JUDGMENT :- This review application has been filed against the judgment delivered in Civil Revision Application No. 115 of 2006 by this court. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as decree-holder and judgment-debtor. 2. The present applicant in review application is a decree-holder while the non-applicant is ajudgment-debtor. Non-applicant judgment debtor had filed Civil Revision Application No. 115 of 2006 before this court. The said revision application came to be allowed. The present applicant/decree-holder seeks to review that judgment in view of the fact that decree-holder was not heard. It is contended that the matter was not actually notified in the list for hearing and therefore the decree-holder's counsel could not remain present before the court and place the proper position of law before the court. 3. The facts may be narrated as follows Decree-holder Radhabai had instituted Civil Suit No.955 of 1971. There was a compromise and a compromise decree was passed on 28-2-1974. The decree was for delivery of possession and recovery of money. Initially, two execution applications were filed - one Regular Darkhast No.280 of 1974 and second R.D. No.131 of 1976. The first application i.e. R.D. No.280174 was dismissed as infructuous and when R.D. No. 13 1/1976 was filed, the judgment debtor moved an application M.J.C. No.67176 contending that the decree could not be executed due to the provisions contained in the Debt Relief Act, 1975. The plea of the judgment-debtor was upheld by the trial court and the execution Application No.131 of 1976 was dismissed. The decree-holder/ applicant filed a revision before this court being CRA No.339/77. This revision came to be allowed on 6-9-1980. After this C.R.A. was allowed, decree-holder - Radhabai filed another execution application R.D. No.175/81. Obviously, therefore, this was filed immediately after the decision of the High court. The decreeholder did not prosecute this properly. As a result, the court passed the following order. "Decree-holder called absent. Decreeholder's counsel filed no instructions pursis. The office objection that remained till today and no further steps has been taken by the Decree-holder, hence the execution proceeding is filed for non-compliance." 4. This order came to be passed on 15-8-1983. Thereafter, in the year 2001, the decree-holder moved an application No.46 of 2001 for revival of the execution proceedings No.131 of 1976. That was allowed by the Civil Judge and he revived the execution proceeding No.131 of 1976. This order came to be passed on 15-8-1983. Thereafter, in the year 2001, the decree-holder moved an application No.46 of 2001 for revival of the execution proceedings No.131 of 1976. That was allowed by the Civil Judge and he revived the execution proceeding No.131 of 1976. It is against that order that the Civil Revision Application No.115/2006 was filed and it is the order in this revision that is now sought to be reviewed. S. Shri. Kshirsagar, learned counsel for the decree-holder/applicant, contended that the Execution Application No.131 of 1976 was rightly revived by the lower court. He contended that the execution application No.131 of 1976 was dismissed because of provisions of Debt Relief Act. He also contended that the order passed in M.J.C. No.67/76 was set aside and therefore it must be assumed that the execution application No.131 of 1976 automatically stood revived. To my mind, there was no question of revival of execution application No.131 of 1976 for two reasons. Firstly, Application No.131/76 was dismissed, therefore unless fresh execution application was filed, there could be no question of revival of earlier execution application. Secondly, after dismissal of the first application No. 131/76, the decree-holder filed another application for execution No.175 of 1981 giving details of both earlier applications No.280 of 1974 and 131 of 1976. Therefore, by this new execution application revival of, in fact, 131/76 was sought. As far as the very first application No.280/74 is concerned, it was dismissed as wholly infructuous. Hence, when Execution Application No.175/81 was filed, it could be said that the revival of execution application No.131/76 was sought. In fact, therefore, to my mind, execution application No.131/1976 completely stood merged in execution application No.175/81. This application No. 175/ 81 was filed within 12 years from the date of decree and therefore could either revive 131/ 76 or application no.175/81 could itself be treated as fresh application within 12 years. 6. Now this application No.175/81 was dismissed for default and non-prosecution. The order is to the following effect. "Decree-holder called absent. Decree holder's counsel filed no instructions pursis. The office objection that remained till today and no further steps has been taken by the Decree-holder, hence the execution proceeding is filed for non-compliance." Therefore, this order was passed on 5-8-1983. 6. Now this application No.175/81 was dismissed for default and non-prosecution. The order is to the following effect. "Decree-holder called absent. Decree holder's counsel filed no instructions pursis. The office objection that remained till today and no further steps has been taken by the Decree-holder, hence the execution proceeding is filed for non-compliance." Therefore, this order was passed on 5-8-1983. The execution was dismissed, as certified copy of order was not filed with execution application from 13-4-1981 to 5-8-1983 when the execution application was dismissed. It is, therefore, for the first time that a separate application with a title "application for reopening R.D. No. 131/76" was filed on 26-4-2001. The learned Civil Judge has allowed this application and revived R.D. No.131/76 by very lengthy order. We have seen that after R.D. No.131/76 was dismissed and another application No.175/81 was filed giving reference of the old Regular Darkhast. Obviously, therefore, as said earlier, R.D. No.131/76 merged into R.D. No.175/81. If at all any execution application that could be reopened or revived that was 175/ 81 and not 131/76. The order directing reopening of R.D. No.131/76 therefore, is patently wrong. 7. Shri. Kshirsagar, learned counsel, contended that since earlier execution application was dismissed for statistical purpose and for no fault of decree-holder, they can be revived after lapse of any time until the decree is fully satisfied. It is no doubt true that all execution applications were dismissed without possession being delivered. Obviously, nothing was recovered in pursuance of the decree. Column No.6 in execution application No.175 of 81 shows that R.D. No.280 of 1974 was dismissed as wholly infructuous and R.D. No.131 of 1976 was simply filed. We have seen that after filing (consigning the application to record room) R.D. No.131 of 1976, fresh R.D. No.175 of 1981 was filed and since R.D. No. 175/81 itself was within limitation, it could be entertained even as fresh application. In any case, therefore, there was no question of revival of R.D. No.131 of 1976, as it had merged with the subsequent application. R.D. No.175 of 1981 was dismissed for non-compliance and non-prosecution after failure to comply for two years. The question is when once an execution is dismissed for non-prosecution and noncompliance, is it finally disposed off or is only dismissed for statistical purpose. R.D. No.175 of 1981 was dismissed for non-compliance and non-prosecution after failure to comply for two years. The question is when once an execution is dismissed for non-prosecution and noncompliance, is it finally disposed off or is only dismissed for statistical purpose. Before, I answer this question, a stock of the decisions cited by Shri. Kshirsagar, learned counsel, has to be taken. The first such decision relied upon by the learned counsel is reported in AIR 1962 Rajasthan 43 (Government of Rajasthan and another Vs. Sangram Singh and others) in which following observations are made "(33) Thus, in the present case, I find that the record of the previous application for the enforcement of the decree was consigned to record room by the order of the court. The previous application for enforcement of the decree was not dismissed at the instance of the decree-holder. In considering whether an application is for the revival of the previous application or not there is no question of partial or total stay. What is to be considered is whether the previous execution application was disposed of or was kept pending. If it was kept pending, it automatically follows that it can be revived either suo motu by the court or being invited to do so by the decree-holder. This point should be borne in mine while applying the principles of revival. Consigning of a case to record without properly disposing it off is an act of the court and a decree-holder cannot be penalised by treating such application as disposed of and not pending. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the present application of the decree holder for the enforcement of the decree is an application for the revival of their old execution application which was not disposed of but was only consigned to record. In this view of the matter, I would dismiss the appeal with costs." Therefore, the material question is whether execution application was dismissed or was kept pending. It is also true that decree-holder cannot be penalised for act of the court in consigning the record without properly disposing of the application. In the case at hand, the case was properly and legally disposed off and not for any statistical purpose. I shall reproduce here the two endorsements (1) "checked, found correct. But counsel for decree-holder has not filed certified copy of operative part of order. In the case at hand, the case was properly and legally disposed off and not for any statistical purpose. I shall reproduce here the two endorsements (1) "checked, found correct. But counsel for decree-holder has not filed certified copy of operative part of order. It be filed at any earlier date" (dated 13-4-1981). (2) "decree-holder absent. Decree holder's counsel filed no instructions pursis. The office objection that is remained today and no further steps has been taken by decree-holder hence, execution proceedings is filed for noncompliance." (dated 5-8-1983) Now by the first order, the decree-holder was directed to comply by supplying certified copy of the order. Order 21, Rule 11(2) of C.P.C. requires that a certified copy of the decree must be filed. Since the certified copy was not filed for two years, ultimately the execution application was filed by the learned judge. Therefore, this was a final order passed for non-compliance of the mandatory provision. It could not be said that the application was kept pending not it could be said that it was disposed off for statistical purpose. 8. The next ruling is reported in AIR 1963 Madras 127 (M. Marudanayagam Pillai Vs. P. M. Krishnaswami Naidu and others). In the reported case, the decree-holder had put to sale by mistake Western half portion instead of the Eastern. After realising the mistake, another execution application was filed and Eastern portion was sought to be sold. The court found that it was through mistake that wrong portion was sold and second application did lie and it could be treated as continuation of the first application. I reproduce here the relevant observations "It is not necessary to consider whether this view of the law is correct or not, as are of opinion that it cannot be said in this case, that there was any default on the part of the decree-holder, by reason of which the previous application became infructuous. What all can be stated in this case is that the decree-holder, by a mistake bona fide or otherwise, sought to specify the half share of the property as the western half. That was ultimately found to belong to defendant 5, who was not liable to (sic) under the decree. That cannot, however, mean that the application was abandoned by the other hand, the decree-holder wanted to pursue the application, although by bringing the wrong property to sale." 9. That was ultimately found to belong to defendant 5, who was not liable to (sic) under the decree. That cannot, however, mean that the application was abandoned by the other hand, the decree-holder wanted to pursue the application, although by bringing the wrong property to sale." 9. What the court found was that the decree-holder did not intend to abandon the execution hence the second application could be held to be continuation. In the case at hand, the execution application is clearly abandoned, in as much as for two years no steps for removal of the objections were taken and ultimately the court filed the application. If the above ratio is applied, the execution application R.D. No.175/81 could be said to be filed as abandoned. 10. The next decision is reported in AIR 1973 Bombay 148 (Sakharchand Bhukandas Gujarathi Vs. Punju Chintaman Wani and others). In the reported case also, the Darkhast was disposed of without any fault on part of the decree-holder and hence it was held that the old Darkhast could be revived. In the instant case, Darkhast i.e. execution application is dismissed precisely due to the fault of the decree-holder. Hence, the ratio of the above ruling has no bearing on the case at hand. 11. The fourth decision is reported in AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 233 (Ramji Lal Vs. Het Ram and others). This decision cannot have bearing on the case at hand, since the decree was for permanent injunction. For execution of decree for permanent injunction, no limitation applies, as is clear from the proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The next two decisions are reported in AIR 1978 Andhra Pradesh 342 (Posani Ramchandraiah Vs. Daggupati Seshamma) and AIR 1990 Bombay 361 (Ramkrishna Bajirao Gotmare Vs. Kanhaiyalal Tribhuwanlal Shah). These two decisions lay down the proposition that the lower court's decree merges into appellate court decree and limitation begins from the date of appellate decree. The last decision that was cited is reported in AIR 1978 Madras 370 (Chidambaram Chettiar Vs. Periyasamy Chettiar). In this case also it is held that if execution application is dismissed for statistical purpose, second application can be treated as one for revival. I have already held that the execution application cannot be said to be dismissed for statistical purpose but for non-prosecution. 12. Mrs. Periyasamy Chettiar). In this case also it is held that if execution application is dismissed for statistical purpose, second application can be treated as one for revival. I have already held that the execution application cannot be said to be dismissed for statistical purpose but for non-prosecution. 12. Mrs. Jawalkar, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor/N.A. however, relied on a decision reported in AIR 1971 Mysore 113 (The State Bank of Travancore Vs. M. Ramu Maheshwariah). The court has made following observations "18. From what has been stated earlier and the circumstances under which the earlier execution petition came to be dismissed in this case, it is clear that the decree-holder was in default. Although the executing court had given four adjournments to the decree-holder to pay fee for attachment of moveables, the judgment debtor being absent throughout, even on 226-1963 the decree-holder did not pay the fee. From the order sheet of that date, it is clear that the counsel for the decree-holder was present when the execution petition was dismissed for non-payment of fee for attachment. The decree-holder did not move the court to grant time or for any other relief on that day with a view to see that the execution petition was saved. He did not file any appeal to get the order of dismissal set aside. Therefore, the order dismissing the execution petition became final and that in our opinion was a proper judicial order; the Court was competent to make by which the execution proceedings stood validly terminated. " "19. None of the decisions, cited by Shri. Ravindrai referred to above could of any assistance to justify the appellant's contention pressed for acceptance in this particular case. The execution petition No.49/62 having been finally and properly dismissed by a judicial order it could not be revived by the present execution petition. This being a fresh application for execution, it must be deemed to be barred by limitation as it is filed beyond 12 years from the date of the decree" This decision certainly lays down the correct law. In the reported case also the execution application was dismissed for nonpayment of process fee by ajudicial order and there was no appeal against it. It was held that since application is disposed of by judicial order, it could not be revi ved by fresh application. In the reported case also the execution application was dismissed for nonpayment of process fee by ajudicial order and there was no appeal against it. It was held that since application is disposed of by judicial order, it could not be revi ved by fresh application. The facts of the reported case and the one at hand are almost identical. Application No.67/76 having been filed after lapse of 12 years from the last execution application, the execution was certainly barred by limitation. I, therefore, find that there is no substance in the review. It is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.