ORDER :- This civil revision petition is filed under Section 91 of A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short the Act) by the respondents 2 to 5 before the lower appellate authority, aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Joint Collector, Medak at Sangareddy dated 12-8-2004, under which the appeal filed by the respondents 3 to 5 herein against the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Toopran, dated 2-6-2003, was allowed. 2. Respondents 3 to 5 herein filed an application before the Mandal Revenue Officer, Toopran under Section 40 of the Act, seeking to substitute their names as legal heirs of the original protected tenants in respect of Sy.Nos.742 and 743 in an extent of Ac.10.32 gts. and 19.30 gts. respectively, situated in Toopran Village and Mandal of Medak District. It was their case that the father of the 3rd respondent herein one Jangam Muthaiah was the protected tenant in respect of the above lands. After his death, the 3rd respondent, who is his son and respondents 4 and 5 who are his grand-sons (sons of 3rd respondent) are entitled to get their names entered as legal heirs and successors. It was also stated that either Muthaiah, the father of the 3rd respondent or the respondents 3 to 5 have ever surrendered the tenancy rights in respect of the above lands to the pattadar, therefore, they are entitled to get their names entered, by recognizing them as successors, and therefore, the application. 3. In the said application, notice was given to the 1st petitioner Smt. Shajadi Begum, who is the wife of Md Nazer Ali, who is the original pattadar of the land, and thereafter, the matter was heard by the Mandal Revenue Officer. The Mandal Revenue Officer referred to the earlier proceedings that had taken place before the then District Revenue Officer, Medak at Sangareedy, dated 3-10-1978 in Case No.C3/11625/1977, which was filed by the pattadar for recovery of rents against the tenants (3rd respondent and his two brothers), where a compromise memo was filed between the pattadar and the protected tenants and the matter was compromised. As per which, the landowner and pattadar agreed to give the land in an extent of Ac.l9.30 gts. As per which, the landowner and pattadar agreed to give the land in an extent of Ac.l9.30 gts. in Sy.No.743 to the tenants with absolute rights, while the tenants have agreed to give up their rights in favour of the landowner in respect of an extent of Ac.l0.32 in Sy.No.742. In fact, pursuant to the said compromise, the tenants have obtained registered documents in Document Nos.154/80, 155/80, 156/80 and 1~7 /80 in favour of the three sons and the wife of one of the sons of late Jangam Muthaiah, the original protected tenant. Therefore, it was felt by the Mandal Revenue Officer that in view of the said compromise and settlement of the rights between the parties, which was recorded by the authority under the provisions of the Act, the present application is not maintainable. Therefore, an endorsement was made to that effect by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Toopran. 4. Aggrieved by that, respondents 3 to 5 herein preferred appeal before the Joint Collector. Before the Joint Collector, they have disputed the endorsement, on the ground that there was no termination of protected tenancy rights of the respondents 3 to 5 or their predecessor in interest, and therefore, the said endorsement made by the Mandal Revenue Officer is illegal and unsustainable, and hence, sought for setting aside the said order and also sought for a direction to the appropriate authority for recording the names of the respondents 3 to 5 as successors, in the Tenancy Register. 5. The appellate authority accepted the said contention, on the ground that the material on record shows that the protected tenancy rights of the appellants before him who are the present respondents, were not terminated, in accordance with law, and even the landlord failed to act as per the provisions of Section 38-D of the Act in disposing of the lands in favour of the respondents 3 to 5 in respect of the land of an extent of Ac.10.32 gts in Sy.No.742. Therefore, the said action is null and void, and accordingly, allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by that, the original pattadar, as well as the subsequent purchasers have come up with the present revision. 6. Therefore, the said action is null and void, and accordingly, allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by that, the original pattadar, as well as the subsequent purchasers have come up with the present revision. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the appellate authority has committed an error in allowing the appeal of the respondents 3 to 5, even though they had the benefit of the compromise that was entered into between the pattadar and the protected tenants and got absolute rights in respect of the other part of land. It is contended by the learned Counsel that late Muthaiah, the protected tenant had three sons, who were parties to the proceedings, initiated by the pattadar for recovery of rents from them. However, the matter was settled before the appellate authority and to the same effect, a compromise memo was filed. As per the terms of the compromise memo, the pattadar has agreed to execute any document as is required by the respondents therein, and accordingly, the appellate authority passed orders, in terms of the compromise. As per which, the tenants have given Ac.19.30 gts. in Sy.No.743, while the tenants have given up their rights in an extent of Ac.10.32 gts. in Sy.No.742. Pursuant to which, sale deeds were executed by the husband of the 1st petitioner in favour of all the three sons of Jangam Muthaiah, as well as in favour of the wife of one of the sons. Thus, they have obtained sale deeds in respect of the entire extent of Ac.l9.30 gts. in Sy.No.743. In fact, even the 1st petitioner entered into an agreement with reference to the land in Sy.No.742 with the petitioners 2 to 4, and the 3rd respondent was, in fact, a witness to the agreement that was entered into by the 1st petitioner with petitioners 2 to 4. Subsequently, in pursuance of the said agreement, the 1st petitioner executed registered sale deed in favour of the petitioners 2 to 4, conveying her interest in the property to the petitioners 2 to 4. Subsequently, in pursuance of the said agreement, the 1st petitioner executed registered sale deed in favour of the petitioners 2 to 4, conveying her interest in the property to the petitioners 2 to 4. Therefore, it is contended that, having compromised the matter and got the benefit, under the compromise, it is not open to the 3rd respondent, who is also one of the parties to the compromise, as well as a beneficiary, to come up with the present application, seeking to get himself recorded as legal heir of the original protected tenant, though they have given up their interest, as per the compromise entered into between the parties. 7. The learned Counsel also contended that Jangam Muthaiah, the father of the 3rd respondent died even prior to 1954, and even in the earlier proceedings, where the landowner filed proceedings for recovery of rents, it is only the three sons of late Jangam Muthaiah were the parties, which was instituted as early as in the year 1976. But, however, the present application is filed by the respondents 3 to 5 mischievously in the year 2002, which is clearly illegal, apart from, without jurisdiction. Even otherwise also, when the matter was compromised as early as in the year 1978, it is not open to the respondents 3 to 5 to come up with the present application, ignoring the proceedings that were recorded as early as in the year 1978, where compromise was recorded, to seek the present relief after 24 years. Therefore, the learned Counsel sought to set aside the impugned order, passed by the Joint Collector, the lower appellate authority. The learned Counsel relied upon the following decisions in (1) State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , (2) Radha Bai v. B. Chinnayya, AIR 1968 AP 353 (FB) and (3) Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 , in support of his contentions. 8. The learned Counsel relied upon the following decisions in (1) State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , (2) Radha Bai v. B. Chinnayya, AIR 1968 AP 353 (FB) and (3) Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 , in support of his contentions. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, sought to contend that though a compromise is said to have been taken place between the pattadar and the protected tenants, but the protected tenancy was not terminated, as is contemplated under the provisions of the Act, and hence the name of the original protected tenant late Jangam Muthaiah is still continuing, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to get themselves entered their names as successors, as is contemplated under Section 40 of the Act. Therefore, it is proper and appropriate for the concerned authorities to enter the names of the respondents 3 to 5 as legal heirs of the original protected tenants. However, the Mandal Revenue Officer relying upon the alleged compromise, did not grant the relief sought for by the respondents 3 to 5, therefore, they approached the appellate authority, which had agreed with the claims of the respondents 3 to 5 and granted the relief, and therefore, the present revision petition is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondents also contended that though the petitioners did not seek any other relief consequent to get themselves recorded as legal heirs, perhaps once their names are entered in the PT records as legal heirs, they are entitled to even for the other consequential relifes of recovery of possession either from the 1st petitioner who is the landowner or their successors, in whose favour she has alienated the property. The learned Counsel also contended that since the tenancy rights were not terminated, as is contemplated under the provisions of the Act, the successors to the original protected tenant are entitled to be recorded as legal heirs, therefore, sought for dismissal of the revision petition. The learned Counsel also contended that since the tenancy rights were not terminated, as is contemplated under the provisions of the Act, the successors to the original protected tenant are entitled to be recorded as legal heirs, therefore, sought for dismissal of the revision petition. The learned Counsel for the respondents also relied upon the following decisions in (1) Venkanna v. P. Buchamma, 1971 APU 266, (2) B. Narayan Rao and others v. Dubbasi Peddaiah, unreported judgment in CRP No.430 of 1989 AP High Court, (3) Ramchandra v. Govind, AIR 1975 SC 915 , (4) Saraswatibai Trimbak Gaikwad v. Damodhar D. Motiwale, (2002) 4 SCC 481 and (5) Kotaiah v. Property Assn. of the Baptist Churches (Pvt.) Ltd., (1989) 3 SCC 424 , in support of his contentions. 10. From the above rival contentions, the issue to be considered is whether the impugned order passed by the lower appellate authority is legal and sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. The admitted facts are that one Md. Nazer Ali was the pattadar of the land f in question and Jangam Muthaiah was the protected tenant of the land in an extent of Ac.l0.32 gts. in Sy.No.742 and Ac.l9.30 gts. in Sy.No.743 of Toopran Village and Mandal of Medak District. As the tenants failed to pay the rents, the said landowner filed proceedings before the competent authorities for recovery of rents. However, he was not successful before the original authority, therefore, filed appeal before the District Revenue Officer, Medak. When the matter was pending before the appellate authority, both the parties entered into a compromise and a compromise memo was filed, signed by both the parties. Pursuant to which, orders were passed by the appellate authority, recording the compromise. As per the compromise, the appellant/landowner has given up his claim as pattadar in respect of Ac.19.30 gts. in Sy.No.743, while the respondents/tenants who are the sons of the original protected tenant Jangam Muthaiah, have given up their right of protected tenancy in respect of Ac.10.32 gts. in Sy.No.742. It was specifically mentioned in the said memo that the appellant has agreed to file any application or execute any document as are required by the respondents for transferring the lands in favour of the respondents. Similarly, the respondents have also agreed to execute any documents as is required by the pattadar. in Sy.No.742. It was specifically mentioned in the said memo that the appellant has agreed to file any application or execute any document as are required by the respondents for transferring the lands in favour of the respondents. Similarly, the respondents have also agreed to execute any documents as is required by the pattadar. The said compromise order was passed on 21-10-1978 by the Joint Collector, Medak at Sangareddy. Pursuant to the said compromise, the respondents got executed four sale deeds by the pattadar Md. Nazeer Ali in favour of the three respondents to the compromise proceedings as well as another sale deed in favour of the wife of the 1st respondent therein. The present 3rd respondent who is the applicant, seeking to enter his name along with his sons, was the 2nd respondent even in the said appeal proceedings, where the compromise was entered into between the parties. 12. After 24 years, the present 2nd respondent along with his sons, who are respondents 4 and 5, have approached the Mandal Revenue Officer, perhaps with an allegation that the name of the protected tenant is continuing in the protected tenancy register, therefore, they are entitled to get their names entered as successors in the protected tenancy register, even though the very possession, as well as the rights of the protected tenants got terminated by virtue of the compromise memo which was filed in writing by the successor tenants, along with the landowner, in terms of which, an order was passed by the competent revenue authorities under the Act. Therefore, when the present application was filed before the Mandal Revenue Officer, the Mandal Revenue Officer made an endorsement recording the earlier compromise where they have given up their right as protected tenants in respect of the land that fell to the landholder i.e. Ac.l0.32 gts. in Sy.No.742. Therefore, the present applicants are not entitled to any relief However, they carried the matter in appeal before the Joint Collector, Medak District. in Sy.No.742. Therefore, the present applicants are not entitled to any relief However, they carried the matter in appeal before the Joint Collector, Medak District. The Joint Collector, however, proceeded as if that the appellants continued as protected tenants, therefore, the sales that are effected by the landholder, the 1st petitioner, who was the successor to the original owner Md Nazer Ali had executed sale deeds in favour of the petitioners 2 to 4, and the said sale deeds are not in conformity with the provisions of Section 38-D, and therefore, they are null and void, and consequently directed to enter the names of the appellants as successors of the protected tenant. In fact, the merits as to the validity or otherwise of the sales were, in fact, not subject-matter of appeal, but, however, the appellate authority had gone into and has even declared that the sales are not valid. 13. The contention of the petitioners is that when once the protected tenants got the matter compromised and have surrendered their interest with reference to part of the land in lieu of the benefit, which they got under the said compromise, having conferred full rights for larger extent of the land, they are estopped to contend that they are still continuing to be the protected tenants. It is not the case of any unilateral action on the part of the pattadar to get the tenancy rights terminated. The tenants having got the benefit under the compromise, not entitled to go back and assail only a part of the compromise, under which they have given up their rights in favour of the pattadar in respect of a part of the land which was the subjectmatter of the proceedings before the competent authorities. The learned Counsel also contended that even assuming that they have got a right, they are supposed to file their claims within a reasonable time, and they cannot approach the authorities as and they like since the present application to enter their names was filed before the Mandal Revenue Officer after 24 years of the compromise order, leave about the demise of the original protected tenant. 14. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav (supra), where the Apex Court while considering the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, where the Commissioner was provided with the power of revision, though no specific period of limitation was prescribed under the provisions of the said Act, still it was held that such power must be exercised within a reasonable time i.e. within a few months. 15. In Radha Bai v. B. Chinnayya (supra), while considering the scope of Section 89(2) of the Act, the Full Bench of this Court while disproving the view expressed by the Division Bench, held that there was no warrant for such limitation as to the scope and effect of Section 89(2) of the Act. It was held that Section 89(2) confers on the Tahsildar, the Tribunal and the Collector all the powers conferred on the Civil Courts by Code of Civil Procedure. 16. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (supra), in a petition, which was filed under the Rent Control Act, the tenant and landlord entered into a compromise, as per which, the tenant had agreed to evict after certain time and the said settlement was recorded. But, however, even after the said settlement and compromise order, the tenant did not vacate the premises as was agreed under the terms of the compromise. But, however, continued protracted litigation, raising frivolous and vexatious contentions regarding the compromise in question and going back on the undertaking given to the Court. The Apex Court, while deprecating the conduct of the tenant, imposed costs of Rs.25,000/- against them for the protracted litigation on frivolous grounds even after the compromise. Therefore, the learned Counsel sought to set aside the impugned order. 17. The Apex Court, while deprecating the conduct of the tenant, imposed costs of Rs.25,000/- against them for the protracted litigation on frivolous grounds even after the compromise. Therefore, the learned Counsel sought to set aside the impugned order. 17. Coming to the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents, in Venkanna v. P. Buchamma (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the provisions of Section 19 of the Act with reference to the procedure as to surrendering of the rights by the tenant to the landlord, it was held that in terms of Section 19 and its proviso, a tenant has to surrender the tenancy rights in writing and the competent authority has to record its satisfaction that the tenant, having known the consequences of the surrender, has done it in writing, and unless and until such facts are recorded while terminating the tenancy, the same would not be valid. The Division Bench also took note of the fact that prior to 1954, there was no such requirement as to the written surrender and the recording of the satisfaction by the competent authority. But, however, after amendment of Section 19 by incorporating the proviso, such compliance is required. Since such compliance was not followed, it was held that the tenants are entitled for recovery of possession. 18. In B. Narayan Rao and others v. Dubbasi Peddaiah (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has confirmed the recovery of possession, ordered by the lower appellate Court, in fact, though on behalf of the contesting parties it was contended that there was an order, modifying the tenancy certificate that was issued originally to the tenants on the contest by a third party, who also claimed to be a protected tenant in respect of a part of the extent of the property. But, however, the said judgment was rendered on the facts of the case; no principle was, in fact, laid down. 19. In Ramchandra v. Govind (supra), which was a case arising under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, where similar provisions exist as that of the present Act. But, however, the said judgment was rendered on the facts of the case; no principle was, in fact, laid down. 19. In Ramchandra v. Govind (supra), which was a case arising under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, where similar provisions exist as that of the present Act. Under the provisions of the said Act, when a tenant surrenders his tenancy rights as per Rule 2(a) of the Rules framed thereunder, the Mamlatdar who is the concerned authority has to record satisfaction with reference to the fact that the tenant understand the nature, and consequences of surrender and such surrender was voluntary, then Mamlatdar must endorse his findings as to such satisfaction and as to documents of, such surrender. It was held that since no such satisfaction was recorded by Mamlatdar the surrender was held to be invalid which was confirmed by the Apex Court. 20. In Saraswatibai Trimbak Gaikwad v. Damodhar D. Motiwale (supra), in a suit for recovery of possession, a decree was passed. But, however, the consequences of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act were not considered, therefore, it was held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the matters which are required to be dealt with by the Tribunal, therefore, the decree for recovery of possession of such land, granted by the Civil Court, cannot be executed, as long as the certificate issued by the authorities under the Tenancy Act remains in force. 21. In Kotaiah v. Property Assn. of the Baptist Churches (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), the appellants therein were found to be protected tenants. But, however, the landlords instead of offering the land for sale first to the appellants/tenants, transferred to the respondent association. Thereafter, the association filed an application for termination of the tenancy and for the grant of symbolic possession of the lands from the tenants. Later the association sought for leave to withdraw· the application made before the Tahsildar, leaving the applicants to agitate their rights elsewhere, was not acceptable as the association cannot be permitted to take advantage of its highhandedness. Therefore, the Tahsildar was directed to put the appellants/tenants in possession of tile agricultural lands within one month. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the respondents sought to sustain the impugned order. 22. Therefore, the Tahsildar was directed to put the appellants/tenants in possession of tile agricultural lands within one month. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the respondents sought to sustain the impugned order. 22. The judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents may not be of any assistance to the respondents 3 to 5 in the present case, since admittedly, they have entered into a written compromise where they have agreed to give up their rights in part of the property under the tenancy, while getting full rights over larger part of the property under the tenancy. In fact, sale deeds were got executed pursuant to the said compromise in the year 1980 itself, though the compromise was recorded in the year 1978. Now, after 24 years, only one of the three successors who was a party to the earlier proceedings along with his two sons, has come up with this application. 23. From the conduct of the respondents 3 to 5, it is clear that they had the benefit of confirmation of full rights with reference to Ac.19.30 gts. of land in Sy.No.743, while surrendering their tenancy rights in respect of Ac.10.32 gts. in Sy.No.742. Having got the benefit, it is not open to them to revert back and make a claim to get illegal benefit. Further, the very 3rd respondent who is a party to the earlier proceedings has signed as a witness in the agreement that was entered between the 1st petitioner with the other petitioners, where the 1st petitioner has agreed to sell the said property for a valuable consideration, and pursuant to which even registered sale deeds were executed in favour of the petitioners 2 to 4. 24. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, further, as the petitioners have approached the authority, even assuming that there is any illegality or any inequities, they ought to have approached the authorities within a reasonable time. Even on that ground also, the application of the respondents 3 to 5 is clearly liable to be rejected. 24. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, further, as the petitioners have approached the authority, even assuming that there is any illegality or any inequities, they ought to have approached the authorities within a reasonable time. Even on that ground also, the application of the respondents 3 to 5 is clearly liable to be rejected. The lower appellate authority was not justified in holding that the compromise entered into was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, since the 3rd respondent who is also one of the beneficiary in getting the sale deed executed by the landholder, conferring full rights to the extent of l/3rd of the land allotted to them along with his two other brothers, could not come up with the present application, seeking a right even with reference to the land to which they have given up their claim as protected tenants. 25. Under the above circumstances, the impugned order is set aside. Consequentially, the civil revision petition is allowed. No order as to costs.