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2007 DIGILAW 1122 (RAJ)

Narendra Kumar v. State of Rajasthan

2007-05-28

DINESH MAHESHWARI, P.B.MAJMUDAR

body2007
JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 7.11.2006 passed in SBCWP No. 5646/2000 whereby the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that since the cause is originated in Revenue District of Sikar, the petitioner can agitate his grievance before the Jaipur Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge also directed the Registry to place the record of the case before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders with regard to transfer of this petition to Jaipur Bench. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that a dispute arose between the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and the private operators regarding grant of two non-temporary stage carriage permits on the interstate route Rajgarh-Hissar via Jhumpa. The writ petitions were preferred by the Corporation before this Court which were allowed by the learned Single Judge, against which some private operators as well as the Corporation preferred Special Appeals before the Division Bench of this Court. In those appeals, this Court held that the permits on the route in favour of the Corporation did not survive as a result of condition with regard to the counter signature of the permits and the Corporation not securing renewal after expiry of the permit. This Court further held that permits granted in favour of Shri Rishi Kumar and Pawan Kumar on the route by the Tribunal vide order dated 17.1.1998 cannot be sustained. This Court further held that the existing vacancy must be notified by inviting all the original applicants who are aspirants to make an application to consider grant of permit. 3. It is also the case of the present appellant in the writ petition that in pursuance of the directions issued by this Court, the Regional Transport Authority, Sikar (RTA) notified the vacancies for grant of two non-temporary stage carriage permits to operate four single trips on the interstate route Rajgarh-Hisar via Jhumpa vide notification dated 5.8.2003 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 13.8.2003. By the said notification, the persons aspirant to obtain the permit on the route were called upon to submit their applications within a period of 30 days from the publication of the notification. In pursuance of the said notification, the appellant made an application for grant of permit on the route in question. By the said notification, the persons aspirant to obtain the permit on the route were called upon to submit their applications within a period of 30 days from the publication of the notification. In pursuance of the said notification, the appellant made an application for grant of permit on the route in question. It is the case of the appellant that he belongs to a family which is engaged in transport business and providing transport services to the commuter public on various routes for last more than 50 years. The applications were considered by the RTA, Sikar in its meeting held on 10.2.2004 and against the two existing vacancies on the interstate route in question, the permits were granted in favour of Bharat Singh S/o. Man Singh and Sube Singh S/o. Chhotu Ram Harijan whose applications were listed before the learned RTA at serial No. 40 and 41 respectively. It is the case of the appellant that the RTA had not examined the competitive claim of the applicants aspirant for the grant of permit and straightway granted permits in favour of Bharat Singh and Sube Singh, giving preference on the ground that Bharat Singh is ex-service man and Sube Singh is a member of Scheduled caste. 4. The said decision of RTA, Sikar was assailed by the appellant by way of writ petition, being SBCWP No. 1266/2004. The said writ petition, was dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy before the State Transport Appellate Authority (STAT) vide order dated 12.4.2004. The said decision of the learned Single Judge was challenged before the Division Bench by way of D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 294/2000. The special appeal was allowed on 13.5.2004 and resolution dated 5.3.2004 was quashed in so far as it related to the grant of permit to Shri Bharat Singh and Shri Sube Singh. The RTA, Sikar was directed to reconsider the application submitted by the appellants and others in pursuance of notification dated 5.8.2003 within a period of two months for grant of permits against the existing vacancies on the interstate route Rajgarh-Hissar via Jhumpa in accordance with law. 5. Against the judgment of Division Bench dated 13.5.2004, Shri Bharat Singh preferred a special leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was also dismissed by order dated 28.6.2004. 6. The RTA, Sikar thereafter considered the applications of the applicants. 5. Against the judgment of Division Bench dated 13.5.2004, Shri Bharat Singh preferred a special leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was also dismissed by order dated 28.6.2004. 6. The RTA, Sikar thereafter considered the applications of the applicants. On 4.8.2004, when the RTA commenced the hearing of the application, one Radhey Shyam produced the copy of stay order dated 3.8.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge of Jaipur Bench of this High Court. An interim order was also passed in favour of Ranveer Singh by the Jaipur Bench of this Court. 7. When the appellant came to know about the aforesaid writ petitions preferred by Radhey Shyam and Ranveer Singh and ad interim order passed therein, he preferred an application for impleading him as party respondent in the writ petition but no specific order was passed on the said applications and ultimately, the said writ petitions were allowed by the learned Single Judge on 12.8.2004 and the application of the appellant for joining him as party respondent was rejected. The learned Single judge directed the RTA, Sikar to declare the result and further to consider all the application which were considered in the meeting held on 5.3.2004 except the applications of Shri Bharat Singh and Shri Sube Singh. 8. The said order was challenged before the Division Bench at the instance of Shri Bharat Singh and Shri Sube Singh and the appeals so preferred were allowed by judgment dated 28.10.2004. This Court directed to consider all the 14 applications including the applications preferred by Bharat Singh and Sube Singh for grant of permit on the interstate route in question afresh on merits.The RTA thereafter considered all the applications preferred by the applicants vide resolution dated 6.12.2004 and resolved to grant permits in favour of appellant Narendra Kumar, Bharat Singh, Sube Singh and Rishi Kumar for operating four single trips. Half permit was granted in favour of each of the applicants to operate one single trip daily. 9. Being aggrieved by the said decision of RTA, appeals were preferred before the STAT which included appeals of respondents No. 4 and 5 as well as seven others. The Tribunal vide order dated 29.7.2005 dismissed six appeals. Half permit was granted in favour of each of the applicants to operate one single trip daily. 9. Being aggrieved by the said decision of RTA, appeals were preferred before the STAT which included appeals of respondents No. 4 and 5 as well as seven others. The Tribunal vide order dated 29.7.2005 dismissed six appeals. The Tribunal also set aside the resolution dated 6.12.2004 and one permit each in favour of Sube Singh and Bharat Singh was granted on the interstate route in question for operating four single trips. Half permits granted in favour of the appellant and Shri Rishi Kumar each were cancelled and their applications for grant of permit were rejected. 10. It is the aforesaid decision dated 29.7.2005, which was challenged before the learned Single Judge by way of the aforesaid writ petition No. 5646/2005. The learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 7.11.2006 came to the conclusion that the cause sought to be agitated in the present writ petition is arising in Revenue District of Sikar and the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate dispute arising out of Revenue District of Sikar lies with Jaipur Bench of this Court in the light of Presidential Order dated 08.12.1976 and also in the light of notification dated 23.12.1976 issued by the then acting Chief Justice of this Court, as well as in view of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocate's Association v. Union of India and Ors. Reported in (2001) 2 SCC 294 . 11. Considering the aforesaid notification as well as the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that in the present case, the cause having originated in the Revenue District of Sikar, the petitioner can agitate his grievance before the Jaipur Bench. In that view of the matter, the petition is required to be filed at Jaipur Bench as the petition can be filed at Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur only if the cause is originate in Revenue Districts of Jodhpur, Pali, Nagaur, Banner, Jaisalmer, Sirohi, Jalore, Udaipur, Dungarpur, Banswara, Rajsamand, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Bikaner, Sriganganagar, Hanumangarh and Churu. 12. It has been submitted by Mr. 12. It has been submitted by Mr. Sangeet Lodha appearing for the appellant-original petitioner that the learned Single Judge has gravely erred in coming to the conclusion that the petition is not maintainable before Principal Seat at Jodhpur even though the part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court as the length of inter-state route in question is i.e. Rajgarh-Hissar via Jhumpa is 72 Kms., out of which a portion of 24 kms. from Rajgarh lies in the State of Rajasthan and remaining 48 kms. lies in the State of Haryana. The entire Rajasthan portion of the route falls within Churu District which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur. It is submitted that by setting aside the resolution passed by the RTA, the appellant-original petitioner was required to ply the vehicle on the said route which originates from Rajgarh in Churu District which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur and therefore, a part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that vacancies on the route have come into existence by virtue of the order passed by this Court at Jodhpur and thereafter the resolution adopted by the learned RTA, Sikar was set aside by this Court and direction for re-consideration was issued by the Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur. Therefore, it cannot be said that in the present case, no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of this Court. The petition filed by the present appellant before this Court is maintainable and the order of the learned Single Judge is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 13. The learned Advocate Mr. B.L. Maheshwari on the other hand submitted that the Regional Transport Authority, Sikar is empowered to decide the question of grant of permit on the interstate route in question and since on the basis of said decision, a person can ply the vehicle and since Sikar is within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench, the decision of said authority can be challenged only at Jaipur and not at Jodhpur. Mr. Mr. Maheshwari has further submitted that no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. It is also submitted by Mr. Maheshwari that in view of presidential notification dated 08.12.1976 and also in light of notification dated 23.12.1976 issued by the then acting Chief Justice of this Court, the principal Seat at Jodhpur has no territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter and the order of passed by the RTA, Sikar cannot be challenged before the Principal Seat at Jodhpur. 14. Both the learned Advocates have also cited various judgments in support of their respective contentions. 15. We have heard the learned Advocates for both the sides at length. We have also considered the case laws cited by both the sides. 16. The principal question which requires consideration is whether the petition submitted before Principal Seat at Jodhpur is maintainable and whether cause of action or part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of Jodhpur. 17. The question of territorial jurisdiction always depends upon the facts of the case. If no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur, the petition is required to be filed before Jaipur Bench of this High Court. Even if a part of cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur, then in such eventuality, in our view, the Principal Seat at Jodhpur has also got jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 18. No doubt it is true that Regional Transport Authority is located at Sikar which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench. It is however, required to be noted that by virtue of decision of RTA, Sikaner, the person in whose favour, permit is granted is entitled to ply the vehicle on the prescribed route. In the instant case, on the basis of decision of RTA, the appellant who was granted 1/2 permit was entitled to have his vehicle plied on the interstate route in question originated from Rajgarh. 19. In the instant case, on the basis of decision of RTA, the appellant who was granted 1/2 permit was entitled to have his vehicle plied on the interstate route in question originated from Rajgarh. 19. It is required to be noted that in view of the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rishi Kumar v. STAT (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1068/1998) and Pawan Kumar v. STAT (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1069/1998), the RTA, Sikar notified the vacancies for grant of non-temporary state carriage permit to operate four single trips on the interstate carriage route in question. The route in question was to originate from Rajgarh which falls within Churu District which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur and by virtue of impugned order of the Tribunal, the claim of the appellant for operating the trip on Rajgarh-Hissar route is denied. In our view, it can be said that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur and the petition can be said to be maintainable before Principal Seat at Jodhpur. 20. It is also required to be noted that earlier the Division Bench of this Court at Jodhpur vide order dated 13.5.2004 allowed D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 294/2000 preferred by the appellant and the resolution dated 5.3.2004 passed by the learned RTA, Sikar was quashed in so far as it related to the grant of permit to Bharat Singh and Sube Singh. The RTA was directed to reconsider the applications submitted by the appellants and others in pursuance of notification dated 5.8.2003 within a period of two months for grant of permits against the existing vacancies on the interstate route Rajgarh-Hissar via Jhumpa in accordance with law. Therefore, the Division Bench of this Court at Jodhpur had entertained the appeal in respect of interstate route in question. It is also required to be noted that the length of inter-state route in question i.e. Rajgarh-Hissar via Jhumpa is 72 kms., out of which a portion of 24 kms. from Rajgarh lies in the State of Rajasthan and remaining 48 kms. lies in the State of Haryana. The entire Rajasthan portion of the route falls within Churu District which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur. from Rajgarh lies in the State of Rajasthan and remaining 48 kms. lies in the State of Haryana. The entire Rajasthan portion of the route falls within Churu District which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur. There is no reason as to why if any dispute arises in connection with the permit in question and when the said permit is in relation with the route, part of which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur, the petition at Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur is not maintainable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Principal Seat at Jodhpur is having no jurisdiction to decide the case. 21. It is not possible for us to accept the argument of Mr. Maheshwari that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur and the entire cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench as RTA is located at Sikar and that since the applicants have applied at Sikar and on the basis of decision of such authority at Sikar, the person is entitled to ply the vehicle on the interstate route in question and that Sikar being included within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of this Court, the Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Simply because the Regional Transport Authority, Sikar is empowered to give permit for route in question and since his office is located within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of this Court, in our view, it cannot be said that only Jaipur Bench will have jurisdiction to decide the case. Even if Head Office is located at a particular place and if the decision of such authority affects the right of the person at other place, the Court at the place where such rights are affected shall have also the territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case, the rights of the appellant are also affected in respect of interstate route in question and he is deprived of plying the vehicle on the said route, a part whereof falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. In the instant case, the rights of the appellant are also affected in respect of interstate route in question and he is deprived of plying the vehicle on the said route, a part whereof falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. In our view, therefore, apart from the fact that earlier matter was heard by the Division Bench of Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur, even otherwise, in view of the fact that the route is originated form Rajgarh which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of principal Seat at Jodhpur, the Principal Seat at Jodhpur has also jurisdiction. It is not possible to accept the say of Mr. Maheshwari that since the appellant had applied for permit at Sikar, he cannot approach the Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur on the ground that the application was made at Sikar and the decision was also taken at Sikar which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of this High Court. The effect of said decision also covers the part of the area which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. We are, therefore, of the view that a part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 22. Mr. B.L. Maheshwari however, submitted that since the first petition was filed in Jaipur Bench, only Jaipur Bench will have jurisdiction to decide the case. As pointed out earlier, it is a case wherein both the Principal Seat as well as Jaipur Bench of this Court can be said to have jurisdiction over the matter. 23. Mr. Maheshwari has however relied on Section 68 and 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Relevant part whereof are re-produced hereunder: "68. Transport Authorities: (1) The State Government shall by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute for the State a State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and function specified in sub-section (3) and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such areas (in this Chapter referred to as regions) as may be specified in the notification in respect of each Regional Transport Authority; the powers and functions conferred by or under this Chapter on such Authorities: Provided that in the Union Territories, the Administrator may abstain from constituting any Regional Transport Authority. 69. 69. General provision as to applications for permits-(1) Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles: Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal, to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles: Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. (2) Notwithstanding, anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in the case of any vehicle or vehicles proposed to be used in two or more regions lying in different States, the application under that sub-section shall be made to the State Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. 24. Relying on the aforesaid provision, Mr. Maheshwari submitted that the permits for interstate route in question is to be granted by the Regional Transport Authority at Sikar and Rajgarh-Hissar route is within the powers of Regional Transport Authority at Sikar, and when the application is also made at Sikar, the cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Sikar which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of this High Court and therefore, only the Jaipur Bench of this High Court has jurisdiction to decide the case. 25. 25. It is required to be noted that simply because Regional Transport Authority Sikar has been given power to grant permits for the interstate route in question, it cannot be said that Jaipur Bench alone shall have jurisdiction to deal with the matter even if part of cause of action had arisen within territorial jurisdiction of me Principal Seat particularly when the route in question or a part thereof falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat. 26. Mr. Maheshwari has fairly conceded that the route in question is originated from Rajgarh which area falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this High Court and it" any area comes within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, we are of the view that the Principal Seat at Jodhpur will also have jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is required to be noted that in a given case, if a vehicle is intercepted within the aforesaid area for violation of any law, such as Motor Vehicles Act etc., the proceedings can be filed in the Court within territorial jurisdiction of principal Seat at Jodhpur. Under theses circumstances, we see no reason as to why the petition filed by the petitioner before the Principal seat at Jodhpur is not maintainable. The jurisdiction of the Court is, therefore, not dependent upon the place of the authority who has power to grant permits or regulate the route in question. This Court is required to consider whether any part of cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat at Jodhpur. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the say of Mr. Maheshwari that in view of the provisions of Section 68 and 69 of the MV Act the place where such authority is located will alone be the decisive factor for deciding territorial jurisdiction of the Court. 27. Mr. Maheshwari has relied upon following authorities to substantiate his contention that since Sikar falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench, therefore, the Jaipur Bench of this Court only will have jurisdiction: (i) AIR 1980 Karn 168-M/s. Republic Medico Surgical v. Union of India. (ii) AIR 1977 All 211 -Balbir Singh v. Atma Ram. (iii) AIR 1980 Kerala 40-E. Keshav Bhat v. Subraya Bhat v. Subraya Bhat. (iv) AIR 1952 SC 192 - G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. 28. Mr. (ii) AIR 1977 All 211 -Balbir Singh v. Atma Ram. (iii) AIR 1980 Kerala 40-E. Keshav Bhat v. Subraya Bhat v. Subraya Bhat. (iv) AIR 1952 SC 192 - G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. 28. Mr. Maheshwari has also relied on the Presidential notification dated 08.12.1976 and also the notification dated 23.12.1976 issued by the then acting Chief Justice of this Court. 29. In our view, the said notifications cannot be interpreted to such an extent that even if part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of either Jaipur Bench or Principal Seat at Jodhpur, then also the petition has to be filed only at one place. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier, the cause of action can be said to have arisen at both the places, therefore, both Jaipur Bench as well as Principal Seat at Jodhpur will have territorial jurisdiction to decide the case. 30. At this stage, the reference is required to be made to the certain decisions cited by both the sides. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 41 has considered the effect of presidential orders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "15. The expression similar to the one "in respect of cases arising in the Districts of" as used in para 2 of the Presidential order came up for the consideration of a Four Judges Bench of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 . It was in the context of division of territorial jurisdiction between Allahabad and Lucknow Benches in Uttar Pradesh. This Court held: "...the expression "cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action" is well known. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action" is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh, it would be open to the litigant who is dominos litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arise. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within the specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action. The expression ""cause of action"" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas, then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad. Similarly, if the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad. Application under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow now or at Allahabad as the applicant will allege that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of Oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified Oudh areas. 16. The above said view of law has been reiterated by this Court recently in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P., (1995) 4 SCC 738 : (1995 AIR SCW 3318 : AIR 1995 SC 214) Pr. 148. 18. It was submitted at the end by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Division Bench of the High Court in its impugned order has observed that the permanent Bench at Jaipur shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear the cases arising out of the 11 specified districts and the High Court at Jodhpur shall not have jurisdiction to hear those cases which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench. He submitted that the use of word "exclusive" prefixed to 'jurisdiction' is uncalled for. We find no substance in this contention as well. The purpose of Presidential order is to carve out and define territorial jurisdiction between the Principal seat at Jodhpur and the Permanent bench seat at Jaipur. The cases are to be heard accordingly unless the Chief Justice may exercise in his discretion the power vested in him by the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential order. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitute provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court. Although the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court, but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying thereunder cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the Principal Seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. Although the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court, but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying thereunder cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the Principal Seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. In case of a dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test-from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 32. As pointed out earlier, the question, therefore, has to be decided regarding territorial jurisdiction with reference to the cause of action. In a given case, even if cause of action arises within territorial jurisdiction of two different High Court, each of such High Courts will have the jurisdiction to decide the case, if it is found that a part of cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of such High Courts. Under such circumstances, it can be said that even if a part of cause of action might have arisen both at Jaipur Bench and Principal Seat at Jodhpur of this Court, the proceeding can be initiated at either of the places. Therefore, there is no reason as to why the petition by the appellant is not maintainable at Principal Seat at Jodhpur. 33. The learned advocate Mr. Maheshwari has relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Ram, AIR 1952 SC 192 ) to substantiate his say that the Principal Seat at Jodhpur has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 21 and 22 of the said judgment has observed as under: "21. The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribed an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are entrusted under Section 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits. Under R. 3 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Regional Transport Authority is called the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority is called the Central Road Traffic Board. These bodies or authorities are constituted by the Provincial Government. 34. The matters which are to be taken into account in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit are specified in Section 47. By delegation under R. 134-A, the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board may exercise certain powers as regards the grant or refusal of stage carriage permits and under R. 136, there is an appeal to the Board from these orders. Similar powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to the Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under R. 148(1). From an original order of the Road Traffic Board there is an appeal to the Central Board and from the original orders of the Central Board to the Government, vide rules 147 and 148. An amendment introduced by the Madras Act XX (20) of 1948 and found as Section 64-A in the Act vests a power of revision in the Provincial Government. Besides this specific provision, there is a general provision in 43-A, that the Provincial Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary to the Provincial Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any matter relating to road transport; and such transport authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions. There is therefore, the regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of Transport by means of motor vehicles. 22. Thus, we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. 22. Thus, we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right. 35. In our view, we are not deciding the merits of the matter. We are only examining the question of territorial jurisdiction for finding out whether the Principal Seat at Jodhpur has jurisdiction to decide the case. Since we are not dealing with the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, the aforesaid decision cited by Mr. Maheshwari has no application. 36. So far as case of Hardev Motor Transport v. State of M.P., (2006) 8 SCC 613 is concerned, in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the question about the discretionary power and the Court has held that by conferring wider power on a statutory authority does not ipso factor attract Article 14, but in such a case a closer scrutiny is required. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed that the Transport authorities of the State indisputably have the power to check a vehicle so as to ascertain whether payment of tax is being evaded and that power of the Transport authority is very wider, but simply because wider powers are conferred, that by itself would not lead to a presumption that the same is capable of misuse or same would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles and it is a self contained code. However, as pointed out earlier, since the decision of the authority whether decision of the authority is correct or not is not the subject matter of these proceedings and since we are not dealing with the merits of the case, therefore, the aforesaid decision cited by Mr. Maheshwari has no application. 37. Mr. However, as pointed out earlier, since the decision of the authority whether decision of the authority is correct or not is not the subject matter of these proceedings and since we are not dealing with the merits of the case, therefore, the aforesaid decision cited by Mr. Maheshwari has no application. 37. Mr. Maheshwari has also relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports, AIR 2002 SC 126 . The aforesaid decision was in connection with refusal to give credit of export made by the assessee under Pass Book scheme. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after examining the benefit of Pass Book Scheme came to the conclusion that the assessee was carrying on his business of export and import. In the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that no part of cause of action arose at Ahmedabad. It is also found in para 12 that none of the respondents in the civil applications are stationed at Ahmedabad. It was also found that Pass book in question, benefit of which the respondent is seeking in the civil applications is issued by an authority who is stationed at Chennai. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also found that the export of prawn made by the respondents and the import of the inputs benefits of which the respondents are seeking in the applications also will have to be made through the same Port i.e. Chennai. 38. Considering the factual background of the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that High Court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction to decide the case. In para 14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: 14. Though it is also contended in para 16 of the application that the appellants have their office at Ahmedabad, that contention has not been pressed since it is clear from the records that none of these appellants have their office at Ahmedabad. De hors this fact, if we take into consideration the other facts enumerated herein above in support of the cause of action pleaded by the respondents, it is seen that none of these facts is in any way connected with the relief sought for by the respondents in their civil applications so as to constitute the cause of action at Ahmedabad." 39. However, the facts of the present case are different as in the present case the decision in question affected the right of the present appellant to ply the vehicle; and the vehicle is to be plied on the route in question a part whereof falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. Even the contesting respondents No. 4 and 5 are residing in Churu District which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court. Therefore, as stated above, part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur. 40. However, so far as the judgments of other High Court are concerned, in none of the judgments, the controversy which is being posed here has been raised or answered. We may also point out that during the course of submission, learned counsel Mr. B.L. Maheshwari has referred to a single Bench Decision of this Court delivered by one of us (Maheshwari, J.) in the case of Smt. Savitri Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1042/2003 decided on 23.02.2006 and submitted that the said writ petition too related to a route part whereof fell within the jurisdiction of Principal Seat though was dealt with by RTA, Sikar; and was held to be of Jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench. It appears that the aspect of part of cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court has not as such been canvassed nor considered in the said decision. In any case, me said Single Bench decision cannot be taken a precedent on the point if part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Principal Seat, yet the matter shall be of jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench alone merely with reference to the situs of the Office of the Transport Authority dealing with grant of permits. The said decision in Savitri's case is of no help to the respondent. 41. As pointed out earlier, we are only concerned with the question about the territorial jurisdiction and in our view, part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur. Therefore, the petition filed by the appellant, in our view, is maintainable. 41. As pointed out earlier, we are only concerned with the question about the territorial jurisdiction and in our view, part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jodhpur. Therefore, the petition filed by the appellant, in our view, is maintainable. It is clarified that we have not examined the merits of the case as the same has not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge. 42. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order dated 07.11.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge and hold that the writ petition filed by the present appellant is maintainable before the Principal Seat at Jodhpur. The matter is accordingly remanded back to the learned Single Judge to decide other issues involved in the matter on merits. No order as to costs.Appeal Allowed - Order of Single judge Set aside. *******