Judgment ( 1. ) THIS order shall govern the disposal of W. A. Nos. 554/07, 559/07 and 560/07 as they arise out of the orders passed on common grounds as common question of law is involved in all these three appeals. ( 2. ) STATE has filed all these Writ Appeals under section 2 (i) of Madhya pradesh Uchcha Nyalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, against the order passed in W. P. No. 2563/07 on 31-7-2007, in W. P. No. 542/07 on 25-4-2007 and in W. P. No. 1504/07 on 1-5-2007. ( 3. ) THE brief facts of the case are that the respondent M. P. Rajya Parivahan nigam is engaged in running the transport business. The bus involved in W. A. No. 554/07 was checked and seized on 9-5-2006 and fine was imposed on 15-5-2006 under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Motoryaan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991. The amount of fine was deposited on 16-5-2006, against which an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority i. e. Transport Commissioner, Gwalior and by the order dated 28-3-2007 appeal was dismissed, against which Writ petition was filed and by order dated 31-7-2007 Writ Petition has been allowed. ( 4. ) IN W. A. No. 559/07, the vehicle was checked and seized on 9-9-2005 and the fine was imposed under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Motoryaan karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991. The amount of fine was deposited on 9-9-2005, against which an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority i. e. Transport commissioner, Gwalior and the same was decided on 4-4-2006, against which writ Petition was filed and by order dated 25-4-2007 Writ Court allowed the writ Petition. ( 5. ) IN W. A. No. 560/07, the vehicle was checked and seized on 29-10-2005 and fine was imposed under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Motoryaan karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991. The amount of fine was deposited on 29-10-2005, against which an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority i. e. Transport commissioner, Gwalior and by the order dated 6-2-2007 appeal was dismissed, against which Writ Petition was filed and by order dated 1/5/2007 Writ Petition has been allowed. ( 6. The amount of fine was deposited on 29-10-2005, against which an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority i. e. Transport commissioner, Gwalior and by the order dated 6-2-2007 appeal was dismissed, against which Writ Petition was filed and by order dated 1/5/2007 Writ Petition has been allowed. ( 6. ) THERE is no dispute that there was amendment in the year 2004 in madhya Pradesh Motoryaan Karadhan Adhiniyam of 25 of 1992 and explanation 7 as amended by Adhiniyam 2004 was added and by amendment No. 1 of 2005 the rate of tax was increased from Rs. 1000 to Rs. 1500/- per seat, in which the number of passengers were found more than the permitted capacity or the vehicle was plying without permit. ( 7. ) IN the case of Hardeo Motor Transport vs. State of M. P. , AIR 2007 SC 839 , the Honble Supreme Court declared the clause (g) of Entry IV of the First schedule of the Madhya Pradesh Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1991 as amended by Madhya Pradesh Motoryan Sansodhan Adhiniyam, 2004 read with explanation (7) of the First Schedule as unconstitutional. The aforesaid judgment was brought into the notice of the learned Writ Court in all the aforesaid three writ Petitions and the learned Writ Court after considering the fact that the supreme Court has declared the penalty imposed as unconstitutional, quashed the order passed by the authorities concerned for imposing the penalty of Rs. 1500/-per seat. It was also directed that the amount of penalty deposited by the petitioner i. e. at the rate of Rs. 1500/-per seat be refunded back to the petitioner. In all the three matters, the Writ Court has passed the similar orders, against which the State has filed these three Writ Appeals. ( 8. ) IN all the three Writ Appeals, we have heard Shri S. B. Mishra, additional Advocate General for the State and Shri M. C. Gupta with Shri R. D. Agrawal, Advocates for the respondent. The submission of Shri S. B. Mishra, learned Additional Advocate General for appellant/state is that operation of the judgment in the case of Hardeo Motor Transport (supra) is prospective and if any penalty is recovered, no order can be passed for the refund of the same as no direction has been issued by the Supreme Court for the refund of the penalty. In support of his contention he cited the decision in the case of Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1676 and India Cement Ltd. vs. State of Tamil nadu, AIR 1990 SC 85 and also submitted that under the doctrine of prospective overruling as considered by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Somaiya organics (India) Ltd. vs. State of U. P. , AIR 2001 SC 1723 , the learned Single judge was not justified in directing the refund of the amount of penalty. He also placed reliance on the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and also clause (c) and (d) of section 10 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1947 and submitted that the effect of the repeal of a particular law is that the action already taken shall not be revived and the repealed Act shall not affect any amount of penalty already recovered. ( 9. ) PER contra, Shri M. C. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that though the effect of the decision in the case of Hardeo Motor transport (supra) is prospective, but it will apply on the pending proceedings, for that he placed reliance on the decision in the case of Federation of Mining assocns. of Rajasthan vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1992 SC 103 and also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 811 that without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceeding shall not continue and he also placed reliance on a decision in the case of Sangeeta Travels vs. State of M. P. , 1998 (1) MPLJ 214 and submitted that the order of refund as passed by the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified as the proceedings were pending, the order was challenged in appeal and thereafter in Writ Petition and in the meantime the aforesaid provisions were declared unconstitutional, therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified and no interference is called for therein. ( 10. ) IN the case of Federation of Mining Association (supra), the Supreme court after considering the decision in the case of India Cement (supra) and orissa Cement (supra) has held as under :- 8. ( 10. ) IN the case of Federation of Mining Association (supra), the Supreme court after considering the decision in the case of India Cement (supra) and orissa Cement (supra) has held as under :- 8. Counsel for the respondents has, however, rightly pointed out that the declaration of invalidity of the levies should only be prospective and not retrospective. Both in India Cement ( AIR 1990 SC 85 ) as well as in orissa Cement cases ( AIR 1991 SC 1676 ) (supra), this Court has, for reasons discussed therein, declared similar legislations invalid only prospectively. In paragraphs 72 and 73 of the judgment in Orissa Cement case (supra), it has been held that the levy of such tax in a State should be declared to be unconstitutional only with effective from the date of the first judgment which declares the legislation to be invalid and not earlier. In the present case, since the High Court has upheld the levy and the levy is being declared unconstitutional only by this order, we direct that our declaration will take effect only from the date of this judgment. In other words, any tax collected under the statute so far need not be refunded by the State Government and if any amount of tax remains to be paid in respect of earlier periods, it will have to be paid by the assessee. However, as and from the date of this judgment, the impugned tax imposed by the Act in question will not be enforceable. The Supreme Court has further held that that the declaration will take effect only from the date of this judgment. Therefore, it is clear that the decision of the Supreme Court will be applicable from the date of its declaration as held above. ( 11. The Supreme Court has further held that that the declaration will take effect only from the date of this judgment. Therefore, it is clear that the decision of the Supreme Court will be applicable from the date of its declaration as held above. ( 11. ) NOW the question for consideration in these appeals is when the order passed by Taxing Officer imposing penalty was under challenge, in some cases appeals were pending and in some cases writ petitions were filed and pending, during this period the relevant provisions of imposing penalty were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as stated supra and on that ground the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions, set aside the order of imposing penalty and directed refund of the amount of penalty deposited by the petitioner, whether such an order passed by Writ Court in the facts and circumstances of the case is justified or not. ( 12. ) THERE is no dispute that in Hardeo Motor Transport (supra), the supreme Court has declared the aforesaid penalty provision as ultra vires and unconstitutional, judgment was pronounced on 19-10-2006, therefore it is clear that from the date of declaration of the aforesaid provision as unconstitutional, neither the penalty can be imposed nor penalty clause can be enforced. ( 13. ) IN a case where respondents have challenged the orders passed by the taxing Officers regarding imposition of penalty in appeals and during the pendency of appeal if the law is declared ultra vires, then as per the settled principle, the orders of penalty were not liable to be enforced and as a result its effect would be that in pending matters the Court was entitled to order for the refund of the same. Therefore, the result is that the party which has challenged the order was entitled to get the benefit of the declaration of the law as unconstitutional and was entitled to obtain the benefit in pending proceedings. ( 14. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has cited various decisions as stated supra but they are all related with the levy of tax and in such matters the Apex court has held that the declaration of invalidity of levies should only be prospective and not retrospective. Though the principle is the same but those decisions are not related to the refund of penalty. Though the principle is the same but those decisions are not related to the refund of penalty. In any of the decision cited supra question of penalty was not under consideration before the Supreme Court that the benefit cannot be granted by the High Court when the order was challenged before it and none of the parties have cited any decision that such a question cannot be considered by the High Court in a pending proceeding where the order is under challenge. ( 15. ) IN this case the question of setting aside of penalty has been raised. There is difference between "levy of tax" and "imposition of penalty". Though the word "penalty" has not been defined either under the General Clauses Act, 1897 or under the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1957, but its dictionary meaning is: penalty means - "punishment imposed on a wrongdoer, especially in the form of imprisonment or fine, though usu. For crimes, penalties are also sometimes imposed for civil wrongs. Excessive liquidated damages that a contract purports to impose on a party that breaches. If the damages are excessive enough to be considered a penalty, a Court will usu. " "a penalty is a sum which a party. . . . . agrees to pay or forfeit in the event of a breach, but which is fixed, not as a pre-estimate of probable actual damages, but as a punishment, the threat of which is designed to prevent the breach. " "penalty is a liability composed as a punishment on the party committing the breach of contract. " therefore, as per the definition under comman parlance, the penalty is defined as a punishment or sum of money imposed by statute, to be paid as a punishment for the commission of a certain offence and is a punishment imposed by law or contract for doing or failing to do something that it was the duty of a party to do. Therefore, in this case primarily it denotes towards the punishment for breach of a particular law. ( 16. ) THERE is no dispute that if the order imposing penalty was under challenge and petitions were filed and were pending in the High Court, the High court was empowered to examine the effect of invalidity and was also empowered to waive the penalty. ( 17. ( 16. ) THERE is no dispute that if the order imposing penalty was under challenge and petitions were filed and were pending in the High Court, the High court was empowered to examine the effect of invalidity and was also empowered to waive the penalty. ( 17. ) AS discussed above and emerged from the legal position, it is clear that by the declaration of the penalty provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Hardeo Motor Transport (supra), which was passed on 19-10-2006, the amount of penalty is neither chargeable nor recoverable. If the orders passed by the Taxing Officer were under challenge in appeal, the appellate authority ought to have considered the effect of the aforesaid decision and if the same was not considered, the High Court was fully justified in considering the same in the Writ Petitions, which were filed challenging the orders passed by the Taxing Officer as well as the Appellate authority. When the law was declared unconstitutional or ultra vires, the orders of imposing penalty were illegal and the effect of the declaration of the law as unconstitutional would be that its effect can be considered in the pending proceedings and while considering the order passed by the Taxing Officer, the high Court can consider the effects of invalidity and grant benefit of the same to the parties whose proceedings are pending. There is nothing like a saving clause and there is no bar that the benefit of unconstitutionality cannot be granted to the pending proceedings where orders are under challenge. This argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that under section 6 of the General Clauses act, the order of imposition of penalty cannot be reviewed as the action is protected under the General Clauses Act and shall not affect any amount of penalty already recovered cannot be accepted, because the order of imposing penalty was under challenge before the appellate authority and subsequently in writ petitions and had not attained finality. The position would be different under the law when there shall be no challenge to those orders. Therefore, it was open to the High Court to consider the question of unconstitutionality and to give effect of the same to the pending matters. ( 18. The position would be different under the law when there shall be no challenge to those orders. Therefore, it was open to the High Court to consider the question of unconstitutionality and to give effect of the same to the pending matters. ( 18. ) THEREFORE, it is held that the learned Single Judge has rightly granted the benefit of the aforesaid decision to the respondents and has rightly quashed the aforesaid orders and directed for refund of the amount of penalty. Thus, we do not find any ground to interfere in the Writ Appeals filed by the State. Consequently, all the three Writ Appeals are dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Writ appeals dismissed.