Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 1140 (DEL)

VIJAYA MYNE v. SATYA BHUSHAN KAURA

2007-05-25

A.K.SIKRI, ARUNA SURESH

body2007
JUDGMENT A.K. Sikri, J.-The respondent herein filed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 6.4.2005. It was in respect of suit property measuring 325 sq. yards bearing No. C-2j270, Janak Puri Residential Scheme, New Delhi. After the pleadings, the respondent moved application under Order 8 Rules 3 and 5 read with Order,12 Rule 6, epe praying for passing of a decree in his favour on the ground that there were :r sufficient admissions made by the defendant (the appellant herein) warranting the passing of the judgment on the basis of such admissions and decreeing the suit. The learned Single Judge has allowed this application, vide judgment dated 22.12.2006 and as a necessary corollary, has passed the decree in favour of the respondent herein. Dissatisfied, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 2. Before coming to the grounds on which the said judgment and decree is impugned, we may take stock of the necessary pleadings. The appellant is the owner of the suit property by virtue of perpetual lease hold rights given to her vide conveyance dated 14.11.1979. She entered into agreement to sell dated 13.4.2004 with the respondent agreeing to sell the property for a total consideration of Rs. 99 lacs. Rs. 8 lacs was paid as earnest money and another sum of Rs. 2 lacs was also paid on the same day vide separate receipt (Ex. P2). This amolmt of Rs. 2 lacs was to be utilized towards payment of dues of electricity, house tax and getting the property converted from leasehold to freehold. The balance payment was to be made by the respondent within one month of getting the property converted as freehold failing which the earnest money was to be forfeited. Deal was struck through M/s. Raja Property Dealer, New Delhi. According to the respondent, when he tried to contact the appellant after some time in order to find out the status of conversion of property from leasehold to freehold, the appellant started ignoring the queries of the respondent. The respondent even made inquiries from the property dealer. Finally, the respondent met the appellant with property dealer some time in December 2004 and found that the appellant was prevaricating on account of escalation of the prices of the properties and wanted sale consideration to be increased. The respondent even agreed to that. The respondent even made inquiries from the property dealer. Finally, the respondent met the appellant with property dealer some time in December 2004 and found that the appellant was prevaricating on account of escalation of the prices of the properties and wanted sale consideration to be increased. The respondent even agreed to that. Revised agreement to sell dated 6.4.2005 was entered into between the parties enhancing the consideration to Rs.1.27 crores. With the execution of this agreement, earlier agreement dated 13.4.2004 was revoked. Further sum of Rs. 7 lacs, in addition to Rs. 8 lacs given earlier as earnest money, was handed over which was acknowledged in the agreement itself thereby making a total payment of Rs. 15 lacs. Balance payment of Rs. 1.12 crores was to be given within one month after the conversion of the property from leasehold into freehold. 3. It was further the case of the respondent that he again pursued the matter with the appellant with request to expedite the matter in getting the property freehold and found reluctance on the part of the appellant in 50ing ahead with the deal and, therefore, filed the suit for specific performance on the basis of aforesaid averments. Before filing the suit the respondent even caused a public notice published in the Hindustan Times and Times of India on 19.3.2006. Thereafter, he received legal notice dated 22.3.2006 from the appellant in which the appellant had stated that she was no longer interested in selling the property to the respondent for personal reasons. The respondent replied, vide dated 5.4.2006, to the said notice requesting her to give information regarding conversion of the property and also stated that he was still ready and willing to purchase the property. The appellant, however, vide her Counsels letter dated 10.4.2006, again showed her disinclination, forcing the respondent to file the suit seeking help of the Court in getting the agreement enforced: 4. The appellant filed the written statement. First agreement to sell dated 13.4.2004 and subsequent agreement to sell dated 6.4.2005 were not denied. Receipt dated 13.4.2004 for Rs. 2 lacs was also admitted. It was also admitted that a sum of Rs. 8 lacs while executing the agreement dated 13.4.2004 and further sum of Rs. 7 lacs when agreement 6.4.2005 was entered into were received by the appellant. Receipt dated 13.4.2004 for Rs. 2 lacs was also admitted. It was also admitted that a sum of Rs. 8 lacs while executing the agreement dated 13.4.2004 and further sum of Rs. 7 lacs when agreement 6.4.2005 was entered into were received by the appellant. It was, however, alleged that the said property dealer was of the respondent who failed to get the property converted from leasehold to freehold and it was the obligation of the respondent to do so as he was a builder by profession. Therefore, it is respondent who was failing to get the property converted into freehold and to get the sale transaction despite the request of the appellant. The appellant, thereafter, got disinterested in selling the property because she wanted to shift there along with her family members. She offered to return the money received from the respondent along with interest at the agreed rate of interest. 5. After filing the written statement, the respondent moved application under Order 8 Rule 3 and 5 read with Order 12 Rule 6, CPC. 6. The factual matrix which is not in dispute is as under: 7. The agreement to sell and purchase dated 13.4.2004 was entered into whereby the appellant agreed to sell this property for a total consideration of Rs. 99 lacs. Thereafter, revised agreement dated 6.4.2005 was entered into revising sale consideration to Rs. 1.27 crores. A sum of Rs. 15 lacs was paid as earnest money under the two agreements. Another sum of Rs. 2 lacs was paid by separate receipt dated 13.4.2004 when first agreement was entered into. This receipt (Ex. P2) is also admitted which mentions that this sum of Rs. 2 lacs was to be utilized towards payment of dues of DESU, the house tax and for getting the property converted from leasehold to freehold. The learned Single Judge has mentioned in the impugned order that these facts are duly admitted by the appellant repeatedly and quoted from her notice dated 22.3.2006, her Counsels communication dated 10.4.2006 in reply to respondents letter dated 5.4.2006, and even in para 3 of the written statement while replying to corresponding para of the plaint. There was no dispute raised about the aforesaid facts even before us. Therefore, we do not need it necessary to reproduce the admissions contained in the aforesaid correspondence and pleadings. 8. There was no dispute raised about the aforesaid facts even before us. Therefore, we do not need it necessary to reproduce the admissions contained in the aforesaid correspondence and pleadings. 8. The dispute was as to whose responsibility it was to get the property converted from leasehold to freehold. The appellant had contended in the written statement that it was the responsibility of the respondent who failed to do the needful. Coupled with this, another related issue raised by the appellant was that readiness and willingness on the part of the respondent to fulfil his part of the agreement by offering balance consideration was not forthcoming. We may mention that even before us these were the two issues raised. The learned Single Judge brushed aside the aforesaid pleas as misconceived and afterthought. Hollowness thereof is described as under in capitulated form: (a) Perusal of the agreement dated 6.4.2005 shows that only obligation on the part of the respondent was to pay the balance sale consideration within one month from the conversion of the suit property from leasehold to freehold and after the conveyance deed is executed in favour of the appellant by the superior lesser. This amount was to be paid at the t(me of getting the sale deed in favour of the respondent. (b) No such plea was taken by the appellant earlier. The learned Single Judge has referred to the legal notice dated 22.3.2006 which is the first document whereby the appellant had refused to abide the agreement to sell and cause thereof. Reason given herein was that there was some misunderstanding between my client and the other legal heirs of the late husband of my client, hence my client is no more interested in selling the aforesaid property to you (the respondent) for some personal reasons and that my client has every apprehension that since there has arisen a dispute in the ancestral property, hence my client would be required to shift to the said property situated at Janak Puri, New Delhi. (c) This notice was replied by the respondent vide reply dated 4.4.2006. Rejoinder thereto was sent by the appellants Counsel which is dated 10.4.2006. Even in this rejoinder the appellant did not raise any such plea to the effect that it was the obligation of the respondent to get the property converted into freehold. (c) This notice was replied by the respondent vide reply dated 4.4.2006. Rejoinder thereto was sent by the appellants Counsel which is dated 10.4.2006. Even in this rejoinder the appellant did not raise any such plea to the effect that it was the obligation of the respondent to get the property converted into freehold. The reason given in this rejoinder was that till the date balance amount had not been paid by the respondent to the appellant and the respondent had also not shown any intention to pay this amount even when the appellant was constantly following up the matter with the respondent as well as the property dealer. Thus, whereas in the notice dated 22.3.2006, personal reasons namely, inter se family dispute was the purported ground for not going ahead with the deal, in the rejoinder dated 10.4.2006 there was an ingenious improvement and it was alleged that balance amount was not paid thereby shifting from cause attributed to self to the blame attributed to the opposite party. Interestingly, even at that stage, this blame game did not extend to the extent of alleging that the respondent had not honoured its obligation to get the property converted into freehold. This realisation dawned upon the appellant after the suit was filed by the respondent and such an accusation is made for the first time in the written statement. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly held that it was an afterthought plea. We see no reason to differ from the observations of the learned Single Judge that it is a mala fide afterthought on the part of the defendant in order to set up a semblance of a defence to the case of the plaintiff. (d) Another important factor, which would demolish the frivolous nature of this plea is the payment of Rs. 2 lacs by the respondent to the appellant. In the receipt, it is clearly stated that this amount is meant, inter alia, for paying the charges for getting the property converted into freehold. Had the responsibility been of the respondent, there was no occasion for the respondent to make the payment to the appellant in this behalf, inasmuch as in that eventuality, the respondent would have himself deposited the requisite amount with the DDA. 9. Had the responsibility been of the respondent, there was no occasion for the respondent to make the payment to the appellant in this behalf, inasmuch as in that eventuality, the respondent would have himself deposited the requisite amount with the DDA. 9. Two additional reasons given by the learned Single Judge which expose the frivolity of this plea are: (1) agreement dated 6.4.2005 does not cast any such obligation nor this obligation was asserted by the appellant in her earlier legal notices dated 22.3.2006 and 10.4.2006. The case set up, therefore, at the best, was that it could be oral stipulation which was not permissible in view of the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act; (2) even if it is presumed that the respondent had such an obligation, still it would not advance the case of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant had herself filed the documents evidencing that the payment was made to DDA for getting the property converted into freehold. Communication dated 1.6.2005 of the DDA addressed to the appellant was also placed by the appellant herself whereby the appellant was requested to attend the office to execute the conveyance deed. The learned Single Judge, thus, concluded that all the formalities relating to processing of the application for conversion of freehold stood completed and what was the final act was of actual execution of the conveyance deed. For this purpose, it is only the appellant who was required to go to the DDA and nothing was to be done by the respondent. Interestingly, in response to the aforesaid letter of the DDA, the appellants son wrote letter dated 8.6.2005 informing that the appellant was out of station and would be back on 20.7.2005 and requested that a date thereafter be given for execution of the conveyance deed. Admittedly, no steps whatsoever were taken by the appellant in this matter thereafter. 10. There was no answer with the Counsel for the appellant to the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge on the basis of admitted position. Once, we examine the matter in the aforesaid perspective which also discloses that the appellant had taken, varying and contradictory stands, the plea of the appellant that the respondent was not ready and willing to pay the balance amount also looks sham on the face of it. Once, we examine the matter in the aforesaid perspective which also discloses that the appellant had taken, varying and contradictory stands, the plea of the appellant that the respondent was not ready and willing to pay the balance amount also looks sham on the face of it. It is the respondent who has been asking the appellant to come forward and execute the sale deed. The respondent had been waiting for the property to be converted into freehold but the appellant was not responding or even coming forward to disclose the truth to us as to what was the stage of the request pending with the DDA in this behalf. The obligation of the respondent to pay the balance amount was only after the conversion of property into freehold and one month time was given for this purpose. As noted above, the DDA had addressed communication dated 1.6.2005 to the appellant requiring her to attend the office and execute the conveyance deed and in response the appellants son had sent letter dated 8.6.2005 informing that the appellant was out of stand and some date after 20.7.2005 be given. Thus, thereafter it is only the appellant who was aware of the requirements of the DDA but no steps were taken by her even till December, 2005. The facts which, therefore, were established from the admissions of the appellant are summarized by the learned Single Judge in para 50 of the impugned judgment are as under: "(i) The parties had executed the agreement dated 6th April, 2005 whereby the obligation to get the property converted to freehold rested squarely on the defendant. It is only thereafter that the plaintiff was required to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 1.12 lakh to the defendant before the sub-registrar at the time of registration of the sale deed in his favour. (ii) The sale consideration which had been agreed between the parties was Rs. 1,27,000/- (iii) The defendant had received a sum of Rs. lslakh towards the earnest money and a sum of Rs. 2lakh towards the clearance of her liability of DESU/house tax/freehold charges. (iv) The defendant had received the letter dated 1st June. 2005 from the Delhi Development Authority for requiring her to appear before the DDA for execution of the conveyance deed whereby the suit property would become freehold. lslakh towards the earnest money and a sum of Rs. 2lakh towards the clearance of her liability of DESU/house tax/freehold charges. (iv) The defendant had received the letter dated 1st June. 2005 from the Delhi Development Authority for requiring her to appear before the DDA for execution of the conveyance deed whereby the suit property would become freehold. (v) The defendant had refused to perform her part of the obligation under the contract. (vi) The plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract." II. The learned Counsel for the appellant could not make any convincing argument to dislodge the aforesaid admitted position. We are, therefore, of the view that these facts were sufficient to pass the decree in favour of the respondent as there was hardly any issue or dispute raised which needed trial. The learned Single Judge has referred to innumerable authorities on Order 12 Rule 6, CPC rendered by the Apex Court, this Court as well as other High Courts and discussed the same in detail. These judgments include the following: 1. Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik, 104 (2003) DLT 151 (DB)=2003 III AD (Delhi) 419. 2. Shikharchand & Ors. v. Mst. Bari Bai &Ors., AIR 1974MP75. 3. K.M. Construction v. J. V.G. Finance Limited, 111 (2004) DLT 437. 4. Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. v. Union Bani of India & Ors., VI (2000) SLT 87= (2000) 7 SCC 120 . 5. Charanjit Lal Mehra & Ors. v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) & Anr., III (2005) SL T 131=(2005) II SCC 279= AIR 2005 SC 2765 . 6. Rajiv Saluja v. M/s. Bhartia Industries Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2003 9 Delhi 142. 7. Rajiv Sharma & Anr. v. Rajiv Gupta, 109 (2Q04) DLT 509=AIR 2004 Delhi 248. 12. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by extracting from the aforesaid authoritative pronouncent as the learned Single Judge has ac- h complished this exercise with prudence 1md dexterity. Rajiv Saluja v. M/s. Bhartia Industries Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2003 9 Delhi 142. 7. Rajiv Sharma & Anr. v. Rajiv Gupta, 109 (2Q04) DLT 509=AIR 2004 Delhi 248. 12. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by extracting from the aforesaid authoritative pronouncent as the learned Single Judge has ac- h complished this exercise with prudence 1md dexterity. Purpose would be served by summarizing the legal position which is that the purpose and objective in enacting the provision like Order 12 Rule 6, CPC is to enable the Court to pronounce the judgment on admission when the admissions are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to get the decree, inasmuch as such a provision is enacted to render speedy judgments and save the parties from going through the rigmarole of a protracted trial. The admissions can be in the pleadings or otherwise, namely in documents, correspondence etc. These can be oral or in writing. The admissions can even be constructive admissions and need not be specific or expressive which can be inferred from the vague and evasive denial in the written statement while answering specific pleas laised by the plaintiff. The admissions can even be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt, for this purpose, the Court has to scrutinize the pleadings in their detail and has to come to the conclusion that the admissions are unequivocal, unqualified and unambiguous. In the process, the Court is also required to ignore vague, evasive and unspecific denials as well as inconsistent pleas taken in the written statement and replies. Even a contrary stand taken while arguing the matter would be required to be ignored. 13. The present case meets all the requisite attributes required to act upon admissions. The only question, in this scenario, was as to whether the decree of specific performance should be passed or the suit be decreed by awarding the damages alone. The learned Single Judge dwelt on this issue at great length and found that it was a case which warranted passing the decree of specific performance. Learned Counsel for the appellant, in fact, hammered this argument with great emphasis and all vehemence. He submitted that relief of specific performance was not a matter of right and grant of this relief was discretionary. Learned Counsel for the appellant, in fact, hammered this argument with great emphasis and all vehemence. He submitted that relief of specific performance was not a matter of right and grant of this relief was discretionary. It was argued that the learned Single Judge did not appreciate in right earnestness that granting of this relief would cause extreme hardship to the appellant and her family members. Plea of changed circumstances and personal reasons because of which the appellant wanted to avoid the deal as mentioned in the notice dated 22.3.2006 was pressed into service. What was argued was that when the agreement to sell was entered into, the appellant and her family were living in another property which was ancestral property in Defence Colony and, therefore, it was decided to dispose of the suit property. However, the dispute in respect of the ancestral property had erupted between the family members and, thus, changed circumstances caused the appellant to take decision to shift to the suit property. It was mentioned that this decision also was necessitated in view of the fact that in the family house not more than 600 sq. ft. area was available to the family of the appellant and for this reason also if the appellant wanted to shift to the suit property to avoid unnecessary hardship, this proposed move should have been given due credence by the learned Single Judge. It was emphasised that the appellant was an old aged widowed lady suffering from various old age ailments which constituted special equity in her favour and could dis-entitle the respondent to seek the relief of specific performance. It was also argued that as far as the appellant is concerned, the suit property was the only house. On the other hand, the respondent was a builder who could invest his money in some other venture as he wanted to purchase this property only for his business interests and he was not entering into the deal with intention to live there but only for the purpose of making profits. Thus, monetary compensation would have been more equitable to both the parties than passing the decree of specific performance. Thus, monetary compensation would have been more equitable to both the parties than passing the decree of specific performance. Learned Counsel also questioned the observation of the learned Single Judge in para 46 of the judgment wherein it is observed that issue as to whether performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act shall be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of contract. His submission was that the appellant could not have foreseen the eruption of any such family dispute at the time of entering into the agreement to sell with the respondent. 14. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent argued that Explanation 2 of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act categorically mandates that circumstances in support of hardship have to be pleaded. His submission was that no doubt the grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. At the same time such a discretion is governed by the statutory provisions and principles evolved by judicial decisions. He further submitted tha t learned Single Judge had taken note of statutory provisions namely Section 16 and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act as well as judicial dicta laying down the principles on which such cases are to be dealt with. He submitted that not only no circumstances of hardship were pleaded to bring the case within the ambit of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the suit regarding ancestral property at Defence Colony was filed by the appellant/her family members themselves and, therefore, there was no question of pleading hardship on the basis of action taken by them. It was also argued that the property at Defence Colony was two and half storeyed structure. The appellant and other co-owners of the Defence Colony property in April 2005 had already decided to sell the said property and divide the consideration among themselves and, therefore, this position was known to the appellant at the time when she was entering into agreement to sell with the respondent. Further, the area of the portion in her possession in the ancestral property was also within her knowledge and with open eyes she agreed to sell the suit property to the respondent. No events took place after the agreement entered into on the basis of which hardship could be pleaded. 15. Further, the area of the portion in her possession in the ancestral property was also within her knowledge and with open eyes she agreed to sell the suit property to the respondent. No events took place after the agreement entered into on the basis of which hardship could be pleaded. 15. This submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent has substance in it. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act which provides Discretion as to decreeing specific performance also stipulates the manner in which such a discretion is to be exercised. It is made clear in Sub section 1 of Section 20 itself, which provides that the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Sub-section 2 gives three situations in which discretion not to decree specific performance is to be exercised. These are as under: "(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance." 16. The appellant did not intend to cover her case under Clause (a) or (c) but had pressed the argument of hardship. Clause (b) of Section 2, however, states, in no uncertain terms, that hardship should be of a nature which the defendant did not foresee. Explanation 2 gives further guidance by describing as to what should be the nature of such hardship. It stipulates: "Explanation 2-The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract." 17. It stipulates: "Explanation 2-The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract." 17. It is clear that normally hardship is to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of contract in order to see as to whether performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant. Exception is in those cases where hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract. Admittedly, no allegation is made by the appellant that hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff. What, therefore, is to be examined is as to whether any hardship has resulted with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of contract which the appellant could not foreseen. 18. When examined in this context, we find that the learned Single Judge has arrived at right conclusion on the basis of admitted factual position on record. Rather, taking into consideration what the appellant had pleaded in this behalf. First agreement to sell regarding the suit property was entered on 13.4.2004 and the consideration fixed was Rs. 99 lacs. As already noted above, the appellant dilly dallied as the prices of the property rose and she wanted more money for the sale of this house. Revised agreement dated 6.4.2005 was entered into enhancing the consideration to Rs. 1.27 crores. Thus, as on 6.4.2005 the appellant was satisfied and agreeable to sell the property when she was offered Rs. 28 lacs more than the previous consideration agreed to between the parties. By that time, the decision had been taken to sell the ancestral property. We may note that the dispute in respect of the ancestral property for which was filed on the original side of this Court was taken in appeal and the said appeal bearing No. RFA (OS) No. 109/06 is decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 1.3.2007. Copy of the judgment is placed on record by the appellant. The perusal of this judgment shows that the said property was owned by late Sh. Barkat Ram. He had five sons and one daughter. The appellant is widow of one of his sons viz. Mr. Copy of the judgment is placed on record by the appellant. The perusal of this judgment shows that the said property was owned by late Sh. Barkat Ram. He had five sons and one daughter. The appellant is widow of one of his sons viz. Mr. Joginder Kumar Myne. Different parties were occupying different portions of the property. In April, 2005, the parties decided that the property should be sold in open market and the entire consideration should be divided into six equal shares amongst the legal heirs. The defendant No. 1 in the said suit had refused to part with documents to carry out the intention of selling the property. Thus, the appellant knew fully well, when she entered into the agreement to sell of the suit property that ancestral property is going to be sold. If the intention was to shift to the suit property, she would not have entered into such an agreement. Such a plea taken now is, therefore, clearly an afterthought and in any case on the basis of this case of hardship cannot be argued in view of the statutory provision contained in Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. 19. The grant of relief for specific performance is a rule and it was for the appellant to demonstrate as to how her case would fall in any of the exceptions carved out under sub Section 2 of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. There has to be valid and cogent reasons for refusal of the relief of specific performance and applying the exception. We do need no more than quoting the following portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding that no case of exception or special equity was made out: "It now becomes necessary to deal with the third submission on behalf of the defendant that under the terms of the contract dated 13th April, 2004, the plaintiff had agreed to receive double the amount of earnest money in case of failure on the part of the defendant to compete the transaction. In this behalf, it becomes necessary to notice the case of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in para 10 of the plaint has clearly asserted that the defendant once again entered into a revised agreement to sell and purchase dated 6th April 2005 in which the total sale consideration was enhanced to Rs. In this behalf, it becomes necessary to notice the case of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in para 10 of the plaint has clearly asserted that the defendant once again entered into a revised agreement to sell and purchase dated 6th April 2005 in which the total sale consideration was enhanced to Rs. 1.27 crores on defendants insistence resulting into novation of the contract/ agreement to sell dated 13th April 2004. The defendant in its written statement has vaguely denied the same and in reply stated that on the contrary, it is submitted that when the defendant told the plaintiff that since the prices of the property were more as compared to the price offered by the plaintiff, the plaintiff immediately increased the price and gain entered into a fresh agreement to sell. Thus, the argument raised now is clearly devoid of merit and only the terms of the agreement dated 6th April, 2005 are require to be looked at. Under this agreement, the parties had clearly covenanted that in case the defendant (first party) backs out from the transaction on my any ground then the plaintiff (second party) would get the transaction completed through Court of law by specific performance of suit at the cost of the first party. The defendant has further stated that on account of some misunderstanding between the other legal heirs of her husband and herself, she was no more interested in selling the property to the plaintiff for personal reasons. it is also stated that on account of a dispute raised in respect of the ancestral property bearing No. A317, Defence Colony, New Delhi, the defendant may be required to shift to the suit property situated at Janak Puri, New Delhi and for this reason was not willing to sell the property to the plaintiff. On these submissions, the defendant submitted that she was ready and willing to return the amount of Rs. 15 lakh received from the plaintiff with interest at the rate of 12% and was also willing to enhance the amount to such a reasonable level to compensate the plaintiff for the deal between the parties. It is only in the rejoinder dated 10th April, 2006 that the defendant tried to fasten blame upon the property dealer to evade the liability for the conversion of the property and tried to link it with the plaintiff. It is only in the rejoinder dated 10th April, 2006 that the defendant tried to fasten blame upon the property dealer to evade the liability for the conversion of the property and tried to link it with the plaintiff. It is therefore evident that it is the defendant who is dishonestly trying to wriggle out of the contract without there being any fault on the part of the defendant. The defendant has admittedly received a sum of 17 lakh in terms of the agreement. Learned Counsel for the defendant did not make out any case of special equity in favour of the defendant or a case of such hardship to the defendant as would disentitle the plaintiff to the relief of specific performance. However, Mr. P. Kumar learned Counsel for the plaintiff has elaborately laid down the principles which would govern adjudication on such a plea as well. Assuming that the plea of the dispute between the legal heirs of the husband of the defendant and the pending dispute in respect of the property at Defence Colony was to be considered as creating hardship to the defendant, the same would be governed by the principles laid down in explanation to Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Such hardship which would disentitle the plaintiff to the decree for specific performance has to be a sum total of various factors and cannot be in the nature of a plea which is not collateral to the contract or in the nature of inadequacy of price or escalation of price subsequent to the date of the contract." 20.The learned Single Judge referred to the following observation of the Karnataka High Court, in the case of Lt. Cdr. M.C. Kendall v. S. Chandrasekhar, AIR 1991 Karnataka 4142, in terpreting Section 20 of the Act: "A perusal of the aforesaid provision would go to show as to under what circumstances hardship can be taken into consideration in refusing specific performance. It is not possible to enumerate the different circumstances which constitute hardship. It will suffice if it is noted that the question of hardship will have to be adjudged in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this connection, the observation of the Privy Council in the Decision in Devis v. SHWE GO, 11 LC. 801(PC) throws light on an important aspect of the matter. It will suffice if it is noted that the question of hardship will have to be adjudged in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this connection, the observation of the Privy Council in the Decision in Devis v. SHWE GO, 11 LC. 801(PC) throws light on an important aspect of the matter. Among other things, it is observed in the said case as under In the absence of any evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff which induced the defendant to enter into the contract, Their Lordships see no reason to accede to the argument. The bargain is onerous, but there is nothing to show that it is unconscionable. The defendant knew all along that a lakh was the plaintiffs limit; it is in evidence that he had frequently urged the defendants daughter to advise him to sell the land if he was getting a higher offer. It is difficult to say under the circumstances that he took an improper advantage of his position or the difficulties of the defendant. Then again, it is necessary to remember that mere rise in price subsequent to the date of the contract or inadequacy of price is not to be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of specific performance of the contract. Further, the hardship involved should be one not foreseen by the party and should be collateral to the contract. In sum, it is not just one factor or two, that is relevant for consideration. But it is the sum total of various factors which is required to enter into the judicial verdict. In the instant case, defendant 1 has not pleaded hardship much less adduced any evidence. He has not even stepped into the witness box. Under these circumstances, it is not at all possible to hold that the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee." 21. We are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge rightly held that no circumstances were pleaded which existed at the time of entering into the contract from which hardship could be gathered. 22. No other argument was advanced before us. 23. We, therefore, do not find merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.