Chandrika Tiwary v. Vidya Shankar Dubey, Vidyanand Dubey
2007-07-16
S.N.HUSSAIN
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for respondent no. G- the Bihar State Hindu Religious Trust Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board for the sake of brevity). No one appears for other respondents. 2. I.A. No. 1191 of 2004 has been filed on 24.2.2004 on behalf of the appellants to stay the operation of the impugned judgment of the learned court below or in the alternative to appoint a suitable person as receiver for the purpose of managing the affairs of the deities and the suit properties. A counter-affidavit to the said interlocutory application has been filed by the Board (respondent no. 8), to which a rejoinder has been filed by the appellants. 3. This case has a chequered history. It is not in dispute that the properties involved originally belonged to Mathura Pandey, who happened to be the maternal grandfather of appellant no. 1 and he established the Mandir in question. It is also stated by the defendant-appellants that in the year 1965-66, the Board filed a criminal case bearing Complaint Case No. 778/ 56 of 1965-67 against the said Mathura Das alleging non-filing of the returns under section 67 of the Bihar State Hindu Religious Trust Board Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity) on the assumption that the Trust in question was a Public Trust, but the said case was dismissed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna, on 21.3.1970 as it was found that the Trust was not a Public Trust. Learned counsel for the appellants also stated that on 1.10.1972 the said Mathura Das died and Partition Suit No. 188 of 1973 was filed by his heirs, which ended in compromise on 18.12.1974. Subsequently Title Suit No. 89 of 1975 was filed by respondent no. 1 claiming that the Mandir in question is a Public Trust and the aforesaid decree on compromise was collusive. The said title suit was decreed on 28.7.1990 and it was held that the compromise decree is collusive and the Mandir in question is a Public Trust. Against the said judgment and decree, the instant First Appeal has been filed by the defendant-appellants. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that during the pendency of the instant First Appeal, the Board treating the Mandir as a public Trust framed scheme under sec.
Against the said judgment and decree, the instant First Appeal has been filed by the defendant-appellants. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that during the pendency of the instant First Appeal, the Board treating the Mandir as a public Trust framed scheme under sec. 32 of the Act by order dated 4.12.1987 appointing the Circle Officer, Jogapatti as its President, against which the appellants filed a petition 22.12.1987, whereupon the Chairman of the Board stayed the operation of the aforesaid order by his order dated 23.12.1987. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants also states that after the said order, Mahanth Awadhesh Das (respondent no. 1) filed C.W.J.C. No. 9153 of 1988 in this court claiming the trust to be a Private Trust and challenging the framing of the scheme by the Board, but the appellants were not impleaded as party to the writ petition. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that during the pendency of the writ petition, the Chairman of the Board recalled his earlier order dated 23.12.1987 by order dated 13.7.1989. The said writ petition was dismissed by an Hon ble Single Judge of this Court by order dated 23.8.1989 holding that the Trust in question was a Public Trust and there was no occasion to interfere with the orders of the Board. 6. Against the said order passed in the writ case, respondent no. 1 filed LP.A. No. 1187 of 1989. In the said Letters Patent Appeal order dated 17.1.2000 was passed and status quo with respect to Sevaitship of the Trust was directed to be maintained during the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal. Subsequently, the said Letters Patent Appeal was admitted and is pending in this Court for final hearing and the order of status quo is continuing. 7. Since the Letters Patent Appeal is with respect to the same subject matter, regarding which the instant First Appeal has been filed and is pending and there is already an order dated 17.1.2000 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the said Letters Patent Appeal for maintaining status quo regarding Sevaitship, hence, in my view this Court cannot pass any order concerning the Sevaitship or the status quo.
Since both the cases, namely, the First Appeal and the Letters Patent Appeal are pending in this court with respect to the same subject matter, it is desirable that this First appeal be also heard along with the said Letters Patent Appeal. Hence, this matter is referred to a Division Bench and with permission of the Hon ble Chief Justice, this may be placed before an appropriate Division Bench along with the Letters Patent Appeal in due course. 8. The appellants of this First Appeal will be at liberty to move the aforesaid interlocutory application before the Hon ble Division Bench of this Court or they may file a separate interlocutory application in the Letters Patent Appeal for that purpose. 9. However, since an order to maintain status quo with respect to Sevaitship has already been passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal on 17.1.2000, the order passed by the Board in the said matter on 29.12.2006, which is Annexure A to the counter-affidavit filed by the Board, appears to be clearly in the teeth of the aforesaid order of the Hon ble Division Bench. 10. In the said circumstances, operation of the said order dated 29.12.2006 of the Board shall remain stayed till further orders by the Hon ble Division Bench of this Court.