JUDGMENT: (L. Narasimha Reddy) - The sole accused in S.C.No.155 of 2005 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram is the appellant. He was charged with the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 I.P.C. The trial Court acquitted him of the charge for the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. but convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand only). 2. The prosecution pleaded that the appellant killed his wife, by name Uma Maheswari, by pouring kerosene. It was stated that on 18.07.2005, the elder brother of the appellant (P.W.3) went to the house of the appellant and, while he was there, the appellant came to the house at about 9.00 p.m. in a drunken condition. It was alleged that suspecting the fidelity of his wife, the appellant poured kerosene on her and set her on fire with a match stick, and ran away from the scene of offence. It was stated that on hearing the hue and cry raised by the deceased, her son (P.W.4) went to the house of the parents of the deceased (P.W.1 and 2) and her brother one Mr.Krishna. The deceased was shifted to hospital and, while undergoing treatment, she died on 22.07.2005. 3. The Head Constable, in-charge of Out Post, District Headquarters Hospital, Vizianagaram, P.W.13, rushed to the hospital on receiving the information and recorded the statement of the deceased at 11.00 p.m. and the said statement was marked as Ex.P17. This was followed by recording of the dying declaration of the deceased, marked as Ex.P7, by the local Judicial Magistrate of First Class, P.W.10. The deceased succumbed to the burn injuries on 22.07.2005. The Investigating Officer visited the scene of offence, prepared the rough sketch, marked as Ex.P19, and seized the burnt cloth pieces- M.O.1, kerosene bottle- M.O.2 and match box- M.O.3, in the presence of P.W.7 and another. Photographs of the scene of offence were also taken and the same were marked as Exs.P9 to P12. After the deceased succumbed to the injuries on 22.07.2005, Section of law in the F.I.R. was altered and inquest was conducted over the dead body in the presence of P.W.8 and another. Ex.P2 is the inquest report. P.W.11 conducted the autopsy over the dead body and Ex.P8 is the post mortem report. 4. After the deceased succumbed to the injuries on 22.07.2005, Section of law in the F.I.R. was altered and inquest was conducted over the dead body in the presence of P.W.8 and another. Ex.P2 is the inquest report. P.W.11 conducted the autopsy over the dead body and Ex.P8 is the post mortem report. 4. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. and convicted him for the said offence. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there are several inherent contradictions in the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. He contends that, in the charge, the offence is said to have taken place at about 9.00 p.m. on 18.07.2005, but the evidence on record discloses that the alleged offence has taken place at around 11.00 p.m. He further contends that P.W.3, the brother of the appellant, stated that he remained in the house of the appellant till 11.00 p.m., but he did not depose anywhere that the offence has taken place in his presence. He further points out that there are contradictions in the two dying declarations, marked as Exs.P7 and P17. Learned counsel further submits that the Investigating Officer, who deposed as P.W.14, categorically stated that he too recorded the statement of the deceased, but neither the statement is filed, nor the reasons for not filing the same are furnished. He also made a reference to the contradiction in the evidence of P.W.4, the son of the deceased, when compared to his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He placed reliance upon certain decided cases. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the minor variations as regards inconsequential events cannot be treated as material and that the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt. He submits that the time mentioned in the charge sheet is only approximate in nature and, once the commission of offence is proved, minor variation in this regard cannot have any bearing on the findings recorded by the trial Court in any manner. It is also submitted that two dying declarations were recorded and the mere fact that a statement recorded by the Investigating Officer at a later point of time was not produced, hardly makes any difference. 7. It is also submitted that two dying declarations were recorded and the mere fact that a statement recorded by the Investigating Officer at a later point of time was not produced, hardly makes any difference. 7. As pointed out earlier, the appellant was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C., but was convicted for the one under Section 302 I.P.C. 8. The point that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the conviction ordered against the appellant can be sustained in law or on facts? 9. It hardly needs any emphasis that the basis for prosecuting an individual in a criminal case is the charge framed against him. It is only the offences that are pointed out in the charges that are required to be established by the prosecution; or conversely, to be defended by the accused. Any deviation from the charge is almost impermissible. It is not uncommon that either on account of discovery of new facts or for other similar reasons, a necessity may arise for amending the charge. Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes a procedure for the same. However, as long as a charge remains intact, the prosecution cannot be permitted to take a stand different from it. 10. The charges framed against the appellant read as under: "Firstly: That you the accused being the husband of Kadyamsetti Uma Maheswari (deceased), aged 37 years, subjected her to cruelty to wit- by suspending her fidelity and attributing illicit affairs to her with some others and used to subject her to physical torture at regular intervals, and that on the 18th day of July, 2005 at about 9.00 pm at the house of your in Rudrabatlavari street, near Rajyalakshmi Theatre, Vizianagaram, you the accused attributed illicit affairs to your wife with your elder brother L.W.5- Kadiyamsetti Satyarao and beat your wife in an intoxicated state, and that you the accused thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. Secondly: That on the same day, time and place as mentioned in the first charge and during the course of same transaction, did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of your wife- Kadiyamsetti Uma Maheswari (deceased) by pouring kerosene and litting fire to her with a match stick, and that you the accused thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance." 11. Not only the factum of commission of offence, but the timing thereof assumes significance, in cases of this nature. From a perusal of the charge sheet, it is clear that the offence alleged against the appellant i.e. pouring kerosene on his wife and setting her on fire, took place at about 9.00 p.m. on 18.07.2005. Therefore, the prosecution is expected to adduce evidence on these lines. However, from the statements of P.Ws.1 and 2, the mother and father of the deceased respectively, it becomes evident that the appellant came to his house in a drunken condition at about 11.00 p.m., on that day. The evidence of P.Ws.5 and 9 is also to the same effect. 12. The brother of the appellant was examined as P.W.3. He stated that he went to the house of the appellant on 18.07.2005 and remained there till 11.00 p.m. The appellant is said to have come to the house at 11.00 p.m. in a drunken state even while he was there and, thereafter, P.W.3 is said to have left the house. He further stated that, at midnight, he came to know that the appellant had set the deceased on fire. From this, it is clearly evident that the occurrence, if at all, had taken place subsequent to 11.00 p.m. on 18.07.2005. Therefore, the very basis of the allegation against the appellant as contained in the charge sheet becomes shaky. 13. Dying declarations, wherever they exist, have their own significance. Time and again, the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts held that if a reliable dying declaration exists, the conviction can be based squarely upon it, even in the absence of corroborative evidence. However, note of caution was also added, to the effect that dying declarations must be examined carefully. The reason is that the person who spoke to the same would not be available for verification. However, note of caution was also added, to the effect that dying declarations must be examined carefully. The reason is that the person who spoke to the same would not be available for verification. An important aspect, which is to be taken note of in this regard, is that, if a dying declaration or a statement of the deceased is said to have been recorded, but is not placed before the Court, it becomes permissible to draw an inference, as provided for under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act. Further, contradictions, if any, in dying declarations, would have their own impact on the strength of the case, particularly, when the prosecution rests its case exclusively on circumstantial evidence. 14. In the instant case, firstly, P.W.13, the Head Constable, Outpost, Government Headquarters Hospital, Vizianagaram, recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at 11.00 p.m. on 18.07.2005 and the same is marked as Ex.P17. In this, the deceased stated that her husband was habituated to drinking and there used to be quarrels between them. The appellant is said to have come to the house at about 10.30 p.m. in a drunken condition, beat her with hands, on suspicion, poured kerosene on her by keeping her in the house, and lit the fire with a match stick. She further stated that no one from the neighbouring locality had come when she raised hue and cry. Her son, P.W.4, and daughter are said to have gone to her parents' house in Tupakula Street and, on receiving the information, her brother Lankalapalli Krishna is said to have come and shifted her to Vizianagaram Headquarters Hospital. 15. About half an hour thereafter, P.W.10, Judicial Magistrate of First Class, came to the hospital, on a requisition given by the District Headquarters Hospital, Vizianagaram, and recorded another dying declaration of the deceased, which is marked as Ex.P7. In the said dying declaration, it was not alleged that the appellant was in a drunken condition. It was stated that after pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, the appellant ran away and at that time both the children were sleeping. P.W.4, her son is said to have brought Krishna, her younger brother, who, in turn, is said to have shifted her to hospital. Beyond this, she did not state anything. 16. It was stated that after pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, the appellant ran away and at that time both the children were sleeping. P.W.4, her son is said to have brought Krishna, her younger brother, who, in turn, is said to have shifted her to hospital. Beyond this, she did not state anything. 16. A contradiction, though not so material, that needs to be noticed is one about the condition of the appellant i.e. whether he was drunken or not at the time of the alleged occurrence. Even if this can be treated as inconsequential, one important aspect that needs to be taken note of here, is about the statement said to have been recorded by P.W.14, the Investigating Officer. In his chief- examination, he stated as under: "I left the police station and reached Government Hospital, Vizianagaram. I recorded a statement of Kadiyamsetti Umamaheswari and I recorded statements of P.W.1, Lankalapalli Krishna (L.W.3) and Lankalapalli Laxmi (L.W.4). I returned the scene of offence and posted guard at the scene of offence situated at Rudrabhatlavari street, Vizianagaram, as it is late in the night." From this, it is evident that he recorded the statement of the deceased and that of her brother Krishna, L.W.3. For the reasons best known to him, he did not file the said statement of the deceased recorded by him. 17. In Harijana Mulinti Bhushanna v. State of A.P.1, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to examine the consequences that flow from withholding of a dying declaration from the Court. It was held that if a dying declaration is recorded during the course of investigation and is not filed into the Court, the inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act must ensue. The same principle applies to the facts of the present case also. 18. The brother of the deceased was the person, who is said to have shifted the deceased to hospital. Having regard to the important role played by him, he was also examined by the prosecution, during the course of investigation, as L.W.3. However, he was not examined as a witness by the prosecution. Further, even according to the version of the prosecution, the first person, who is said to have seen the deceased soon after the incident, is her son, P.W.4. However, he was not examined as a witness by the prosecution. Further, even according to the version of the prosecution, the first person, who is said to have seen the deceased soon after the incident, is her son, P.W.4. There are contradictory versions as to the manner in which the incident is said to have taken place. In his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C, P.W.4 stated that his mother, the deceased, came out of the room by opening the door. In his chief- examination, he stated that, on hearing the cries of his mother, the neighbours gathered and put off the fire. If one peruses the dying declaration of the deceased, an impression would emerge that the appellant had bolted the door from outside after setting the deceased on fire. The deceased herself stated in the dying declaration that none of the neighbours have turned out to put off the fire even after she raised hue and cry. These contradictions would have their own impact upon the credibility of the version presented by the prosecution. 19. This Court is of the view that when so many doubts shroud the veracity of the case of the prosecution, the benefit of doubt deserves to be extended to the appellant. 20. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence ordered against the appellant. Accordingly, he shall be set free.