JUDGMENT N.K. Mody, J. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 17-12-2002 passed by Additional District Judge, District-Indore in Civil Suit No. 19-A/2002 whereby the suit filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for eviction of the appellant was decreed u/s 12(1) (a),(c) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (which shall be referred hereinafter as "Act"), the present appeal has been filed. Short facts of the case are that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the real sisters and are daughters of one Thakurdas Chandani who filed a suit for eviction of appellant alleging that appellant is tenant in the suit accommodation @ Rs. 3,000/- per month and is in arrears of rent with effect from 1-7-1996 which has not been paid in spite of demand. It was alleged that appellant has denied the title of respondents No. 1 and 2, therefore, on account of disclaimer of title respondents No. 1 and 2 are entitled to get the suit accommodation vacated. Further case of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was that the respondents No. 1 and 2 requires the suit accommodation for carrying on the business for themselves and members of their family bona fidely. It was alleged that respondent No. 1 is doing the business of manufacturing of Caster Wheels at Pune. It was alleged that respondent No. 1 wants to open a branch at Indore for which there is a consent of respondent No. 2. It was further alleged that for the purpose of opening the branch at Indore respondents No. 1 and 2 are not having any alternative accommodation of their own in the city of Indore. On the basis of aforesaid pleadings, the decree was prayed on account of arrears of rent, disclaimer of title and genuine requirement. The suit was contested by the appellant on various grounds by denying the allegations made in the plaint. It was alleged that Thakurdas Chandani was the owner of the suit accommodation who let it out to Thakursingh who is respondent No. 3 herein vide rent note dated 20-11-1995 for a consideration of Rs. 7,000/- per month. Since respondent No. 1 was not in a position to run the health club for which the suit accommodation was taken on rent, therefore, respondent No. 3 vacated the suit accommodation and handed it over to the appellant. 7,000/- per month. Since respondent No. 1 was not in a position to run the health club for which the suit accommodation was taken on rent, therefore, respondent No. 3 vacated the suit accommodation and handed it over to the appellant. It was alleged that thereafter Thakurdas Chandani let out the suit accommodation to the appellant vide rent note dated 12-1-1996 is for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/- per month. It was alleged that appellant paid six months advance rent to Thakurdas Chandani in his life time which was upto 30-6-1996. Further case of appellant was that no notice of demand has been issued to the appellant. It was alleged that appellant has not disputed the title of the respondents No. 1 and 2 as successor of deceased Thakurdas Chandani. It was alleged that Thakurdas Chandani was having other legal representatives also including respondents No. 1 and 2, therefore, respondents No. 1 and 2 are not having the right to evict the appellant as they are not exclusive owner of the suit accommodation. It was denied that respondents No. 1 and 2 requires the suit accommodation for opening of branch of business of Caster Wheels. It was prayed that the suit be dismissed. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the issues, recorded the evidence and decreed the suit u/s 12(1)) (a)(c) and (f) of the Act, against which the present appeal has been filed. Mr. G.M. Chaphekar, learned senior counsel with Mr. D.S. Kale, counsel for the appellant submits that learned trial Court committed error in passing the decree against the appellant. It is submitted that the notice dated 13-2-1997 Ex.P/8 was issued by the respondents No. 1 and 2 to respondent No. 3, a copy of which was sent to appellant. It is submitted that in the said notice it was alleged that respondent No. 3 is tenant in the suit accommodation @ Rs. 7,000/- per month. It is submitted that since no demand notice was issued to appellant, therefore, no decree of eviction could have been passed against the appellant, as it is the basic requirement of section 12(1)(a) of the Act. 7,000/- per month. It is submitted that since no demand notice was issued to appellant, therefore, no decree of eviction could have been passed against the appellant, as it is the basic requirement of section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Reliance was placed on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Chimanlal vs. Mishrilal, 1985 MPLJ 1 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a valid notice demanding arrears of rent relatable to the accommodation let to the tenant from which he is sought to be evicted is a vital ingredient of the conditions which govern the maintainability of the suit, for unless a valid demand is made no complaint can be laid of non-compliance with it, and consequently no suit for ejectment of the tenant in respect of the accommodation will lie on that ground. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that so far as decree passed against the appellant u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act is concerned, appellant never denied that Thakurchand Chandani was not the owner of the suit accommodation. Similarly, it was never denied that respondents No. 1 and 2 being legal representatives of deceased Thakurchand Chandani are not owner of the suit accommodation. Learned counsel submits that the case of the appellant is that Thakurchand Chandani was having other legal representatives including the respondents No. 1 and 2, therefore, respondents No. 1 and 2 are not the exclusive owner of the suit accommodation. It is submitted that respondents No. 1 and 2 are claiming their rights on the basis of derivative title, therefore, on the basis of allegations made by the respondents No. 1 and 2, no decree of eviction can be passed on the ground of disclaimer of title u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. For this contention reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Sheela and Others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that denial of title of the landlord or disclaimer of tenancy is not as such set out as a ground on which tenant may be evicted u/s 12 of the Act. Section 12(1)(c) provides inter alia that a tenant incurs liability for eviction if the tenant or any person residing with him has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. Section 12(1)(c) provides inter alia that a tenant incurs liability for eviction if the tenant or any person residing with him has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. Learned counsel further submits that since the respondents No. 1 and 2 were having the derivative title and appellant has bona fidely called upon the landlord who are respondents No. 1 and 2 to prove their ownership or to their title and appellant has not set-up of his own title or the title of third party, therefore, no decree could have been passed against the appellant. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Ram Sewak and Others Vs. Chakresh Kumar Jain, wherein this Court in a case where the plaintiff claimed to have derived title on the basis of the Will of the original owner and the defendants denied it, this Court observed that mere denial of acquisition of title by the plaintiff on the basis of the Will cannot be termed as disclaimer of title so as to furnish a ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the decree of eviction can be passed against tenant only when the tenant renounce his character as tenant and set out the title in a third party. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the matter of Balveer Singh vs. Kishan Lal, 1989 MPACJ 190 wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench after placing reliance on a decision in the matter of Ghulam Mohammad vs. Poonamchand, 1969 MPLJ 843 observed that under the provision, a lease of immovable property determines in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. Thus, in the context, the term 'disclaimer' as to be understood to mean renunciation by the tenant of his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. So, a 'disclaimer' necessarily jeopardises and landlord's title, and, when the landlord's title is so jeopardised, the 'disclaimer' necessarily has been tendency to constitute an act, which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest in the accommodation. So, a 'disclaimer' necessarily jeopardises and landlord's title, and, when the landlord's title is so jeopardised, the 'disclaimer' necessarily has been tendency to constitute an act, which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest in the accommodation. That constitutes a ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that learned trial Court also committed error in granting the decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act. It is submitted that matter is required to be objectively decided by the Court. It is submitted that it is not only the mere assertion of the landlord on the basis of which the decree of eviction can be passed. It is submitted that at present respondent No. 2 is residing abroad and respondent No. 1 who is a lady is carrying on her business of manufacturing and selling of Caster Wheels at Pune and is also having another industry at Mumbai. It is submitted that the brother of respondents No. 1 and 2 who has come in witness-box submits that he will look after the business of respondents No. 1 and 2, if he is being permitted by the respondent No. 1. Reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business is not decisive. It is for the Court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one and merely because a landlord asserts that he wants the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business, that would not be enough to establish that he requires it for that purpose and that his requirement is bona fide. The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show - the burden being upon him that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show - the burden being upon him that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. The Court should not misdirect itself in regard to these matters as for example, by misconstruing the word 'required' or by erroneously placing the burden of proof on the tenant. Learned counsel further placed reliance on a decision in the matter of Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court had a occasion to consider the dictionary meaning of term 'bona fide' and observed that considering Dictionary meanings the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of tenant would be enough to persuade the Court certainly deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Learned counsel further submits that since respondent No. 1 is doing the business and wants to expand her business, therefore, it was the duty of respondent No. 1 to plead and prove the actual expansion of the business. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Damodar Sharma and Another Vs. Nandram Deviram, wherein Hon'ble Full Bench has observed that if the landlord's business has in fact grown and there is a felt need, to be determined objectively, for additional accommodation for the purpose of continuing the expanded business, the tenant is liable to be ejected. Further reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Sunderlal vs. Achaldas, 1963 MPLJ SN 109 wherein this Court has observed that where a landlord do not need the premises for starting new business. His need was for continuing existing business. Mere statement of the plaintiff that he need the premises was not sufficient to establish the need unless he showed objectively that his business had extended. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the matter of Bhagwania Bai vs. Krishna Sewak, 1964 MPLJ SN 12 wherein it was held that plaintiff had to show that their business had in fact grown and there was a felt need for additional accommodation for the purpose of continuing the expanded business and that it had been determined objectively. When it had been authoritatively expounded that something had to be determined objectively, it was the imperative duty of the Court of fact to reach a conclusion on the evidence adduced by the parties and by application of its mind to it that the thing was proved. Since the plaintiffs led no evidence to show that the business had grown and there was a felt need for additional accommodation nor such a case was pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for ejectment. Further reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Nemichand vs. Mannulal, 1961 JLJ (SN) 217 wherein it was held that ejectment of a tenant cannot be had for future expansion of the business of his landlord. On the other hand, if the landlord's business had in fact grown and there is a felt need to be determined objectively for additional accommodation for the purpose of continuing the expanded business, the tenant is liable to be ejected. It is submitted that for the purpose of decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act the respondents No. 1 and 2 are required to prove their ownership. For this contention reliance is placed on the Will Ex.P/2. It is submitted that merely production of Will or exhibit the same in evidence will not fulfil the requirement of law until and unless the Will is proved by the respondents No. 1 and 2 by examining attesting witnesses as per section 63 of Indian Succession Act and section 68 of Indian Evidence Act. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in view of the aforesaid position of law, the decree passed by learned Court below u/s 12(1) (a)(c) and (f) of the Act deserves to be set-aside. Mr. Mayank Purohit, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 submit that the decree passed against the appellant is in accordance with law and no interference is called for by this Court. Learned counsel submits that the copy of notice Ex.P/8 was undisputedly received by the appellant, therefore, it cannot be said that no notice of demand was given by respondents No. 1 and 2. Learned counsel submits that the copy of notice Ex.P/8 was undisputedly received by the appellant, therefore, it cannot be said that no notice of demand was given by respondents No. 1 and 2. So far as disclaimer of title is concerned, learned counsel submits that Ex.P/9 is the reply of notice given by appellant on 11-3-1997 wherein it was not disputed that appellant has not received copy of notice of demand and it was also not disputed that respondents No. 1 and 2 were owner of the suit property by virtue of Will Ex.P/2 executed by Thakurchand Chandani. It is submitted that Ex.P/3 to Ex.P/5 which are orders dated 12-2-1998 passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Indore in three different, different matters pending between the appellant and respondents No. 1 and 2 wherein appellant admitted respondents No. 1 and 2 as owner of the suit property. Learned counsel further submits that apart from this in notice dated 13-11-1997 Ex.D/27 which was issued by appellant to brother of the respondents No. 1 and 2, it was specifically stated that respondents No. 1 and 2 are landlord of the appellant. It is submitted that apart from this the ground of eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act was added by the respondents No. 1 and 2 by amending the plaint. It is submitted that in spite of that appellant did not choose to deny the allegations made by respondents No. 1 and 2 in amended plaint. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case learned Court below has rightly granted the decree u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. For this contention, reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Anar Devi vs. Nathuram, 1994 JLJ 486 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Ever since, the accepted position is that section 116 of the Evidence Act applies and estops even a person already in possession as tenant under one landlord from denying the title of his subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as his landlord by attornment or conduct. Ever since, the accepted position is that section 116 of the Evidence Act applies and estops even a person already in possession as tenant under one landlord from denying the title of his subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as his landlord by attornment or conduct. Therefore, a tenant of immovable property under landlord who becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting him to be the owner who had derived title from the former landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter's title, even when he is sought to be evicted by the latter on a permitted ground." Further reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Tej Bhan Madan Vs. II Additional District Judge and Others, wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has observed that "tenancy attorned and rent paid by tenant to successor-in-interest of reversion ever since such assignment or successor or mistake on the part of the tenant misleading him to such attornment, held, tenant estopped from disclaiming the derivative title of the assignee or succession, in absence of any misrepresentation by the assignee or successor or mistake on the part of the tenant misleading him to such attornment, tenant is estopped from disclaiming the derivative title of the assignee or successor." Further reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Ranjit Narayan Vs. Laxmanbhai, wherein this Court has taken a view that "once relationship of landlord and tenant admitted or proved, tenant is estopped from denying the title of landlord." Further reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs., wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that "a denial of title in the course of eviction petition constitutes a ground for eviction provided the denial is not bona fide and it is not necessary that in order to constitute a ground for eviction the denial of title must be anterior to the filing of the eviction petition." So far as decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act on the ground of genuine requirement is concerned, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 submit that the requirement was not only pleaded but also proved by adducing cogent evidence which was duly relied upon by the learned trial Court. Learned counsel submit that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed. Learned counsel submit that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed. From perusal of the record, it is evident that respondents No. 1 and 2 are demanding arrears of rent with effect from 1-7-1996. Notice dated 13-2-1997 Ex.P/8 was issued by respondents No. 1 and 2 to respondent No. 3 alleging him to be a tenant. Undoubtedly, copy of the notice was sent to the appellant. Since neither it was alleged that appellant is tenant nor demand of arrears of rent was made, therefore, it cannot be said that a valid demand notice claiming arrears or rent of the suit accommodation from which appellant is sought to be evicted was given. Since valid demand of arrears of rent is not made, no suit for ejectment of the tenant in respect of the accommodation was maintainable on that ground. In view of this, learned trial Court committed error in passing the decree of eviction against appellant u/s 12(1)(a) of the Act. So far as decree of eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act is concerned, the law is well settled. Facts which are no more in dispute are that appellant was inducted as tenant in the suit accommodation by Thakurdas Chandani who happens to be father of respondents No. 1 and 2 vide rent note dated 1-7-1996. In the life time of Thakurdas Chandani appellant never denied his title. After his death, when the respondents No. 1 and 2 claimed ownership of the suit accommodation on the basis of Will Ex.P/2 dated 1-9-1993, appellant denied the title of respondents No. 1 and 2 and alleged that apart from respondents No. 1 and 2 there are other legal representatives also of the deceased. Hence, respondents No. 1 and 2 are not the sole owner of the suit accommodation. Up to this extent appellant was within his rights to assert the ownership of the suit accommodation also in other legal representatives of deceased Thakurdas Chandani. However, later-on appellant admitted the ownership of respondents No. 1 and 2 as is evident from the reply notice dated 11-3-1997 which is Ex.P/9 and which was issued by the counsel of the appellant upon his instructions wherein it was specifically informed to respondents No. 1 and 2 that it is admitted to the appellant that after the death of father i.e. Thakurdas Chandani, respondents No. 1 and 2 are the owners of suit accommodation. It was also admitted by the appellant in the said notice that by virtue of Will executed by Thakurdas Chandani respondents No. 1 and 2 are owners of suit accommodation. Thereafter on 13-11-1997 vide Ex.D/27 appellant through his counsel informed Ramesh Chandani brother of respondents No. 1 and 2 that appellant is tenant of respondents No. 1 and 2 after the death of Thakurdas Chandani who are the owners of the accommodation and Ramesh Chandani has nothing to do with it. Apart from this, from the orders dated 12-2-1998 and 26-12-1998 Ex.P/3 to P/5 passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Indore, it is evident that appellant did not dispute that respondents No. 1 and 2 are owner/landlord of suit accommodation. After admitting the ownership and tenancy in the notice dated 11-3-1997 and 13-11-1997 and also before Rent Controlling Authority, appellant submitted the written statement before the Court below on 16-11-1998 wherein not only landlords/ownership was disputed, but it was also disputed that any Will was executed by Thakurdas Chandani in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2. Appellant went one step ahead in the written statement and alleged that Thakurdas Chandani stated number of people that he wants to donate suit accommodation to Geeta Bhawan or some other Charitable Trust. In view of this, the denial of title by the appellant in the written statement filed by the appellant in the present eviction proceedings on 16-11-1998 cannot be said to be bona fide denial of title. Since appellant once admitted title of respondents No. 1 and 2, there was no justification on the part of the appellant in denying the title at any subsequent stage. Since the title of respondents No. 1 and 2 was admitted by the appellant, therefore, there was no necessity to prove the Will Ex.P/2 as per provisions of Indian Evidence Act and Indian Succession Act. Apart from this, it is surprising that after taking ground of eviction by the respondents No. 1 and 2 u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act, on account of disclaimer of title, by way of amendment in the suit, which was not a ground of eviction at the initial stage of filing of the suit, appellant did not bother to amend the written statement. Appellant was having opportunity to explain that in what circumstances appellant was compelled to deny the title of respondents No. 1 and 2, in spite of earlier admission on three occasions i.e. notice dated 13-11-1997 Ex.D/27, reply of notice dated 11-3-1997 Ex.P/9 and orders dated 12-2-1998 and 26-10-1998 Ex.P/3 and P/5 passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Indore. Since the appellant did not deny the allegations made by respondents No. 1 and 2 in the plaint by way of amendment, therefore, it ought to have been taken that allegations made by respondents No. 1 and 2 were admitted to the appellant. In view of the aforesaid facts and position of law, this Court is of the view that denial of the title by appellant was not bona fide and learned Court below committed no error in passing the decree against the appellant u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. Coming to the next ground of eviction u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act, the case of respondents No. 1 and 2 was that respondent No. 1 requires the suit accommodation for carrying on her business of Castrol Wheels. Undisputedly, respondent No. 1 who is a young lady is carrying on her business at Mumbai and Pune. Respondent No. 1 is manufacturer of Castrol Wheels. To prove her bona fides, not only respondent No. 1 came in witness box, but also examined her brother Ramesh Chandani who is resident of Indore. In the cross-examination of respondent No. 1, it has also come that respondent No. 1 is having customers of her product at Indore and she is supplying her Wheels at Indore as well. It is not a case where the respondent No. 1 has filed a suit for eviction of a tenant situated at Pune or Mumbai, where the respondent No. 1 is already doing the business. Had it been the suit for eviction of a tenant who is having accommodation at Pune or Mumbai, than certainly the respondent No. 1 was required to plead and prove expansion of her business and insufficiency of accommodation which is in her possession. In the present case, the respondent No. 1 intends to open a branch of her products at Indore. Respondent No. 1 is also having the customers at Indore, therefore, there is nothing on record on the basis of which it can be said that the need of respondent No. 1 is unnatural. In the present case, the respondent No. 1 intends to open a branch of her products at Indore. Respondent No. 1 is also having the customers at Indore, therefore, there is nothing on record on the basis of which it can be said that the need of respondent No. 1 is unnatural. On the contrary, the respondent No. 1 is a young lady and is in the business of manufacturing of Castrol Wheels and is also having property at Indore which is one of the best growing industrial/commercial township of Madhya Pradesh. No material has been placed by the appellant on record to enable this Court to draw inference that the reality was to the contrary and respondent No. 1 is merely attempting for getting rid of from the appellant. On the contrary, respondent No. 1 is having all the infrastructure, such as production of Castrol Wheels at Pune, customers of her product at Indore, suit property at Indore from where she can make an effort to capture the market in Madhya Pradesh and top of it a reliable person like her brother Ramesh Chandani who has offered himself to look after the business of respondent No. 1. It will not be out of place to mention that the State Government is inviting investors by arranging a global investors meet at Indore in the year 2007 while the respondent No. 1 thought to start her branch office of her products before 10 years but because of clumsy legal process could not start the same till to this date. In the opinion of this Court the need of respondent No. 1 is natural, real, sincere and honest and learned trial Court committed no error in passing the decree of eviction against the appellant u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act. In view of this, the appeal filed by the appellants stands allowed in part. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court so far as it relates to eviction of appellant u/s 12(1)(a) of the Act is concerned, is set-aside and the decree of eviction passed against the appellant u/s 12(1) (c) and (f) of the Act is concerned, is maintained. No order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed