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2007 DIGILAW 115 (GAU)

W. Birbal Singh v. State of Manipur

2007-02-05

MAIBAM B.K.SINGH, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2007
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. The unsuccessful writ Petitioner is the Appellant in the present writ appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15.4.2004 dismissing the writ petition being WP(C) No. 999/2001 filed by the Appellant-writ Petitioner assailing the order of the Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District, Government of Manipur, Imphal, Manipur dated 17.1.2001 dismissing the Appellant-writ Petitioner from service and also the order of the appellate authority, i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police (Range-Ill) dated 26.5.2001 dismissing the appeal filed by the Appellant-writ Petitioner against the dismissal order dated 17.1.2001. 2. Heard Mr. B.P. Sahu, learned Counsel assisted by Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, for the Appellant/writ Petitioner and Md. Jalaluddin, learned Government Advocate appearing for the Respondents. 3. The precise facts which would suffice for deciding the present writ appeal are that, while the Appellant-writ Petitioner was serving as H.C. (Head Constable) was posted at Churachandpur Police Station in the year 1998. In the month of January 1998 some arms and ammunitions kept inside Malkhana/Arms Kote were stolen and the said fact of stealing of arms and ammunitions was known to the Appellant-writ Petitioner when he opened the lock of the Arms Kote on 17.1.1998 for issuing arms and ammunitions to the police personnel for their duties. Soon after knowing the said fact of stealing of the arms and ammunitions from the Malkhana/Arms Kote, the Appellant-writ Petitioner lodged a report to the Officer in-Charge, Churachandpur Police Station and registered as FIR No. 35(1)/98 under Section 457 / 380, IPC by the Churachandpur Police Station. The Deputy Inspector General of Police also visited the place of incident. 4. After about 3 years of the occurrence of the said incident, the Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District, Government of Manipur issued an order on 13.6.2000 for placing the Appellant-writ Petitioner under suspension with immediate effect in contemplation of a Departmental Enquiry. The Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District, Government of Manipur issued an Office Memorandum dated 21.6.2000 framing 2 articles of charges for holding departmental enquiry against the Appellant-writ Petitioner. Under the said office memorandum dated 21.6.2000 the Appellant-writ Petitioner had been asked to submit his written statement of defence not later than 5.7.2000. The Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District, Government of Manipur issued an Office Memorandum dated 21.6.2000 framing 2 articles of charges for holding departmental enquiry against the Appellant-writ Petitioner. Under the said office memorandum dated 21.6.2000 the Appellant-writ Petitioner had been asked to submit his written statement of defence not later than 5.7.2000. The 2 articles of charges are that the article No. 1 while the Appellant-writ Petitioner was posted at Churachandpur Police Station as Head Constable in the period 1997 to 1998, holding the keys of the Malkhana-cum-Arms Kote of Police Station under Inspector N. Mangi Singh, Officer in-Charge, had conspired with Inspector N. Mangi Singh (OC), S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh and Constable No. 2981 L. Ingocha Singh during their posting at Churachandpur Police Station for disposal of Government properties and seized exhibits of FIR cases kept in the Malkhana-cum-Kote and in furtherance of the conspiracy, he had caused loss of the following Government properties: (i) One 303 MK-IV Rifle B/No. 500-0366 with magazine (defective). (ii) One 303 MK-IV Rifle, B/No. BD/15636 (defective) Exhibits of FIR No. (i). One M-16-Assault Rifle, B/No. 19929 with magazine, (iii) One Mag. Of G-3 Rifle (iv) 112 rds. of M-16 Rifle (v) 3 rds. Of G-3 Rifle (vi) One torch light, one chain and T-Shirt and Exhibits of FIR No. (i) One country made Carbine with magazine. (ii) 9 rds of 9mm, (iii) 11 Cartridges of 12 bore, (iv) 6 improvised bombs, (v) one Bayonet, (vi) 5 Chargers of.303 Rifle, (vii) 4 Web belts for 12 bore Cartridge and Exhibit of FIR No. 48 (10)97 SGT PS (i) One Pistol bearing star mark and letter "CCCP" on the body (Russian made) with magazine Having 13 rds., one belt and one pistol cover (placed on the wooden rack) 5. Article 2 is that during the aforesaid period and while functioning as aforesaid, the Appellant-writ Petitioner with the only ulterior motive of supporting the armed militants to act against the security, had handed over the arms and ammunitions to armed militants from Malkhana-cum-Kote of Churachandpur Police Station by showing a fake burglary allegedly occurred on 16.1.1998, the Appellant-writ Petitioner now as A.S.I., had failed to maintain sincerely, professionalism, integrity, alertness and above all symbol of policeman and conducted himself in a manner unbecoming of a Government Servant is Police Uniform. 6. 6. The gist of the statements of imputations of misconduct/misbehaviour in support of the articles of charge framed against the Appellant-writ Petitioner are that during his posting at Churachandpur Police Station as Head Constable in the period 1997 to 1998, held the key of the Malkhana-cum-Arms Kote under Inspector N. Mangi Singh the Officer In-charge, where the said articles which had been stolen were kept on the Wooden Racks and in a big Burmese Bag and that the Appellant-writ Petitioner had conspired with Inspector Shri N. Mangi Singh, S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh, C/No. 2981 L. Ingocha Singh during their posting at the Police Station for disposal of these properties (arms) which had been kept in the Malkhana-cum-Arms Kote and in furtherance of the conspiracy, had caused loss of the said arms and seized exhibits by removing those from the main door of the Kote and handed over those to the armed militants (ZRA militants) for a fat price through a secret dealing with the ZRA sympathizer on 14.1.1998 from across the southern wall of the Police Station near the quarter occupied by him and those Government properties were removed selectively by him with his conspirators from other Government arms and ammunitions kept on Wooden racks in the Malkhana-cum-Kote and also the seized exhibits kept on Wooden rack. On 17.1.1998 the fabricated a false FIR stating that in between the night of 16.1.1998 and 17.1.1998 the said properties and seized exhibits had been stolen from said Kote by unknown miscreants by breaking the rear wall and, thus, reported a fake burglary case to be registered by his accomplices, i.e., Inspector Shri N. Mangi Singh under FIR No. 35(1)/1998 in December 1997. The Appellant-writ Petitioner, the Key holder of the Malkhana-cum-Kote approached S.I. Thangthangzoul of the Station with S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh with on M-16 Rifle (defective) brought by one Paopi Tonsing residing near the Police Station (a ZRA think-tank) for exchange with one good M-16 Rifle seized from ZRA activists and kept in the Arms Kote in connection with FIR No. No. 562(II)/1997 C.C.P. P.S. by conspiring with Inspector N. Mangi Singh, S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh, C/No. 2981 L. Ingocha Singh, Paopi Tonsing and one Haopu (ZRA think-thank) of Pearsonmuan village. For the said task they had joint secret meeting day and night in the quarter, OC's Office Room and quarters before the incident. For the said task they had joint secret meeting day and night in the quarter, OC's Office Room and quarters before the incident. On 16.1.1998 from 6 p.m the Appellant-writ Petitioner with Inspector N. Mangi Singh (OC), S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh, C/No. 2981 L. Ingocha Singh enjoyed a party with liquor and duck-curry comprising of Paopi Tonsing, Haopu (ZRA think-tank) and 4/5 hard core ZRA activists including V.K. Jashua. The expenses of the party was borne by ZRA think-thank for felicitating the success of the task of handing over the above said Government properties and seized exhibits to the ZRA militants before the occurrence of alleged fake burglary. Further on 16.1.1998 the Appellant-writ Petitioner with his accomplices, instead of alertness diluted the Thana alertness totally at night by secret withdrawal of C/No. 2981 L. Ingocha Singh from rear Sentry, supplying liquor to the Sentries of the guard room, confining and shadowing them by engaging Paopi Tonsing (ZRA think-tank) and taking out ASI Kamzathang, detailed as NDO-cum-Part 1 Officer up to Pearsonmuan village in order to cause the fake burglary by removing one boulder from the near wall of the Malkhana-cum-Arms Kote. 7. From the articles of charges, statements of imputations and also the statements of the witnesses of the prosecution in the departmental enquiry, the case of the prosecution against the Appellant-writ Petitioner was that the Appellant-writ Petitioner conspired with the Inspector N. Mangi Singh (OC of the P.S.), S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh, C/No. 2981 L. Ingocha Singh, Paopi and one Haopu (ZRA think-tank) of Pearsonmuan village for exchange of one M-16 Rifle defective brought by the said Paopi Tonsing with one good M-16 Rifle seized from ZRA activists and kept in the Arms Kote in case FIR No. 562(11)97 CCP PS and handed over the good M-16 Rifle to the ZRA activists. 8. According to the Appellant-writ Petitioner no departmental enquiry and/or departmental proceedings were initiated against the alleged conspirators, viz., Inspector N. Mangi Singh, S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh and others. 8. According to the Appellant-writ Petitioner no departmental enquiry and/or departmental proceedings were initiated against the alleged conspirators, viz., Inspector N. Mangi Singh, S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh and others. The further case of the Appellant-writ Petitioner is that if the prosecution story against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges in the departmental proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner is accepted and also come to a finding that the articles of charges against the Appellant-writ Petitioner have been proved, the said two conspirators, i.e., Inspector N. Mangi Singh and S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh, are also liable to be punished for the said two articles of charges against the Appellant-writ Petitioner. In order to verify as to whether or not any departmental enquiry had been taken up against the said two conspirators, i.e., N. Mangi Singh and S.I N. Subolchandra Singh, the learned Government advocate had been directed to take necessary instructions as to whether or not the disciplinary proceeding had been proceeded against the said conspirators. The learned Government advocate could not get any instruction or information from the authorities of the Home Department, Government of Manipur. But the learned Government advocate informed this Court that the said conspirators are still in service as police officers in the police department, Government of Manipur. 9. The Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District under his order dated 10.7.2000 appointed one Sri Kh. Dhanachandra Singh, MPS, Churachandpur as enquiry officer to enquire into the charges framed against the Appellant-writ Petitioner, but the Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District did not appoint any presenting officer in the departmental enquiry against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges. This fact of non-appointment of the presenting officer in the departmental enquiry against the Appellant-writ Petitioner is not denied by the State Respondents. From perusal of the file placed by the learned Government advocate containing the departmental proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges, it is confirmed that no presenting officer is appointed in the departmental proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges. In the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges, the prosecution examined 7 state witnesses, i.e., S Ws, namely, (1) Tuangthang Zoula, (2) Tungkhopao, (3) Thaineisian (Seima), (4) Kamzathang, (5) Y. Surchandra Singh, (6) Thangkholian and (7) T. Ramhlun. In the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges, the prosecution examined 7 state witnesses, i.e., S Ws, namely, (1) Tuangthang Zoula, (2) Tungkhopao, (3) Thaineisian (Seima), (4) Kamzathang, (5) Y. Surchandra Singh, (6) Thangkholian and (7) T. Ramhlun. None of the important witnesses, i.e., Inspector Shri N. Mangi Singh, S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh, Constable No. 2981 L. Ingocha Siongh, Paopi Tonsing (ZRA think-tank), Haopu (ZRA think -thank) and Sri V.K. Jashua (ZRA), the departmental proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges. 10. The enquiry officer, without examining any important witnesses but basing on a voluminous statement of the S Ws which do not have direct link with the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said charges against him, submitted his report dated 10.1.2001, with the finding that the charge levelled against the Appellant-writ Petitioner was found to be proved. From analysis and assessment of evidence made by the enquiry officer for coming to his finding that the charge against the Appellant-writ Petitioner had been proved in his report dated 10.1.2001, it is clear that the findings of the inquiry officer are based on no evidence, inasmuch as, in fact statements of the S Ws are not at all considered. The analysis and assessment of evidence made by the enquiry officer in his report dated 10.1.2001 reads as follows: Analysis and assessment of evidence: The oral evidences of the state witnesses duly recorded, the documents on records for the case and the documents in favour of the charged officer were examined and analysed minutely keeping view the oral versions and materials on records both in favour of the case and the charged officer. The material evidence adduced by the P Ws who witnessed physical evidence of the scene of crime, related the circumstantial facts before and after the incident without a missing gap and the previous and subsequent conduct of the charged officer and his accomplices before and after the incident, to tell the circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy of the charged officer with his accomplices, highest possibility of faked burglary, fabricating a faked FIR, removal of the missing Government properties and exhibits selectively from the Malkhana-cum-Arms Kote through main door and disposal of the same to the ZRA militants before 19.1.1998 though not on 14.1.1998. Though not proved by eye witnesses as regards the removal of missing weapons and exhibits from the Arms Kote and handing over of the same of ZRA militants on 14.1.1998 or any date before 16.1.1998, the same chain of physical evidence, circumstantial evidence well set and the previous and subsequent conduct of the charged officer and the accomplices as sustained by P Ws and documents on record uphold the maxim that circumstances can't lie. Further a witness may lie and may be impartial but documents once made shall not. On analyzing the evidence through true perspective, there was preponderance of the probabilities of the charges against the charged officer. The retraction of the PW-15 during cross-examination by D.A. had no weight age. The charged office had no proper account of defence except from his D.A. The chain of well set circumstances, physical evidence of the site of incident, previous and subsequent conducts pre-dominate the defence materials of the charged officer. 12. Finding and decision against each charge: (a) The facts in Article 1 of the charge are proved by the evidence available on record except the actual date of disposal of the Government properties before 16.1.1998. Hence, the charges are held proved, thus. (b) The facts in Article 2 of the charges are held proved beyond doubt by the evidence on record. Hence, the charges are held proved as indicated. (c) The facts in Article 1 of the imputation of misconduct/misbehavior in support of the charges are proved by the evidence on record except the actual date of disposal of the missing Government properties and exhibits before 16.1.1998. Hence, the charges are proved as indicated. (d) The facts in Article 2 of the imputation of misconduct/misbehaviour in support of the charge are proved by the evidence on record banning the actual date of disposal of the missing properties before 16.1.1998 and the minor fact that the charged officer assaulted the ZRA activist Lem Vaiphei to give statement that the M-16 Rifle seized from him by CRPF on 24.1.1998 was the same M-16 Rifle missing from Arms Kote which fact is negligible at all. Hence, the charges are held proved as indicated. Hence, from the evidence available on record of enquiry decision has been taken that the charges framed against the charged officer are held proved Except the actual date of disposal of the properties before 16.1.1998. 11. Hence, the charges are held proved as indicated. Hence, from the evidence available on record of enquiry decision has been taken that the charges framed against the charged officer are held proved Except the actual date of disposal of the properties before 16.1.1998. 11. Basing on the said report of the enquiry officer dated 10.1.2001, the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur issued the impugned order dated 17.1.2001 for imposing the penalty for dismissing the service to the Appellant-writ Petitioner. Against the said dismissal order dated 17.1.2001, the Appellant-writ Petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police (Range III), Government of Manipur, Imphal, Manipur. On the failure of the Deputy Inspector General of Police/appellate authority to consider and dispose of the appeal filed by the Appellant-writ Petitioner, this Court by an order dated 19.4.2001 passed in WP(C) No. 606/2001 directed the appellate authority to dispose of the Petitioner's appeal within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the judgment and order of this Court with a permission that if the Appellant-Petitioner feels aggrieved by the order of the learned appellate authority, he may approach this Court again. 12. Ultimately the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Range III), Churachandpur passed an order dated 26.5.01 dismissing the appeal filed by the Appellant-writ Petitioner and thereby upholding the order of the dismissal dated 17.1.2001 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District. Being aggrieved the Appellant-writ Petitioner filed a writ petition being WP(C) No. 999/2001 for quashing the impugned dismissal order dated 17.1.2001 and also order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Range III) dated 26.5.2001 dismissing the appeal filed by the Appellant-writ Petitioner and upholding the dismissal order dated 17.1.2001 against the present Respondents before this Court. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 15.4.2004 dismissed the writ petition. 13. The Appellant-writ Petitioner filed the present writ appeal on the following inter alia grounds: (A) Non-appointment of the Presenting Officer in the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said two articles of charges will vitiate the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner. (B) Non-examination of the important witnesses, i.e., Inspector Shri N. Mangi Singh, O/c. of the Churachandpur P.S., S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh of Churachandpur P.S., Constable No. 2981 Shri L. Ingocha Singh of Churachandpur P.S., Mr. Paopi Tonsing (ZRA think-thank), Mr. (B) Non-examination of the important witnesses, i.e., Inspector Shri N. Mangi Singh, O/c. of the Churachandpur P.S., S.I. N. Subolchandra Singh of Churachandpur P.S., Constable No. 2981 Shri L. Ingocha Singh of Churachandpur P.S., Mr. Paopi Tonsing (ZRA think-thank), Mr. Haopu (ZRA think-than) and Mr. V.K. Jashua with whom the Appellant alleged to have stolen the arms and ammunitions mentioned in the articles of charges from the Malkhana-cum-Arms Kote of Churachandpur P.S. and non-availability of cross-examining them will amount to not only basing the report of the enquiry officer on no evidence but also denial of Principles of Natural Justice to the Appellant-writ Petitioner in the disciplinary proceeding. (C) There cannot be selective punishment against the Appellant-writ Petitioner if the prosecution story in the departmental proceeding against the Appellant for the said 2 articles of charges is accepted and proved, inasmuch as, the State Government neither imposed any penalty nor taken up any action against the said conspirators. (D) The finding of the enquiry officer in his report dated 10.1.2001 that articles of charges against the Appellant-writ Petitioner have been proved are based on no evidence. 14. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-writ Petitioner in order to substantiate the ground (A) has placed the decisions of this Court in (1) Dr. Rajyamallu Buzarbarua v. The Assam Administrative Tribunal and Ors. (1983) 1 GLR (NOC) 71 (Division Bench), (2) Chelfrumog v. State of Tripura and Ors. (2000) 2 GLR 604, (3) Baharulislam (C.T.) v. Union of India and Ors. 2001 (1) GLT 621 and, (4). State of Manipur and Ors. v. Chongtham Homendro Singh 2005 (3) GLT 154 pressed into service. Against the common judgment and order of this Court (Division Bench) passed in the State of Manipur v. Chongtham Homendro Singh (supra) and a bunch of the writ petitions, the State Government preferred Civil Appeals before the Apex Court being No. CA 2291/2006, to CA No. 2299/2006. The Apex Court did not interfere with the finding of this Court that non-appointment of the presenting officer in the disciplinary proceeding shall vitiate the disciplinary proceeding. 15. The Apex Court did not interfere with the finding of this Court that non-appointment of the presenting officer in the disciplinary proceeding shall vitiate the disciplinary proceeding. 15. This Court in the above cases held that the enquiry officer has assumed the roll (sic.) of the Judge as well as the prosecution, inasmuch as, in absence of the presenting officer, the enquiry officer himself examined the witnesses and exhibited documents and it would be violative of the rules and the fundamental principles of natural justice. Admittedly, in the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said 2 articles of charges no presenting officer was appointed and the enquiry officer himself assumed the roll (sic.) of Judge as well as prosecution. Accordingly, we are of the considered view, that the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant-writ Petitioner is liable to be quashed only on this score. 16. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-writ Petitioner in support of ground No. B. has referred to the decisions of the Apex Court (1) Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 277 , (2) Union of India and Ors. v. Ratneswar Karmakar2000 (2) GLT 610 (2000) : 3 GLR 335., (3) Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 142 . 17. The fact of the case in Hardwari Lal (supra) is that the Appellant Constable in the Police department was subjected to the departmental enquiry on a charge that on the night between 16/17.1.1991 being under the influence of liquor hurled abuses in a Police Station at Constable Prakash Ch. Pandey. The complainant Sri Virendra Singh for the said alleged occurrence and the witness who had been accompanied with the Appellant to the hospital are the material witnesses for the said occurrence, but they were not examined in the disciplinary enquiry against the Appellant. The Apex Court held that non-examination of the said two material witnesses shall not only cause non-observation of principles of natural justice but also cause prejudice to the Appellant in defending his case and accordingly, there was no proper enquiry held by the authority. Para Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of AIR in Hardwari Lal (supra) reads as follows: 3. Before us the sole ground urged is as to the non-observance of the principles of natural justice in not examining the complainant, Shri Virendra Singh, and witness, Jagadis Ram. Para Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of AIR in Hardwari Lal (supra) reads as follows: 3. Before us the sole ground urged is as to the non-observance of the principles of natural justice in not examining the complainant, Shri Virendra Singh, and witness, Jagadis Ram. The tribunal as well as the High Court have brushed aside the grievance made by the Appellant that the non-examination of those two persons has prejudiced his case. Examination of these two witnesses would have revealed as to whether the complaint made by Virender Singh was correct or not and to establish that he was the best person to speak to its veracity. So also, Jagadish Ram, who had accompanied the Appellant to the hospital for medical examination, would have been an important witness to prove the state or the condition of the Appellant. We do not think the tribunal and the High Court were justified in thinking that non-examination of these two persons could not be material. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court and the Tribunal erred in not attaching importance to this contention of the Appellant. 4. However, Shri Goel, the learned Addl. Advocate General, State of Uttar Preadesh has submitted that there was other material which was sufficient to come to the conclusion one way or the other and the has taken us through the same. But while appreciating the evidence on record the impact of the testimony of the complainant cannot be visualized. Similarly, the evidence of Jagadish Ram would also bear upon the state of inebriation, if any, of the Appellant. 5. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that there was no proper enquiry held by the authorities and on this short ground we quash the order of dismissal passed against the Appellant by setting aside the order made by the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal and direct that the Appellant be reinstated in service. Considering the fact of long lapse of time before the date of dismissal and re-instatement, and on blame can be put only on the door of the Respondents we think it appropriate to award 50 per cent of the back salary being payable to the Appellant. We, thus, allow the appeal filed by the Appellant. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 18. We, thus, allow the appeal filed by the Appellant. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 18. In Ratneswar Karmakar (supra), the Respondent-Ratneswar Karmakar was subjected to a disciplinary enquiry for the charge for possessing of assets disproportionate to his known source of income. Shri Yadavendu, Assistant Valuation Officer of the department who assessed the valuation of the building of the Respondent and also Shri I. Sarma who prepared the valuation report were not examined as witnesses in the disciplinary proceeding against the Appellant for the charge of possession of property disproportionate to his known source of income. The assessment of the valuation of the property in possession of the Appellant are based on the valuation report prepared by the said two persons in the disciplinary proceeding, but they were not examined as witnesses. Non-examination of the two important witnesses would be unfair on the part of the enquiry officer, inasmuch as, it would amount to a denial of opportunity to the Respondents to presenting his case. Paras 8, 9, and 14 of the GLT in Union of India and Ors. v. Ratneswar Karmakar reads as follows: 8. On the background of the case as stated above, this Court is required to examine whether non-examination of Shri P.L. Yadavendu, AVO and Shri R.K. Choudhury, ITO (Vigilance) and the consequent denial of the opportunity to cross-examine them by the Respondents have in any manner occasioned failure of justice. Shri Yadavendu, Assistant Valuation Officer of the department has assessed the valuation of the building of the Respondent at Sree Nagar, Guwahati. The valuation report tendered in evidence as Exhibit-S-1 shows that the property has been valued at Rs. 3,27,830. The Respondent contended before the Inquiry Officer that Shri Yadavendu assessed the building on the basis of the Delhi Plinth Area rate as on 1.10.1976 of the Central Public Works Department and it was unfair to adopt the rate applicable in Delhi in assessing the valuation of the building in Guwahati. The point has been vehemently argued before us by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. Despite that Shri Yadavendu was not called for a witness to enable the Respondent to cross-examine him. It would appear from the enquiry report that Shri Yadavendu did not turn up during the course of enquiry and the case being time bound had to be closed. Despite that Shri Yadavendu was not called for a witness to enable the Respondent to cross-examine him. It would appear from the enquiry report that Shri Yadavendu did not turn up during the course of enquiry and the case being time bound had to be closed. On the other hand, the valuation report prepared by Shri I Sarma, a Government approved valuer at the instance of the Respondent shows that the building in question is worth Rs. 1,82,059.50 only. The Inquiry Officer observed that the valuation report submitted by Shri Yadavendu and Shri I. Sarma stand on equal footing as Shri I. Sarma was also not produced as a defence witness. The Inquiry Officer has relied upon a diary (Exhibit-S33) maintained by the wife of the Respondent where he found that a total sum of Rs. 2,63,309.20 was spent by the Respondent in the construction of the building. Taking into consideration the entries made in the diary and on speculation of probable expenditure on account of electrical fittings, glasses etc., the report given by Shri Yadavendu in Exhibit-S 33 has been held to be reasonable. The I.O. simultaneously held that the report given by the Government approved valuer is, therefore, undervalued. Eventually, taking into consideration the savings, the Inquiry Officer assessed the value of disproportionate assets at Rs. 48, 878. The Inquiry Officer also observed that the rate adopted by Shri Yadavendu are the Delhi Plinth Area rate with cost index for the relevant period for Guwahati. 9. It is apparent from above that the Inquiry Officer relied upon the valuation report submitted by Shri Yadavendu without giving an opportunity to the Respondent to cross-examine him. The report submitted by Shri Yadavendu being crucial in the disciplinary proceeding, all efforts should have been made to procure his attendance. The plea that the case was time-bound as per direction of the Central Administrative Tribunal and, as such, had to be closed cannot be an acceptable ground. It was open to the authorities concerned to move the learned Tribunal for extension of time. The casual observation by the Inquiry Officer that Shri Yadavendu relied upon the Delhi Plinth Area rate with cost index for the relevant period for Guwahati also cannot be accepted in its finality as the question raised by the Respondent relating to the rates applied is significant for the purpose of his defence. The casual observation by the Inquiry Officer that Shri Yadavendu relied upon the Delhi Plinth Area rate with cost index for the relevant period for Guwahati also cannot be accepted in its finality as the question raised by the Respondent relating to the rates applied is significant for the purpose of his defence. That apart, it would be grossly incorrect to equate the report of Sri Yadavendu with that of the Government approved valuer for non-examination of the latter and then to take the report submitted by Shri Yadavendu into consideration. The Inquiry Officer has drawn support to the report from the entries made in a diary maintained by the wife of the Respondent. This is not permissible as the diary was not allowed to be inspected by the Respondent. 14. A brief review of the lapses discussed hereinabove would show that non-examination of two important witnesses, denial of the opportunity for inspection of the diary and the Central Bureau of Investigation's report has been unfair on the part of the Inquiry Officer. The argument that the proceedings had to be concluded within the time frame given by the Tribunal is of no consequences as the Inquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority are expected to discharge their statutory duty in a just, proper and fair manner. Had the opportunities as highlighted above been afforded, it might have had the effect of reversal of the order of dismissal. The right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act in a fair manner. The disciplinary proceeding was initiated in the year 1990 and the order of dismissal was passed on 30.12.1993, the last day of the Respondent in service. The disciplinary authority took three years to complete the enquiry and there was delay of about another three years for the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal. The manner in which the proceedings have been concluded indicate that the sense of urgency developed at a belated stage only with a view to impose the penalty before the Respondent goes on superannuation. The principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and have application to departmental proceedings. The manner in which the proceedings have been concluded indicate that the sense of urgency developed at a belated stage only with a view to impose the penalty before the Respondent goes on superannuation. The principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and have application to departmental proceedings. The cardinal principle of natural justice is that the decision maker should afford a party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case and that he must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. It is needless to reiterate that the purpose of the Rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and when there is violation of such principle in the form of denial of adequate and reasonable opportunity to a party to present his case, the order passed cannot be supported. The irregularities in the disciplinary proceeding on various counts as discussed above, if considered on the touchstone of prejudice would invariably, in the given case, would lead to the conclusion that the decision making process in the proceeding has been glaringly arbitrary. 19. In Sher Bahadur (supra) the Appellant was issued a charge memo alleging that he had fraudulently secured his appointment order duly signed by A.P.O. (Const.), Northern Railway, Kashmiri Gate, Delhi and after holding enquiry for the said charge memo he was dismissed from service. The said A.P.O. (Const.) and the cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist were not examined as witness but the inquiry officer submitted his finding in his report, "in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry". The alleged misconduct against the charged officer has been proved. The Apex Court held that the said finding of the enquiry officer is based on no evidence in law, inasmuch as, "sufficiency of evidence" postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Para 7 of the SCC in Sher Bahadur (supra) reads as follows: 7. It may be observed that the expression "sufficiency of evidence" postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconducts alleged against him. Evidence, however, voluminous it may be. Which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. It may be observed that the expression "sufficiency of evidence" postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconducts alleged against him. Evidence, however, voluminous it may be. Which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, "in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry", would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence. Though, the disciplinary authority cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist, Ex-CVI/Northern Railway, New Delhi, in support of the charges, he was not examined. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of appointment of the Appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge. The statement of the Appellant recorded by the enquiry officer shows no more than his working earlier to his re- engagement during the period between May 1978 and November 1979 in different phases. Indeed, his statement was not relied upon by the enquiry officer. The finding of the enquiry officer that in view of the oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, the charge against the Appellant for securing the fraudulent appointment letter duly signed by the said APO (Const.) was proved, is, in the light of the above discussion, erroneous. In our view, this is clearly a case of finding the Appellant guilty of charge without having any evidence to link the Appellant with the alleged misconduct. The High Court did not consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such the judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the disciplinary authority, under challenge, cannot be sustained, they are accordingly set aside. 20. In the present case the enquiry officer in his report dated 10.1.2001 while analyzing and assessing of evidence did not discuss the existence of some evidence. 21. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the considered view that the ground (B) has a force of law. 22. 20. In the present case the enquiry officer in his report dated 10.1.2001 while analyzing and assessing of evidence did not discuss the existence of some evidence. 21. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the considered view that the ground (B) has a force of law. 22. In support of the ground (C), the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-writ Petitioner has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in (1) K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of A.P. and Anr. (1999) 6 SCC 257 , (2) The decision of this Court (D/B) in Girish Ch. Sarmah v. Bongaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. and Ors. 2006 (1) GLT 235, the Apex Court in K. Sukhendar Reddy (supra) held that the Government cannot be permitted to resort to selective suspension. Para 7 of the SCC reads as follows: 7. Mr. Dutta, learned senior counsel argued at length highlighting different facts of the case which primarily relate to the questions raised by the Appellant in his representation dated 23.8.2002. Mr. Dutta argued that the materials unfurled before the Inquiry Officer have no nexus with the charges framed and, as such, the inquiry report and the subsequent actions taken thereon by the disciplinary authority in imposing the penalty are perverse. With reference to the charges framed and the evidence of the three witnesses examined by the authority, Mr. Dutta tried to justify that the Appellant was not liable for any penalty. According to Shri Dutta, the Appellant was one of the members of the different committees constituted for the purpose and he alone cannot be held responsible for the collective decision of the said committees in recommending acquisition/purchase of the land for establishment of a retail outlet at Jorabat allegedly on payment of price higher than the prevailing market value. Mr. Dutta submitted that there being no motive attributed, it was wrong on the part of the disciplinary authority to pick and choose the Appellant and victimize him. The learned senior counsel further argued that the collective decision of the committees could at best be termed as an error of judgment simpliciter and under no circumstances could be treated as misconduct as defined in Rule 8. The main thrust of argument was on the perversity in the findings of the inquiry report which, according to Shri Dutta, are inconsistent and not supported by materials on record. 23. The main thrust of argument was on the perversity in the findings of the inquiry report which, according to Shri Dutta, are inconsistent and not supported by materials on record. 23. The Division Bench of this Court in Girish Ch. Sarmah, (supra) held that a person cannot be blamed/punishment alone for misconduct which was done/committed jointly along with some other persons. In the present case if the prosecution story against the present Appellant-writ Petitioner for the said 2 articles of charges are proved, the State Government cannot be permitted to resort to selective punishment. The Apex Court in Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 713 held that the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction, ought to have examined as to whether the evidence adduced before enquiry officer had nexus with the charge and could or could not lead to the guilt of the employee mere ipse dixit of the enquiry officer would not suffice. Paras 26, 27 and 28 of the SCC in Narinder Mohan Arya, (supra) reads as follows: 26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the enquiry officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it, it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry -- see State of Assam v. Mahendra Kumar Das. (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice - see Khem Chand v. Union of India and State of U.P. v. Om Prakash Gupta. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involves two elements (i) objective, and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element -see K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involves two elements (i) objective, and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element -see K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis - see Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan. (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject-matter of the charges is wholly illegal - see Director (Inspection and Quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances - see Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police. 27. We may notice that this Court in Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura was clearly of the opinion that a civil suit challenging the legality of a disciplinary proceeding and consequent order of punishment is maintainable. Even this Court in its order dated 29.7.1994 said so. It is interesting to note that in the celebrated judgment of this Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh this Court opined: (SCR pp. 608-09). On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases - and the instant case is in point - where the error. Irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. Irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it-or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. 28. Yet again in Sher Bahadur v. Union of India this Court observed: (SCC p. 144 para 7). 7. It may be observed that the expression 'sufficiency of evidence' postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however, voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, 'in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry', would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence. Though, the disciplinary authority cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist, Ex CVI/Northern Railway, New Delhi, in support of the charges, he was not examined. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of appointment of the Appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of appointment of the Appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge. The statement of the Appellant recorded by the enquiry officer shows no more than his working earlier to his re-engagement during the period between May 1978 and November 1979 in different phases. Indeed, his statement was not relied upon by the enquiry officer. The finding of the enquiry officer that in view of the oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, the charge against the Appellant for securing the fraudulent appointment letter duly signed by the said APO (Const.) was proved, is in tin- light of the above discussion, erroneous. In our view, this is clearly a case of finding the Appellant guilty of charge without having any evidence to link the Appellant with the alleged misconduct. The High court did not consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such the judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the disciplinary authority, under challenge, cannot be sustained, they are accordingly set aside. 24. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) had been relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-writ Petitioner in support of the ground No. (D). 25. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the considered view that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 15.4.2004 passed in WP(C) No. 999/2001 is required to be interfered with. Accordingly, we hereby set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 15.4.2004 passed in WP(C) No. 999/2001. 26. In the result the impugned dismissal order dated 7.1.2001 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Churachandpur District for dismissing the Appellant-writ Petitioner from service and also the order of the appellate authority, i.e., order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Range III), Government of Manipur, Imphal dated 26.5.2001 are hereby set aside. The Appellant should be re-instated in service. However, it is left to the Respondents to pass any appropriate orders regarding arrear of pay and allowances of the Appellant according to law and the writ appeal and writ petition are allowed. 27. Parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal allowed