J. M. MALIK, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a peculiar case where the father and son are at logger heads over one room on the ground floor and a latrine on its roof of property bearing no. 6-A, Village Kilokari, Post Office Jangpura, New Delh. The father is Dhan singh, the respondent and son is Mohan Pal, the appellant. The respondent claims that he is the owner of above-said house. In the year 1993, the respondent permitted his son, Mohan Pal to use and occupy the abovesaid premises in dispute. The possession was permissive simpliciter. Thereafter, vide notice dated 8th July, 2002, the respondent terminated the licence of the defendant/appellant. However, the notice did not ring the bell. Ultimately, the respondent filed a suit for possession against the appellant. ( 2 ) THE appellant defended the present suit on the following grounds. The property in question was given to him by his grandfather, late Shri Lal Singh and it has no connection with the ancestral property of 180 square yards. He used to do the work of carpentary along with his grandfather, late Shri Lal singh. They used to transact their business of carpentary in the suit property itself. The said land was provided to late Shri Lal Singh by the Zamindars of village Kilokar. In the alternative, it is averred that the present property is an ancestral property which was purchased in the year 1961 after selling the land which belonged to the ancestors in Village Bandpur, Post Office Khekra, district Baghpat, (UP) and the construction was also raised out of the funds of the ancestral property. He being the co-owner of the property in dispute, no suit for possession can lie against him. ( 3 ) THE trial court decreed the suit of the respondent and the First appellate Court affirmed the judgment given by the trial court. ( 4 ) I have heard the counsel for parties at length. The argument urged by the learned counsel for appellant has four prongs. Firstly, the respondent has failed to produce any sale deed on record. In his cross-examination, the respondent admitted that there is no sanctioned plan with regard to the construction of property in question. He pointed out that position does not begin to jell in absence of sale deed and sanctioned plan. Firstly, the respondent has failed to produce any sale deed on record. In his cross-examination, the respondent admitted that there is no sanctioned plan with regard to the construction of property in question. He pointed out that position does not begin to jell in absence of sale deed and sanctioned plan. The respondent also admitted that the eviction petition filed against the earlier tenant, Birbal, was decided ex parte. On the contrary, the appellant filed receipts MCD challans dated 9. 1. 1989, 16. 1. 1991, 20. 4. 1991, 5. 10. 1991, 25. 3. 1992, 17. 9. 1992 and 31. 3. 1993, which were proved on record as Ex. DW-1/c to Ex. DW1/. The possession of the appellant stands proved since 9th January, 1989. The stand taken by the respondent that the appellant is in permissive possession of premises in dispute since 1993 stands falsified. Again, Hari Kishan , son of the above-said tenant, Birbal, was produced in the dock as DW-2. He has supported the case of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the main question which falls for consideration of this court is whether the property in possession of the appellant forms part of the property of the respondent. He argued that under these circumstances, the substantial question of law regarding the identification of property stands established. He further argued that the evidence adduced by the respondent is not admissible in view of Sections 61 to 64 of the Indian Evidence Act. He pointed out that the site plan should have been proved by calling the draftsman. In order to buttress his case, learned counsel for the appellant has cited an authority reported in Bishwanath Rai Vs. Sachhidanand Singh [ (1972) 4 SCC 707 ]. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant argued that second substantial question of law which arises for consideration is : "whether Ex. P7 and Ex. P7-A were admissible in evidence in the present suit. " he submitted that the courts should not have relied upon documents Ex. P7 and Ex. P7-A. e. exparte judgment and site plan appended thereto which form part of the judgment passed against the third party, namely, Shri Birbal. It was argued that the those documents are not relevant under Sections 40-42 of the indian Evidence Act. The above-said judgment is judgment in personam. It was also pointed out that Ex. P7 and Ex. P7-A. e. exparte judgment and site plan appended thereto which form part of the judgment passed against the third party, namely, Shri Birbal. It was argued that the those documents are not relevant under Sections 40-42 of the indian Evidence Act. The above-said judgment is judgment in personam. It was also pointed out that Ex. PW7 is an ex parte judgment which was not contested by birbal and therefore, the same is doubtful and should not have been read into evidence. The courts below wrongly compared site plan Ex. P1 with Ex. P7 and ex. P7-A to come to a conclusion that property in possession of the appellant forms part of the property of the respondent. The attention of the court was drawn towards an authority reported in Kumar Gopika Raman Roy vs. Atal Singh [air 1929 Privy Council 99], wherein it was held, "the Evidence Act does not make finding of fact arrived at on the evidence before the court in one case evidence of that fact in another case where parties are not same. " the attention of the Court was also drawn towards an authority reported in Kalappa Shiddappa Uppar Vs. Bhima Goving Uppar [air 1961 Karnataka 161], wherein it was held that recitals contained in a document not inter parties are not admissible in evidence. ( 6 ) COUNSEL for the appellant submits that in view of the above-said circumstances, Local Commissioner should have been appointed in order to demarcate the case property. It was submitted that in order to safeguard his property from the clutches of the respondent, the appellant moved an application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC which was dismissed by the First Appellate Court on 29th September, 2006 on the ground that it is not the duty of the Court to collect the evidence on behalf of the parties. It was pointed out that under these circumstances, the third question of law arises for consideration is: "whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Lower courts were justified in dismissing the applications under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC for appointment of Local Commissioner for investigation as well as to identify the disputed party on spot. " In support of his case, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention towards the authorities reported in Payani Achhutan Vs. " In support of his case, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention towards the authorities reported in Payani Achhutan Vs. Chambali kundu Harijan Fisheries Development Cooperative Society [air 1996 Kerala 276], ponnusamy Vs. Salem [air 1996 Madras 3] and Rampal Vs. M/s Leela Ram and Sons [ (1997) 65 DLT 338 ]. ( 7 ) IT was also pointed out that before the First Appellate Court an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was moved with the prayer to place the original voucher of Bharat Gas Company on record to show that the appellant had connection with the suit property since 11th February, 1983. The said application was also dismissed. Consequently, counsel for the appellant argued that the fourth question of law which arises for consideration is: whether the First Appellate Court rightly rejected the application under order 41 Rule 27 CPC rejecting the receipt of gas connection obtained by defendant way back in the year 11. 02. 1983" in support of his case, the appellant has cited authorities reported in wadi Vs. Amilal [jt (2002) 6 SC 16] and Akash Ganga Builder and Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. G. P. Seth, HUF [air 1999 Delhi 362 (DB)]. It was also pointed out that the appellant has filed affidavit of all the other brothers of respondent before the trial court stating therein that the appellant was in no way encroaching upon their property and that the property in possession of defendant do not form part of property of plaintiff. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant did not come to grips with the real problem but touched the unimportant one. As a matter of fact an attempt was made to louse up the real issue. To top it all the admission regarding respondent's ownership comes out from the horse's mouth itself. In the written statement, the appellant admitted that as far as property bearing No. 6-A, village Kilokari, is concerned, "his father is one of the co-owners of the case property alongwith his brothers". ( 9 ) I am also of the considered view that Hari Kishan. e. DW2 is a witness of infinite importance. Now, his deposition deserves a look. In his cross- examination, this witness admitted that property bearing No. 6a, Village kilokari, is owned by four brothers, namely, Dhan Singh, Kashi Ram, Ram Kishan and Ramdhan. ( 9 ) I am also of the considered view that Hari Kishan. e. DW2 is a witness of infinite importance. Now, his deposition deserves a look. In his cross- examination, this witness admitted that property bearing No. 6a, Village kilokari, is owned by four brothers, namely, Dhan Singh, Kashi Ram, Ram Kishan and Ramdhan. He also admitted that all the above-said four brothers had separate portions in the said property. It is noteworthy that name of Lal Singh as one of the owners is conspicuous by its absence. In his cross-examination recorded on 27. 9. 2004, he admitted that the eviction petition was filed by the respondent/plaintiff against his father in respect of the premises in occupation of the appellant. Thereafter, counsel for the appellant objected that this was not what the witness wanted to say. Thereafter, the question was repeated and the witness replied that the suit between his father and the plaintiff was not in respect of the property under the occupation of the appellant. It is apparent that the trial court committed an egregious mistake by permitting the witness to answer the crucial question again particularly when the witness had already got sufficient hint from his counsel. Consequently, the first answer given by the witness would prevail and second answer would pale into insignificance. The court has to turn a blind eye towards that answer instead of being taken by a ride. Nobody can be permitted to pull the wool in the eyes of law. It is well settled that his statement has to be viewed holistically and not in vacua to the benefit of one and detrimental to other. Again, he admitted that he was present when the respondent had taken possession from his father and he had also signed as a witness on Ex. P11 at point 'x'. Ex. P11 clearly, specifically and unequivocally depicts that possession of property No. 6a, village Kilokari was taken as per site plan of the disputed place shown in red. I have compared Ex. P7-A, certified copy of the site plan filed in the Eviction petition, with Ex. P1, the suit property of the present suit. These appear to be the same property. Hari Kishan denied the suggestion that the portion under the possession of his father is shown in red colour in Ex. I have compared Ex. P7-A, certified copy of the site plan filed in the Eviction petition, with Ex. P1, the suit property of the present suit. These appear to be the same property. Hari Kishan denied the suggestion that the portion under the possession of his father is shown in red colour in Ex. P7-A. He explained that on the North of the property under occupation of his father was the house of the plaintiff/respondent, on the south was the Ring Road, on the East was the village road and on the West was the house of uncle of Mohan Lal/appellant. It is thus clear that the case of the appellant stands demolished by his own witness. ( 10 ) THE respondent has filed certified copy of the judgment between him and Birbal in eviction proceedings Ex. P7, the certified copy of the site plan ex. P7-A, the execution petition Ex. P8, and the certified copies of the proceedings of the bailiff for delivery of possession Ex. P9 to Ex. P11 in respect of the suit property. All these documents go to show that property in dispute is similar in both these cases. Both the courts below have come to the same conclusion. Eviction Petition Ex. P7-A goes to show that this petition was filed by Dhan Singh against his tenant, Birbal, on 9th April, 1987. This pertains to premises bearing No. 6a, Kilokari village. It was stated that premises in dispute was let out on 1st January, 1985. The judgment, Ex. P7 reveals that an eviction order was passed against the tenant, Birbal, on 22nd July, 1987 by the additional Rent Controller. ( 11 ) BY no stretch of imagination it can be said that judgment Ex. P7 is a judgment in personam since the appellant is claiming through his father, therefore, it also binds him. Moreover, otherwise, too, the said judgment, site plan and other documents can be taken into consideration. In a case reported in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams Vs. K. M. Krishnaiah [ air 1998 SC 1132 ], it was held, "9. In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy Council. Moreover, otherwise, too, the said judgment, site plan and other documents can be taken into consideration. In a case reported in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams Vs. K. M. Krishnaiah [ air 1998 SC 1132 ], it was held, "9. In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy Council. In Srinivas Krishna Rao kango v. Narayan Devji Kango, AIR 1954 SC 379 , speaking on behalf of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J held that a judgment not inter partes is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. A contention that judgments other than those failing under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence act were not admissible in evidence was expressly rejected. Again B. K. Mukherjea, J (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of four learned judges in Sital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR 1954 SC 606 held that a previous judgment not inter partes, was admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence act as a 'transaction' in which a right to property was 'asserted' and 'recognised'. In fact, much earlier, Lord Lindley held in the Privy Council in dinamoni v. Brajmohini, (1992) ILR 29 Cal 190 (198) (PC) that a previous judgment, not inter partes was admissible in evidence under Section 13 to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who was declared entitled to retain them. The criticism of the judgment in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini and Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Sing (1895) ILR 22 Cal 533 (PC) by Sir John Woodroffe in his commentary on the Evidence Act (1931, p. 181) was not accepted by Lord Blanesburg in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157 : 61 IA 286. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff and hold that the TTD could rely on the judgment in OS 51/37 as evidence to prove its title in regard to the suit property, even though the present plaintiff was not a party to that suit. Point no. 1 is held accordingly against the respondent. Point no. 1 is held accordingly against the respondent. " ( 12 ) THE most important thing is that if the property in possession of appellant/mohan Lal is different from the premises held by Birbal then where are the premises which were in possession of Birbal. Neither the appellant nor Hari kishan, DW-2, could point out the premises held by Birbal. The appellant has failed to show that there used to be another tin-shed as well and the tin-shed shown in the tanancy of Birbal is different from his own erstwhile tin-shed. ( 13 ) ON the other hand, the story minted by the appellant is made out of whole cloth. He has not approached the court with clean hands. The alarcity with which he kept changing his stance gave one the impression that he thought the entire world was composed of morons. Firstly, it is not supported by any cogent and plausible evidence. Secondly, no evidence has been adduced to show that Lal Singh had any right, title or interest in the property in dispute. It is apparent that appellant was inducted in the suit property because of his father. Without his father, he could not have entered into the suit property. On one hand, the appellant stated that the property was given by zamindars to lal Singh and Lal Singh had handed over the same to him. Then he took the stance that the present property is an ancestral property which was purchased in the year 1961 after selling the land which belonged to the ancestors in Village bandpur, Post Office Khekra, District Baghpat, (UP) and the construction was also raised out of the funds of the ancestral property. However, there is no evidence worth the name which may go to support his case. ( 14 ) APPELLANT's case is an inchoate mix of irreconcilable opposites. On the one hand, he stated that he came in possession of the premises in dispute in the year 1987. On the other hand, he wanted to adduce evidence to show that he came in possession of the premises in dispute in the year 1983. Consequently, the application moved under Order 41 Rule 27 was rightly dismissed by the First appellate Court. ( 15 ) THE appeal has no force. RSA 19/2007 is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate fees fixed at Rs. 25,000/ -. CM 796/2007 also stands dismissed.