Judgment : P. Jyothimani, J. The unsuccessful defendants before the Courts below are the appellants. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and injunction in respect of the house property. Pending second appeal, the first appellant died and her legal representatives were brought on record as appellants 3 and 4. The plaintiff is the brother of defendants 1 and 2. It is stated that the first defendant is blind and the second defendant is a widow. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that his father Palanipandithar was owner of the suit property and by a registered settlement deed dated 38. 1970, which is marked as Exhibit A 1, he settled the property in favour of he plaintiff and ever since the date of the settlement, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by paying house tax, etc. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the settlement deed executed by his father under Exhibit A-1 is irrevocable since he had no such right. It is also his ease that ten years after the settlement deed was executed, the defendants have fraudulently taken away the original settlement deed from the plaintiffs possession and had obtained a cancellation deed dated 6. 1980 cancelling the said settlement deed, which stands marked on the side of the defendants as Exhibit B-1, and also obtained a settlement deed in their favour on 7. 1980, which stands marked as Exhibit B-2. According to the plaintiff, though the defendants had accepted the settlement made in his favour by his father on 38. 1970, yet, they are attempting to interfere with his possession and therefore, he tiled the said suit. .3. The defendants, while admitting in the written statement about the settlement deed dated 38. 1970 marked as Exhibit A-1 writ-ten by Palanipandithar in favour of the plaintiff, would however deny the statement that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. It is the case of the defendants that after the said settlement deed, Palanipandithar himself was enjoying the property and since the plaintiff did not maintain his father, by document dated 6. 1980, their father had cancelled the settlement deed and a new settlement deed was executed in their favour on 7. 1980 based on which, possession was given to the defendants and it is the defendants, who have been maintaining their father as well as their aged mother. 1980, their father had cancelled the settlement deed and a new settlement deed was executed in their favour on 7. 1980 based on which, possession was given to the defendants and it is the defendants, who have been maintaining their father as well as their aged mother. The defendants have also filed additional written statement stating that the plain-tiff had obtained settlement deed from his father on 38. 1970 by giving a false promise to him that the plaintiff would maintain him during his lifetime by providing food, shelter, etc. It is also their case in the additional written statement that their father, thinking that he is signing a "will", had signed the settlement deed but kept the same with him since the plaintiff had failed to maintain him. The father of the plaintiff, after seeing the document, which was in his possession and having found that it was obtained as settlement in a fraudulent manner, had cancelled the same on 6. 1980 and executed another settlement deed on 7. 1980 in favour of the defendants. 4. The Courts below have concurrently held that since Palanipandithar had settled the property under Exhibit A-1 (settlement deed) dated 38. 1970 in favour of the plaintiff, he has no right of revocation or any other right over the said property and therefore granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, as against which, the defendants have filed the present Second Appeal. .5. While admitting the Second Appeal, the following substantial question of law was framed by this Court: ."Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Lower Appellate Court committed material error in law in not presuming and not shifting the burden on the respondent to prove that Exhibit A-1 has been obtained by the respondent by undue influence, coercion, misrepresentation and fraud?" .6. It is seen from the records that Exhibit A-I-settlement deed executed by Palanipandithar in favour of the plaintiff on 38. 1970 is a registered settlement deed and it does not contain any clause enabling the senior to revoke the same. It is also seen that on the date of settlement, the senior had given possession of the property to the plaintiff, which has been found by both the Courts be-low. 1970 is a registered settlement deed and it does not contain any clause enabling the senior to revoke the same. It is also seen that on the date of settlement, the senior had given possession of the property to the plaintiff, which has been found by both the Courts be-low. It is further seen that though the defendants, in the original written the statement as well as in the additional written statement had admitted the execution of Exhibit A-1 by Palanipandithar, yet, they have chosen to state in the additional written statement that the plaintiff got Exhibit A-1 executed by misrepresenting his father that it was a "will", The very fact that the plaintiff was not given possession of the document shows that Palanipandithar was keeping the document with him and after 10 years when he happened to see the said document, he came to know that it was a registered settlement deed and there-fore he revoked the same under Exhibit B-1 dated 6. 1980 and executed a fresh settlement deed dated 7. 1980 in favour of the defendants under Exhibit B-2. 7. Therefore, it is clear that it was the positive case of the defendants in the additional written statement that what was obtained by the plaintiff under Exhibit A-1 was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. It is to prove the same, the mother of the plaintiff and defendants, namely, Papayee, was examined as D.W.3, who had chosen to state that her husband - Palanipandithar was made to sign in Exhibit A-1 on the belief that it was a "will". 8. Learned counsel for the appellants would rely upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in K. Varadhan v. Patlammal (died) and four Others 1992 (2) LW 209 wherein this court, by referring to Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, and applying the principle of non-est factum, had held that the onus of proof that the defendant has played fraud upon the plaintiff, exercised undue influence, misrepresentation, etc. was not on the plaintiff, but lies on the defendant to prove that there was no misrepresentation, fraud, etc. since by such vitiating factors the contract is deemed to have been not in existence. The principle of non-est factum based on the vitiating factors of fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc. was not on the plaintiff, but lies on the defendant to prove that there was no misrepresentation, fraud, etc. since by such vitiating factors the contract is deemed to have been not in existence. The principle of non-est factum based on the vitiating factors of fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc. as quite contrary to the provisions of Section 15 to 18 of the Indian Contract Act have been explained in detail by the Division Bench by referring to the pas-sages from Cheshire and Fifoots Law of Con-tract wherein, by referring to the judgment in Foster v. Mackinnon 1869 LR (4) CP 704, the author has quoted the passages from the judgment as follows: "It seems plain on principle and on authority that if a blind man, or a man who cannot read or who for some reason (act implying negligence) forbears to read, has a written extract falsely read over to him, the reader his reading to with a degree that the written contract is of a nature altogether different from the contract pretended to be read from the paper which the blind or illiterate man afterwards signs; then, alteast if there be no negligence, the signature so obtained is of no force. And it is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the con-tract to which his name is appended (ibid at 711)." .9. It is based on the celebrated concept that "a mans deed is not his deed if his mind does not go with his pen" as observed by LORD REID, the Division Bench has examined Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act with particular reference to women in India who are either pardanisan or in most part of the country illiterate and their transaction of business generally through menfolk and therefore, considering that the plaintiff/appellant in that case had put a thumb impression, has shifted the burden on the defendant to show that the plaintiff who put her thumb impression was in-formed fully about the contents of the document. The relevant passage from the Division Bench judgment is as follows: ."8. The relevant passage from the Division Bench judgment is as follows: ."8. Courts in India have on the rule of evidence enshrined in Sections 101 and 102 in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act, particularly in cases of women in India who in some parts and some communities are pardanashin and in most parts of the country illiterate, for the reason that they transact their business generally through malefolk only, men always dominated women, and women lived a life dominated by man, this being the curse that always surrounded womenfolk even though law recognised their independent rights, they failed invariably in exercising such rights, accepted that onus lies upon the defendant to show that there has been no fraud, undue influence or coercion in the transaction. One could easily, since the plaintiff alleged misrepresentation and fraud, ask her to prove the misrepresentation and fraud. But not in a case where she being an illiterate and unaware of the contents signed the document. Unless and faithfully informed about the contents, she cannot be asked to bring evidence to prove her case. Learned single Judge, in our opinion, is right in holding that the Court will not ask the plaintiff to prove the allegation, but demand from the defendant to disprove the allegation of misrepresentation and fraud. The learned single Judge, in our opinion, has taken the correct view of the law on the face that the 1st plaintiff is an illiterate woman who merely affixed her thump impression. She is a woman who possibly could not act without help." .10. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the said judgment has no application. In the present case, it was not the case of the defendants at any point of time that Palanipandithar was either illiterate or has signed Exhibit A-I not knowing that it was a settlement deed. It is the specific case of the defendants in their original written statement that Palanipandithar had signed the settlement deed, the execution of which was categorically admitted by the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff would maintain his father Palanipandithar. 11. It is only in the additional written statement subsequently filed, the defendants have made a new statement about the fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation, etc. stated to have been played by the plaintiff. 11. It is only in the additional written statement subsequently filed, the defendants have made a new statement about the fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation, etc. stated to have been played by the plaintiff. In the light of the contrary stand taken by the defendants, I do not think that it is safe to apply the principle of non-est factum for the purpose of shifting the onus on the plaintiff in this case to prove that his father has signed Exhibit A-1 settlement deed knowing the contents thereof. 12. However, it is seen that the plaintiff has examined the attestor of Exhibit A-1 Veerappa Gounder as P.W.2. The reliance placed on by the learned counsel for the appellants that the judgment of this Court rendered in the case re-ported in Dhartnan and Six Others v. Marimuthu 1996 (II) CTC 279 wherein by referring to a plethora of decisions of this Court has held that on the face of the nature of trans-action covered by the documents if the same is unconscionable or unnatural then the burden shifts on the person to prove that the transaction was not induced by undue influence. Ultimately, this Court has held: "17. The various decisions referred to above would go to show that if on the face of the document and the nature of the transaction covered by the document appears to be either unconscionable or unnatural one, the burden of proving that the transaction was not induced by undue influence was considered uniformly to rest with the beneficiary under the document. That apart, the various decisions noticed also point out sufficiently indicating as to what type of circumstances present in a particular or given case could be taken to provide the necessary indicia or test to form an opinion about the unnatural or unconscionable character of the transaction. In the case on hand the contents of the gift deed in question and the consequences that may be brought about if the gift under Exhibit A-1 is sustained and enforced are to be analysed in the light of the principles referred to above. Some of the admitted facts and stalk realities flowing there from cannot escape the attention of any judicial forum dealing with any issue before it objectively and judiciously." 13. Again it is not a case where the settlement deed executed by Palanipandithar in favour of the plaintiff under Exhibit A-I dated 38. Some of the admitted facts and stalk realities flowing there from cannot escape the attention of any judicial forum dealing with any issue before it objectively and judiciously." 13. Again it is not a case where the settlement deed executed by Palanipandithar in favour of the plaintiff under Exhibit A-I dated 38. 1970 is questioned by the defendants. On the other hand, it is their case that their father, after 10 years of execution of Exhibit A-I, had cancelled the settlement deed on the basis that his son/the plaintiff did not maintain him as promised by him. A reference to Exhibit B-1 stated to have been executed by Palanipandithar on 6. 1980 cancelling the earlier settlement deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff on 38. 1970 marked as Exhibit A-1 shows that nowhere in the said document Palanipandithar had stated that hews made to sign Exhibit A-1 settlement deed dated 33. 1 970 in favour of the plaintiff believing the same to be a "will" and after realizing that by undue influence the plaintiff had forced him to sign the said settlement deed by making a misrepresentation that it is a "will" and, that prompted him to cancel Exhibit A-1. Therefore. it is clear that the father had only cancelled the settlement deed given by him in favour of the plaintiff on 38. 1970 by cancellation deed dated 6. 1980 marked as Exhibit B-1 on the ground that his son. namely, the plaintiff, did not choose to maintain him. Therefore, on the factual position as found by both the Courts be-low, there is no difficulty to come to the conclusion that the defendants cannot raise a new plea as if the father was forced to sign Exhibit A-1 believing it to be a "will" which later was revealed to be a settlement deed and therefore it should he a non-est factum. 14. In the light of the above said factual position particularly with reference to the contents of Exhibit B-1 cancellation deed, I do not think that the judgments relied up by the learned counsel for the appellants as stated above and also in respect of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act regarding undue influence as held by the Honble Supreme Court in Mst. Sethani v. Bhana AIR 1993 SC 956 have any application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Sethani v. Bhana AIR 1993 SC 956 have any application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. That was the case wherein a sale deed was stated to have been executed by a Tribal woman, who was old, illiterate and blind in favour of her relative and in such circumstances. While referring to the provisions of Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Honble Apex Court has held that the respondents had not let in any evidence to discharge the onus that the sale deed was executed without undue influence. 15. As I have stated earlier, on the factual position of this case, especially with reference to the contents of Exhibit B-1, admittedly executed by the father of the plaintiff Palanipandithar, it is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff, using undue influence, fraud or any of the vitiating factors, obtained the said document. There is one other factual position in this case, which has to be decided i.e.. When once Palanipandithar had executed Exhibit A-1 settlement deed on 38. 1970 without referring to any right of revocation or cancellation and stating that the settlement deed is not revocable and also stating that even if such cancellation is made, the same is not valid, whether Exhibit B-1 cancellation deed is valid in law? As rightly held by the Courts below, while referring to Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, this Court has held in the judgment rendered in Murikipudi Ankamma v. Thummalacheruvu Narasayya and Others AIR (34) 1947 Mad. 127 : (1946) 2 MLJ 357 that in the absence of any reservation of his power by the donor to revoke the gift. The same cannot be revoked. The relevant portion of the said judgment of this Court is as follows: "The gift was entirely out of love and affection and the reference to maintenance was only as a matter of fond wish. In this view it is not possible to agree with the appellants contention that in the absence of any ex-press reservation of a power of revocation, the donor continued to have that right, even after he had divested himself of all the right, title and interest in the property by means of this gift and after he had duly vested the property in the donee. The document itself further recites that the property had then alone been delivered into the possession of the donee." 16. The facts of the said case also corresponds to the fact in issue in the present case. This was also the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the judgment rendered in Khushalchand Bhagchand v. Trimbak Ramachandra and Others AIR (34) 1947 Bom. 49. 17. It is relevant to point out that at the earliest point of time when the defendants gave a reply notice dated 27. 1986 marked as Exhibit A-4 to the suit notice given by the plaintiff, it was only the case of the defendants that the cancellation deed was made by the father only due to the reason that the plaintiff did not maintain him and that has resulted in cancellation of the settlement deed. Even in that earliest reply notice, the defendants have not taken a stand that the father of the plaintiff was made to believe that what was signed by him under Exhibit A-1 was only a "will" and not a settlement deed. In fact, the learned First Appellate Judge has considered the contradictory stand of the defendants and disbelieved the same on factual position. In view of the above said facts and circumstances. I am of the considered view that the judgment and decree of the Courts below do not suffer from any illegality and therefore, no question of law much less a substantial question of law arise for consideration in this Second Appeal. With the result, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No Costs. Second appeal dismissed.