JUDGMENT C.S. Sistani, J.-In both the present cases, the: facts are almost identical, arguments addressed by both the parties are by far the same and Counsel for the parties in both these cases agree that the applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be disposed of by a common order. GS (OS) No. 275/2007 2. The plaintiff has filed the present suit for permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff from terminating the contract of the plaintiff dated 9.2.2002, Together with the suit the plaintiff has filed the present application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for interim relief. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff is engaged in the business of catering services on the trains run by the Indian Railways. Vide letter dated 28.12.2001, the defendants decided to award the plaintiff a licence for the management of un-board catering services on Train No. 2925-2926, Paschim Express on a concession fee of Rs. 2.83 crores. In addition a licence fee of Rs. 32.5 lakh was required to be paid by the plaintiff. Vide letter dated 23.1.2002, the plaintiff conveyed its unconditional acceptance to the defendants of the terms and conditions for the management of on-board catering services on the train. Thereafter vide letter dated 24.1.2002, the defendants were called upon to deposit a sum of Rs. 94.341akh as the first instalment of concession fee and a licence fee of Rs. 16.25 lakh on or before 29.1.2002. An agreement dated 9.2.2002 was executed between the defendants and the plaintiff for licence to operate and provide catering on board services on Train No. 2925-2926, Paschim Express for a period of five years w.e.f 15.2.2002. 4. It is stated that the plaintiff has been satisfactorily running its services on the train between Bandra Station (Mumbai-Maharashtra State) to Amritsar (Punjab State) end he had received various appreciation letters by the passengers travelling in the train including VIPs. In view of the satisfactory service rendered by the plaintiff, the defendants vide letter dated 30.11.2006 decided to renew licence of the plaintiff for a further period of five years and called upon the plaintiff to give consent/willingness to operate and provide catering on-board services on Train No. 2925-2926, Paschim Express by 10.12.2006. In view of the satisfactory service rendered by the plaintiff, the defendants vide letter dated 30.11.2006 decided to renew licence of the plaintiff for a further period of five years and called upon the plaintiff to give consent/willingness to operate and provide catering on-board services on Train No. 2925-2926, Paschim Express by 10.12.2006. The plaintiff conveyed its consent vide letter dated 6.12.2006 accepting the terms and conditions of the renewal of licence for a further period of five years w.e.f 15.2.2007 to 14.2.2012. 5. The plaintiff received a letter dated 12.1.2007 from the defendants terminating the licence of the plaintiff on the ground that during the inspection of the subject train on 13.10.2006 some irregularities were noticed and called upon the plaintiff to show cause as to why licence, for management of on-board services in the train, should not be terminated, 6. Vide letter dated 24.1.2007, the plaintiff submitted a detailed reply to the show-cause notice. It is submitted that, although, the inspection was carried out on 13.10.2006 on the basis of which the show-cause notice dated 12.1.2007 was issued, the defendants itself had decided to renew the contract of the plaintiff for a further period of five years vide letter dated 30.11.2006. It is further stated that while renewing the licence on 30.11.2006, the defendants had found no substance on the irregularities alleged to have 9 been found in the inspection held on 13.10.2006. 7. It is further submitted that the defendants vide letter date 13.2.2007 has conveyed its decision not to renew the plaintiffs licence for a further period of five years on the ground as mentioned in the show-cause notice dated 12.1.2007. As per the plaintiff, the action of the defendants terminating the contract is blatantly illegal. The show-cause notice was based on an inspection carried out by the defendants on 13.10.2006 whereas the defendants had itself decided to offer to the plaintiff renewal of licence for a further period of five years vide letter dated 30.11.2006 based on past performance. 8. On 14.2.2007, this Court passed an interim order that the defendants shall not give effect to the letter dated 13.2.2007. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has argued that the letter dated 13.2.2007 is illegal, arbitrary and would cause irreparable harm and injury to the plaintiff and it would be in the interest of justice to confirm the interim order dated 14.2.2097. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has argued that the letter dated 13.2.2007 is illegal, arbitrary and would cause irreparable harm and injury to the plaintiff and it would be in the interest of justice to confirm the interim order dated 14.2.2097. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff further argued that under the agreement the defendants have the unilateral power to extend the contract by invoking Clause 5.1 of the agreement and defendant No. 1 vide letter dated 30.11.2006 triggered the renewal, i.e., extended the contract for a further period of five years. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has further argued that renewal of licence in the instant case in sum and substance is an extension of the subsisting contract which is evident from the fact that the concession fee of 2.83 crores enures for a further period of five years. There are no fresh terms and conditions and the contract continues in the case of extension on the same rates. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has laid strong stress that the letter dated 30.11.2006 is a clear pointer of the fact that a decision "to extend the contract by a further period of five years has been taken on the basis of past performance". Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the Court is empowered to examine/review the justifiability of the impugned action on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India even in the realm of a contract. What the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has really argued is that it is no longer res integra, that the "decision" of the state and its instrumentalities are subject to judicial review even in matters pertaining to contractual obligations. The plaintiff "" has relied on the case of Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 wherein the Supreme Court of India has observed that all the actions of the statutory bodies including contractual dealings are subject to judicial review. The Court can see if such body has followed the statutory purpose and acted in public interest and not in mala fide or arbitrary or for a collateral purpose. The actions of the statutory body must be reasonable and taken up lawfully and relevant grounds of public interest. The Court can see if such body has followed the statutory purpose and acted in public interest and not in mala fide or arbitrary or for a collateral purpose. The actions of the statutory body must be reasonable and taken up lawfully and relevant grounds of public interest. The plaintiff has further relied on in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 212 . 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon in the case of Jamshed Hormusji Wudia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai and Anr., (2004) 3 SCC 214 to canvass the point that in the field of contracts, the State and its instrumentalities ought to so design their activities as would ensure fair competition and non-discrimination. They can augment their resources but the object should be to serve the public cause and to do public good by resorting to fair and reasonable methods. 13.1t is further argued by learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff that the justifiability of the decisions taken by the State or its instrumentalities are subject to scrutiny and rigour of Article 14 of the Constitution even in a case where there is not a formal contractual relationship where entities have enjoyed a relationship with the State or its instrumentalities during a length of time. In such cases, according to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of India has evolved the "doctrine of confidence" i.e. before the State terminates a long standing .business/ commercial relationship it must take the effected party into confidence. To buttress this submission, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon 1990 (3) SCC 752 , MahavirAuto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation. 14. According to the plaintiff, letter dated 13.2.2007 is bad in law as the said letter speaks about events of October, 2006 which lost its relevance after issuance of letter dated 30.11.2006. The letter dated 13.2.2007 lacks application of mind as well as the fact that the impugned letter is a complete breach of the principles of natural justice and no opportunity of hearing has been given. 15. In support of the fact that this Court is empowered to grant a mandatory injunction at the interim stage, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the case of Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Ltd., (1974) 1 All ER 954. 15. In support of the fact that this Court is empowered to grant a mandatory injunction at the interim stage, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the case of Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Ltd., (1974) 1 All ER 954. In that case, under a contract made in March 1970, the plaintiff agreed with the defendant that, for a minimum period of ten years, it would buy all the petrol and diesel fuel that it needed for its filling stations from the defendant. In November, 1973 the defendant purported to terminate the contract for an alleged breach of its terms by the plaintiff company. The plaintiff company brought an action against the defendant and sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from withholding supplies of petrol and diesel fuel from the plaintiff company. While granting injunction, it was held that: "An interlocutory injunction would be granted for the Court could order specific performance of a contract to sell and purchase chattels which were not specific or ascertained in cases where damages would not provide a sufficient remedy, and on the evidence damages would not be an adequate remedy for the plaintiff-company." 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon in the case of Birmingham Corporation v. Perry Barr Stadium Ltd. & Anr., (1972) 1 All ER 725. 17. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has further relied upon the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 117 to show that even if the order tantamounts to, a mandamus can be issued at the initial stage where withholding the interim relief would amount to dismissal of the second petition itself. 18. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff has a strong prima fade case and the balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff inasmuch as that the defendants had already taken a decision vide letter dated 13.11.2006 and contracts of similarly placed persons have been extended. It is submitted that the plaintiff had geared up its business to cater for service on trains and an enormous investment has been made by the plaintiff legitimately expecting that the contract would be for a further period of ten years. It is submitted that the plaintiff had geared up its business to cater for service on trains and an enormous investment has been made by the plaintiff legitimately expecting that the contract would be for a further period of ten years. By not extending the contract, it would have a direct impact on the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff and the contents of the impugned letter are stigmatic and the plaintiff will not be considered for feature tenders. In fact, the plaintiff submits that this is a fit case for confirming the interim orders. GS (OS) No. 491/2007 19 .In this case, the facts are almost identical. The only difference being that after the letter dated 30.11.2006 was issued by the defendants, the plaintiff did not send any letter requesting for renewal of the licence but subsequently gave its acceptance vide letter dated 4.12.2006. The argument of learned Senior Counsel, for the plaintiff in this case is that, the letter dated 30.11.2006 was a proposal within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 20. In support of this argument, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff relies on the following lines issued in the letter dated 30.11.2006: "In case you are interested to manage the on-board services, after• the expiry of the present term of licence, please give your consent/willingness to manage the on-board services in the above train." 21. According to the plaintiff, the defendants in terms of letter dated 4.12.2006 have signified the plaintiffs willing to renew the licence for another term of five years and, therefore, letter dated 30.11.2006 was a communication in the form of a proposal. Consequent to this proposal, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff relies on the definition of acceptance of proposal as per Section 2(b) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to show that vide letter dated 4.12.2006, the plaintiff unconditionally accepted proposal of the defendants. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff relies on the following line of the letter dated 4.12.2006: "We hereby accept your renewal letter and give you our consent/ willingness to continue to manage the on-board services in the train No. 2903-04, Golden Temple Mail w.e.f. 14.3.2007 as per the present terms and other terms as mentioned in your letter." 22. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff further submits that the first term of the licence agreement was for the period of 15.3.2002 to 14.3.2007. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff further submits that the first term of the licence agreement was for the period of 15.3.2002 to 14.3.2007. However, the plaintiff has paid the defendants a sum of Rs. 1.37 crores towards concession fee for the period of ten years. The plaintiff has paid licence fee for the period of 15.3.2002 to 14.3.2007 and thereafter the licence fee for the period from 15.3.2007 to 14.7.2012 has also been paid on 14.3.2007 in the sum of Rs. 9.00 lacs. Once the proposal was accepted, the licence stood renewed as the parties had entered into a binding contract. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has strongly argued that the stand of the defendants that the letter dated 30.11.2006 was not a proposal is completely contrary to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff submits that the balance of convenience is entirely in favour of the plaintiff. In view of the fact that not only the plaintiff has acted on the proposal of the defendants but also, in case, the ex parte injunction is vacated the suit of the plaintiff will become infructuous and on the other hand no prejudice would be caused to the defendants. 23. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff relies on Clause 5.1 of the agreement in support of this argument where it has been mentioned that no additional concession fee will be payable by the licensee on renewal of the licence. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon in the case of Pioneer Publicity Corporation v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2003) 103 DLT 442 where in a petition under Section 9 this Court had granted an injunction restraining the DTC from taking down or defacing the advertisement panels at the back and side panels of DTC buses. In this case, during the pendency of the agreement the DTC terminated the contract. The Court had held that the actions of the DTC were whimsical and devoid of reason. The facts of this case would not be applicable as the licence agreement has not been extended and there is no termination during the pendency of the agreement. 24. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff further relies on the decision in the case of Atlas Interactive (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., (2006) 126 DLT 504. The facts of this case would not be applicable as the licence agreement has not been extended and there is no termination during the pendency of the agreement. 24. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff further relies on the decision in the case of Atlas Interactive (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., (2006) 126 DLT 504. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced below: "In Atlas Interactive, the Court found that no loss would be caused to the Government in continuing the services of plaintiff company, which did not enjoy any kind of exclusivity. In the present case on the contrary, the plaintiff has the exclusive right to provide catering services on-board the train in question and the public at large would be put to grave prejudice if the plaintiff with its poor quality of service is allowed to continue to provide services to passengers on the train." 25. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has also relied upon various other arguments raised by learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff in the present case. 26. The defendants have filed an IA No. 2081/2007 under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure [in CS(OS) No. 275/2007] and have strongly argued that the interim order should be vacated and the application under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of interim stay should be dismissed. At the very outset, it is submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the defendants that the contract dated 9.2.2002 was for a period of five years. 27. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants submits that vide letter dated 9.1.2002, the plaintiff had sought a clarification from defendants whether the total tenure of the licence was ten years or not. The defendants immediately replied to this letter on 11.1.2002 and clarified that the tenure of licence is for five years subject to renewal at the sole discretion of IRCTC (Ds) for another term of five years and reference was given to sub-para 2.6 and para 2 of the bid document. The plaintiff was asked to convey unconditional acceptance within four days. Vide letter dated 23.1.2002, the acceptance was given to the defendants. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendant has relied on Clause 5.1 of the agreement which reads as under: 5.1 TOTAL TENURE OF LICENCE-- Term of Licence for pantry cars will be five years. The plaintiff was asked to convey unconditional acceptance within four days. Vide letter dated 23.1.2002, the acceptance was given to the defendants. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendant has relied on Clause 5.1 of the agreement which reads as under: 5.1 TOTAL TENURE OF LICENCE-- Term of Licence for pantry cars will be five years. The licence may be renewed for another terms of 5 years at the sole discretion of the IRCTC and the decision of IRCTC in this regard shall be binding on the Licensee. 28. the term of the contract was from 15.2.2002 to 14.2.2007. As per the defendants, during the term of the contract, the standard of service by the plaintiff was poor and several complaints were received from the passengers. Several inspections of the train were carried out and the conditions of hygiene and on-board catering service on train was found to be unsatisfactory. As the term of the plaintiffs contract was about to expire in 2007 the defendants decided to consider whether the plaintiffs contract was to be renewed or not. Even before looking into the plaintiffs service record, the defendant vide letter dated 30.11.2006 decided to ask the plaintiff whether he was willing to continue to provide on board catering service on train. 29. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has drawn the attention of the Court to following, paragraphs of the letter dated 30.11.2006 to buttress his argument: "....As per terms and conditions of the licence, tenure of existing licensee is expiring on 14.2.2007, It has been, decided to consider renewal of your licence based on past performance for another period of 5 years or as decided by IRCTC. In case you are interested to manage on-board services, after expiry of the present term of the licence, please give your consent/willingness to manage the on-board services in the above train. The Management of services after expiry of the present term shall be subject to the following- 8.The decision of IRCTC to consider your willingness, to continue to manage the services, shall be final and binding." 30. It is submitted by the Senior Counsel for the defendants that even the plaintiff was aware that vide letter dated 30.11.2006, the contract has not been renewed as on 30.11.2006 or as on 6.12.2006. It is submitted by the Senior Counsel for the defendants that even the plaintiff was aware that vide letter dated 30.11.2006, the contract has not been renewed as on 30.11.2006 or as on 6.12.2006. Fully aware that the contract had not been renewed, the plaintiff wrote another letter to the defendants on 5.2.2007 requesting that the term of licence be renewed for a further period of five years. 31. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has submitted that that a bare reading of the letter dated 30.11.2006 would show that the renewal of the licence of the plaintiff was to be considered and only the consent of the plaintiff was to taken to ensure whether the plaintiff would at all be interested in continuing to provide services if the contract was to be renewed. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants further submits that the letter dated 30.11.2006 expressly states that the consideration for renewal would be subject to past performance of the plaintiff and the contract would be renewed only when the plaintiffs performance had been satisfactory. 32. A bare reading of the letter dated 6.12.2006 would show that the plaintiff himself requested the defendants that the licence be renewed for a further period of five years. In case, the plaintiff considered his licence to have been renewed by the defendants vide letter dated 30.11.2006, there was absolutely no occasion for the plaintiff to have addressed the letter dated 6.12.2006 or 5.2.2007 to the defendants. The letter dated 5.2.2007 reads as under: "No. PC/RCG/2925-26/Paschim Ex./Gen1.l Dated: 5.2.2007 The GCM/ Ops Indian Railway Catering Tourism & Corporation Ltd., 9th Floor, Bank of Bardoa Building, 16, Parliament Street, New Delhi. Sub: Management of on-board services in train No. 2925-26, Paschim Express train - expiry of present term of licence Ref: (1) your letter No. 2006/IRCTC/Catg./Renewal dated 30.11.2006. (2) Our letter No. RCG/PC/2925-26/Dated: 6.12.2006. Respected Sir, Your kind attention is invited to our letter No. RCG/PC/2925-26/ 1 Dated 6.12.2006 in reply to your letter No. 2006/IRCT/Catg./Rencewal dated 30.11.2006, wherein we had accepted all the terms and conditions referred there, in your above quoted letter for managements of on-board services in train No. 2925-26 Paschim Express during the renewal of licence for another period of five years. Sir. as per terms and conditions of the licence, tenure of existing licensee is expiring on 14.2.2007. Sir. as per terms and conditions of the licence, tenure of existing licensee is expiring on 14.2.2007. Hence, it is requested that the approval for renewal of licence for management of on-board services in train No. 2925-26. Paschim Express train, may kindly be accorded for further period of five years with effect from 15.2.2007. An early action is solicited please. Assuring you for 24 hrs. best and effective services. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For M/s. R.C. Goel." 33. It is argued by the Senior Counsel for the defendants that on the plaintiffs own showing, the letter dated 30.11.2006 cannot be termed as a letter of renewal. Even Clause 5.1 of the agreement dated 1.12.2002 specifically provides that there shall be no automatic renewal and the renewal was subject to the sole discretion of the defendants whose decision would be final and binding. As per the Counsel for the defendants, the defendants have acted fairly and not arbitrarily or in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. As per the contract, although the defendants were not required to provide any reason for non-renewal of the contract, however, the defendants vide letter dated 13.2.2007 clearly communicated the reason for non-renewal which was "unsatisfactory service". 34. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants further submits that the plaintiff was not only warned but fined on several occasions but he persisted with the poor quality of service and did not show any improvement. As per the plaintiffs own case, the present dispute is purely contractual in nature. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants further submits that in case of contracts freely entered into with the State, there is no room for invoking the "doctrine of fairness or reasonableness" merely because one of the contracting parties happens to be the State. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter & Ors. (3 Judges) (1994) 4 SCC 104 . The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under: "Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine developed in the administrative law field to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice where the action is administrative in nature. (3 Judges) (1994) 4 SCC 104 . The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under: "Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine developed in the administrative law field to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice where the action is administrative in nature. Just as principles of natural justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasi-judicial, the doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action where the function is administrative. But it can certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the express terms of the contract between the parties. This is so, even if the contract is governed by statutory provisions, i.e., where it is a statutory contract- or rather more so. It is one thing to say that a contract - eyery contract must be construed reasonably having regard to its language. But this is not what the licensees say." They seek to create an obligation on the other party to the contract, just because it happens to be the State. 35. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendant has further relied in the case of C.J. International Hotels ITD. v. NDMC, 105 (2003) DLT 545 (DB). Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Verigamto Naveen v. Government of A.P. &Ors., VI (2001) SLT 624= AIR 2001 SC 3609 ,itwasheid as under: "54. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court when analysed, Clearly brings out the distinction that where action is taken pure and simple under a contract, the principles of justness, fairness, arbitrariness, reasonableness, etc. flowing out of Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be attracted. Where, however, the foundation of the action lies in an administrative or an executive policy decision taken and then applied to the contract, the merits of the administrative or executive decision taken are subject to judicial review. In each of the cases, aforesaid, before the Supreme Court it was noted that either the policy decision taken suffers from the vice of arbitrariness or the administrative decision taken was found to be so suffering. In each and every decision the Supreme Court was at pains to clarify that their observations would not apply purely to a field of contract pure and simple." 36. In each and every decision the Supreme Court was at pains to clarify that their observations would not apply purely to a field of contract pure and simple." 36. It has been argued that the above cases have expressly considered the judgments of the Supreme Court of India in Dwarkadas Marfatia v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 ; Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752 ; and Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 212 . 37. The last submission of learned Senior Counsel for the defendants is that Section 41(e) read with Sections 14(1)(a) 14(1)(c) and 14(1)(d) of the Specific Relief Act expressly bars the grounds of an injunction in the facts of the present case and for this proposition he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation v. Amritsar Gas Service & Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 533 . In this case, the distributorship agreement of the respondent was terminated by the appellant. The Supreme Court appointed an arbitrator who made his award on 15.11.1986 against which the appellant filed objections. It was held that: "Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable. In the present case, it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of Sub-section (1) of Section 14, which also may be attracted in the present case since Clause (c) clearly applies on the finding read with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. This being so granting the relief af restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to the law governing such cases. The grant of this relief in the award cannot, therefore, be sustained." 38. Counsel further relies on the judgment in the case of Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. v. The Stroh Brewery Co., reported at (2000) 3 Arb. LR 509 (Delhi) (DB). The grant of this relief in the award cannot, therefore, be sustained." 38. Counsel further relies on the judgment in the case of Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. v. The Stroh Brewery Co., reported at (2000) 3 Arb. LR 509 (Delhi) (DB). Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation (supra), in paragraph 14, it was observed as under: "14. The effect of breach of a contract by a party seeking to specifically enforce the contract under the Indian law is enshrined in Section 16(c) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Clause (e) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act provides that injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Clause (c) of Section 41 enumerates the nature of contracts, which could not be specifically enforced. Clause (c) to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. Learned Single judge thus was iustified in saying that if it is found that a contract which by its very nature is determinable, the same not only cannot be enforced but in respect of such a contract no injunction could also be granted and this is mandate of law. This, however, is subject to an exception, as provided in Section 42 that where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstances that the Court is tillable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement." 39. Counsel further relies on the judgment in the case of Cogen Silver Fibre Pte Ltd. v. Noble Fibre Technologies Inc & Ors., Reported at (2006) 127 DLT 707 . Relevant paragraph 14 of the said judgment reads as follows: Para 14: The effect of breach of a contract by a party seeking to specifically enforce the contract under the Indian law is enshrined in Section (c) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Clause (e) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act provides that injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Clause (e) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act provides that injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Clause (c) of Section 41 enumerates the nature of contract, which could not be specifically enforced. Clause (c) to Subsection (1) of Section 14 says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. Learned Single Judge thus was justified in saying that if it is found that a contract which by its very nature is determinable, the same not only cannot be enforced but in respect of such a contract no injunction could also be granted and this is mandate of law. This is, however, is subject to an exception, as provided in Section 42 that where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstances that the Court is unable to complete specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement. 40. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has submitted that during the duration of the contract, in the case of M/s. Hakmichand D. & Sons, several irregularities were noticed and complaints were received from passengers. While relying upon the arguments made in the connected matter Counsel for the defendants submits that the cheque of Rs. 9.00 lacs sent by the defendants has not been encashed and the licence of the plaintiff has not been renewed on account of unsatisfactory services. Along with the reply, the defendants have filed a letter dated 14.3.2007 which is reproduced as under: No. 2002/IRCTC/Catg./2903-04 14th March, 2007 M/s. Hakmi Chand D. & Sons, G-4, Nityanand Apartment, Vakilwadi, Near Punit Ashram, Maninagar, Ahmedabad-380008. Tel No. 5463666,2144123. Sub.: Non-renewal of licence on account .of poor performance in respect of train No. 2903-04, Golden Temple Mail. Your licence is due to expire on 14th March, 2007. By letter dated 30.11.2006, willingness was sought, in case you wanted your case to be considered by the Corporation for renewal of the licence. Pursuant to your willingness to be considered for renewal, past performance regarding provision of satisfactory catering services to passengers travelling in prestigious train No. 2903-04, Golden Mail, was reviewed by a three-member Committee of the Corporation. By letter dated 30.11.2006, willingness was sought, in case you wanted your case to be considered by the Corporation for renewal of the licence. Pursuant to your willingness to be considered for renewal, past performance regarding provision of satisfactory catering services to passengers travelling in prestigious train No. 2903-04, Golden Mail, was reviewed by a three-member Committee of the Corporation. It has been found that a large number of complaints, both from-passengers and railway officials have been received, regarding your failure to supply good quality and hygienic food to the passengers. Inspections and photographs reflect poorly on the working of this train. You have also defaulted in adhering to the terms and conditions of the licence agreement in several respects. Due to above deficiencies, fines, punitive action, Counselling has been done, but they have yielded no result. Please note that the Honble Delhi High Court in a public interest litigation Varun Goswami v. Union of India, WP (C) No. 6420 of 2006 is constantly monitoring the quality and nature of catering services provided on the trains. In view of the above irregularities as well as continuance provision of deficient and unsatisfactory service to passengers resulting in complaints and public inconvenience, the Competent Authority has accepted the recommendations of the Committee and decided that, in public interest, your licence for management of catering and bedroll services in train No. 2903-04, Golden Temple Mail would not be renewed for further any period beyond the expiry of the licence. Vindo Asthana Executive Director (OS)" 41. This letter was not accepted by the plaintiff. As per this letter, the performance of the plaintiff was reviewed by a three-member committee and, therefore, the licence was not renewed. 42. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has also pointed out that a Public Interest Litigation titled Varun Goswami & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., WP(C) No. 6420-21/2006 is pending in the Delhi High Court and the Division Bench is consistently monitoring the quality and the nature of catering services provided on the trains. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has relied upon various complaints as well as photographs filed along with the complaint in support of his argument. 43. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants submits that the letter dated 30.11.2006 does not constitute an offer. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants has relied upon various complaints as well as photographs filed along with the complaint in support of his argument. 43. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants submits that the letter dated 30.11.2006 does not constitute an offer. The argument of learned Senior Counsel for the defendants is that the letter dated 30.11.2006 was not sent at the stage of inspection or creation of the contract. The plaintiff had already enjoyed the benefit of its full five years term and, thus, the letter dated 30.11.2006 cannot be said to be an offer. It was merely asking the plaintiff to inform the defendants whether he was willing to continue to provide the catering services. In case, the defendants decided to renew the plaintiffs licence, the renewal would have to be only on the past performance of the plaintiff, if found satisfactory. 44. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants denies that the defendants has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. He further submits that as per the terms of the Contract, IRCTC was not required to provide reasons for non-renewal. Be that as it may, vide its letter of 14.3.2007 IRCTC clearly communicated its reasons for non-renewal i.e. unsatisfactory services. The plaintiff was warned/fined on several occasions but persisted with the poor quality of service and did not show any improvement. 45. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants further argued that Section 41(e) read with Sections 14(l)(a), 14(l)(c) and 14(l)(d) of the Specific Relief Act expressly bars the grant of an injunction in the present case. For this proposition, the defendant relies on the following authorities: (i) Indian Oil Corporation v. Amritsar Gas Service & Ors., [1991] 1 SCC 533] - paragraphs 11, 12. (ii) Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. v. The Stroh Brewery Co., (2003) 3 Arb LR 509 (Delhi) (DB) - 14 to 19. (iii) Cogent Silver Fibre Pte Ltd. v. Noble Fibre Technologies Inc. & Ors., (2006) 127 DLT 707 paragraph 14. 46. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties and given my thoughtful consideration to the matter. 47. A bare reading of the agreement dated 9.2.2002 would show that the agreement was for a period of five years. As per Clause 5.1 of the agreement which has been reproduced above, the term of licence was to be for five years. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties and given my thoughtful consideration to the matter. 47. A bare reading of the agreement dated 9.2.2002 would show that the agreement was for a period of five years. As per Clause 5.1 of the agreement which has been reproduced above, the term of licence was to be for five years. Clause 5.1 of the agreement further states that the licence "may be" renewed at the sole discretion of IRCTC and the decision of IRCTC in this regard shall be binding on the licensee. Therefore, at the end of five years whether this agreement was to be renewed or not, it was the sole discretion of the defendant. 48. Two things would thus emerge on the basis of the argument that, firstly, whether the letter dated 30.11.2006 was a renewal of the licence, and secondly, whether the action of the defendants in not renewing the licence was bad in law and arbitrary. To answer the first question, no doubt the first paragraph of this letter dated 30.11.2006 does give an impression that the defendants have decided to renew the licence on the basis of the past performance of the plaintiff. However, no portion of any document can be read in isolation. The letter has to be read as a whole. Reading the letter as a whole, the Court prima facie finds that it was a letter written in routine to enquire whether the plaintiff was willing to, continue for a further term of five years. The following lines of the said letter would clinch the issue: ".... As per terms and conditions of the licence, tenure of existing licensee is expiring on 14.2.2007. It has been decided to consider renewal of your licence based on past performance for another period of 5 years or as decided by IRCTC. In case you are interested to manage on-board services, after expiry of the present term of the licence, please give your consent/ willingness to manage the on-board services in the above train. The Management of services after expiry of the present term shall be subject to the following- 8. The decision of IRCTC to consider your willingness, to continue to manage the services, shall be final and binding." 49. The Management of services after expiry of the present term shall be subject to the following- 8. The decision of IRCTC to consider your willingness, to continue to manage the services, shall be final and binding." 49. In CS(OS) No. 275/207, after the letter dated 30.11.2006 was issued, the plaintiff vide letter dated 5.2.2007 requested the defendants to renew the licence, a complete reading of which would show that the plaintiff understood the letter dated 30.11.2006 as a letter simply taking the consent of the plaintiff and in case it was a renewal by itself, then there was no occasion on the part of the plaintiff to address the letter dated 5.2.2007. Interestingly, vide this letter, the plaintiff accepted all the terms and conditions contained in the defendants letter dated 30.11.2006 and requested the defendants to grant renewal for a further period of five years w.e.f. 15.2.2007 to 14.2.2012, Thus, the letter dated 30.11.2006 was, prima facie, not a renewal by itself. 50. Once this Court has prima facie come to a finding that the letter dated 30.11.2006 was not a letter of renewal, the next question to be answered is whether the action of the defendants in terminating the licence and not granting extension is arbitrary, bad in law and without application of mind. 51. This Court while deciding this questiqn must surely keep in mind the observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the cases relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff. The Court must also keep in mind whether as per the terms of the agreement, should every licence be renewed as a matter of routine or did the defendants have a right, discretion and grounds not to grant renewal? To arrive at a conclusion being a contractual transaction, this Court must revert back to Clause 5.1 of the agreement. Clause 5.1 of the agreement is crystal clear. The agreement is for five years. It may be renewed for another five years at the sole discretion of the defendants and the decision of the defendants shall be binding on the licensee. The argument of learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff that, in fact, this agreement was for a period ten years has no legs to stand since this doubt of the plaintiff was in its mind even prior to signing of this agreement. The argument of learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff that, in fact, this agreement was for a period ten years has no legs to stand since this doubt of the plaintiff was in its mind even prior to signing of this agreement. The plaintiff vide letter dated 9.1.2002 asked for this clarification "This may kindly be clarified that the total tenure of the licence is ten years to enable me to act accordingly". The defendants promptly replied to this letter dated 11.1.2002 clarifying "That the tenure of licence is five years subject to renewal of, at the sole discretion of IRCTC (defendants) for another term of five years referred in sub-para 2.6 of para 2 of bid document." 52. In CS(OS) No. 275/2007, the grounds for not granting renewal are stated in the letter dated 18.12.2006 addressed by the defendants to the plaintiff drawing their attention to an inspection held on 12.12.2006 to show that the conditions under which food was being prepared were deplorable. Photographs were enclosed with this letter and have also been filed in this Court including a picture showing a cockroach running. Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants have also relied upon the investigation report of December, 2006 showing discrepancies observed during investigation as well as letter dated 8.8.2006 where a fine of Rs. 1,000/- was imposed. He further relied upon the letter dated 16.7.2006 calling upon the plaintiff to rectify the reported lapses and improve the services including personal hygiene of staff and cleanliness to ensure that package drinking water in sealed glasses is served to the passengers as well as copies of other documents bringing out the poor quality and sub-standard food, dead cockroaches in a water bottle dusty blankets. 53. In CS(OS) No. 491/2007, the grounds for not granting renewal are stated in the letter dated 14.3.2007 addressed by the defendants to the plaintiff. 54. In the light of the provisions of the agreement and perusal of the various complaints and warning issued to the plaintiffs as well as the show-cause notice; dated 12.1.2007, this Court cannot hold that the non-renewal of the licences was arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable. 55. 54. In the light of the provisions of the agreement and perusal of the various complaints and warning issued to the plaintiffs as well as the show-cause notice; dated 12.1.2007, this Court cannot hold that the non-renewal of the licences was arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable. 55. While granting interim injunction, this Court must consider whether the plaintiff has made a strong prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff and whether in case the injunction is not granted the plaintiff will suffer an irreparable loss. 56. Having regard to the facts of these cases, based on the agreements entered into between the parties, the relevant Clauses of the agreements as well as the documents placed on record, prima facie, I am of the view that the plaintiffs have not been able to establish a strong prima facie case, the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the plaintiffs .and in case the injunction is vacated, the plaintiffs shall not suffer irreparable loss for non- renewal of the licences. Therefore, no injunction can be granted. Moreover, in the facts of this case, grant of injunction would amount to decreeing the suit at this stage. 57. Accordingly, the applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiffs in these cases are dismissed and the application filed by the defendants under Order 39 Rule fin CS (OS) No. 491/2007 is allowed. The interim orders dated 14.2.2007 and 15.3.2007 passed in CS(OS) No. 275/2007 and CS(OS) No. 491/2007, respectively, are vacated. 58. Needless to say any observations made in this order will have no bearing, on the final adjudication of these cases. Result: Applications dismissed.