JUDGMENT:- The applicant is being prosecuted for the offence punishable under section 7, read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 120 of Indian Penal Code in Special Case No. 101 2003 (Old No.8/1993) in Special Court for C.B.I. (Prevention of Corruption Act), Nagpur. The allegations against the applicant are that while working as Senior Manager (Projects) with non applicant No.3 i.e. M/s. Richardson & Cruddas (1972) Ltd. M.I.D.C. Hingna. Nagpur he was trapped while accepting a bribe of Rs.10,000/- from non applicant No.2 - M.K. Roy, Proprietor M/s. G & Roy Enterprises, Nagpur. It is alleged that it was a bribe accepted as a part of the total amount demanded of Rs.6,50,000/- by one J.C. Agrawal, General Manager, (Projects) of non applicant No.3 According to the prosecution, the non applicant No.2 was to receive the amount of Rs.27,86,582/- from the non applicant No.3 and when the dues were to be demanded; one J. C. Agrawal working with non applicant No.3 was approached by non applicant No.2; and he made demand of Rs.6,50,0001- for clearing the bills. It is alleged that the said amount was to be received by the applicant - accused. The trap was arranged. During the trap, in Ashoka Restaurant; he was caught while accepting Rs.10,000/- by the CBI authorities. After due investigation the applicant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences. The said J.C. Agrawal, however, was not prosecuted on the ground that no evidence could be collected against him. The applicant has moved this application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code seeking quashing of the said proceedings in Special Case No.10/2003 (Old case No.8/1993) pending on the file of Special Judge, C.B.I. Nagpur. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant Shri. Voditel has vehementally contended that the applicant had moved an application under section 319 of Cri. P.C. for impleading said J.C. Agrawal as an accused and his application was rejected. According to him, there was no direct transaction between the accused applicant and non applicant No.2, so as to call for demand of any bribe. According to him FIR and circumstances in this case reflects total improbability of the incident alleged by the prosecution. To mention a few, the trap was linked with the allegations against J.C. Agrawal and he has not been made accused. According to him FIR and circumstances in this case reflects total improbability of the incident alleged by the prosecution. To mention a few, the trap was linked with the allegations against J.C. Agrawal and he has not been made accused. He was asked to be made as an accused; but respondent CEl told that it is not interested in making him as party accused as there was no evidence that could be collected against him. It is also contended that amount of Rs.10,000/- can not be treated as a bribe amount, as it was part of the amount which was due and payable, in view of the documents shown by applicant for which there was already a demand by the applicant to respondent No.2 out of the personal transaction. He has further submitted that omission in the sanction order regarding the amount payable to non applicant No.2 and the discrepancy therein leads to the conclusion that the prosecution of applicant was spiteful and was not based on true facts. According to the learned counsel, the explanation of the respondent CBI that there was no evidence against J. C. Agrawal and therefore he was not impleaded as an accused, is most unconvincing. He has also submitted that there is perversity in the prosecution of the applicant sans the prosecution of the said J.C. Agrawal. This is a classic case of false prosecution without any substantial material on record. It is abuse of process of law and therefore calls for quashing of the charge-sheet and a proceeding; under section 482, Cr.P.C. He has relied on 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajanlal & others) to contend that as the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet are so absurd and inherently improbable, on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for prosecution of the applicant and the criminal proceeding the present applicant is so malicious and with ulterior motive and for wreaking vengeance against the applicant that, it calls for quashing. He has also relied on the decision of the apex Court in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 702 (State by Special Police Establishment Vs. D. Krishnamurthy) to derive a support for contention that the evidence in this case is lacking against applicant and therefore, the proceeding has to be quashed in the interest of justice. He has also relied on the decision of the apex Court in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 702 (State by Special Police Establishment Vs. D. Krishnamurthy) to derive a support for contention that the evidence in this case is lacking against applicant and therefore, the proceeding has to be quashed in the interest of justice. He has also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in (2004)8 SCC 40 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1492 (S.C.)] (State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh and others Vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew) to contend that there is no reasonable connection between the act of the accused - applicant and that of his official duties. Further, he has relied on (1997)7 SCC 622 (Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujrat) to contend that the sanction order issued in this case is bad as there was no indication that the authority had applied its mind while granting sanction. Similarly, he has relied on (1998)1 SCC 205 : [1998 ALL MR (Cri) 407 (S.C.)] Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. Pandey Ajay Bhushan & others) to contend that the sanction should reflect that the accused had acted in the official capacity. Besides this he has also relied on (1996)11 SCC 688 (Virendernath Vs. State of Maharashtra) to contend that evidence on record that is appearing in the charge-sheet does not lead to the positive conclusion that there is material for framing the charge against the .accused applicant. Thus, mainly according to learned counsel, because J.C. Agrawal is not made an accused, the prosecution is bad inasmuch as the very basis of the prosecution case is shattered. Further the sanction order which is produced on record, does not show the application of mind and lastly on merits, the charge-sheet in the present case is not tenable as there was no possibility of his being asking for a bribe of Rs.10,000/-.and it was personal transaction payment of part of a loan between applicant and complainant (non applicant No.2). 3. Learned counsel for the respondent C.B.I. Shri. Ahirkar has submitted that the applicant who is accused, could have moved proper application in the trial court for discharge. He has not moved such application and instead moved an application under section 319, Cr.P.C. to implead the said J.C. Agrawal as an accused and the learned trial Judge has rightly passed an order to reject that application. He has not moved such application and instead moved an application under section 319, Cr.P.C. to implead the said J.C. Agrawal as an accused and the learned trial Judge has rightly passed an order to reject that application. It is also his submission that as the CBI did not find any material against J. C. Agrawal, he is not made an accused and court is not powerless to implead him as accused, after receiving some evidence i.e., if after recording evidence, it finds necessary to proceed against him. He has relied on the decision of this court 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 441 (Rajendra Tatoba Magdum Vs. State of Maharashtra), to contend that the sanction for prosecution in the present case was correct. He has referred to the observations of the court in paragraph 35 which read thus: 'The issue of sanction should not be put on such a pedestal as would make it impossible for the prosecution and the court to prosecute a public servant. The object and purpose of grant of sanction and protection and immunity contemplated thereby does not mean that technical and trivial objections to the legality and validity of the same must be entertained. The sanction order cannot be said to be vitiated merely because, it is termed as "Irregular"." He has also referred to the judgment of Apex Court reported in (2000)4 sec 459 (R. Sarala Vs. T.S. Velu & others) wherein it has been held that the investigation and prosecution are two different aspects, and formation of opinion as to whether on the material collected; a case is made out to place the accused for trial is the exclusive function of the officer in charge of the police station and/or his superior in charge. He has contended; relying on these observations; that it is for the investigating authority ultimately to take decision as to whether the material which is collected, is sufficient for proceeding against the accused. He has also referred to (2006)10 SCC 192 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 1819 (S.C.)] (Lokram Vs. Nihal Singh and another) to contend that it is the discretionary power of the trial court which should be exercised judiciously, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of material available in charge-sheet or case diary. Nihal Singh and another) to contend that it is the discretionary power of the trial court which should be exercised judiciously, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of material available in charge-sheet or case diary. Person named in FIR as having participated in the crime but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. According to him, the sanction order in the present case is not invalid, merely because some facts are not mentioned therein. It was valid as was granted after due application of mind. Further, according to him, the contention that whether the said J.C. Agrawal should be made an accused is a matter that can be considered by the trial court, if from the evidence it would appear that he has committed any offence and he needs to be made an accused. The trial court is certainly empowered to pass such an order under section 319 of Cr. P.C. even at the later stage of the trial. Further he has also brought to the notice of this court that in the present case, charge has been already framed by the trial court. 4. It is in these circumstances, necessary to find out as to whether the chargesheet against the applicant can be quashed under section 482 of Cr.P.C.. My answer is in negative for the reasons which I indicate below. 5. It is necessary to note that when the question of quashing of charge-sheet is examined, it has to be shown that no offence is made out on the basis of the charge-sheet which is filed. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge or even for that matter quashing of charge-sheet, ultimate reliability of evidence, can not be considered too meticulously. What is to be seen is whether prima facie any offence is made out on the basis of charge-sheet and the relevant documents submitted along with it. 6. Here is the case where, it is apparent that in the special court the chargesheet was submitted in 1993, charge was framed on 6-7-2004 and this application for quashing of the proceedings is moved on 9-8-2005. 6. Here is the case where, it is apparent that in the special court the chargesheet was submitted in 1993, charge was framed on 6-7-2004 and this application for quashing of the proceedings is moved on 9-8-2005. As the charge has been framed by the learned trial Judge; it would clearly mean that he has found sufficient material on the basis of the charge-sheet and the documents on record to proceed against the applicant. The applicant has not claimed discharge in the trial. But has applied for quashing of the charge-sheet in this court. This application therefore, seems to be quite belated and therefore, it cannot be considered at such a late stage, as there is no plausible explanation for this delay. 7. True that some arguable points are raised by the applicant and for that matter, even the application under section 482 would be maintainable if it is shown that no offence is made out against the applicant, but then as stated above because the charge has been framed against the applicant, it needs to be held that there is sufficient material against him to proceed for trial unless some glaring infirmities in taking cognizance are pointed out and substantiated. 8. Turning to the question of validity of sanction order, it would be seen that the instant sanction order states about the demand of bribe, as well as receipt of the installment of the bribe. No doubt the said sanction order does not depict the recitals about the dues of non applicant No.2, but that fact by itself can not lead to the conclusion that there was non application of mind by the sanctioning authority. The mention of the fact in Sanction Order that after carefully examining the material before him, with regards to the above said allegations and circumstances of the case, sanction has been granted, at this stage will lead to the inference that he has applied his mind. 9. In view of 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 441 (Rajendra Tatoba Magdum Vs. State of Maharashtra), the issue of sanction can not be put on such a pedestal as would make it impossible for the prosecution and the court to prosecute the public servant. The object and purpose of grant of sanction and protection and immunity contemplated thereby does not mean that technical and trivial objections to the legality and validity of the same must be entertained. The object and purpose of grant of sanction and protection and immunity contemplated thereby does not mean that technical and trivial objections to the legality and validity of the same must be entertained. The sanction order can not be said to be vitiated merely because, it is termed as irregular. Unless there is clear material to show that there was nothing before the sanctioning authority when it granted sanction, it can not be found fault with, as the necessary material including the FIR and the panchanama etc. was available for consideration of the sanctioning authority at the relevant point of time. 10. As regards the non impleading of the said J. C. Agrawal as an accused, it seems that the application of the applicant was rejected on the ground that advocate for the applicant was heard on earlier date, he was unable to make submissions as to how without sanction of the competent authority he can be impleaded in the said case. 11. It is true that the applicant is claiming that because J.C. Agrawal is not made accused, the case against him would not stand. It is also a say of the respondent CBI that there was no material found against J.C. Agrawal. It is obvious that in view of the authorities referred above, said J.C. Agrawal can be made accused as and when he is found liable for proceeding; under section 319 of Cr.P.C., the trial court can consider the prayer at the appropriate stage and respondent C.B.I. can take sanction, if required, to prosecute the said J.C. Agrawal. 12. Merely because he is not made an accused at the very beginning of the trial, it can not be said that, as he is not made accused applicant would be entitled for quashing of the proceedings against him. Prosecution of applicant is not un-separable. At the trial he may be able to show that unless J. C. Agrawal is prosecuted, case against him is bound to fail. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant has taken me through the other documents on record to make out a stand that there was a loan transaction between applicant and complainant. He has also tried to show that some amount was due to the applicant from non applicant No.2 and alleged bribe amount was a part thereof towards payment. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant has taken me through the other documents on record to make out a stand that there was a loan transaction between applicant and complainant. He has also tried to show that some amount was due to the applicant from non applicant No.2 and alleged bribe amount was a part thereof towards payment. It is also tried to show that the applicant had reprimanded the complainant for non-performance of contracts as per agreements and hence he has been falsely implicated out of vengeance. In my opinion, all these contentions, can not be considered at this stage of the proceeding when the charge has been already framed against the applicant. Such contentions and, documents can be considered only at the trial and hearing of the case. Merely because there is defence of possibility of parallel transaction of loan and non applicant No.2's paying the amount as part of loan at that time, that fact by itself will not lead to the quashing of the proceedings. It would be a defence which can be considered at the time of trial. The other contentions raised by the learned counsel for applicant as regards the spiteful prosecution of the applicant etc. can also be considered at the stage of trial. Sufficient ground for the purpose of framing the charge is not a ground for conviction but the ground for putting the accused to trial, vide (Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parish ad Vs. Dilip Nathumal Chordia and another) (1989)1 SCC 715 . The authorities referred by the learned counsel for applicant are therefore, distinguishable on facts. 14. In this view of matter, therefore, I find that this application can not be allowed. Same is therefore, dismissed. 15. The stay to the proceedings in the lower court is vacated. 16. It is needless to mention that during the process of trial if it is found that there is ground to proceed against said J. C. Agrawal under section 319 of Cr.P.C., if necessary, respondent - C.B.I. shall obtain required sanction. 17. The above observations being in prima facie view of the matter shall not influence the learned trial Judge in any way while deciding the matter on merits.