A. K. SIKRI, J. ( 1 ) IN order to make thing simple and avoid any confusion while taking note of the facts of this case, we propose to give the same description to the parties as appeared in the suit. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff (the respondent No. 1 herein) filed two suits which were primarily against the defendant No. 1 (the appellant herein ). One suit was for possession and mesne profits and prayer made in the other suit was for permanent injunction. The suits related to room Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the first Floor of House No. J-125, Saket, New Delhi. The case of the plaintiff was that Sh. P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2 was the owner of the suit property. He let out the property to his son Sh. Surender Kumar who was operating a Gust House under the name and style "saket Gust House". Sh. Surender kumar died on 4. 5. 1992 leaving behind his legal heirs who were impleaded as the defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5. In this Gust House, the defendant No. 1 was inducted as a lodger in room Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 on the First Floor thereof for a period of three months under an Agreement to Licence dated 8. 4. 1988. ( 3 ) AFTER the death of Sh. Surender Kumar, his legal heirs namely the defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 surrendered their tenancy rights to the owner of the house namely the defendant No. 2 vide letter dated 24. 4. 1993 including the fixtures, fittings, telephone and geysers etc. On 6. 5. 1993, the defendant no. 2 sold the First Floor of the property along with a mezzanine to the plaintiff for valuable consideration and executed the documents transferring the property. Since the defendant No. 1 was in physical possession of the property, who was inducted as lodger by Sh. Surender Kumar, as mentioned above, constructive possession of the suit property was also delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant No. 2 as part performance. The defendant No. 2, vide registered letter dated 3. 9. 1993, informed the defendant No. 1 about the sale of suit property and required the defendant No. 1 to attorn to the plaintiff and to pay room charges, licence fee etc. to the plaintiff as per licence agreement dated 8. 4. 1988. The defendant No. 2, vide registered letter dated 3. 9. 1993, informed the defendant No. 1 about the sale of suit property and required the defendant No. 1 to attorn to the plaintiff and to pay room charges, licence fee etc. to the plaintiff as per licence agreement dated 8. 4. 1988. It would be necessary to point out at this stage that though, vide licence agreement dated 8. 4. 1988, the defendant No. 1 was inducted as a lodger for a period of three months, he had not vacated the premises and filed the suit for permanent injunction in the year 1992 being suit No. 379/1992 against the defendant No. 2 (who was the owner before the sale of the property by the defendant No. 2 to the plaintiff ). In this suit, he had stated that he was a tenant in the premises on monthly rent of Rs. 6,900/ -. ( 4 ) VIDE agreement dated 8. 1. 1997, the defendant No. 2 also sold fixtures, fittings, furniture, telephone etc. to the plaintiff and assigned him to recover hire charges from the defendant No. 1 from 6. 5. 1993. He informed the defendant No. 1 about this transaction as well. The defendant Nos. 3 to 5 also confirmed this transaction. ( 5 ) THE defendant No. 1, however, did not pay any rent or hire charges after 6. 5. 1993. The plaintiff, in these circumstances, served notice dated 9. 1. 1997 upon the defendant No. 1 terminating the tenancy. In suit No. 379/92, filed by the defendant No. 1, since he had claimed that he was tenant at Rs. 6,900/- per month, the plaintiff admitted him to be the tenant in the premises in question and notice was served under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff demanded the arrears of rent from the defendant No. 1. As the defendant No. 1 did not vacate the premises even after the service of the aforesaid quit notice, the plaintiff filed the suit for possession, recovery of rent and mesne profits as mentioned in the beginning. In this suit, he mentioned that though rent was not paid from 6/5/1993, since rent upto the period of 5. 2. 1994 was barred by time, arrears of rent were claimed from 6/2/1994 to 5/2/1997 amounting to Rs. 2,48,400. 00. However, from 6/2/1997 mesne profits @ Rs. In this suit, he mentioned that though rent was not paid from 6/5/1993, since rent upto the period of 5. 2. 1994 was barred by time, arrears of rent were claimed from 6/2/1994 to 5/2/1997 amounting to Rs. 2,48,400. 00. However, from 6/2/1997 mesne profits @ Rs. 50,000/- per month were claimed on the basis that this was the prevailing market rate and the defendant No. 1 was in unauthorized occupation as he had failed to vacate the suit premises by 5/2/1997 pursuant to the demand made in the notice to quit. Besides claiming interest @ 15% per annum on arrears of rent and mesne profits/damages, decree for possession was also prayed for. ( 6 ) THE defendant No. 1 filed the written statement taking various defences. At the outset, ownership of the plaintiff in the suit property was itself denied. Relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 was also denied stating that it was the defendant No. 2 sh. P. R. Mittal who was the owner of the property and, therefore, the plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had not filed any sale deed on record to suggest that he had become the owner of the suit property. Simply an agreement to sale dated 6. 5. 1993 was placed on record and this could not be the basis for passing the title in favour of the plaintiff and it was stated that the agreement to sell was not properly stamped as per the provisions of the Indian Stamps Act nor was it registered under the Registration Act though registration was compulsory. It was further pleaded that rent could be claimed only by the defendant No. 2, who was the owner of the property, but even he was not entitled to rent as the doctrine of suspension was applicable inasmuch as facility of water supply was disconnected despite orders passed in suit No. 379/92 in the absence of which the defendant No. 1 had been deprived the use of the premises purposely or effectively. On this basis, the defendant No. 1 even made counter claim of Rs. 4,93,672/- on the ground that he paid the water bill or excess electricity charges or annual repairs. ( 7 ) THE defendant Nos. 2 to 5 also filed their joint written statement. On this basis, the defendant No. 1 even made counter claim of Rs. 4,93,672/- on the ground that he paid the water bill or excess electricity charges or annual repairs. ( 7 ) THE defendant Nos. 2 to 5 also filed their joint written statement. Far from denying the claim of the plaintiff in the suit, they in fact supported the case of the plaintiff admitting that the defendant No. 2 sold the first floor of the suit property along with mezzanine to the plaintiff and had also required the defendant No. 1 to attorn the plaintiff. However, during the pendency of the suit, the defendant No. 2 died and his legal heirs were brought on record vide order dated 20. 9. 1999. These legal heirs abstained from the proceedings and were proceeded ex-parte on 20. 9. 1999. The defendant Nos. 3 to 5 also abstained from the proceedings and were proceeded ex-parte on 15. 5. 2000. ( 8 ) IN any case, the real contesting party was the defendant No. 1 and the battle lines were drawn between who stuck to their respective guns in the form of aforesaid pleadings. Missiles were set on fire thereafter against each other in the form of evidence led by the respective parties and final phase of close combat in the form of oral arguments of the counsel also took place. After hearing the parties, the learned ADJ has pronounced his verdict by passing the judgment and decree dated 24. 1. 2007 vide which the plaintiff has been declared victorious and the defendant No. 1 vanquished. Decree for possession was passed in respect of the said four rooms on the first floor of the suit property which were described and delineated in colour red in the site plan Ex. PW-1/2 filed by the plaintiff along with the plaint. Decree for arrears of rent in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant No. 1 @ rs. 6,900/- per month for the period from 6. 2. 1994 to 5. 2. 1997 also passed. Further, the plaintiff is held entitled to mesne profits @ 14,000/- per month with effect from 6. 2. 1997 till the possession of the suit property. Interest @ 6% per annum with effect from 6. 2. 1997 is also awarded on the mesne profits. Counter claims of the defendant No. 1 are dismissed. 1994 to 5. 2. 1997 also passed. Further, the plaintiff is held entitled to mesne profits @ 14,000/- per month with effect from 6. 2. 1997 till the possession of the suit property. Interest @ 6% per annum with effect from 6. 2. 1997 is also awarded on the mesne profits. Counter claims of the defendant No. 1 are dismissed. The plaintiffs second suit For permanent injunction is also dismissed and as that is not the subject matter of appeal, we have skipped discussion thereon. ( 9 ) THE defendant No. 1 has filed the instant appeal challenging the said judgment and decree. The plaintiff had filed the caveat and, therefore, appeared on the very first date itself when the matter came up for preliminary hearing. The arguments advanced were purely of legal nature and the counsel for both the sides agreed that these submissions could be made on the basis of papers filed in this appeal by the defendant No. 1 and it was not necessary to summon the record. They also agreed that defendant nos. 2 to 5 who were made respondent Nos. 2 to 5 in this appeal were proforma parties and it was not necessary to serve any notice upon them and the matter could be taken up for final arguments straightaway. Therefore, we heard the entire matter on the very first date and reserved the judgment. ( 10 ) BEFORE taking note of and appreciating the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of which the impugned judgment is attacked, we may place on record the findings of the learned trial court on the issues which are relevant for our purposes. ( 11 ) FOLLOWING issues were framed on 4. 2. 1998: "1. Whether the suit is bad for lack of locus-standi? OPD 2. Whether the suit is for lack of cause of action? OPD 3. Whether the suit if bad for lack of relationship of landlord of tenant? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has duly terminate the tenancy of the defendant? OPP 5. Whether the plaintiff entitled for possession of suit property? opp 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of rent, if so, for what sum and for which period? OPP 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profit, is so, at what rate and for which period? OPP 8. OPP 5. Whether the plaintiff entitled for possession of suit property? opp 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of rent, if so, for what sum and for which period? OPP 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profit, is so, at what rate and for which period? OPP 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest, if so, at what rate and for which period? OPP 9. Relief. " ( 12 ) AFTER the counter claims, additional issues were framed on 29. 10. 2003. The counter claims were dismissed for want of any evidence produced by the defendant No. 1. ( 13 ) NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that as many as nine issues were framed, the dispute essentially revolved on the plea taken by the defendant No. 1 to the effect that the plaintiff was not the owner of the suit premises and, therefore, he had no locus standi to file the suit. It is because of this reason that the relationship of landlord and tenant was denied and the defendant no. 1 also claimed that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession as well as the recovery of rent or mesne profits due to the reason that he lacked ownership in the premises and the defendant No. 1 never accepted him as owner or landlord. As far as service of notice dated 9. 1. 1997, sent by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1 terminating the tenancy, is concerned, the defendant No. 1 did not deny the receipt of the said notice but challenged the validity of this notice on the same ground, namely, as the plaintiff was not the owner and landlord of the suit premises, he had no locus standi to send such a notice and terminate the tenancy. Therefore, bone of contention remains the same namely whether the plaintiff had become the owner of the suit premises and landlord of the defendant No. 1. ( 14 ) THE facts are also not in dispute. The genuineness of the documents on record produced by the plaintiff is not contested. The case of the defendant no. 1 is that these documents are not sufficient to pass on the title in favour of the plaintiff. This was the main plank of defence before the trial court in which the defendant No. 1 failed and same contention was raised before us as well. The case of the defendant no. 1 is that these documents are not sufficient to pass on the title in favour of the plaintiff. This was the main plank of defence before the trial court in which the defendant No. 1 failed and same contention was raised before us as well. ( 15 ) THE plea of the defendant No. 1 was that the defendant No. 2 had no authority either to sell the first floor or the proportionate land or sub divide the the portion to the plaintiff as the terms of perpetual lease deed executed between the plaintiff and the lessor/precedent of India did not permit so. Further, there was no transfer of title as per the provisions of sections 53 A and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in favour of the plaintiff and for want of registered sale deed, the plaintiff could not be termed as owner of the property. It was submitted that the agreement to sell does not transfer the title. This contention of the defendant No. 1 was rejected by the learned trial court giving the following reasons: " (a) ownership or title of the property is one concept and landlord is another concept. The owner of the property will always remain landlord, however, it is not necessary that the landlord will always to be the owner of the immovable property. (b) perpetual lease deed, no doubt covenants certain terms and conditions between the principal lessor and the lessee Shri P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2 and in case Shri P. R. Mittal had acted contrary to the terms of lease, it is a subject matter between the principal lessor and the lessee; the defendant No. 1 Shri Anil kumar Marwah being tenant in the suit property would not derive any benefit qua the terms of lease, inter-se the principal lessor and the lessee; (c) the defendant No. 1 has been taking inconsistent stand in his pleadings as well as in evidence. In Suit No. 379/1992 and in the written statement to the present suits, he has admitted to be the tenant on the monthly rent of Rs. 6,900/- under the landlord/owner Shri P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2. In Suit No. 379/1992 and in the written statement to the present suits, he has admitted to be the tenant on the monthly rent of Rs. 6,900/- under the landlord/owner Shri P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2. He had denied the status of Shri Surender Kumar or his letting out the premises to him, however, the defendant No. 1 in his affidavit R-1 or in the written arguments, highlighted that Shri Surender Kumar was his landlord or he had let the property or if Shri P. R. Mittal had no role in letting out the premises. In fact, this inconsistent or paradoxical stand corroborates the case of the plaintiff that initially, the premises was given by Shri Surender Kumar to the defendant No. 1 Shri Anil Kumar Marwah, however, Shri surender Kumar had surrendered his tenancy rights in favour of Shri P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2; the defendant No. 1 Shri Anil kumar Marwah remained in the premises and later on the plaintiff Shri Deepak Sunder purchased the premises in question. Shri Deepak Sunder also became party/defendant to civil suit No. 379/92 by order dated 20. 3. 1995 (Ex. DW1/p6 ). The order dated 20. 3. 95 Ex. DW1/p6 attained finality. (d) it is well known that the agreement to sell is not transfer of complete title, certainly the agreement to sell is a step towards the transfer of title. It is an undisputed fact that Shri P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2 was alloted the property J-125, Saket, new Delhi by way of perpetual lease deed. The defendant No. 2 shri P. R. Mittal in his written statement had also narrated categorically that the suit premises was sold for consideration by him to the plaintiff Shri Deepak Sunder and the constructive possession was delivered to him. The plaintiff had also proved the notice dated 03. 09. 1993 (Ex. PW1/5) by Shri P. R. Mittal/defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 in respect of the sale of suit premises to the plaintiff Shri Deepak Sunder and the defendant No. 2 had filed postal receipt No. 0344 (Ex. PW-1/6)and postal certificate (Ex. PW-1/7 ). The service of notice on the defendant No. 1, the record filed by the defendant No. 2, has been proved by the plaintiff. There was an objection at the stage of final arguments about the proof of carbon copy of notice by (Ex. PW-1/5)or letter dated 8. 1. PW-1/6)and postal certificate (Ex. PW-1/7 ). The service of notice on the defendant No. 1, the record filed by the defendant No. 2, has been proved by the plaintiff. There was an objection at the stage of final arguments about the proof of carbon copy of notice by (Ex. PW-1/5)or letter dated 8. 1. 1997 being notice by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 (Ex. PW1/19), however, this objection does not sustain since the objection was not taken at the juncture of proof of documents and secondly, the witness PW-1 Shri Deepak sunder (in Suit No. 118/06/97) was not cross examined on behalf of the defendant. This objection of the defendant does not sustain in the light of Krupanidhi Educational Institute v. Super sale 2002 10 SCC 496 ; (e) the provisions of Section 53a and 54 of Transfer of Property Act or Section 17 of Registration Act, no doubt it relates to the title of the property or registrable documents. The case law presented also pertains the title of the documents. In the present case there is no dispute of title of the property, while assessing the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 and it is not a title suit between the plaintiff on one side and the defendants on the other side. Had there been a dispute of title amongst the parties, the statutory provisions of Transfer of Property Act and of Indian registration Act or the case law/precedent would prevail. " ( 16 ) THE learned trial court then put a poser as to whether the plaintiff had gained the status of landlord and whether the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 existed and recorded the following findings : " (f) the plaintiff has proved an agreement to sell dated 06. 05. 1993 (Ex. PW-1/4) by the defendant No. 2 Shri P. R. Mittal in favour of the plaintiff Shri Deepak Sunder. The Will dated 06. 05. 1993 and letter of probate (Ex. PW-1/9 and Ex. PW-18) have also been proved by the plaintiff. The property was also assessed in the name of the plaintiff in the record of Municipal Corporation of delhi by way of assessment order Ex. PW1/24. The Will dated 06. 05. 1993 and letter of probate (Ex. PW-1/9 and Ex. PW-18) have also been proved by the plaintiff. The property was also assessed in the name of the plaintiff in the record of Municipal Corporation of delhi by way of assessment order Ex. PW1/24. (g) considering the documents, aforementioned and the written statement of the defendant No. 2 Shri P. R. Mittal, it stands establish that Shri P. R. Mittal never exercised his option as landlord of the defendant No. 1 Shri Anil Kumar Marwah after execution of the documents. The defendant No. 1 also failed to establish that after 06. 05. 1993, Shir P. R. Mittal ever since exercised his rights as landlord towards the defendant No. 1 Anil kumar Marwah in respect of any aspect. The entire circumstances corroborates that Shri Deepak Sunder was exercising his rights, after purchase the suit property by way of agreement to sell and after the defendant No. 2's notice to the defendant No. 1, as landlord of the defendant No. 1. Therefore, by operation of law, the plaintiff became landlord of the defendant No. 1. There was existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. " ( 17 ) THE learned trial court, thus, concluded that since the plaintiff had established that he was the landlord and the defendant No. 1 was his tenant, there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the plaintiff had locus standi to file the suit. Consequently, it was also held that he had right to terminate the tenancy as the notice terminating the tenancy was not disputed, which notice was otherwise valid as it conformed to the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, the defendant No. 1 was in unauthorized use and occupation of the premises with effect from 5. 2. 1997 and entitled to mesne profits which were awarded @ Rs. 14,000/- per month i. e. virtually double the contractual rate of rent. There was hardly any issue in so far as recovery of arrears of rent for the period from 6. 2. 1994 to 5. 2. 1997 is concerned as admittedly during this period no rent was paid by the defendant No. 1. 14,000/- per month i. e. virtually double the contractual rate of rent. There was hardly any issue in so far as recovery of arrears of rent for the period from 6. 2. 1994 to 5. 2. 1997 is concerned as admittedly during this period no rent was paid by the defendant No. 1. ( 18 ) AS pointed out above, since the arguments of defendant No. 1 in this appeal remains the same namely the plaintiff did not become the owner of the property by virtue of sale and further that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, we have to examine as to whether the aforesaid findings of the trial court are legally sustainable. ( 19 ) TO appreciate the controversy, we may reproduce the admitted facts. The defendant No. 2 was the owner of the property in question. The defendant No. 1 did not deny this fact. In suit No. 379/1992 filed by the defendant No. 1 as well as written statement to the suit in question filed by the plaintiff, he admitted that he was tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 6,900/-under the defendant No. 2 who was the owner, though in his affidavit by way of evidence, he took the plea that the suit premises were let out through sh. Surender Kumar son of defendant No. 2. This plea is rightly discarded by the learned trial court in view of defendant No. 1's own admission in the written statement itself as well as in his plaint filed in suit No. 379/1992. Therefore, we can proceed on the premise that the defendant No. 1 had accepted the defendant No. 2 as his landlord as well. The defendant No. 2, along with the defendant Nos. 3 to 5, filed the joint written statement in the trial court admitting that he had sold the premises in question to the plaintiff and the plaintiff had become the owner of the suit premises. The letter of attornment by the defendant No. 2 to the defendant No. 1 informing the defendant No. 1 about the transfer of the suit property to the plaintiff and requiring him to pay the rent to the plaintiff is proved on record. The service of this notice on defendant No. 1 by the defendant No. 2 has been proved by the plaintiff. The service of this notice on defendant No. 1 by the defendant No. 2 has been proved by the plaintiff. The learned trial court has observed that the plaintiff was not even cross-examined on this aspect by the defendant No. 1. Therefore in so far erstwhile owner, viz defendant No. 2 is concerned, he had come out with the plea that not only he sold the suit premises to the plaintiff for valuable consideration, he specifically called upon the defendant No. 1 to attorn in favour of the plaintiff and start paying rent to him. The defendant No. 2 in his life time itself had written letter to the defendant No. 1 telling him that the plaintiff had purchased the property from him and he should attorn in his favour. Ever since it is the plaintiff who exercised his right as landlord towards the defendant. ( 20 ) IN this backdrop, the plea, taken by the defendant No. 1 disputing ownership of the plaintiff, becomes meaningless. In any case, the question as to whether the agreement to sell was sufficient to transfer the title in favour of the plaintiff need not even detain us because of one more significant factor. No doubt, by mere agreement to sell, which is only a step towards the transfer of title, title does not pass and for this purpose registered sale deed is required to be executed between the parties which needs compulsory registration as well. However, in this case, the defendant No. 2, in addition to agreement to sell dated 6. 5. 1993, had executed Will dated 6. 5. 1993 as well. On the death of defendant No. 2, the Will became operative. On the basis of this Will, the plaintiff had even obtained letter of probate as well from competent court of law. The Will was proved before the learned trial court also as Ex. PW1/9 and probate as Ex. PW18. On the basis of this probate the property has been mutated in favour of the plaintiff by the MCD and assessment is in the name of the plaintiff. One such assessment order was also proved Ex. PW1/25. In view of the aforesaid, the controversy raised by the defendant No. 1, which is founded on agreement to sell, goes into the pale of insignificance. In any case, the plaintiff has become the owner of the premises by virtue of Will. One such assessment order was also proved Ex. PW1/25. In view of the aforesaid, the controversy raised by the defendant No. 1, which is founded on agreement to sell, goes into the pale of insignificance. In any case, the plaintiff has become the owner of the premises by virtue of Will. ( 21 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant advanced an argument, in this context, that the effect of the Will should not be seen as that was not the part of pleadings. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A. V. G. P. Chettiar and Sons and Others v. T. Palanisamy grounder, 2002 (5) SCC 337 and particularly emphasised the following passage there from: "the High Court's reasoning was far removed from the pleadings of the respondent. The respondent had claimed that Gowthaman was the absolute owner of the suit property and that such absolute interest had been purchased by the respondent. Given this pleading the respondent could not be allowed to set up a different case and take shelter behind the definition of "landlord" in the Act. The definition of "landlord" is an enabling provision in the sense that it enables persons who are not the owners to ask for eviction under the Act. But it does not mean that a person who has claimed to be the landlord qua owner can jettison his case as pleaded in his eviction petition and established claim on the basis that he was otherwise entitled to claim as landlord of the suit premises. As held in Trojan and Co. v. Rm. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar: (AIR p. 240, para 22) "it is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. " ( 22 ) NO doubt, the case is to be decided on the pleadings. However, subsequent event can be taken note of to do complete justice in the matter as provided under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC. Interpreting this provision, the supreme Court in the case Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and general Traders, AIR 1975 SC 140, has observed as under: "we feel the submissions devoid'of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis a vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. Interpreting this provision, the supreme Court in the case Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and general Traders, AIR 1975 SC 140, has observed as under: "we feel the submissions devoid'of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis a vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date of a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the Us has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decrotal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myraid. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments (subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fair-'ness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the high Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict in view of the inhibition written into Section 10 (3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact. 6. The law we have set out is of ancient vintage. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact. 6. The law we have set out is of ancient vintage. We will merely refer 10 Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri [1940] F. C. R. 85 which is a leading case on the point. Gwyer C. J. , in the above case, referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the united States in Patterson v. State of Alabama 294 U. S. 600, 607: we have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. and said that that view of the Court's powers was reaffirmed once again in the then recent case of Minnesota v. National Tea Co. 309 U. S. 551, 555. Sulaimun J. , in the same case [1940] F. C. R. 85 relied on English cases and took the view that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by him at the date on which the appeal was heard, (emphasis, ours ). Varadachariar J. , dealt with the same point a little more comprehensively. We may content ourselves with excerpting one passage which brings out the point luminously (at p. 103): it is also on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. " ( 23 ) EVEN the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant based on Section 53a and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act would not cut much ice. Section 54 defines "sale" as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. " ( 23 ) EVEN the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant based on Section 53a and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act would not cut much ice. Section 54 defines "sale" as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. No doubt, such transfer is effected only by a registered instrument and it cannot be said that by mere agreement to sell, there is a transfer of ownership. However, here the dispute is not between the erstwhile owner who has entered into agreement to sell with the plaintiff. The dispute is between the plaintiff and the person who was inducted as tenant by the defendant No, 2, the then owner of the premises. The defendant No. 2 had taken full consideration from the plaintiff. He had given symbolic possession of the premises to the plaintiff as well since the actual possession was with the defendant No 1. In order to cement this relationship further, he wrote to the defendant No, 1 to attorn in favour of the plaintiff and start giving him the rent. ( 24 ) WE may at this stage even take note of the conduct of the defendant no. 1. On the plea that he did not accept the plaintiff as landlord, he did not pay any rent to the plaintiff. At the same time, he did not even tender the rent to the defendant No. 2 or his legal heirs after the death of the defendant no. 2. This was the position till the filing of the suit. He paid rent only after the orders were passed by the learned trial court directing him to pay the rent to the plaintiff. There are huge arrears on account of mesne profits at well. ( 25 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant had referred the following judgments: 1. Bua Ditta Mal v. Devi Ditta Mal, AIR 1931 Lahore 130. 2. T. Nathon and others v. Mrs. A. S. Nathon, AIR 1930 Oudh 272. 3. Hukmi Chand v. Mt. Bhanwari, AIR (39) 1952 Rajasthan 51. 4. K. M. Varghese and others v. K. M. Oommen and others, air 1994 Kerala 85. However, in view of our discussion above, none of these judgments would come to the rescue of the appellant. 2. T. Nathon and others v. Mrs. A. S. Nathon, AIR 1930 Oudh 272. 3. Hukmi Chand v. Mt. Bhanwari, AIR (39) 1952 Rajasthan 51. 4. K. M. Varghese and others v. K. M. Oommen and others, air 1994 Kerala 85. However, in view of our discussion above, none of these judgments would come to the rescue of the appellant. In all these cases the principle which is laid down in the probate proceedings, the question to be decided by the Court as to whether Will is proved to be duly executed and, therefore, by showing that the respondent had obtained the probate would not mean; that his ownership is established. However, it is not only that the respondent has obtained the letter of administration by proving the Will, the defendant no. 2 and legal heirs of the defendant No. 2 have also accepted the ownership of the respondent. The said property stands mutated in the name of the respondent who is paying the property tax as well. ( 26 ) IN so far as counter claims of the appellant are concerned, the appellant did not lead any evidence. The grievance is that the appellant was not allowed to lead the evidence. It was predicated on the premise that counter claims are to be treated as separate suit in view of provisions of order 8 Rule 6 CPC and, therefore, separate and independent opportunity should have been given to the appellant to lead the evidence which was denied. Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mitthulal and another v. the State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 149 was cited and para 4 thereof which was read by the learned counsel is to the following effect: "it is apparent from a bare reading of the judgment of the High Court that it suffers from a serious infirmity and it is impossible to sustain it. The High Court has based its conclusion not only on the evidence recorded in the case against the appellants and the four other accused but also taken into account the evidence recorded in the cross-case against Ganpat, Rajdhar and others. This is what the High Court has stated in so many terms in paragraph 7 of the judgment: "the two cases Cr. A. No. 188 and Cr. This is what the High Court has stated in so many terms in paragraph 7 of the judgment: "the two cases Cr. A. No. 188 and Cr. A. No. 202 of 1968 have to be read together and then alone the real position can be understood. The witnesses in one case are undoubtedly accused in the other. It is by going through the evidence in both the cases that we can come to the real story. The Nandwanshis claim that the fight took place in the field belonging to them, and, therefore, they had a right of private defence, whereas the other party similarly claims that the fight took place in their field and they had a right of private defence. Curiously enough both claim that the origin of the trouble is the grazing of the cattle. If we read both the cases together with the statement of the accused in one case and the version of the witnesses of the prosecution in the other along with the statement of the accused and the version of the prosecution witnesses in the other we can come to the true story. Independently considered a particular case, it creates some confusion. If both the cases are read together there leaves no room for doubt that the incident happened in the following manner. . . . . . . . . . . . After going through the evidence of both the cases I have come to the conclusion that the convictions in both the cases are in order. " This was clearly impermissible to the high Court. It is difficult to comprehend as to how the High Court could decide the appeal before it by taking into account evidence recorded in another case, even though it might be what is loosely called a cross-case. It is elementary that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. Even in civil cases this cannot be done unless the parties are agreed that the evidence in one case may be treated as evidence in the other. Much more so in criminal cases would this be impermissible. It is doubtful whether the evidence recorded in one criminal case can be treated as evidence in the other, even with the consent of the accused. Much more so in criminal cases would this be impermissible. It is doubtful whether the evidence recorded in one criminal case can be treated as evidence in the other, even with the consent of the accused. But here there was clearly no consent of the appellants to treat the evidence recorded in the cross-case against Ganpat and Rajdhar as evidence in the case against them. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in taking into consideration the evidence recorded in the cross-case against Ganpat and Rajdhar. The High Court ought to have decided the appeal before it only on the basis of the evidence recorded in the present case and ought not to have allowed itself to be influenced by the evidence recorded in the cross-case against Ganpat and Rajdhar. IT is regrettable that the High Court should have fallen into such an obvious error. The judgment of the High Court must, therefore, be set aside on the evidence recorded in the present case - without looking into the evidence recorded in the other cross-case - the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellants can be sustained. " ( 27 ) THIS plea of the learned counsel has no substance as the following two answers reveal: (a) The counter claims are to be treated as suit for the purpose of giving opportunity to the plaintiff to file reply/written statement to these counter claims. Otherwise, these are in the "same suit" as provided under Sub Rule 2 of Rule 6a of Order 8 CPC. Order 8 Rule 6a CPC reads as under: "6a. Counter-claim by defendant.- (1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under rule 6, set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not: provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. (2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court. (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints. " Therefore, in so far as proceeding in the matter is concerned, these are in the "same suit". Order 8 Rule 6 (C) further clarifies that the counter claims are in the nature of defence. It is not denied that after the evidence of the plaintiff (respondent herein) was over, the defendant (appellant herein) was given opportunity to lead his evidence. He had filed his affidavit in the form of examination-in-chief and was duly cross-examined. In his affidavit, he talked about counter claims as well. However, after this was over and the case was to be listed for arguments, the plea was raised for examination of the defendant as witness again in support of counter claim. It was turned down by the learned ADJ, vide order dated 14. 11. 2006, holding that provisions of Rule 6 (C) of Order 8 CPC do not permit the defendant to make separate trial by leading separate evidence on his counter claim. In support, the learned trial court also referred to the judgment of this Court in Cofex exports Ltd. v. Canara Bank, AIR 1997 Delhi 355 : 1997 (43) DRJ 754 (DB ). In view of this legal position, the request was rightly turned down as the appellant had been given opportunity to lead his evidence and it was not permissible for him to lead additional evidence again. (b) The two suits filed were consolidated and common evidence was to be led. Therefore, the appellant was expected to lead evidence in one go. ( 28 ) THE learned trial court, thus, rightly rejected the counter claims as there was no evidence even on record produced by the appellant to justify these counter claims. ( 29 ) BOTH the appeals are, thus, without any merit. We dismiss these appeals with costs.