JUDGMENT:- Both the second appeals are between the same parties and as regards the same property. They arise out of O.S. Nos. 10 of 1984 and 33 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyai. The appellants are the legal representatives of one Mr. Bhogi Reddy. He was the sole defendant in the 1st suit and sole plaintiff in the second suit. 2. Respondents 1 and 2 are the grandsons of one late Jaffer Saheb. He was the absolute owner and possessor of an extent of about Acs.2.80 cents of land in Survey No.180 of Kanala Village. The respondents filed O.S. No.10 of 1984 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, against Mr. Bhogi Reddy, for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction as regards the said land. It was pleaded that, Mr. Jaffer Saheb, had executed two gift deeds on 16.3.1981 in their favour, donating the suit schedule property and delivered possession to them. According to them, ever since the date of gift deeds, they are in possession and enjoyment of the property and, it was alleged that Bhogi Reddy was interfering with their possession. 3. A written statement was filed in the suit stating that Jaffer Saheb executed an agreement of sale on 26.9.1964 offering to sell the land to Bhogi Reddy for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/-, per acre, and subsequent thereto, the further amounts were paid on 4.10.1964 and 29.5.1965. It was stated that the entire consideration was paid and possession of the property was delivered, and that there was absolutely no basis for the claim in the suit. 4. On his part, Bhogi Reddy also filed O.S. No.33 of 1988 in the same Court, for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale. The contents of the plaint in this suit were similar to the written statement in O.S. No.10 of 1984 and vice versa. An additional plea as to limitation was raised in the written statement filed in O.S. No.33 of 1988. 5. With the consent of parties, both the suits were clubbed and evidence was recorded in O.S. No.10 of 1984. During the pendency of the suit, Bhogi Reddy died and his legal representatives i. e., the appellants herein were brought on record. Through a common judgment, dated 30.7.1994, the trial Court decreed O.S. No.10 of 1984 and dismissed O.S. No.33 of 1988. During the pendency of the suit, Bhogi Reddy died and his legal representatives i. e., the appellants herein were brought on record. Through a common judgment, dated 30.7.1994, the trial Court decreed O.S. No.10 of 1984 and dismissed O.S. No.33 of 1988. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed A.S. Nos.24 and 30 of 1994 against the judgments and decrees in O.S. Nos.10 of 1984 and 33 of 1988, respectively, in the Court of II Additional District Judge, Kurnool. The appeals were dismissed on 30.12.1997, through a common judgment. While S.A No.141 of 1998 is filed against the judgment in O.S. No.24 of 1994, S.A No.997 of 1998 is filed against AS. No.30 of 1994. 6. Sri Y. Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that the Courts below erred in decreeing the suit filed by the respondents and dismissing the one filed by the appellants. He contends that the evidence on record clearly demonstrates that the agreement of sale marked as Ex.B.1, was proved and the possession of the appellants was admitted by none other than the Jaffer Saheb himself, as is evident from Exs.B.6, B.7 and B.8. According to him, the appellants perfected their title by way of adverse possession. Learned Counsel points out that when execution of agreement of sale is proved and the appellants are in possession of the suit schedule property, the only alternatives was to grant the decree for specific performance. He contends that suit for injunction was not tenable when the possession has already been parted and that the plea of limitation raised by the respondents cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Sri Syed Sharif Ahmed, learned Counsel for the respondents, submits that the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation, since it was filed nearly decades, after the date of alleged agreement of sale. He contends that during his lifetime, Jaffer Saheb, who figured as 1st defendant in O.S. No.33 of 1988, filed a written statement denying the agreement of sale, and the concurrent findings recorder by the Court below, do not warrant interference. 8. There was no dispute that Jaffer Saheb was the original owner of the suit schedule property. While the respondents claimed their rights on the strength of the two gift deeds, marked as Exs.A.I and A.2, the appellants rested their claim on Ex.B.1, the agreement of sale, and other supplementary documents. 8. There was no dispute that Jaffer Saheb was the original owner of the suit schedule property. While the respondents claimed their rights on the strength of the two gift deeds, marked as Exs.A.I and A.2, the appellants rested their claim on Ex.B.1, the agreement of sale, and other supplementary documents. It is noteworthy that Jaffar Saheb was alive when the suits were filed and in fact he figured as defendant in O.S. No.33 of 1988. 9. The trial Court framed the following issues in both the suits : O.S. No. 10 of 1984 : 1. Whether the plaintiff acquired the title to the suit schedule property under the two registered gift deeds said to have been executed by their paternal grandfather Mulla Jaffar Saheb on 16.3.1981 ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule property on the date of the suit ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to have declaration and the permanent injunction granted as Sought by them ? Additional Issues : 1. Whether the defendant in any event has perfected his title to the suit land by adverse possession? O.S. No.33 of 1988 : 1. Whether the agreement of sale dated 26.9.1964 relied upon by the plaintiff is true, valid and supported by consideration ? 2. Whether the payments are endorsements dated 4.10.1964 and 29.5.1965 relied upon by the plaintiff are true and valid? 3. Whether the plaintiff got the land measured ? 4. Whether the plaintiff made improvements to the land and if so in what amount? 5. Whether the plaintiff was put into possession of the suit land in pursuance of agreement of sale? 6. Whether the suit is not barred by time as pleaded by the plaintiff ? 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped in law from claiming title to the suit land in view of the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act ? 8. Whether the suit for mere specific performance without seeking possession is maintainable? 10. On behalf of the respondents, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A.1 to AA were marked. On behalf of appellants, DWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.7 were marked. In addition to that, the trial Court had undertaken exercise under Section 45 of the Evidence Act for comparison of the thumb impressions of Jaffer Saheb, in Ex.B.1 and other related documents. On behalf of appellants, DWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.7 were marked. In addition to that, the trial Court had undertaken exercise under Section 45 of the Evidence Act for comparison of the thumb impressions of Jaffer Saheb, in Ex.B.1 and other related documents. The proceedings, in relation thereto, including the report submitted by the handwriting expert, are marked as Exs.C.1 to C.11. At the stage of appeal, the appellants have filed Exs.B.9 to B.60, which are cist receipts. 11. The trial Court answered all the issues against the appellants. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decrees passed by the trial Court. 12. This Court is of the view that the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration. (a) When the owner of the premises admitted delivery of possession of land to the purchaser under an agreement of sale, a suit for injunction by the donees from him, under subsequent gift deeds, is maintainable? (b) When the purchaser under an agreement of sale can resist recovery of possession of the land by raising the plea of adverse possession and the one under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, can the suit for specific performance be rejected on the ground that it is barred by limitation? 13. EX.B.l is the agreement of sale, said to have been executed by Jaffer Saheb. It contains thumb impressions. A perusal of the same discloses that Jaffer Saheb offered to sell the land to Bhogi Reddy, for a consideration of Rs.1,000/-, per acre, subject to the final measurement. On the date of agreement of sale, a sum of Rs.1000/- was paid. It was agreed that the land shall be measured within a very short time. 14. On 4.10.1964, a further sum of Rs.1,900/- was paid. This was endorsed on EX.B1, and marked as EX.B.2. Another endorsement was made on the agreement, on 29.5.1965 and it is marked as EX.B.3. According to this, the land was measured and found to be Acs.2.80 cents, and that a sum of Rs.800/- was paid. It is mentioned that the entire consideration stood paid. 15. The respondents denied the execution of the agreement as well as subsequent endorsements. It was in this context that the trial Court sent the document to the handwriting expert for comparison, through its order, passed in an application filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. It is mentioned that the entire consideration stood paid. 15. The respondents denied the execution of the agreement as well as subsequent endorsements. It was in this context that the trial Court sent the document to the handwriting expert for comparison, through its order, passed in an application filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. The thumb impressions found on the original agreement as well as subsequent endorsements are marked as Exs.Q1and Q3. Incidentally, Jaffer Saheb was alive by the time this exercise was undertaken and his thumb impressions were taken on a plain paper, by the trial Court. They were marked as 'S'. 16. The handwriting expert submitted his report on 31.10.1987, which is marked as Ex.C.10. It reads as under : "Report of the F.P. Expert (F.P.S.L) on the examination of thumb impressions in O.S. No.10 of 1984 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Nandyal. The left thumb impressions said to be of Mulla Jaffar Sab marked as Q1 on the sale agreement dated 26.9.1964, Q2 on the endorsement dated 4.10.1964 and Q3 on the endorsement dated 29.5.1965 on the reverse of the sale agreement dated 26.9.1964 are identical with the specimen left thumb impression marked 'S' of Mulla Jaffar Sab obtained on a plain sheet of white paper in open Court on 22.6.1987. Reason : vide photo comparison chart." 17. The record does not disclose that any objections were filed by the respondents, to the findings recorded by the handwriting expert. Further, the thumb impressions of Exs.Q.1 to Q.3 and the subsequent thumb impressions taken from Jaffer Saheb are so clear and visible that their similarity is apparent, even to the naked eye. ' 18. Another important aspect of the matter is that, during his lifetime, Jaffer Saheb made complaints before the revenue authorities in the context of recovery of possession of the land. The Revenue Inspector of the Taluq recorded the statement of Jaffer Saheb on 21.11.1981 and it is marked as EX.B.7. In this, he categorically admitted that he executed EX.B.I and had delivered possession of the land to Bhogi Reddy. He stated that since no registered sale deed was executed in favour of Bhogi Reddy, he gifted the said property in favour of his two grandsons. His grievance was that the pattedar passbooks were not issued to him, nor the land revenue was being received. He stated that since no registered sale deed was executed in favour of Bhogi Reddy, he gifted the said property in favour of his two grandsons. His grievance was that the pattedar passbooks were not issued to him, nor the land revenue was being received. He almost took the same view to the statement recorded by the Tahsildar on 20.9.1982, which is marked as EX.B.8. He made a request to the revenue authorities to restore possession of the land to him. In view of this clinching evidence, hardly there exists any doubt that EX.B.1 was proved, and that the possession of the land is with Bhogi Reddy, or his legal representatives. 19. It may appear strange that the Courts below have faltered on so clear a matter. However that happened on account of their interpretation of EX.B5. It is an extract of 10(1) adangal. On a reading of this document, the Courts below, particularly the lower appellate Court, held that the appellants failed to prove that they are in possession of land in Survey No.180 and that their possession is reflected only as regards the land in Survey No.164. On a close analysis of the document, it becomes evident that the number 164' in the document is the Khata number, whereas the survey number referable to the land is 180. The entire document contained only one survey number i.e., 180 and the name of the wife of Bhogi Reddy was written against it. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Courts below, in this regard are clearly perverse. When Jaffar Saheb himself admitted as late as on 20.9.1982 (date of Ex.B8), much after the execution of the gift deeds, Exs.A1 and A2, dated 16.3.1981, and it was not even pleaded that the possession was recovered in any manner, a suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, without the relief of recovery of In possession is untenable. The admissions in Exs.B7 and B8 c1inchingly establish that the appellants have perfected their title through adverse possession. Hence, the 1st question is answered in favour of the appellants. 20. Now remains the second question. It is no doubt true that there is vast gap of time between the date of EX.B.l - agreement of sale, on the one hand, and the filing of O.S. No.33 of 1988, on the other hand. Hence, the 1st question is answered in favour of the appellants. 20. Now remains the second question. It is no doubt true that there is vast gap of time between the date of EX.B.l - agreement of sale, on the one hand, and the filing of O.S. No.33 of 1988, on the other hand. Article 54 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, prescribes a period of three years for' filing of suits for specific performance. The starting point, for computing the period is the date specified for the performance of the agreement, or the date on which the refusal is communicated. The continuous possession over the suit schedule property discloses that the appellants did not face any resistance from the respondents or Jaffer Saheb. For the first time, Jaffer Saheb made grievance in 1981 and 1982. His intention to dishonour his obligation under EX.B1 became manifest only when the respondents filed O.S. No.10 of 1984 on the basis of the gift deeds. There is nothing to disclose that the intention was communicated in any other manner. Soon after receiving the notice in O.S. No.10 of 1984, the appellants filed the suit for specific performance on 15.3 .1984; in the Court of District Munsif. Subsequently it was transferred to the Court of Subordinate Judge and renumbered as O.S. No.33 of 1988. Therefore, it cannot be straight away said that there existed a clear starting point of limitation and if computed from that date, the suit was barred. 21. There is an important angle from which the matter needs to be examined. Had the adjudication been confined to the suit for specific performance filed by the appellants, the question of limitation would have assumed greater significance. In the instant case, the respondents filed the suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, against the appellants. In fact, that was earlier in point of time. The appellants, in turn, pleaded their rights on the basis of EX.B.l and have pleaded that they have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. Apart from that an occasion arises to apply the principle underlying Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the Act), was raised. This was followed by independent suit for specific performance. Apart from that an occasion arises to apply the principle underlying Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the Act), was raised. This was followed by independent suit for specific performance. Whatever be the rigour with which the plea of limitation needs to be examined in a suit for specific performance, it virtually pales into insignificance, once the transferee acquires the title through adverse possession, or where a plea under Section 53-A of the Act is raised. These important aspects, however, were not adverted to by the Courts below. The relief of specific performance was denied, on the ground of limitation in the teeth of the principle underlying Section 53-A of the Act. Apart from that, the appellants perfected their title through adverse possession. Strictly speaking, the relief claimed in O.S. No.33 of 1988 becomes redundant. The appellants can however pursue that suit and establish that they acquired clear title to the property, instead of resting satisfied with the claim on the basis of adverse possession. 22. For the foregoing reasons, the second appeals are allowed. Consequently, O.S. No.10 of 1984 shall stand dismissed and O.S. No.33 of 1988 shall stand decreed as prayed for. There shall be no order as to costs.