JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. (Oral).:-The present Regular Second Appeal arises from the judgment and decree dated 28-4-1980 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Narnaul, vide which the appeal filed by the plaintiff-respondent was accepted and the judgment and decree dated 24-9-1976 passed by the learned trial Court was set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for possession by redemption was decreed on payment of Rs, 3318/- was allowed. 2. Bhawani Parshad deceased and defendant Nos.1. to 5 in the suit mortgaged with possession Shops No. 984, 985, 987 and stair-case No.986 in lieu of Rs. 10,000/- by a registered deed with Mool Chand, father of Smt.Misri, defendant No.14. The mortgage was to be redeemed within 8 years. Mool Chand died and his daughter Smt. Misri sold her mortgagee rights on 16th of December, 1952 in favour of Mohan Lal, defendant No.15. Defendant Nos.1 to 13 were sued as either the mortgagors or successors-in-interest of mortgagors. Bhawani Parshad, one of the mortgagors, had three sons out of whom, one was Bhola Shankar alias Nanhe, who died during the Iife time of Bhawani Parshad and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are sons of Bhola Shankar. A mutual partition had taken place between Bhawani Parshad and defendant Nos. 1 to 5 on 20th July 1949 in which shop No.985 and 1/3rd share of stair-case No.986 fell to the share of Shiv Shankar, defendant No.5. 3. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 brought a suit titled as Kishan Lal and and others Vs. Mohan Lal and others for redemption of whole of the property against defendant Nos. 14. and 15 and other heirs of Bhawani Parshad in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Rewari, in which preliminary decree was passed on 26th March, 1962 against defendant Nos.14 and 15 on payment of Rs. 6708.10 annas and four months’ time was given to the mortgagors for depositing the mortgage amount. A final decree was passed on 13th December, 1962. The mortgagors deposited the amount in the month of September, 1962. 4. On 29th August, 1962 Shiv Shankar, defendant No.5, sold shop No. 985 along with 1/3rd share in the stair-case No 986 to Gujar Mal and Balwanti Rai, plaintiffs, by representing that he had deposited his share of mortgage money regarding that shop and the same was free from encumbrances. 5. 4. On 29th August, 1962 Shiv Shankar, defendant No.5, sold shop No. 985 along with 1/3rd share in the stair-case No 986 to Gujar Mal and Balwanti Rai, plaintiffs, by representing that he had deposited his share of mortgage money regarding that shop and the same was free from encumbrances. 5. Defendant No.1 had filed appeal No.59 of 1963 in this Court impleading all the defendants against the redemption decree and this Court vide judgment dated 10-7-1972 maintained the decree of the trial Court for redemption only in favour of defendant No.1 holding that he had alone deposited the amount of Rs. 6708.10 annals. It was further ordered that the remaining mortgagors would get possession after paying mortgage money of their respective shares. As the plaintiffs had become successors-in ­interest of defendant No.5, they wanted to pay their share of mortgage money amounting to Rs.2260.22 Ps., but defendant No.1 refused to accept the same. The plaintiff-respondents accordingly brought a suit for possession by redemption of shop No.985 and 1/3rd share of stair-case No.986 on payment of Rs.2269.22 Ps. as their share of mortgage amount. 6. The said suit was contested by Brij Kishore, defendant, who raised preliminary objection that the suit was beyond limitation. It was further claimed that plaintiffs had no cause of action to file the suit and that the suit was not maintainable in the present form. The ownership of the plaintiffs over the shop in suit was also denied and the sale in their favour was stated to be illegal. It was also alleged in the written statement that mortgage amount was paid on 30th July, 1962 and in case of redemption, 9% interest was claimed in addition to mesne profits with effect from 30-6-1962 upto date. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:­ “1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit property vide registered sale deeds dated 29.8.1962 as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the property in dispute fell to the share of defendant No.5 in partition on 20.7.1949 as alleged and he was competent to sell the same to the plaintiffs as alleged? OPP 3. If issue Nos.1 and 2 are proved, on payment of what amount the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the properties in dispute? Opp 4. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. OPP 3. If issue Nos.1 and 2 are proved, on payment of what amount the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the properties in dispute? Opp 4. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. Whether defendant No.1 is also entitled to interest at 9% costs of previous litigation and mesne profits as alleged? OPD 7. Relief.” 7. On issue No.1, it was held that the plaintiffs were not in actual possession of the shop in suit but they were held to be owners of the same. On issue No.2; it was held that Shiv Shankar, defendant No.5, was competent to sell the property to the plaintiffs. Issues No.3 and 6 being inter-connected were taken up together and it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the property on payment of Rs. 3318/- and issue No.6 was partly answered in favour of defendant No.1. On issue No.4, the suit of the plaintiffs was held to be barred by time. Issue No.5 was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. In the result, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed on 24-9-1976 leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 8. The plaintiff-respondents filed an appeal in which finding on issues No.4 was assailed which was regarding the question of limitation. The learned lower Appellate Court held that as the mortgage deed EX.PW5/2 showed that the mortgagor had agreed to pay the entire mortgage money to the mortgagee within 8 years and to redeem the property, the suit had to be treated within limitation. It was further held that the limitation would start running after 8 years. The support to this finding was drawn from the judgment of this Court in the case of Hargudial Singh Dhlan Singh Vs. Des Raj Lachhman and others, AIR 1963 Punjab 25. In the said judgment, this Court was pleased to hold that mortgage money does not become due within Article 132 of the Limitation Act” 1908 until mortgagor’s right to redeem and the mortgagee’s rights to enforce the security have accrued. The reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Privy Council in the case of Lasa Din Vs. Mt. Gulab Kunwar and others, 1932 Privy Council 207. The reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Privy Council in the case of Lasa Din Vs. Mt. Gulab Kunwar and others, 1932 Privy Council 207. The learned lower Appellate Court also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Maturi Umamahewara Rao and others Vs. Pendyala Venkatrayudu and others, 1970 A.P.225. Accordingly, finding on issue No.5 was reversed and the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents was decreed. Mr. Rajesh Garg, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, raised the following substantial question of law:­ “1. Whether in a case where the mortgagor’s right to redeem the property is not restricted for a specified period, the limitation is to start running from the date of mortgage and not on expiry of the period so fixed? 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the mortgage deed was executed on 5th of January 1944 with an option to redeem the same within a period of 8 years. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, was that in the present case limitation was to start running from 5th January 1944 and, therefore, the suit filed was beyond the period of limitation. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that even on redemption of mortgage by the appellant, the plaintiff-respondents had a right to get the same redeemed within 30 years of the original mortgage deed or within 12 years from the date of redemption, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant, was 26-3-1962 i.e. the date when the payment was made. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vallikat Thekkedath Valappil Lakshmikutty Amma and others Vs. Vallikat Thekkedath Valappil Demodara Menon and others, AIR 1997 SC 1909 to contend that once one of the co-mortgagors redeemed the mortgage and subrogated into shoes of mortgagee, the other co-owners are entitled to pay to the extent of respective shares of mortgage amount and seek possession from the co-mortgagor within 12 years from the date of redemption of the mortgage. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the present suit having’ been not filed within a period of 12 years or within a period of 30 years from the date of mortgage was to be held barred by time. 11. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the present suit having’ been not filed within a period of 12 years or within a period of 30 years from the date of mortgage was to be held barred by time. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Jamiat Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1984 P.& H. 351, wherein this Court was pleased to lay down as under: “A non-redeeming co-mortgagor has two distinct remedies vis a vis the redeeming co-mortgagor i.e. (i) to get the property redeemed within the period of limitation prescribed by Article 148 of the Limitation Act now 61 of 1963 (Act) and (ii) an equitable right to get possession of his share of the property on payment of his share of the mortgage money within twelve years from the date of the redemption of the hypothec a by the redeeming co-mortgagor. It is not a matter of dispute that the redeeming mortgagors could file a suit for contribution or, recovery of the mortgage amount paid by them in excess of their share within twelve years from the date of the redemption of the original mortgage or taking possession of the land of the non-redeeming mortgagors. It then follows that non-redeeming mortgagors could also enforce their rights of securing possession of the land to the extent of their shares within that very period that is 12 years, on payment of their share of the mortgage money. A non-redeeming mortgagor’s right to get his portion or share of the hypotheca on contribution to the redeeming co-mortgagor to the extent of his share of the .mortgage debt is correlated right which accrues to the former and survives or remains alive till the redeeming mortgagor has the right to recover the excess amount paid by him at the time of redeeming the mortgage. This right of the non-redeeming mortgagor cannot possibly be subject to the overall period prescribed for the redemption of a mortgage. Thus it must be held that in equity a redeeming co-mortgagor has a right to reimbursement from a non-redeeming mortgagor to the extent of. the latter’s share in the mortgage money and the non­redeeming mortgagor can recover possession of his share of the hypotheca on payment to the redeeming co-mortgagor. Thus it must be held that in equity a redeeming co-mortgagor has a right to reimbursement from a non-redeeming mortgagor to the extent of. the latter’s share in the mortgage money and the non­redeeming mortgagor can recover possession of his share of the hypotheca on payment to the redeeming co-mortgagor. In the instant case, the property in question was initially mortgaged by predecessor-in-interest of parties to the appeals on 6-6-1922. On 18-5-1974 the appellants redeemed the entire property including the share of non-redeeming mortgagors through a decree of redemption. The appellants secured possession of this property a part of which was subsequently acquired under Land Acquisition Act. During payment of compensation the claim for compensation by the non­redeeming co-mortgagors-respondents was upheld.” 12. He also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Mange and others Vs. Des Raj and others, AIR 1967 Punjab 270, wherein it has been held as under: “A, non-redeeming co-mortgagor can recover his share after contribution to the redeeming co-mortgagor in possession, either within sixty years from the date of original mortgage under Article 148 or within twelve years from the date of redemption by the redeeming co-mortgagor under Art 132. However, the redemption by one co-mortgagor would not start a further period of sixty years for any co-mortgagors to assert their rights in the redeemed property.” 13. Learned counsel for the appellant thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Shambhu Dayal Vs. Smt. Tarawanti and others, AIR 1985 P.& H. 21 to contend that unless and until the redemption of the property was barred for a specified period, the limitation would start running from the date of original mortgage deed and no benefit of the period so fixed could be given. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that for the purpose of computing the period of 12 years, the date of payment of mortgage money is to be taken into consideration and not the date of decree. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Oudh High Court in the case of Brij Bhukhan Vs. Pt. Bhagwan Datt and others, AIR (29) 1942 Oudh 449 and he also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court reported as Umar Ali and another Vs. Asmat Ali and others, AIR 1931 Calcutta 251. Pt. Bhagwan Datt and others, AIR (29) 1942 Oudh 449 and he also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court reported as Umar Ali and another Vs. Asmat Ali and others, AIR 1931 Calcutta 251. 14. I have considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and find no force in the same. 15. It may be noticed that in the present case, the mortgage deed contained a stipulation that the mortgagors could get the property redeemed within a period of 8 years from the date of execution of the sale deed. Though the mortgage deed gave right to get the property redeemed prior to the date stipulated therein, but the mortgagee did not get a cause of action to seek foreclosure before the expiry of said period. In that situation, learned lower Appellate Court was right in coming to the conclusion that mortgage money would be deemed to have become due only on expiry of period of 8 years, as the rights of mortgagors and mortgagees have to be crystallized to start the period of limitation as was held by this Court in the case of Hargudial Singh Dhian Singh (supra). Even if seen from the other angle, it would be noticed that the decree originally passed by the learned trial court was modified by this Court in RF No.59 of 1963 on 10th July 1972. wherein a right was given to the plaintiff-respondents to get their shares redeemed. The operative part of the judgment passed by this Court in the said RFA reads as under: “We have ample power under Order 41, rule 33 Code of Civil Procedure, to pass such a decree. We accordingly modify the decree of the trial Court and direct that the redemption decree shall be in favour of the appellant and the other co-mortgagors will only be entitled to the benefit of the redemption decree on payment of their share of the mortgage money according to the terms of the preliminary decree. We may mention that in spite of service none of the respondents has appeared and, therefore, we have had no advantage of hearing any arguments on behalf of the respondents. We may mention that in spite of service none of the respondents has appeared and, therefore, we have had no advantage of hearing any arguments on behalf of the respondents. The appeal is allowed as indicated above, but there will be no order as to costs.” Thus, it has to be seen that the right of the plaintiffs to get the property redeemed accrued to them on the date of passing of the judgment and decree by this Court. It would be, therefore, seen that the learned lower Appellate Court was right in recording a finding that the suit was within limitation and accordingly decreed the same. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order passed by this Court would relate back to original decree and the suit would be deemed to be time barred also cannot be accepted, as by way of judgment and decree, this Court did not declare the law but decided the claims of the parties and, therefore, the same cannot be said to relate back to the original decree to hold the suit to be time barred. In view of what has been stated above, the substantial question of law, as framed, is answered against the appellant and the appeal filed by him is held to be without any merit, which is accordingly dismissed with no, order as costs. ————————————