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2007 DIGILAW 116 (ALL)

DHRUWA PRASAD v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2007-01-15

V.K.SHUKLA

body2007
JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Shukla, J.—On 31.5.2006, petitioner requested for transfer, and he was transferred from Gorakhpur to Hata, District Kushinagar. On 1.7.2006, petitioner joined at Block Hata. Petitioner has contended that he started taking action on 7.7.2006, 14.7.2006 and 31.7.2006 against Hardev Mishra, Jugul Kishore Sharma and Subhash Gupta respectively, and thereafter pressure has been exerted and petitioner has been sought to be transferred from Hata to Vishunpura in the district of Kushinagar. Petitioner has contended that he has been transferred from Hata to Vishunpura and, on the other hand, Ajay Kumar Tiwari, District Quardinater Training, Kushinagar has been given additional charge at Hata in his place. At this juncture present writ petition has been filed. 2. Counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 separately, and therein, it has been contended that there have been complaints in respect to functioning of petitioner, and the reports which are sought to be submitted and the action which is said to be taken, all are motivated, and in this background, it has been contended that transfer of petitioner has been rightly made. 3. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed, wherein averments made in counter affidavit have been disputed and that of writ petition have been reiterated. 4. After pleadings have been exchanged, present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing and disposal with the consent of the parties. 5. Sri K.N. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended with vehemence that power of transfer has not been bona fide exercised and there is clear cut misuser of the power of transfer and as such impugned order is liable to be interfered with. 6. Learned Standing Counsel as well as Sri Girjesh Kumar Tiwari, appearing for respondents, have contended that rightful action has been taken, and it is a case of local arrangement, as such no interference is warranted. 7. At this stage the view point of Hon’ble Apex Court qua transfer is also being looked into to know the parameters of interference in transfer matter. In the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, 1995 (71) FLR 1011 (SC) the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : "A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. In the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, 1995 (71) FLR 1011 (SC) the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : "A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer order issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day to day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration, which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders.” 8. In the case of State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, 2004 (101) FLR 586 (SC) Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : "7. It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of services. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at the best may afford an opportunity to the office or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless as noticed supra shown to be vitiated by mala fide or is made in violation of any statutory provisions. 8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirement of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of Competent Authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer. 9. The very questions involved, as found noticed by the High Court in these cases being disputed questions of facts, there was hardly any scope for the High Court to generalise the situations based on its own appreciation and understanding of the prevailing circumstances as disclosed from some write ups in journals or newspapers reports. Conditions of service or rights, which are personal to the parties concerned, are to be governed by rules as also the inbuilt powers of supervision and control in the hierarchy of the administration of State or any authority as well as the basic concepts and well-recognised powers and jurisdiction inherent in the various authorities in the hierarchy. Conditions of service or rights, which are personal to the parties concerned, are to be governed by rules as also the inbuilt powers of supervision and control in the hierarchy of the administration of State or any authority as well as the basic concepts and well-recognised powers and jurisdiction inherent in the various authorities in the hierarchy. All that cannot be obliterated by sweeping observations and directions unmindful of the anarchy which it may create in ensuring and effective supervision and control and running of administration merely on certain assumed notions of orderliness expected from the authorities effecting transfers. Even as the position stands, avenues are open for being availed of by anyone aggrieved, with the concerned authorities, the Courts and Tribunals, as the case may be, to seek relief even in relation to an order of transfer or appointment or promotion or any order passed in disciplinary proceedings on certain well-settled and recognised grounds or reasons, when properly approached and sought to be vindicated in the manner known to and in accordance with law. No such generalised directions as have been given by the High Court could ever be given leaving room for an inevitable impression that the Courts are attempting to take over the reigns of executive administration. Attempting to undertake an exercise of the nature could even be assailed as an onslaught and encroachment on the respective fields or areas of jurisdiction earmarked for the various other limbs of the State. Giving room for such an impression should be avoided with utmost care and seriously and zealously Courts endeavour to safeguard the rights of parties.” 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India and others v. Janardhan Debanath and another, (2004) 4 SCC 245 has taken the view that transfer order should not be interfered unless same is in violation of statutory provisions or order passed is malafide. Relevant extract is being quoted below : "The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. Relevant extract is being quoted below : "The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to another is not only an incident but a condition of service. Necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, (2001) 8 SCC 574 . 10. The caution given by Hon’ble Apex Court qua transfer matters of members of Force has been given in the case of Major General, J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, 2005(107) FLR 37 in following terms : "It will be noticed that these decisions have been rendered in case of civilian employees or those who are working in Public Sector Undertakings. The scope of interference by Courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed force should posted. The Courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless and exceptionally strong case is made out no interference should be made.” At this juncture the view of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Ashok Kumar and others, (2005) 8 SCC 760 qua mala fides is also being looked into which is as follows : "21. Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the authority of its power. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man’s mind, for that is what the employee has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. The difficult is not lessended when one has to establish that a person apparently acting on the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fides in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. It is not the law that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 733 or AIR 1964 SC 72 ] It cannot be overlooked that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. As noted by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 ; AIR 1974 SC 555 Courts would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before them by a party, particularly when the imputations are gave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. [See Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579 ]. 22. As observed by this Court in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 mala fides is the last refuge of a losing litigant.” 12. On the touchstone of the judgments cited above, claim of petitioner based on the facts and circumstances involved in the present case is being adverted to. 22. As observed by this Court in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 mala fides is the last refuge of a losing litigant.” 12. On the touchstone of the judgments cited above, claim of petitioner based on the facts and circumstances involved in the present case is being adverted to. Much emphasis has been laid on the fact that entire action has been taken against petitioner at the behest and initiative of the incumbents against whom action has been taken and totally an incompetent incumbent has been sought to be substituted in place of petitioner. In the present case the three incumbents, viz. Hardev Mishra, Jugul Kishore Sharma and Subhash Gupta, against whom action is said to have been taken, have not at all been impleaded as respondents, and consequently, plea of mala fide is not substantiated against them. The authority, who has exercised the power of placement, has also not been impleaded as party. Thus, the plea of mala fide is neither here nor there. The only incumbent who has been impleaded is Ajay Kumar Tiwari, who has taken over additional charge at Hata in place of petitioner. There is no fault of Ajay Kumar Tiwari in accepting the charge at Hata, as in the event of petitioner being transferred, some one has to take over charge, as such impleadment of Ajay Kumar Tiwari and plea of mala fide against him is neither here nor there. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, plea of mala fide has got no substance. 13. Transfer and posting are within the domain of the authorities concerned and it is for them to see as to where an incumbent should be posted and where his/her services can be best utilised. Here, in the present case, petitioner has been transferred from one block to another, as such, as far as petitioner is concerned, none of his legal rights is infringed/prejudiced on any count, warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Consequently, writ petition, as has been framed and drawn, is dismissed. ———