REKHA SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) IN the year 1988 the petitioner Smt. Premjit Kaur Takhi was working as a confirmed Junior Stenographer in Hindustan Paper Corporation limited at New Delhi while her husband lived in Africa. It so happened that on may 16,1988 the Corporation in order to solve the problem of surplus staff in its Delhi office came out with a package deal for its employees who were willing to retire and relinquish their jobs. For Smt. Premjit Kaur it was a God-sent opportunity to join her husband in Africa and at the same time reap the benefits of service so far rendered by her. So quick was her response to the offer that on the very same day she sent her application opting for the scheme. At about the same time she applied for earned leave of two months with permission to go to Africa to join her husband. The Corporation vide a communication of May 30,1988 informed her that her application opting for one time package deal had been recommended and sent to CHQ for consideration/ approval which was awaited. ( 2 ) SHE was further informed that her earned leave had been sanctioned w. e. f May 30,1988 and had also been granted permission to go to Africa. Armed with the communication of May 30, 1998, she left for Africa in the hope that her request for retirement in terms of the package deal would be acceded to in due course. With this legitimate expectation once in Africa, she made all arrangements to settle there and even got her son admitted in an international school of Africa. However things did not work out her way. On September 20,1988 she was informed that her application for voluntary retirement under the package deal had not been accepted and she was asked to report for duty immediately as she had no leave to her credit. On October 10,1988 she received another communication asking her to report for duty immediately. She wrote back to the Corporation on november 1, 1988 stating therein that being sure of getting retirement under the package deal she had made arrangements to settle in Africa along with her husband and had even got her son admitted in an international school whose session was to come to an end on December 31,1988. Accordingly, she requested for grant of 'leave not due' uptill January 17, 1989. Accordingly, she requested for grant of 'leave not due' uptill January 17, 1989. The Corporation vide telegram dated November 29,1988 which, according to her was received by her on december 14,1988 informed her that her request for grant of ?leave not due? had not been accepted and further informed that her extra ordinary leave limit of 365 days in entire service shall be reached on December 12,1988. Accordingly, she was asked to return to duty latest by December 13,1988. ( 3 ) BEFORE I proceed to narrate further facts, I deem it appropriate to reproduce the contents of the telegram for it is on this telegram that the corporation has rested its case. This is how it reads: express Telegram smt. Premjit Kaur Takhi c/o. Mr. G S Takhi post Box No. 4742 africa refer your application dated 1. 11. 88 regarding sanction of leave. Your request for grant of ?leave not due? not accepted. EOL limit of 365 days in entire service shall be reached on 12. 12. 88. Report for duty latest by 13. 12. 88 failing which you will lose lien on your post of Junior Steno in HPC in terms of hpc Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules which inter alia provide that the lien of an employee may be terminated on over-staying the sanctioned/extended leave for more than 8 (eight) days. C L Gera c L Gera sr. Manager (Landa) 29. 11. 88 ( 4 ) TO continue with the narration, Smt. Premjit Kaur on receiving the telegram responded to the same by a telegram dated December 14, 1988 informing the Corporation that she was suffering from Spondylitis of cervical and lumber for the last two months and was taking treatment. This was followed by a letter dated December 19,1988 wherein she referred again to her aforesaid ailment and expressed her inability to report till January 18, 1989. Accordingly she requested that she be granted medical leave upto January18, 1989. She also enclosed with her letter the medical certificate advising her complete bed rest and hospitalised treatment till January 18, 1989. Thereafter, she wrote another letter to the Corporation dated January 17, 1989 in which she made a request for further three weeks leave upto February 7,1989 and also enclosed with it a medical certificate from an Orthopedic Surgeon, Maputo. She also enclosed with her letter the medical certificate advising her complete bed rest and hospitalised treatment till January 18, 1989. Thereafter, she wrote another letter to the Corporation dated January 17, 1989 in which she made a request for further three weeks leave upto February 7,1989 and also enclosed with it a medical certificate from an Orthopedic Surgeon, Maputo. She received no response either to her letter of December 19, 1988 or to January 17, 1989. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, on being declared medically fit she undertook overseas journey and reached New Delhi in the afternoon of February 9, 1989. On the following day. e. on February 10,1989 she joined her duties. Whereas according to her, her immediate Boss accepted her joining report and allowed her to mark attendance in the office register, the Corporation has alleged that she was not allowed to join and that she was given a memo dated February 10, 1989 informing her that since she had not reported for duty by December 13, 1989 as was required of her by telegram dated November 29, 1988 she had lost her lien on the post of Junior stenographer w. e. f December 12,1988 in terms of HPC Conduct, Discipline and appeal Rules which inter alia provide that the lien of an employee may be terminated on over-staying the sanctioned/extended leave for more than 8 days. ( 6 ) IT is this order of February 10,1989 which is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition by Smt. Premjit Kaur. ( 7 ) THE only ground on which the order dated February 10,1989 has been assailed is that before terminating the lien of the petitioner on the post of junior Stenographer in terms of HPC Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, she ought to have given notice to show cause and to explain the circumstances in which she could not join the duties. Elaborating on the same, it was contended that she was a permanent employee of the Corporation having 10 years of service to her credit yet the Corporation dealt with her in a cavalier manner and terminated her lien on the post without affording an opportunity to explain her case. Elaborating on the same, it was contended that she was a permanent employee of the Corporation having 10 years of service to her credit yet the Corporation dealt with her in a cavalier manner and terminated her lien on the post without affording an opportunity to explain her case. It was argued that though Rule 23 (IV) E under which her lien was terminated does not specifically provide for giving of a show cause notice and for providing a hearing, the requirement of a show cause notice and compliance of principles of natural justice must be taken to be inherent. In this regard, reference was made to a judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1996 (2) SCC Page 404 titled Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited Vs. Upendra Chakravarty. In the said judgment this very Rule came up for consideration and there the counsel appearing for the Corporation conceded that the Rule had to be construed by reading into it the principles of natural justice. Accordingly the court held as under : we consider that in view of this concession made by learned counsel on behalf of the appellant- Corporation that the said Rule must be read and given effect to, subject to the compliance of the principles of natural justice, it cannot be said that the Rule is arbitrary or unreasonable or ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. In other words, before taking action under the said clause, an opportunity should be given to the employee to show cause against the action proposed and if the cause shown by the employee is good and acceptable, it follows that no action in terms of the said clause will be taken. Understood in this sense, it cannot be said that the said clause is either unreasonable or violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. ( 8 ) NO doubt, the judgment proceeds on the basis of a concession but it does show that the concession, which to my mind was based on well established principles of natural justice, did find approval of the Apex Court. ( 9 ) THE Corporation in its counter affidavit to the writ petition has raised number of preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the writ petition but none of those objections were pressed at the time of hearing. ( 9 ) THE Corporation in its counter affidavit to the writ petition has raised number of preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the writ petition but none of those objections were pressed at the time of hearing. As has been noticed above, it is the telegram dated November 29, 1988 which forms the sheet anchor of the respondent's case. It was contended that by means of the telegram, petitioner was unequivocally told that her application for leave had not been accepted and that the limit of her extra ordinary leave would come to an end on December 12, 1988. She was asked to join duty latest by December 13, 1988 failing which she was warned that she would lose her lien in terms of HPC conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. It was thus argued that it was fully made known to her that if she did not join the duties she would lose her job and she therefore was not taken off-guard. According to the Corporation if despite the telegram she chose not to join duty on February 10,1989 she alone was to be blamed for the consequences. ( 10 ) THE question before me is not whether the petitioner was made aware of the consequences which would flow in case she failed to join duty by december 13, 1988 as was sought to be contended by the respondent, but whether before her lien on the post of Junior Stenographer was terminated she was given a show cause notice to explain the circumstances in which she did not join duty by December 13,1988 and why no action under Rule 23 (IV) (E) be not taken against her. In other words, notwithstanding the telegram which undoubtedly did not amount to show cause notice, were the principles of natural justice followed? true, the Corporation by means of the telegram did inform the petitioner that in case she did not join by December 13, 1988 she would lose her lien on the post of Junior Stenographer. But this was not sufficient. I feel that on her having failed to join duty on December 13, 1988, the Corporation was under an obligation to give her a notice to show cause why action in terms of the HPC Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules terminating her lien be not taken against her. But this was not sufficient. I feel that on her having failed to join duty on December 13, 1988, the Corporation was under an obligation to give her a notice to show cause why action in terms of the HPC Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules terminating her lien be not taken against her. It was only upon receiving a response from her or on not getting any response and after objectively considering her explanation or lack of explanation that a further order terminating her lien or allowing her to continue on duty could be passed. Had this been done, it could be said that the principles of natural justice were met. The Corporation rather than adopting this course simply relied upon the telegram which was pre-emptory in nature. ( 11 ) ITS contents were such that no scope was left for a show cause notice or for submitting an explanation. It virtually pronounced the order of termination except that in terms thereof it was to take effect after December 13, 1988. As a result, when the petitioner came to join duty she was unceremoniously told that she stood already relieved from the service. This became all the more harsh considering she had worked for 10 years and more so when she had been writing from Africa that she was suffering from spondylitis of cervical and lumber and had sent medical evidence in support. The Corporation having not taken recourse to the principles of natural justice, the order cannot be sustained. The same is, therefore, quashed. Consequently, petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in service. ( 12 ) NOW the vexed question ?whether the petitioner is entitled to salary from the date of termination of her lien till her reinstatement. ? In this regard I propose to follow a judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Limited Vs. Prem Chand Gupta and another reported in (2000) 10 SCC cases 115. ( 13 ) IN the said case the termination order was passed on 29. 4. 1966 and it was set aside after more than 33 years. However, the court did not grant full back wages. It directed payment of 50% of the back wages on the following reasoning : the reasons for non-granting full back wages from the date of his termination of 29-4-1966 till actual reinstatement pursuant to the present order can now be indicated. However, the court did not grant full back wages. It directed payment of 50% of the back wages on the following reasoning : the reasons for non-granting full back wages from the date of his termination of 29-4-1966 till actual reinstatement pursuant to the present order can now be indicated. Firstly, for no fault of the contesting parties, the litigation has lingered on for more than three decades. The termination order was as early as on 29-4-1966 and after 33 years and more it is being set aside. To saddle the appellant Corporation and its exchequer, which is meant for public benefit, with full back wages for the entire period would be too harsh to the appellant Corporation. It is the delay in disposal of cases in the courts that has created this unfortunate situation for both the sides. The respondent workman is also not at fault as he was clamouring for justice for all these years. However, this delay in court proceedings for no fault of either side permits us not to burden the appellant Corporation, being a public body, with the full back wages for the entire period of the respondent workman's unemployment, especially when for no fault of either side actual work could not be taken from the respondent workman by the appellant Corporation. It is true that the respondent workman was always willing to work but he could not be permitted to work so long as the termination order stood against him. ( 14 ) THE present case is no different. Respectfully, I adopt the reasoning. Here also the order terminating the lien of the petitioner was passed on february 10, 1989. It is after a considerable lapse of time that the proceedings in this Court have come to an end. In this case too, the petitioner had reported for duty and had thereby shown her willingness to work. Therefore, it will be appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case to direct the corporation to pay 50% of the salary of the petitioner along with other consequential benefits from the date of the termination order. I order accordingly.