the defendant was not a stranger and that he was a confidant . of and was employed as a peon in the plaintiff's family. The learned Single Judge held that the defendant had not chosen to examine either the scribe or the attestor to prove the document and passing of sale consideration, that no details were forthcoming as to how the sale consideration was paid in a lumpsum and that nobody was examined to establish that the sale consideration had passed from the defendant to Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu. The learned Single Judge noted that P.W.3 had deposed that the market value of the property was about Rs.75,000/- to Rs.80,000/- even in 1974 and had also stated about the circumstances in which EX.A-2 had come into existence, that after the death of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu a mediation was held in respect of EX.A.2 sale deed in which PW s.1 and 3 were present and, when asked about the sale deed, the defendant had admitted that late Govindarajulu Naidu had executed a nominal sale deed in his favour and that he would execute a re-conveyance deed. The learned Single Judge held that the Benami Transactions (prohibition) Act, 1988 had no application to the facts of the case as there was a distinction between a nominal transaction and a benami transaction, that while in the former the title vested with the vendor, and there was no sale consideration between the vendor and the vendee, in the case of a benami transaction the title vested with the purchaser. The learned Single Judge relied on R. Rajagopala Reddy v. P. Chandrasekharam, AIR 1996 SC 238 , to hold that the Act was prospective in its application, that only cases which took place after Section 3(1) came into operation were covered and that the trial Court was in error in relying on the Act in deciding the suit. The learned Single Judge held that since the trial Court had held that the family was joint it ought to have considered that, even on the date of sale consideration, though Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was a major he was not a party to the sale transaction, that any bona fide purchaser would insist on a major son being made a party to the sale deed and, if he was mentally unsound, there would have been a clear recital in the sale deed stating that the document was being executed for his benefit and that EX.A.2 was silent on this aspect. The learned Single Judge relied on Balmukand v. Kamalawati, AIR 1964 SC 1385 , to hold that, what constitutes benefit for the family depends upon the facts of each case, that in a case where a manager agrees to sell the property of the joint family all adult members must be consulted and they must be parties to the transaction. The learned Single Judge relied on Balmukand v. Kamalawati, AIR 1964 SC 1385 , to hold that, what constitutes benefit for the family depends upon the facts of each case, that in a case where a manager agrees to sell the property of the joint family all adult members must be consulted and they must be parties to the transaction. The learned Single Judge held that EX.A.2 was totally invalid and non est in law in view of the fact that the major son was not a party to the document, that in all cases of open land possession always follows title, that from the facts and probabilities of the case it was obvious that it was a nominal transaction, that admittedly possession was with the plaintiffs and the defendant did not assert his rights, that no action was taken and, when for the first time the defendant had issued a legal notice dated 27.6.1981 claiming title to the suit property, the plaintiffs were constrained to file the suit. The learned Single Judge, while holding that the Trial Court had erred in coming to the conclusion that since the plaintiffs did not get into the witness box the case of the plaintiffs was not proved, observed that P.W.1 was no other than the brother of the second plaintiff, that late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was his maternal uncle and that he had spoken of every detail mentioned in the plaint and had established the case of the plaintiffs. The learned Single Judge also observed that PW.2 was known to the family and had also spoken about the fact that the defendant was appointed as a peon by Rao Bahadur Gurappa Naidu who was none other than the senior paternal uncle of late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, that PW.2 also spoke of the fact that the defendant was assisting Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu in his family matters, that he was collecting rents and purchasing articles for the family, that the defendant was taking his food in the house of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu and was treated as a member of the family. The learned Single Judge held that PW.2 had spoken every detail as to how for a period of 45 years the defendant was treated as a confidant member of the family and that the value of the property was about Rs.100/- to Rs.150/- per square foot in 1974, that P.W.4 had spoken about the fact that the defendant had no capacity to purchase the property covered by EX.A2 and that he had also spoken about the fact that there was mediation in which himself, Sankara Reddy, Subrahmanyam of Vadamuru and another were present and that the defendant had admitted that Sri Govindarajulu Naidu had executed a nominal sale deed in his favour and that he would execute a re-conveyance deed. The learned Single Judge held that the evidence of these witnesses clearly established that EX.A.2 was executed by late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu as a nominal and sham document, that no consideration had passed under it, that it was not intended to be acted upon, and that the judgment and decree of the trial Court was liable to be set aside declaring the plaintiffs right and title over the plaint schedule property and that there shall be a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. 9. Sri Nazir Ahmed Khan, learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant, would submit that, since the appellant was in possession of the suit schedule property, the suit in OS No.37 of 1982, filed for declaration of title and not for possession and as the validity of EX.B.I sale deed was also not under challenge therein, was not maintainable. Learned Counsel would submit that the order of the learned Single Judge decreeing the suit was without jurisdiction and was liable to be set aside. Learned Counsel would submit that plaintiff No.2, the wife of Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu, and the daughter-in-law of Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, did not choose to enter into the witness box and lead evidence nor make herself available for cross-examination. Learned Counsel would contend that none of the plaintiffs adduced evidence and it is only the second plaintiffs brother, and two others unconnected with the sale, who were examined on behalf of the plaintiff. Learned Counsel would contend that none of the plaintiffs adduced evidence and it is only the second plaintiffs brother, and two others unconnected with the sale, who were examined on behalf of the plaintiff. Learned Counsel would submit that, in the absence of the plaintiffs entering into the witness box, examining themselves and making themselves available for cross-examination, a presumption would arise that the case set up by them is not correct. According to the learned Counsel, since in a suit for declaration of title the plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own title and not on the discrepancies, if any, in the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant, and as the plaintiff did not choose to examine themselves, the suit as filed was liable to be dismissed. Learned Counsel would submit that, as is evident from the recitals in the sale deed in Ex.B.1, (a copy of which was filed as Ex.A.2), the suit schedule property was sold by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu to the defendant for legal necessities and for payment of municipal taxes and land revenue and, as Sri. G. Govindarajulu Naidu was admittedly the Kartha of the family, he was entitled to alienate the property by way of its sale to the defendant. Learned Counsel would submit that there is ample evidence on record to justify the finding of the trial Court that the defendant had the capacity to pay the sale consideration and that the finding of the learned Single Judge, that EX.B.l sale deed was nominal and a sham, was contrary to the overwhelming evidence on record. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Sunil Kumar v. Ram Prakesh, (1988) 2 SCC 77 , Ram Saran v. Smt. Ganga Devi, AIR 1972 SC 2685 , Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31 , Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573 = 1999 (2) ALD (SCSN) 17 and Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558. 10. Sri T.S. Anand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent plaintiffs, on the other hand, would submit that failure of plaintiff No.2 to enter into the witness box to adduce evidence would not necessitate the presumption that the case set up by them was incorrect as the second plaintiffs brother was examined as PW.1 and the documents in Exs.A.1 to A.4 were marked on their behalf. Learned Counsel would contend that the relief sought for in O.S. No.37 of 1982 was not merely for declaration of title but was also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Learned Counsel would dispute the fact that the possession was with the defendant and would submit that since the suit site was adjoining Gurunatha Talkies which is owned and managed by the plaintiffs and, as the urinals, the water tank of the theatre was located in the suit site which admittedly continued to be in the plaintiffs possession, the contention of the appellant-defendant that he was in possession of the property was erroneous. Learned Counsel would contend that Ex.B.1 sale deed was a sham inasmuch as the appellant-defendant neither had the capacity to pay the sale consideration nor did Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, who was admittedly a wealthy man, have any legal necessity to sell the suit schedule site. Learned Counsel would submit that, in any event, the suit schedule property was admittedly the joint family property and, since Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu who was alive at the time of execution of Ex.B.1 sale deed had neither been consulted nor his consent obtained, the sale was not binding on him or on his heirs. Learned Counsel would refer in detail to the evidence on record to submit that the conclusions of the learned Single Judge was based on the evidence on record and did not necessitate interference in appeal. According to the learned Counsel, Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, at best, could have alienated his half share and not that of the other coparcener, his son Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu. Learned Counsel would contend that the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled for a declaration of title atleast for half the extent of the suit schedule property. Learned Counsel would rely on Chanumuri Subhaveni v. Sapped Srinivasa Rao, 2004 (4) ALD 745 and Dwarampudi Nagaratnamba v. Kunuku Ramayya, AIR 1963 AP 177 . 2008(2)FR-F-51 11. It is no doubt true that under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act a suit for declaration of title, without claiming possession, is not maintainable. (Ram Saran's case (supra)). However, the relief sought for in OS No.3? 2008(2)FR-F-51 11. It is no doubt true that under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act a suit for declaration of title, without claiming possession, is not maintainable. (Ram Saran's case (supra)). However, the relief sought for in OS No.3? of 1982 was not merely for declaration of title but was also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his son and servants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment by the plaintiff of the suit schedule property. As such the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit must fail. 12. It is well settled that in a suit for declaration of title if the plaintiffs are to succeed they must do so on the strength of their own title. (Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos's case (supra)). Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and state his own case on oath, and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct (Vidhyadhar 's case (supra)). Ordinarily, the burden of proof would be on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the party against whom, at the time the question arises, judgment would be given, if no further evidence were to be adduced by either side. The initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to the relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same. (Anil Rishi's case (supra)). But then the question of burden of proof at the end of the case, when both parties have adduced their evidence, is not of very great importance and the Court has to come to a decision on a consideration of all materials. (Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos's case (supra)). 13. The fact that Sri G. Gdvindarajulu Naidu had executed the sale deed in Ex.B.1 in favour of the defendant is not in dispute. The sale deed itself records the sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-. On a perusal -of its contents there is nothing to show that the said document in EX.B 1 was ever intended to be nominal or a sham. The fact that Sri G. Gdvindarajulu Naidu had executed the sale deed in Ex.B.1 in favour of the defendant is not in dispute. The sale deed itself records the sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-. On a perusal -of its contents there is nothing to show that the said document in EX.B 1 was ever intended to be nominal or a sham. Except for the evidence of P.W.!, the brother of plaintiff No.2, the evidence on record does not support any such conclusion. The learned Single Judge relied on the oral evidence of P.W.3 to come to the conclusion that the market value of the property was around Rs.75,000/- to Rs.80,000/- in 1984 itself. D.WA in his evidence stated that the defendant had purchased the site from Govindarajulu Naidu for Rs.10,000/-, that there were 10 or 12 huts in that site, that as those hut dwellers were not paying rents the defendant had filed petitions before the Rent Controller and got them evicted, that he had demolished all the huts except one and got the site levelled, that the site was 100 feet away from the main road of Old Taluk Kutcheri Street and was located at an interior place near Municipal public lavotry, that there were boulders and trees near that site and that the site did not cost more than the consideration paid at that time. P.W.2 deposed that the urinal and the water tank attached to Gurunadha Talkies was situated in the suit site, that in 1974 there were about 15 to 20 huts in the remaining portion of the suit site in occupation by persons who were not paying the rents regularly and though Sri Govindarajulu Naidu was asking them to vacate those huts they did not do so. P.W.3 deposed that one had to approach the suit property passing through lands from the main road. He admitted that even prior to the sale the defendant was in possession of the lands covered by EX.A.2 and was collecting rents of Rs. 4 or 5 from persons. P.W.3 deposed that one had to approach the suit property passing through lands from the main road. He admitted that even prior to the sale the defendant was in possession of the lands covered by EX.A.2 and was collecting rents of Rs. 4 or 5 from persons. In the absence of any documentary evidence being placed on record with regards the market value of the suit schedule property being higher than the sale consideration, and as it is evident that there were tenants and encroachments on the suit site which was situated away from the main road, there is no justifiable reason to hold that EX.B 1 sale deed was nominal, sham and without adequate consideration. 14. The learned Single Judge, ignoring the overwhelming evidence on record that the defendant had the capacity to pay the sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-, relied on the oral evidence of P.WA to hold that the defendant did not have the capacity to purchase the property covered by EX.A.2 sale deed (copy of EX.B.1 sale deed). The defendant in his evidence had stated that he had wet and dry land of 3 to 4 acres including a coconut garden, that he had sold a shop site to Sri Jaggannadha Reddi for Rs. 10,000 /- on 11.7.1975 and that he had invested the amount received in his business of selling firewood and coal. The defendant marked Ex.B.12, a bunch of seventy municipal tax receipts relating to the suit site, to show that he was paying municipal tax regularly. He deposed that he had taken agricultural lands of Sri Govindarajulu Naidu on lease, that from out of the income of his lands and, by selling firewood and coal, he had purchased the suit site from Sri Govindarajulu Naidu. He stated that he used to get Rs.10,000/- per year in his business. D.W.2 deposed that the defendant had three acres of land at Thenabanda Village with coconut trees, that he had a house, that he got Rs.6,000/or Rs.7,000/- per annum as income from his lands, that he was also doing business in coconuts, coal and firewood from which he got Rs.l0,000/- per year. In cross-examination he stated that the defendant had 3 acres of land in which there were coconut trees in one acre and that he raised sugarcane and paddy crops in the other 2 acres. In cross-examination he stated that the defendant had 3 acres of land in which there were coconut trees in one acre and that he raised sugarcane and paddy crops in the other 2 acres. D.WA deposed that the defendant was having a vacant site by the date of purchase of the suit site which he sold later for Rs. 10,000/-. The learned Single Judge was in error as the trial Court was justified in concluding that the defendant had the capacity to pay the sale consideration of Rs.1 0,000/- as reflected in Ex.B.1 sale deed. 15. The evidence on record, however, discloses that the suit schedule property was the joint family property of which Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was the kartha/manager and his son Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu a coparcener. All that is recorded in EX.B I sale deed is that the property was being sold to meet family expenses and to pay Municipal tax and land revenue and that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had borrowed a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff which was the sale consideration for execution of the sale deed. Since the sale deed was executed only by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, and not Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu who was alive on the date of execution of the sale deed, the question which arises for consideration is whether the joint family property could have been alienated by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu in favour of the defendant without the consent of other members of the joint family. 16. It is well settled that in a joint Hindu family a son acquires by birth an interest equal to that of the father in the ancestral property. The father, by reason of his paternal relation and his position as the head of the family, is its manager and he is entitled to alienate joint family property so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor coparceners in the property provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate or for meeting an antecedent debt. (Sunil Kumar's case (supra)). While dealing with legal necessity vis-a-vis the powers of the karta of a joint family, compulsion or pressure on the estate, prudence to be exercised, benefit of the estate, proper management, nature of debts, proof in relation thereof, pious obligation and bona fide enquiries also may be relevant considerations. (Sunil Kumar's case (supra)). While dealing with legal necessity vis-a-vis the powers of the karta of a joint family, compulsion or pressure on the estate, prudence to be exercised, benefit of the estate, proper management, nature of debts, proof in relation thereof, pious obligation and bona fide enquiries also may be relevant considerations. No straightjacket formula can be prescribed while judging these aspects. (Chanumuri Subhaveni's case (supra)). What transaction would for the benefit of the family must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. The Court must be satisfied from the material before it that it was in fact such as was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. Where adult members are in existence the judgment is to be not that of the manager of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the manager, (Balmukand's case (supra)). 17. When alienations made by the father or karta of a Hindu joint family is called in question it is always the duty of the purchaser to prove either that there was legal necessity in fact or that he had made proper and bona fide enquiry and did all that was reasonable to satisfy as to the existence of such necessity. Unless the sale is for legal necessity or the benefit of the family it will not bind the other members of the family. (Dwarampudi Nagaratnamba's case (supra)). 18. Sri Nazir Ahmed Khan, learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant, would however submit that, since Ex.B.1 sale deed itself records that the property was being sold for payment of Municipal tax dues and for family expenses, the alienation was only for legal necessities for which the manager was entitled to alienate properties belonging to the Hindu joint family. Learned Counsel would further contend that Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was mentally ill, he was in no position to give his consent to the sale and it was in such circumstances that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had alienated the property to meet legal necessities and family expenses of the Hindu Undivided Family. 19. We must express our inability to agree. The overwhelming evidence on record is that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was a wealthy man and, while he did sell a few vacant sites and other properties, he still had huge extents of lands and several buildings in Chittoor Town. 19. We must express our inability to agree. The overwhelming evidence on record is that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was a wealthy man and, while he did sell a few vacant sites and other properties, he still had huge extents of lands and several buildings in Chittoor Town. P.W.! in his evidence stated that the suit site was the ancestral property of Sri Govindarajulu Naidu and his son Sri G. Nandagopal, that as long as G. Nandagopal Naidu and G. Govindarajulu Naidu were alive they lived together as a joint family, that in the year 1974 Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu and his son possessed properties worth Rupees ten to twelve lakhs, that they had a theatre called Gurunatha Talkies, about 47 houses in Chittoor, about 30 acres in various villages including Vedamur, Kattamanchi, Chavatapalle and Gandlapalle Villages, that the lands in Gandlapalle was adjacent to Krishnaveni Women's College, that Kattamanchi Village was adjacent to and at a distance of half a mile from Chittoor Town. In cross-examination he admitted that Sri Govindarajulu Naidu had sold vacant sites at Chittoor to Subrahmanyam Naidu, Ramchandraiah Chetty, Krishnamoorthi Chetti, Govinda Reddi and others whose names he did not remember and that he did not know for how much the sites were sold. He stated that the plaintiffs had discharged the debts due to Narasimhaiah contracted by late Govindarajulu Naidu, that late Govindarajulu Naidu had discharged the debt of Rs.6,000/- due to one Vasuvamba, wife of Pottikrishnaiah Chetty, taken on mortgage of V.J. Press and that on 5.9.1954 late Govindarajulu Naidu had mortgaged the suit property for Rs.6,000/-. He stated that late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was paying municipal taxes for all his houses and paying land revenue for all his lands. He admitted that late Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu, on behalf of himself and his minor son, had sold a vacant site to Sri P. Subrahmanyam Naidu, that the suit property and the properties sold to Perumur Ramachandraiah Chetti on 29.3 .1972 and Satyamurthi on 29.3.1975 were joint family properties and that late Sri Govindarajulu Naidu alone had sold these three properties. He stated that the properties sold to Sri P. Ramachandraiah Chetty in 1972 was for Rs.30,000/-. 20. He stated that the properties sold to Sri P. Ramachandraiah Chetty in 1972 was for Rs.30,000/-. 20. P.W.2 in his evidence stated Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu owned properties worth about 15 lakhs one or two years prior to his death, that he had about 20 to 30 acres of land under Kattamanchi Tank near the sugar factory and at Kongareddipalli and Vedamuru Villages, that he was getting about Rs.10,000/- to 15,000/- income from these lands per year, that he had 50 houses and shops in Chittoor Town and that he was getting Rs.7 to 10 thousand per month by way of rent from these shops and houses. P.W.3, deposed that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had 25 acres of lands at Vedamuru Village in the year 1974 when one acre of land was worth about Rs.30,000/-, that he had 50 or 60 houses in Chittoor, that he owned Gurunatha Talkies in Chittoor, that he had lands at Kattamanchi Village and at Kokavendalavooru near Kattamanchi, that he had lands in Vedamooru, Thondarayanapalle and Chinnampalle, that he had properties worth about Rs.70 to 75 lakhs in the year 1974 and that he was getting income more than about Rs.1 lakh per year in the year 1974. 21. The defendant, in his evidence, stated that Sri Govindarajulu Naidu had also sold EX.B.2 site near the main road to Satyamurthi, six months after the date of Ex.B.1, for Rs.12,000/- on behalf of the joint family, that he also sold another site to Ramachandrayya Chetty on 29.3.1972 under EX.B.3 which was in the main road and it had become a shopping center, that EX.B.15 was the certified copy of the suit register extract in O.S. No.110 of 1979 on the file of the Sub-Court, Chittoor, which showed that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had executed a mortgage in favour of Vasavamba as manager of the joint family on 5.9.1954, that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was meeting the expenses of the joint family including the expenditure incurred for the treatment of Sri G. Nandagopal, that he used to sell properties to meet his expenditure, that there were other properties belonging to the family besides the items sold but he was not getting good income by way of rents or yield from the land, that he died when he was 57 years of age and was indebted to several people. In cross-examination he admitted that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was a rich person, that he had 30 acres of land, that he had 10 acres of land around Krishnaveni College of Chittoor and that he owned Gurunatha Talkies by the date of Ex.B.1. D.W.3, on being cross-examined stated that the defendant had told him that he was looking after the affairs of Sri Govindarajulu Naidu who was a rich person. 22. Stray instances of sale of vacant plots/sites notwithstanding, the overwhelming evidence on record is that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu was extremely wealthy and owned huge extents of agricultural lands, house sites and buildings in and around Chittoor Town. In the light of the aforesaid evidence the recital in EX.B.l sale deed that the sale was for legal and family necessities and to pay municipal taxes and land revenue cannot be accepted. Since the defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proving that there was legal necessities or that he had made bona fide enquiries to satisfy himself of the existence of such necessity and, since the sale of the suit schedule property in EX.B.1 sale deed is not for legal necessity or the benefit of the family, it cannot be said to bind the other members of the HUF including Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu. 23. Now the question whether Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu, suffered from mental illness and whether the illness was of such magnitude as to render him incapable of giving his free consent to the sale of the suit schedule property. 24. The defendant, no doubt, stated that a Court guardian was appointed for Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu on the ground that he was mentally ill, that he was mentally unsound since 10 years prior to his death in 1975, and that it was evident from Ex.B.16 admission card of CMC Vellore that Sri G. Nandagopal was admitted in the Mental Health Centre. In cross-examination the defendant admitted that he did not know whether Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was admitted to C.M.C. or in a mental hospital at Ve1lore and that he never visited him there. D.W.4 stated that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had a son who was mentally unsound since a period of 10 years period to his death in the year 1975. P.W.1, in cross-examination, stated that Sri Nandagopal was not mentally unsound. D.W.4 stated that Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had a son who was mentally unsound since a period of 10 years period to his death in the year 1975. P.W.1, in cross-examination, stated that Sri Nandagopal was not mentally unsound. He denied the suggestion that in the year 1967 he was in a mental hospital at Madras for sometime, that in the year 1974 when he was admitted in CMC Hospital, Ve1lore the doctors had sent him to the Mental Health Centre to ascertain whether he had any mental worries and that late• Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu had met all his medical expenses both at Madras and at Ve1lore. He denied the suggestion that Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was mentally unsound from 1965 till his death in 1975. While admitting that he was in CMC Hospital, Vellore on 21.6.1965, P.W.1 denied the suggestion that he was in a mental hospital at Madras on 20.11.1967, or that he was in a Mental Health Center attached to CMC Hospital, Vellore, on 16.4.1975 or that he died in 1975 due to mental illness. P.W.3, in cross-examination, admitted that Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu was having some mental disease. 25. Even if this sketchy evidence, regarding the mental illness of Sri G. Nandgopal Naidu, were to be held to have some basis the extent of his mental illness, the period during which such illness lasted and whether the illness was such as to render him incapable of giving his tree consent to the alienation of the suit schedule property by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu is not borne out from the evidence on record. As rightly held by the learned Single Judge there is no recital in the sale deed regarding Sri G. Nandagopal being mentally ill or that the sale deed was executed for his benefit. Neither was any evidence adduced to prove that Sri G. Nandgopal Naidu I gave his consent to the sale of the suit schedule property nor is any such recital reflected in EX.B.1 sale deed. It is evident that the sale deed in EX.B.1 was executed by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu without Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu having either been consulted or his consent obtained. It is evident that the sale deed in EX.B.1 was executed by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu without Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu having either been consulted or his consent obtained. As a result, alienation of the suit schedule property, by way of Ex.B.1 sale deed, by Sri G. Govindarajulu Naidu in favour of the defendant cannot be held to bind either Sri G. Nandagopal Naidu or his heirs, and Sri Govindarajulu Naidu could, at best, have alienated only 1/2 the extent of the suit schedule property. 26. The judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge is modified to the extent that the plaintiffs are declared to have the right and title over half a share in the plaint schedule property. Since the evidence on record discloses that the urinal and water tank, adjacent to Gurunatha Talkies, located in the suit schedule property is in the possession of the plaintiffs, there shall be a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of half the extent of the suit schedule property adjoining Sri Gurunatha Talkies. 27. LPA No.167 of 2000 is disposed of accordingly.